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ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, 2012.
Excerpts of Award, Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and 
Others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, 2012.
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Decision on Jurisdiction, Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and 
Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/1, 2012.
Decision on Liability, Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/5, 2012.
Award, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic of Paraguay, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2012.
Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/8, 2011.
Award, El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/15, 2011.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Hochtief AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/31, 2011.
Decision on Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. The 
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2010.
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/18, 2010.
Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010.
Award, Merrill and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, 
2010.
Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 2010.
Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. 
Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010.
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Award, Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/24, 2010.
Award, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
2009.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of 
Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 2009.
Award, Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of 
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, 2009.
Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue, Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. 
Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 2009.
Award, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 2009.
Award, Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/05/2, 2009.
Award, Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 2009.
Procedural Order No. 4, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2009.
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Bureau Veritas, Inspection, 
Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, 2009.
Award, EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, 2009.
Award, Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/2, 2009.
Award, Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, 2009.
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Award, Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, 2008.
Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008.
Unofficial Translation of the Award on the Merits, Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, 2008.
Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, 2008.
Award, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, 2008.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Noble Energy, Inc. and Machalapower Cia. Ltda. v. 
The Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/12, 2008.
Award, Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/9, 2008.
Decision on Responsibility, Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, 2008.
Award, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/14, 2008.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic 
of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 2007.
Award, Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2007.
Award, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 2007.
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Award, PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya 
Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/5, 2007.
Award, Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, 2007.
Award, Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8, 2007.
Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
2007.
Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2007.
Decision on Annulment, MTD Equity v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, 2007.
Award, Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 2007.
Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006.
Award of the Tribunal, ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management 
Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 2006.
Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E 
International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006.
Decision on Preliminary Objections, Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina 
Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 
2006.
Award, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. the United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 2006.
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Award, Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/15, 2006.
Decision on Jurisdiction, El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 2006.
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Telefónica S.A. v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, 2006.
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, 2006.
Award, Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/26, 2006.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2005.
Award, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005.
Award, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 2005.
Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, 2005.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/3, 2005.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 2005.
Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, Gas Natural 
SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 2005.
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. 
Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 2005.
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Award on Jurisdiction, Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 2004.
Award, Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/7, 2004.
Award, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7, 2004.
Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (“Number 2”), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 2004.
Award, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/4, 2004.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/8, 2004.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 2004.
Extracts of the Award, Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, 2004.
Award, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 2003.
Sentence Arbitrale, Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/6, 2003.
Award, ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/1, 2003.
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
2003.
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Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003.
Dissenting Opinion of Antonio Crivellaro, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003.
Award, Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 2003.
Award, Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, 2002.
Decision on Annulment, Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2002.
Award, Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, 2002.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom 
of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 2001.
Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic 
of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001.
Award, Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, 2000.
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. 
The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 2000.
Award, Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 
2000.
Award, Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 
1998.
Award, American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/93/1, 1997.
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Final Award, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, 1990.
International Court of Justice
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 174.
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States 
of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 48.
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 645.
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, 
p. 501.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p. 226.
Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United State of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1989, p. 15.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13.
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second 
Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.
Anglo-Iran Oil Co. Case (jurisdiction), Judgment of July 22nd, 1952: I.C.J. 
Reports 1952, p. 93.
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   33 04/12/2019   11:35:58
34
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4.
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Award, Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and the United 
States of America, Award No. 460-880-2, 23 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
Reports 1994.
Award, Phillips Petroleum Company v. Iran, Award No. 425-39-2, 21 Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunals Reports 1990.
Award, Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 310-56-3, 
15 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1988.
Award, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers 
of Iran, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Aviation Organization, 
Plan and Budget Organization, Iranian Air Force, Ministry of Defence, Bank Melli, 
Bank Sakhteman, Mercantile Bank of Iran and Holland, Award No. 141-7-2, 6 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1986.
Interlocutory Award, Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett 
Housing International, Inc. v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Bank Omran, Bank Mellat, Bank Markazi, Award No. ITL 32-24-1, 4 Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal Reports 1985.
United States v. Iran, No. A17, Decision No. Dec. 37-A17-FT, 1985, 8 Iran United 
States Claims Tribunal Reports 1987.
Award, Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Ports and Shipping 
Organization of Iran, Award No. 135-33-1, 1984, 6 Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal Reports 1986.
Award, Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 35-219-2, 1983, 2 Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1984.
Award, Dallal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 53-149-1, 1983, 3 Iran-United 
Stats Claims Tribunal Report 1984.
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Permanent Court of Arbitration
Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-22, 2019.
Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-21, 2019.
Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019.
Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-19, 2019.
Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-01, 2018.
Final Award, Jürgen Wirtgen, Stefan Wirtgen, Gisela Wirtgen and JSW Solar (zwei) 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-03, 2017.
Award, Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-
22, 2016.
Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2012-17, 2016.
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, William Ralph Clayton, William Richard 
Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, 2015.
Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of 
Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, 2015.
Award on the Merits, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc 
Holding Company Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2011-09, 2015.
Final Award, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 2014.
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Final Award, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 2014.
Final Award, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 2014.
Decision on Jurisdiction, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc 
Holding Company Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2011-09, 2012.
Award, Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-
05, 2012.
Award on Jurisdiction, European American Investment Bank AG (EURAM) v. 
Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-17, 2012.
Award, Vito G. Gallo v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
55798, 2011.
Partial Award on the Merits, Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company 
v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, 2010.
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Veteran Petroleum Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 2005-05/AA228, 2009.
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of 
Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 
2009.
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Hulley Enterprises Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 
2009.
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium/Netherlands), PCA 
Case No. 2003-23, 2005.
Arbitral Award, The Rhine Chlorides Arbitration concerning the Auditing of 
Accounts (The Netherlands/France), PCA Case No. 2000-02, 2004.
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Award of the Tribunal, Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States 
of America), PCA Case No. 1921-01, 1922.
Permanent Court of International Justice
Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issues in France (France 
v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovene), PCIJ Judgment, 1929, PCIJ 
Reports, Series A (1929).
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) (Claim for 
Indemnity) (the Merits) [1928], PCIJ Reports Series A No. 17.
Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. 
Poland), PCIJ Judgment, 1926, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 7 (1926).
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019.
Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg 
Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I 
S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case 
No. 2015/150), 2018.
Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case 
No. V 2015/095, 2018.
Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018.
Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 
2016.
Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments 
v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016.
Dissenting Opinion of Prof. Dr. Guido Santiago Tawil, Charanne and Construction 
Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016.
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Award on Respondent’s Bifurcated Preliminary Objections, Cem Cengiz Uzan v. 
Republic of Turkey, SCC Case No. V 2014/023, 2016.
Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding 
Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 2013.
Final Award, Remington Worldwide Limited v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. V(I 
16/2008), 2011.
Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the 
Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009.
Award on Preliminary Objections, Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación 
Emergentes F.I., Ahorro Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV 
S.A., Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A., Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 
SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, 2009.
Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 
2008.
Partial Award, Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC 
Case No. 088/2004, 2007.
Award on Jurisdiction, RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC 
Case No. V079/2005, 2007.
Award, Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. The Russian Federation, 
SCC Case No. 080/2004, 2006.
Arbitral Award, Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 
(126/2003), 2005.
Final Award, William Nagel v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 049/2002, 
2003.
Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of 
Latvia, SCC, 2003.
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World Trade Organization: Panel and Appellate Body Reports
Report of the Panel, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/
DS512/R, 2019.
Report of the Appellate Body, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R, 2016.
Report of the Panel, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, WT/DS456/R, 2016.
Reports of the Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the 
Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R, 2013.
Reports of the Panel, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff 
Program, WT/DS412/R and WT/DS426/R, 2012.
Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States 
– Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/
DS452/1, 2012.
Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Concerning 
Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1, 2011.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 DSU by 
Ecuador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, 2008.
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the United States, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 2008.
Report of the Appellate Body, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, 1999.
Report of the Panel, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, WT/DS34/R, 1999.
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Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/9, 1996.
Reports of the Appellate Body, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/
AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 1996.
Domestic Court Judgments
England
Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., S.C. 
Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania [2018] EWCA Civ 1801, Court of Appeal England.
Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., S.C. 
Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania [2017] EWHC 31, High Court of Justice England.
The Netherlands
Judgment, Russian Federation v. Yukos Universal Ltd, Rb The Hague (20 April 
2016), Case No C/09/477162/HA ZA 15–2.
Sweden
Judgment, Ioan Micula, S.C. Multipack S.R.L., S.C. European S.A., S.C. Starmill 
S.R.L., Viorel Micula v. Romanian Ministry of Public Finance, District Court Nacka, 
Case No. Ä 2550-17, 2019.
United States of America
Judgment, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, US Supreme Court, 457 
U.S. 176 (1982).
Judgment, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, US Supreme Court, 444 U.S. 164 
(1979).
Judgment, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, US Supreme Court, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Judgment, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, US Supreme Court, 376 U.S. 
398 (1964).
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Other Courts and Tribunals
Final Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic 
of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, 2004.
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Protection of Investment (Japan-Iraq) (adopted 07/06/2012, entered into force 
01/02/2014).
US Model BIT, 2012.
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commentaries), November 2001, International Law Commission, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf > accessed on 21/11/2016.
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the 
Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Austria-Armenia) (adopted 17/10/2001, entered into force 
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of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 July 2001.
Agreement Between the Government of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and 
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Chapter 1
1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral trade and investment agreement 
that establishes ‘a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation 
in the energy field.’1 Concluded in the geopolitically turbulent early 1990’s by 
primarily European and Central Asian States, the energy sector proved to be 
a sector where a win-win situation could be created between the contracting 
parties. By establishing an international legal framework that would govern 
amongst others investment, trade, and transit in the energy sector, the treaty 
could contribute to the realization of various policy objectives of the different 
parties involved.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from capital exporting States 
in the West could contribute to the development of the energy sectors in the East 
where natural resources were abundant but a lack of capital and technology 
prevented their exploitation.3 This, in turn, could contribute to the general 
economic development of former Communist States for whom FDI constituted 
a means to revive their economies.4 Furthermore, since the ECT would also 
provide for rules on international trade and transit, these energy resources could 
subsequently make their way to European markets where imports from the East 
could enhance the security of energy supply in a time when the Middle East, an 
important source of oil for Western Europe, was in turmoil.5
Although the emphasis of the ECT was primarily on conventional energy sources, 
such as oil, gas, nuclear, and coal, the treaty demonstrates awareness for 
environmental considerations and Renewable Energy Sources (RES).6 In doing 
1. Article 2, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
2. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Introduction’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 1-2.
3. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy 
Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 
1996). Pp. 138-139. Kaj Hober, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty – An Overview’ [2007] 8(3) 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 323. P. 324.
4. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Introduction’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 2.
5. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The 
Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law 
International 1996). Pp. 138-139. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2015). P. 114. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 
241-242. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International 
Publishing 2006). Pp. 106-107.
6. See for example: Article 19, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered 
into force 16/04/1998). Understanding 2, Final Act of the European Energy Charter 
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so, it has been said that the treaty ‘has broken new ground by coupling its trade 
and investment provisions with emphasis on the importance of environmental 
protection in all aspects of the energy industry.’7
In comparison to 25 years ago, climate change – and the measures required to 
mitigate its consequences – are currently higher on the political agenda than 
ever before. In the 2015 Paris Agreement, an agreement that was adopted under 
the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – a 
framework convention that itself is recalled in the preamble of the ECT – the 
international community recognized the ‘urgent threat of climate change’ and 
acknowledged that it is a ‘common concern of humankind.’8 Therefore, the 
agreement aims at ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this 
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change’.9
The energy sector (can) play(s) a crucial role in mitigating climate change and 
meeting the target of the Paris Agreement.10 On the one hand, it is traditionally 
a carbon intensive sector while, on the other hand, RES may be able to provide 
for low-carbon substitutes.11 In addition, the stimulation of RES may also create 
jobs since RES are more labour intensive than conventional energy sources 
and States that rely on energy imports may enhance their security of supply by 
reducing their dependency on foreign suppliers.12 Primarily due to incentives 
created by States, investments in RES have increased significantly over the 
last few decades to the extent that they make up a substantial proportion of 
Conference.
7. Clare Shine, ‘Environmental Protection under the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Wälde 
(ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer 
Law International 1996). P. 545. Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, 
Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’ [2001] 51 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 811. P. 817.
8. Preamble, Paris Agreement (adopted 12/12/2015, entered into force 04/11/2016). Antonio 
Morelli, ‘Preamble’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty 
(Edward Elgar 2018). P. 12.
9. Article 2(1)(a), Paris Agreement (adopted 12/12/2015, entered into force 04/11/2016).
10. Sebastian Heselhaus, ‘Energy Transition Law and Economics’ in Klaus Mathis et al (eds.), 
Energy Law and Economics (Springer 2018). Pp. 19-20.
11. Timothy F. Braun & Lisa M. Glidden, Understanding Energy and Energy Policy (Zed Book 
Ltd 2014). P. 12.
12. European Commission, ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ COM(2014) 330 final. Pp. 
12-13. Hugo Lucas & Rabia Ferroukhi, ‘Renewable Energy Jobs: Status, Prospects & 
Policies’ (IRENA Working Paper 2011). P. 4.
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total global energy investments.13 Also, RES are increasingly becoming price 
competitive in comparison to conventional energy sources.14 In light of these 
considerations, amongst others, it has been said that an ‘energy transition’ is 
currently underway.15
Nevertheless, very significant challenges remain. To make low carbon energy 
supply meet the world’s energy demand in the year 2050, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that global energy investments of USD 3.5 tln 
are needed on an annual basis until 2050.16 As the main source of investment, 
the private sector will (have to) play an important role in the energy transition.17 
In 2016, it accounted for 90 percent of the RES investments.18 Given the fact that 
global energy investments have amounted to approximately USD 1.8 tln over 
the last few years, just over 50 percent of the required amount, it is clear that 
investments will have to be ramped up considerably to meet the policy objectives 
of keeping global warming within the limits specified by the Paris Agreement 
while also ensuring that the world’s energy demand is met.19
In order to increase the amount of investment, conducive policy instruments will 
have to be adopted at all political levels: sub-national, national, and international. 
However, since the economic interests in the RES sector increase as the 
sector itself grows, it sometimes seems that States are also viewing the RES 
sector as an interesting emerging economic pie of which they all want their 
share.20 By adopting measures that constitute barriers to trade and investment, 
industrial policy objectives – i.e. those aimed at encouraging domestic economic 
development – may hinder the realization of green policy objectives – i.e. those 
related to the development and employment of RES – because these measures 
may make RES less competitive.
13. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2018 (OECD/IEA 2018). P. 243. 
International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2019 (OECD/IEA 2019). P. 9.
14. International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2018 
(IRENA 2019). P. 11.
15. Id. Sebastian Heselhaus, ‘Energy Transition Law and Economics’ in Klaus Mathis et al 
(eds.), Energy Law and Economics (Springer 2018). P. 20.
16. International Energy Agency, Perspectives for the Energy Transition – Investment Needs for 
a Low Carbon Energy System (IEA/IRENA 2017). P. 8.
17. IRENA and CPI, Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance (IRENA 2018). P. 8.
18. Id.
19. International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2019 (OECD/IEA 2019). P. 11.
20. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 39.
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This dissertation will examine the role that one legal instrument at the international 
level plays in the current energy transition, namely the ECT. The main focus will 
be on the role that the treaty can play as an International Investment Agreement 
(IIA). The purpose of IIA’s is to encourage flows of FDI between the contracting 
parties. As such they could, in theory, encourage flows of FDI that are necessary 
to implement the energy transition by addressing barriers to FDI – including those 
adopted in the pursuit of industrial policy objectives – and mitigate perceived 
investment risks by strengthening the rule of law in the energy sector.21 FDI 
plays an increasingly important role in the RES sector and may be of particular 
relevance for countries that lack domestic financial resources to finance their 
energy transition.22
Since its conclusion nearly 25 years ago, the ECT has already played a notable 
role in international energy affairs, specifically in the context of investor-State 
relations.23 With more than 120 known disputes between States and foreign 
investors it has become one of the most promiment IIA’s in existence as it is the 
most often invoked treaty with nearly twice as many cases as the second most 
often invoked IIA, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).24 What 
is also notable is the fact that the treaty, in particular during the last decade, 
has primarily been relied upon in West-West relations rather than the anticipated 
East-West relations and not in the context of hydrocarbons, but primarily in the 
RES sector.25
21. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Introduction’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 1.
22. Makane M. Mbengue & Deepak Raju, ‘Energy, Environment and Foreign Investment’ 
in Eric de Brabandere et al (eds.), Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector – Balancing 
Private and Public Interests (Brill 2014). P. 173.
23. Eric de Brabandere, ‘The Settlement of Investment Disputes in the Energy Sector’ in Eric 
de Brabandere et al (eds.), Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector – Balancing Private 
and Public Interests (Brill 2014). P. 134.
24. See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-
dispute-settlement>. Note that the NAFTA has recently been ‘renegotiated’, which 
resulted in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. This agreement was concluded 
on 30/11/2018 but has not yet entered into force. For its implications on the investment 
chapter of NAFTA, see: Robert Landicho & Andrea Cohen, ‘What’s in a Name Change? 
For Investment Claims Under the New USMCA Instead of NAFTA, (Nearly) Everything’ 
(Kluwer Arbitration Blog 2018). <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/10/05/
whats-in-a-name-change-for-investment-claims-under-the-new-usmca-instead-of-nafta-
nearly-everything/> accessed on 14/06/2019.
25. Cees Verburg, ‘Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal 
Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment 
and Trade 425. P. 434. Stephanie Grace Hawes, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty: New Energy, 
New Era’ (Thomson Reuters, Arbitration Blog 2016). <http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.
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Not only the energy sector and the context in which the ECT is invoked are 
subject to change, the treaty itself may soon be too. Currently, the Energy 
Charter Conference, which is the conference of ECT contracting parties, is in 
the process of modernizing the treaty.26 This was started by the adoption of 
the International Energy Charter in 2015.27 The International Energy Charter is 
a legally non-binding declaration of ‘political intention’ and has been signed 
by a number of countries that well exceeds the current constituency of the 
ECT.28 In 2017, the Energy Charter Conference held that the second step of the 
modernization process ‘is to consider the potential need and/or usefulness of 
updating, clarifying or modernising’ the text of the ECT itself.29 To that end, the 
Conference compiled a list of ‘approved topics for modernization’ in late 2018.30 
This list consists primarily of topics related to the investment chapter of the ECT, 
which will also be the main focus of this dissertation.31
1.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze what changes could be made 
to Part III of the ECT – concerning investment promotion and protection – to 
com/the-energy-charter-treaty-new-energy-new-era/> accessed on 06/06/2019.
26. Dylan Geraets & Leonie Reins, ‘Article 1 – Definitions’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), 
Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 19.
27. Decision of the Energy Charter Conference, Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(CCDEC 2017 23 STR, 28 November 2017). P. 2.
28. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The International Energy Charter’ (23 June 2016) <https://
energycharter.org/process/international-energy-charter-2015/overview/> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
29. Decision of the Energy Charter Conference, Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(CCDEC 2017 23 STR, 28 November 2017). P. 2.
30. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
31. The list of topics includes: Pre-investment; Definition of ‘charter’; Definition of ‘economic 
activity in the energy sector’; Definition of investment; Definition of investor; Right to 
regulate; Definition of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET); MFN Clause; Clarification of 
‘most constant protection and security’; Definition of indirect expropriation; Compensation 
for losses; Umbrella clause; Denial of benefits; Transfers related to investments; Frivolous 
claims; Transparency; Security for costs; Valuation of damages; Third party funding; 
Sustainable development and corporate social responsibility; Definition of ‘transit’; Access 
to infrastructure (including denial of access and available capacities); Definition and 
principles of tariff setting; REIO; Obsolete provisions.
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more effectively facilitate RES investments.32 As such, this research will have a 
practically oriented objective: its purpose is to give recommendations for legal 
changes to the ECT that could be implemented and applied with the purpose 
of improving the existing legal framework in order to facilitate investments in 
the RES sector. This dissertation thus concerns the operation of the law, that is 
international investment law – and the ECT in particular – in a specific context, 
namely the RES sector.
As a part of this research, the existing legal framework of the ECT will be analyzed 
to examine what the current framework provides for. As such, the research may 
be of interest to those who, in the course of their work, deal with the ECT. It has to 
be noted, however, that the primary objective of this research is not to establish 
the exact content of existing norms of the ECT, i.e. what is the law?, but rather to 
describe what changes could be made to the treaty to facilitate RES investments 
more effectively, i.e. what should the law be? Therefore, this exercise will be one 
in deductive logic.33
The main contribution that this dissertation strives to make concerns the 
interrelatedness of investment and trade in the RES sector and, therefore, it will 
emphasize that a legal framework which governs investments in RES should 
reflect this. At the start of this research project in 2015 the focus was initially 
exclusively on investment protection under the ECT and its application to RES 
investment disputes. At the time, this was chosen in light of the significant number 
of pending ECT disputes concerning RES at the time. However, as this research 
progressed the present author became convinced that more ambitious rules are 
required in order to effectively facilitate RES investments. Ever since the failure of 
the International Trade Organization in the late 1940’s, the public international law 
rules governing trade and investment have seemingly developed into two almost 
separate fields of ‘international law.’34 In reality, however, investment and trade 
are very much interrelated: much of the world’s trade in goods is for example 
intra-firm and this can only exist when firms invest abroad.35 To a significant 
32. Part III, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
33. Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in L. Ruddock et al (eds.), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell 2008). P. 32.
34. Mark Wu, ‘The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving International 
Investment Regime’ in Zachary Douglas et al (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law – Bridging Theory into Practice (Oxford University Press 2014). P. 172.
35. Rainer Lanz & Sébastien Miroudot, ‘Intra-Firm Trade: Patterns, Determinants and Policy 
Implications’, OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 114 (OECD Publishing 2011).
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extent, business practice in the RES sector is very much the same. Therefore, 
it is argued in this dissertation that in order to facilitate RES investments most 
effectively, a governing legal framework should consider the entire value chain 
of RES, including that of generation equipment and project development, since 
increased efficiency along any segment of the value chain can enhance the 
competitiveness of RES. This requires one to think beyond the traditional ‘silos’ 
of international investment law and international trade law; it entails that a more 
holistic approach should be adopted.
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION
The main question that this research will answer is:
“What changes to the legal framework of the ECT, regarding 
investment promotion and protection, have to be made to facilitate 
investments in renewable energy sources?”
This question makes clear that my analysis is, in principle, limited in scope to 
the provisions of Part III of the ECT which concerns investment promotion and 
protection. Nevertheless, certain provisions that can be found outside Part III 
may still be relevant. Think of the definitions of ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ which 
determine the scope of the provisions of Part III of the treaty but that are found 
in Art. 1 ECT. Also, Arts. 21 and 24 ECT contain a carve out and exceptions that, 
subject to certain conditions, preclude the application of provisions of Part III of 
the treaty. For the sake of completeness, these provisions will also be taken into 
account. Furthermore, this dissertation will be limited to the substantive norms as 
laid down in Part III of the ECT. Therefore, procedural rules, for example relating 
to Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), which is addressed in Part V of the 
treaty, will not be discussed.
To further specify the purpose of the research question, I will briefly elaborate 
on what I consider a feasible change to the ECT that facilitates RES investment. 
In essence, I will primarily be looking for changes that can increase the 
competitiveness of RES, for example by reducing the levelized cost of electricity 
(LCOE).36 The presumption is, based on economic theories, that once RES 
36. The LCOE is the price of electricity produced by generation facilities considering the entire 
lifetime of a facility, including costs related to construction, operation, and maintenance. 
Also, the costs of fuel, which in the case of most forms of RES are non-existent, are taken 
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becomes price competitive with conventional energy sources, the market will 
favor investments in RES over conventional energy sources.37 Economic theory 
will be relied upon to determine what measures would enhance economic 
efficiency, the costs of capital and/or reduce transaction costs.
A successful energy transition to low carbon energy sources requires 
significant investments in not only RES generation facilities, but also in network 
infrastructure, storage, and demand/supply technology. In this research, I will 
primarily limit myself to investments related to the production of RES which most 
often generate a form of RES into electricity.38 This delimitation ensures that the 
specific characteristics of the RES industry can be considered.
1.2.1. Sub-Questions
To answer the main research question, the following sub-questions will be 
adressed:
1) On the basis of economic theory, what factors are to be taken into 
account for the investment chapter of the ECT to enhance economic 
efficiency of RES investments and reduce investment risks?
2) How does the current RES sector operate: who are the investors, 
how is the sector organized, and to what extend are investments 
cross-border? What are existing barriers to investment and trade in 
the RES sector and how do they affect investors/investments?
3) Under what circumstances was the ECT negotiated and 
concluded, what are the main ‘pillars’ of the treaty, and to what 
extent do RES fall under the scope of the existing treaty?
4) What does the current legal framework of the ECT concerning 
investment promotion and protection provide for?
into account.
37. Hubert D. Henderson, Supply and Demand (University of Chicago Press 1958). Chapter II. 
Marcia Lusted, Supply and Demand (Rosen Publishing Group 2018). Fred E. Foldvary, The 
Foundations of Economic Theory (Business Expert Press 2015). Pp. 55-63. Theo S. Eicher, 
John H. Mutti & Michelle H. Turnovsky, International Economics (Routledge 2009). Pp. 
55-58.
38. It has to be noted that there are also renewable gasses, such as biogas.
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5) In light of the considerations identified and after answering the 
first and second sub-questions, what are the shortcomings in the 
existing legal framework of the ECT?
6) What changes could be made to the legal framework of the ECT, 
concerning investment protection, to facilitate RES investments?
7) What changes could be made to the legal framework of the ECT, 
concerning investment promotion, to facilitate RES investments?
8) How can the identified changes be implemented by the ECT 
contracting parties?
The first sub-question, which will be answered in chapter 2, seeks to determine 
– on the basis of economic theories – what considerations should be reflected 
in the legal framework of the ECT if the purpose of that framework is to facilitate 
RES investments. This chapter will provide the theoretical background against 
which this dissertation will be set.
The second sub-question, which will be addressed in chapter 3, aims at providing 
a practical overview of the (renewable) energy sector and the entities active in 
that sector. Also, frequent barriers to investment and trade in that sector will be 
discussed. By making linkages to the previously discussed economic theories, 
these questions will try to link economic theory to practice and briefly outline 
how this may affect investors.
By answering the third sub-question, which will be discussed in chapter 4, the 
reader will obtain the historic background surrounding the conclusion of the ECT 
and the main pillars of the treaty: namely, trade, transit, and investment. Most 
importantly, this question will address the scope of the ECT and provide clarity 
regarding the applicability of the treaty to RES investments and investors.
The fourth sub-question, which will be spread out over chapters 5-7, will identify 
what the existing legal framework of the ECT provides for. In order to make 
meaningful suggestions as to an improved legal framework, this is a necessary 
preliminary question.
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The fifth sub-question will answer what the shortcomings are in the existing legal 
framework of the ECT. This answer will be given in light of the economic and 
practical considerations laid down in chapters 2 and 3.
The sixth sub-question will focus on the rules on investment protection of the ECT 
and identify changes that could be made to it that may facilitate investments in 
RES. In a similar vein, the seventh sub-question will focus on the rules concerning 
investment promotion and identify potential changes that could be made in order 
to facilitate RES investments.
The final sub-question will address the ‘legal tools’ that are available to the ECT 
contracting parties to implement the identified changes that should facilitate 
RES investments.
1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN
This section will explain the research design chosen to answer the research 
question and sub-questions.
1.3.2. Theoretical Assessment Framework
Although this dissertation is legal in nature, I will primarily rely on economic 
theory to determine what changes should be made to the investment chapter 
of the ECT to facilitate RES investments. As such, the assessment framework 
will consist of economic theory. Hence, the primary purpose of this research 
is not to assess how the legal framework of the ECT interacts with other legal 
norms, rules, and/or principles, but to draw from economic theory to come up 
with recommendations to improve the current law.39 Since ‘legal research almost 
always incorporates information from other disciplines’ this legal research will 
incorporate views from the economic discipline as these ‘play an important role 
in shaping the law.’40
39. Jan Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’ in 
Mark van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research – Which Kind of Method for 
What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011). Pp. 116-121. Pauline Westerman & Mark 
Wissink, ‘Rechtsgeleerdheid als Rechtswetenschap’ [2008] 440 Nederlands Juristenblad 
503. Pauline Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as 
a Reflection on the Debate on Law’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal 
Research – Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011).
40. Irma J. Kroeze, ‘Legal Research Methodology and the Dream of Interdisciplinarity’ [2013] 
16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 35. P. 52. Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas 
Mercuro, Law and Economics - Alternative Economic Approaches to Legal and Regulatory 
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While discussing the legal framework of the ECT and the case law developed 
thereunder, comparison will be made to other international agreements and 
relevant case law. The purpose of adopting this comparative approach is 
threefold. Firstly, by comparing the ECT to other relevant agreements – also 
in light of relevant case law – I will be able to position the treaty in the broader 
context of international economic law, identify differences, and the interaction 
between them.41 Secondly, the identified differences can serve, on the one hand, 
as a source of inspiration for suggestions of changes that can enhance the 
competitiveness of RES while, on the other hand, it also allows me to make 
suggestions that are in line with contemporary investment policy practices.42 
This is in line with the decision of the Energy Charter Conference which ‘expects’ 
that the modernization process will use ‘the current main trends’ as ‘a primary 
reference.’43 Thirdly, treaty innovations outside the ECT context can have an 
Issues (Taylor and Francis 2004). Chapter 1. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign 
Direct Investment (Ashgate Publishing 2002). P. 9.
41. Developments in ECT disputes may affect the drafting of subsequent IIA’s. For example, 
many of the current ECT investor-State disputes concerning RES relate to regulatory 
changes to RES support schemes, sometimes by retroactively changing remuneration 
methodologies for subsidies. More recent IIA’s, such as the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or the Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT) between 
the European Union (EU) and Vietnam explicitly state that a decision not to issue, renew 
or maintain a subsidy does not amount to a violation of certain investment protection 
standards. Treaty innovations like these are relevant when making suggestion for a new 
investment chapter that should govern RES investments.
42. The importance to rely on other IIA’s as a source of inspiration is twofold. Firstly, in its 
decision to modernize the ECT the Energy Charter Conference analyzed and considered 
‘current investment policy tendencies’ in IIA’s. Therefore, there is seemingly a desire 
amongst ECT contracting parties to align the content of the ECT with policy trends as 
incorporated in recent IIA’s. In order for me to be able to come up with suggestions that 
would meet this requirement it is important to adopt a legal comparative approach in 
this dissertation. (See: Decision of the Energy Charter Conference, Modernisation of the 
Energy Charter Treaty (CCDEC 2017 23 STR, 28 November 2017). P. 1) Also, even modern 
IIA’s may adopt different approaches to comparable matters. For example, as will be 
seen, the current legal framework of the ECT concerning investment promotion merely 
contains best endeavors obligations that do little to effectively address discriminatory 
barriers to investment. Other IIA’s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the EU-Singapore FTA or CETA contain provisions that do promote and liberalize 
investment more effectively. Nevertheless, the various treaties may employ different 
drafting techniques that can influence the level of investment promotion, transparency, 
and predictability. This can be relevant when making suggestions for an improved legal 
framework: one could argue that higher levels of transparency can reduce transaction 
costs and consequently increase economic efficiency.
43. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
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influence on the interpretation and application of norms of the ECT, even if the 
ECT text does not incorporate certain innovations.44 Admittedly, this latter point 
has inherent limitations.45
1.3.4. Interpreting the Law and Establishing its Content
When interpreting the ECT and relevant rules from other international agreements, 
I will interpret and establish the content of these rules on the basis of the rules 
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
44. For example, where it concerns investment protection, contemporary IIA’s – including 
IIA’s concluded by ECT contracting parties – often contain more precise definitions 
and standards of treatment which can affect the scope of application and the level of 
investment protection offered by the treaty. In turn, these innovations may affect the 
interpretation and application of ECT norms. When reference to new treaty practice is 
made in this dissertation, it is important to keep in mind that although these new treaties 
do not affect the text and obligations from the ECT as such, they may have an influence 
on the interpretation and application of the treaty in practice. There are several examples 
where investment tribunals interpreted an IIA by reference to treaty innovations contained 
in more recent IIA’s. For example, the tribunal in the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case that 
was interpreting and applying the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT made reference to the CETA 
and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) when interpreting the expropriation 
provision contained in the BIT. Contrary to the BIT, the CETA and EU-Singapore FTA 
contain annexes that more precisely describe the scope of indirect expropriation. This 
reference to IIA’s concluded by the EU is notable given the fact that neither Switzerland 
nor Uruguay is legally involved in CETA or the EU-Singapore FTA. However, the tribunal 
came to the conclusion that these new treaty provisions reflected ‘the position under 
general international law.’ Consequently, this was a factor taken into account by the 
tribunal which eventually rejected the expropriation claim of Philip Morris. See: Annex 8-A, 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) (adopted 
30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Award, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip 
Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, 2016. Paras. 290-307.
45. The impact of new treaty provisions on investment cases based on older IIA’s, such as 
the ECT, may depend on the type of provision. For example, one could argue that an 
innovative provision which merely spells out the content of an already existing obligation 
in more detail – as happened in the Philip Morris case with regards to expropriation (see 
footnote above) – may have more influence than provisions that de facto create new 
carve outs, exceptions or alter the content of an obligation. In a case of the latter, an 
interpretation in line with the new provision would arguably amount to an amendment 
of the treaty. Arbitrators that are called upon to settle ECT disputes and subsequently 
interpret and apply the treaty in a manner that would de facto amount to an amendment 
of the treaty would arguably exceed their powers. With regards to this final point, see: 
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, 
Judgment of 18 July 1966, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. Para. 89. In the context of arbitration, 
see: Award, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 23 August 1958, 
I.L.R. 27, 1963, p. 117. P. 148.
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of treaty interpretation as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).46 The fundamental rules of treaty interpretation are laid down 
in Arts. 31-32 VCLT and are considered to constitute customary international 
law.47 Making use of the VCLT to interpret the ECT is in line with the practice of 
ECT tribunals.48 This means that the treaty shall be interpreted ‘in good faith in 
46. Articles 31, 32 & 33, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23/05/1969, 
entered into force 27/01/1980).
47. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008). P. 933. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 
43. Para. 160. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 174. Para. 94. Case Concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2004, p. 48. Para. 83. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 501. Para. 99. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 645. Para. 37. Award of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium/Netherlands), PCA Case No. 2003-23, 
2005. Para. 45. Arbitral Award, The Rhine Chlorides Arbitration concerning the Auditing of 
Accounts (The Netherlands/France), PCA Case No. 2000-02, 2004. Para. 59.
48. Arbitral Award, Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. (126/2003), 
2005. P. 23. Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Hulley Enterprises Limited 
(Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 
2009. Paras. 260-262. Final Award, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian 
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 2014. Para. 1344. Interim Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian 
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 2009. Paras. 260-262. Final 
Award, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 2014. Para. 1344. Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 2009. Paras. 260-262. Final Award, Veteran Petroleum 
Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 
2014. Para. 1344. Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue, Hrvatska Elektroprivreda 
d.d. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 2009. Paras. 157-165. Excerpts 
of Award, Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, 2012. 
Paras. 333-336. Decision on Annulment, Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/13, 2014. Para. 29. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne 
and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 437. Award, 
Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 2011. 
Para. 553. Decision on Jurisdiction, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-
European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 
2016. Para. 157. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF 
Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 237. Final Award, Blusun S.A., 
Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 
2016. Para. 279. Decision on Termination Request and Intra-EU Objection, Eskosol S.p.A. 
in liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, 2019. Para. 79. Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Liability and Quantum Principles, NextEra Energy Global Holdings 
B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/11, 2019. Para. 580. Award, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom 
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accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.’49 Furthermore, subsequent 
practice in relation to the treaty or subsequent agreements shall be taken into 
account as context of the treaty in addition to its text.50 This is quite relevant for 
the ECT, the context of which consists of a protocol, and numerous annexes, 
decisions, understandings, and statements.51 On the basis of Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT 
‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
paries’ shall also be taken into account.52 Under certain circumstances reference 
may also be made to the preparatory works on the basis of Art. 32 VCLT. 
Throughout this dissertation several references will be made to the negotiating 
history of the ECT. It has to be noted, however, that the archive of the Energy 
Charter Secretariat where the negotiating history is kept was rearranged when the 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 2018. Para. 197. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services 
Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Paras. 206-207. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 
S.Á.R.L., et al. v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150, 2018. Paras. 201-204. Final 
Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR 
v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 453. Decision on the Intra-
EU Jurisdictional Objection, Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean Ltd, and 
Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14, 2019. Paras. 
145-148. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-22, 2019. Para. 208. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 237. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 248. Award, WA Investments-Europa 
Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 265. Decision 
on the Achmea Issue, Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/12, 2018. Paras. 132, 153-154 & 169-184. Decision on the Intra-EU 
Jurisdictional Objection, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and others v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/45, 2019. Para. 112. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial 
Decision on Quantum, Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 2019. Para. 122. See also: Judgment, Russian Federation v. 
Yukos Universal Ltd, Rb The Hague (20 April 2016), Case No C/09/477162/HA ZA 15–2. 
Para 5.9.
49. Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23/05/1969, entered into 
force 27/01/1980). Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to 
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4. P. 8.
50. Article 31(2), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23/05/1969, entered into 
force 27/01/1980).
51. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 13. Silke Goldberg & Krishna 
Kakkaiyadi, ‘Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al (eds.), 
Multilateral Environmental Treaties (Edward Elgar 2017). Pp. 440-441. Emmanuel Gaillard 
& Mark McNeill, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under 
International Investment Agreements – A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 
2010). Pp. 30-40.
52. Article 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23/05/1969, entered 
into force 27/01/1980).
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Secretariat moved premises. In doing so it was rearranged from article-to-article 
basis to a chronological order. Consequently, the archives became less easily 
accessible and I have, therefore, not conducted an all-encompassing analysis of 
the preparatory works. Finally, Art. 33 VCLT contains rules for the interpretation 
of treaties that are authenticated in multiple languages. There are six authentic 
versions of the ECT: English, French, German, Italian, Russian, and Spanish.53 
For personal proficiency reasons I have made sole use of the English version. 
Furthermore, this was also the primary language used during the negotiations 
and most ECT cases are decided in English.
Throughout this dissertation extensive references will be made to case law 
developed under the ECT and other international agreements. The existing case 
law can provide guidance into the application of the relevant rules at hand even 
though it has to be noted that these decisions are not legally binding upon future 
adjudicators.54
1.3.5. Practical Research Methods Employed
The exact methods employed to conduct this research depend on the specific 
chapter and the content thereof.
Chapter 2 will outline the theoretic economic assessment framework. This 
will be done by reference to economic literature. The 3rd chapter will describe 
the (renewable) energy sector, which includes an analysis of the practical 
organization of the energy sector, and more specifically the electricity sector, the 
investors in the RES sector, and existing barriers to investment and trade. This will 
primarily be done by reference to reports of international organizations such as 
the IEA, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and other relevant national and international organizations. These reports give 
a factual overview of the RES sector, and the investment needs and barriers.
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 contain an analysis of the existing legal framework of the 
ECT. The content of the ECT will be established in accordance with the rules on 
treaty interpretation as laid down above. Sources that will be taken into account 
include the text of the treaty and other relevant international agreements and 
53. Article 50, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
54. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 565. Marc Bungenberg & Catharine Titi, 
‘Precedents in International Investment Law’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law – A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 1506-1511.
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relevant case law of national and international courts and tribunals. In addition, 
academic literature, and, if relevant, the preparatory works of the ECT will also 
be considered.
After having examined the existing legal framework of the ECT and having 
identified various shortcomings in it, in particular in light of the theoretical and 
practical considerations that were laid down in the second and third chapter, 
chapter 8 will discuss potential improvement that can be made to the legal 
framework of the ECT. This chapter will attempt to link economic theory and 
the business practice of the RES sector, as described in the second and third 
chapters, and propose legal solutions that may facilitate investment.
Chapter 9, on the legal tools that are available to ECT contracting parties to 
implement changes, will be based on various sources, such as the text of the 
treaty, relevant procedural (arbitration) rules, relevant case law of tribunals as 
well as academic literature.
The final chapter of this dissertation contains the recommendations and 
conclusion.
1.4. DELINEATION AND LIMITATIONS
Like most research projects this dissertation has to be delineated which also 
means that it has inherent limitations.
Concerning the theoretical viewpoints, I will base my recommendations on 
economic theories because these underlie investment and trade agreements. 
This means that other important considerations are left out of the equation. For 
example, in international economics, comparative advantages are important in 
establishing where the factors of production can be employed most efficiently. 
However, the comparative advantage of some countries may primarily consist 
of low standards – concerning the environment, labor, and human rights – and 
cheap labor. In such a case, production may be economically efficient but not 
necessarily sustainable. Sustainability is not, however, part of the theoretical 
assessment framework since economic theories are the basis of international 
investment and trade agreements.
 1
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The main emphasis of this dissertation will be on the ECT. The ECT was chosen 
simply because the current research project was supposed to conduct research 
in relation to the ECT and disseminate this accordingly.55 Since the ECT itself 
is a comprehensive legal framework that addresses multiple topics relevant for 
the energy sector, such as trade, transit, and investment, a further delineation 
within the ECT was required. Since the investment chapter is in practice highly 
relevant, in particular for RES investors, Part III of the treaty is the main subject 
of this dissertation. As said, certain provisions outside Part III may be relevant 
since they may affect the scope of Part III and are thus also addressed. This 
means that other parts of the ECT are not specifically subject of this dissertation, 
even though they may be highly relevant for the application of Part III. One can 
think of ISDS for example. Currently, ISDS is a controversial topic that will not 
be addressed because it is located in Part V of the treaty concerning dispute 
settlement.
Furthermore, since the modernization process of the ECT is conducted by the 
ECT contracting parties, one could also take international relations and political 
theories into account. This will likewise not be the case since the research design 
of this dissertation was adopted before the contours of the modernization process 
were clear. In addition, by putting the emphasis on economic theories against the 
factual background of the RES sector, the conclusions and recommendations of 
this dissertation might also be relevant beyond the ECT context.
This research was concluded on 1 June 2019. Any relevant developments after 
that date are not taken into account.
55. This dissertation has been written as part of a Green Deal research project, partially 
financed by the Dutch Energy Law Association (NeVER), Stibbe, and EBN.
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2. ECONOMIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
INVESTMENT AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
It has been said that international investment law has been shaped by ‘[t]he 
interplay of various economic, political and historical factors.’1 Since investing, or 
as the Oxford Dictionary defines it ‘[a] thing that is worth buying because it may 
be profitable or useful in the future’ can be considered as an economic activity, 
this dissertation will draw from economic theory to analyze what changes could 
be made to the ECT to facilitate RES investments.
When discussing the legal regime governing investment and trade on an 
international level, one would expect that the content of investment and trade 
agreements represents an equilibrium of the diverging social and economic 
policies of the States involved in the negotiations of the agreement. At the very 
least, one would expect that the negotiation positions of the contracting parties 
to the ECT at the time of conclusion were in line with the larger social and 
economic policies of the States involved.2 In that regard, the negotiation of the 
ECT was carried out by an interesting mix of countries with diverging economic 
backgrounds: in the former Communist States, Marxist economic (and legal) 
theory had prevailed until shortly before the negotiations of the ECT were initiated. 
In addition, under the reign of Ronald Reagan, neoliberal views had gained 
significant support in the United States (US), as well as in the United Kingdom 
(UK) of Margaret Thatcher. Continental European policies at the time were more 
aligned with liberal economic theory. As one might expect, the diverging views 
of these States were expressed in their respective investment treaty practice as 
will be explained below.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an economic background for international 
investment and trade agreements. Therefore, this chapter will begin with an 
analysis of diverging economic views on FDI, trade, and how these views 
influenced treaties. This will be done from a macro-economic and micro-
economic viewpoint. Furthermore, the concept of transaction costs will be 
explained as well as the importance of the cost of capital. These two aspects 
can significantly affect the competitiveness of RES projects. If transaction costs 
1. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2017). P. 9. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment 
(Ashgate Publishing 2002). P. 9.
2. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 75.
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are too high, economic exchanges may never take place while if the cost of 
capital is high, the electricity produced by such an investment might have a 
very high LCOE.
2.1. MACRO-ECONOMIC THEORIES: INVESTMENT AND 
TRADE
Macro-economics focusses on the way the economy performs as a whole and is 
often used by governments to develop economic policies. This can be contrasted 
with micro-economics, which focusses on the behavior of individuals or firms. 
Since IIA’s are negotiated by States, but investments in the RES sector are most 
often eventually made by private investors, this chapter will briefly introduce both 
perspectives.
Long before IIA’s were signed, the prevailing economic policy in Europe was 
known as mercantilism.3 From the 16th through the 18th century, European States 
were concerned with accumulating wealth: export as much as possible in 
exchange for gold but import as little as possible to minimize the loss of gold.4 
If policy based on this theory prevails, exporting capital to other jurisdictions 
to invest abroad should be restricted, if not prohibited, since it is considered 
as a loss of wealth. In the late 18th and early 19th century, Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo would challenge the mercantilist theory by introducing the 
theory of economic liberalism. According to Smith free trade would allow for 
specialization, thus in the words of Smith: ‘[i]t is the maxim of every prudent 
master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more 
to make than to buy. […] What is prudence in the conduct of every private 
family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.’5 Ricardo would later 
develop the theory of comparative advantage: specialization would lead to the 
development of comparative advantages, which in turn will lead to economies 
of scale and maximize consumer welfare because resources are employed in 
the economically most efficient manner.6 Thus, according to Smith and Ricardo, 
3. Id. Stephen Husted & Michael Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 2007). P. 55.
4. Id.
5. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Wordsworth 
Editions 2012). P. 446.
6. David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (John Murray 1821). 
Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford University 
Press 2010). Pp. 3-4. Stephen Husted & Michael Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 
2007). P. 60. Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and 
Policy (Addison-Wesley 2000). P. 13.
 2
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States should be concerned with increasing their productivity in order to produce 
new wealth instead of trying to maximize their share of the existing wealth.7
On the basis of economic liberalism, the level of production in an economy is 
determined by a combination of factors: labor, capital, and natural resources.8 
Investments in either of these three can increase the total output of these factors 
and thereby increase productivity of an economy.9 Investments can be financed 
domestically, for instance by savings, or from abroad.10 In theory, FDI would than 
contribute to the host State in several manners.11 Firstly, it increases the amount 
of capital in a given jurisdiction which means that domestic capital can be used 
for other purposes.12 Secondly, FDI may be accompanied by the introduction of 
foreign technology, thereby increasing the level of technological development in a 
State.13 This is an important consideration since RES technology is currently in the 
hands of companies from a relatively limited number of States while RES should, 
ideally, be employed in all developed and developing States alike.14 Thirdly, labor 
may become more productive if training is provided for, thereby transferring 
skills to domestic employees.15 Fourthly, the arrival of foreign companies may 
force the domestic industry to become more competitive.16 Fifthly, domestic 
7. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 75.
8. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 469. Pp. 478-479.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Leon E. Trakman & Nicol W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview’ in Leon E. 
Trakman et al (eds.), Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2013). Pp. 1-3.
12. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 48. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469. Pp. 479-480. Imad 
A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 
2002). P. 73. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (Ashgate 
Publishing 2002). P. 10.
13. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 48. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469. Pp. 479-480.
14. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 34-37.
15. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 48. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469. Pp. 479-480.
16. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 469. P. 480.
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infrastructure may be upgraded which also benefits the host State as a whole.17 
Finally, the arrival of foreign companies may lead to more integration in the world 
economy and thereby facilitate international trade by the host State in large.18 
In an increasingly integrated world economy consisting of Global Value Chains 
(GVC’s), much of global trade is actually intra-firm trade.19 Increased participation 
in world trade would, in turn, bestow host States the benefits as predicted by 
Smith and Ricardo: free trade leads to specialization, which leads to comparative 
advantages which allows for economies of scale and thereby the creation of 
efficiency that increases the general level of welfare.
According to economic liberals the home State of the investor also benefits from 
FDI. For instance, on the basis of the economic law of diminishing returns, ‘each 
additional unit of capital brings a smaller return because of limits on the growth 
of the other factors of production.’20 In addition, since much of the current world 
trade is actually intra-firm, the establishment of foreign subsidiaries may lead to 
increased exports of the home State as well.21 Around the time of conclusion of 
the ECT the liberal economic view was a widely held view in continental Europe. 
Despite the fact that economic liberals considered it necessary that the market 
rather than the State determined the direction of investment flows, they did not 
favor completely unregulated markets.22
Going slightly further were the neoliberal views adhered to by policy makers 
in North-America and the UK in the 1980’s and ‘90’s.23 More than the liberal 
economic view did neoliberals push for largely unregulated markets in the belief 
that this would allocate resources in the economically most efficient manner.24 
17. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 48.
18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 469. P. 480.
19. For an explanation of GVC’s, see section 3.3.1. Andreas Maurer & Christophe Degain, 
‘Globalization and Trade Flows: What You See is not What You Get!’ (World Trade 
Organization, 2010). <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201012_e.pdf> 
accessed on 13/11/2018. Leon E. Trakman & Nicol W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: 
An Overview’ in Leon E. Trakman et al (eds.), Regionalism in International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013). Pp. 12-13.
20. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ [2000] 41 
Harvard International Law Journal 469. P. 481.
21. Id.
22. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 76.
23. David M. Kotz, ‘Globalization and Neoliberalism’ [2002] 14 Rethinking Marxism 64. P. 64.
24. Id.
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On an international level, this meant that ‘goods, services, and money (but not 
people)’ should move freely across the globe.25 This is evidenced in North-
American and Japanese Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s), which are bilateral 
treaties concluded with the aim of promoting and protecting FDI.26 In line with 
the US Model BIT for instance, the US-Bahrain BIT provides for so-called ‘pre-
establishment’ rights.27 In essence, pre-establishment rights extend the rules on 
National Treatment (NT) and Most Favored Nation (MFN) to the pre-establishment 
phase of an investment.28 On the basis of such rules, a host State may no longer 
discriminate the foreign investor at the stages of establishment, acquisition, and 
expansion.29 As Joubin-Bret points out, the host State, in essence, accepts ‘a 
limit on its sovereignty to regulate foreign investment.’30 Moreover, it also extends 
the object and purpose of the treaty to ‘the general liberalization of markets for 
foreign investment.’31 Nevertheless, this obligation may be subject to exceptions 
which may be laid down in the treaty itself.32
This approach can be contrasted with the traditional and quite consistent IIA 
practice of European countries.33 For instance, the Netherlands-Georgia BIT 
states that:
25. Id.
26. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International Publishing 
2006). P. 26.
27. Articles 3 & 4, US Model BIT, 2012. Art. 2(1), Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Bahrain) (adopted 
29/09/1999, entered into force 30/05/2001).
28. See also, section 5.7. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context 
of Investment Protection’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection 
(Oxford University Press 2008). P. 13. Lee M. Kaplan & Jeremy K. Sharpe, ‘United States’ 
in Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford 
University Press 2013). P. 776.
29. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ 
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 13.
30. Id. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International 
Publishing 2006). P. 26. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 338.
31. Lee M. Kaplan & Jeremy K. Sharpe, ‘United States’ in Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries 
on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2013). P. 776. Zachary 
Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
P. 139.
32. Article 2(2), US Model BIT, 2012. Art. 2(1), Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Bahrain) (adopted 
29/09/1999, entered into force 30/05/2001).
33. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ 
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“Either Contracting Party shall, within the framework of its laws and 
regulations, promote economic cooperation through the protection 
in its territory of investments of national of the other Contracting 
Party. Subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws or 
regulations, each Contracting Party shall admit such investments.”34
Under these rules, the admission of FDI is within the discretion of the host 
State, thus there is no obligation to provide market access to foreign investors.35 
However, once a host State does admit foreign investors, these investors, 
once established, may be protected by the full range of investment protection 
standards as provided for by the treaty. This approach is also adopted by the 
ECT although the ECT does contain the ambition of a supplementary treaty that 
would contain pre-establishment rights.36 This treaty would, however, never be 
concluded.37
It has to be noted that a shift in European IIA practice is currently taking place. 
Since the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union (EU) has gained an exclusive 
competence over FDI in relation to the common commercial policy.38 Since 2009, 
the EU has been active in negotiating and concluding Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) that are aimed at liberalizing free trade and foreign investment. In that 
regard, it is not surprising that the EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic 
Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Vietnam FTA contain pre-establishment 
rights and rules on market access for foreign investors.39
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). Pp. 11-12.
34. Article 2, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Georgia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Georgia-the Netherlands) 
(adopted 03/02/1998, entered into force 01/04/1999).
35. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ 
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 12.
36. Article 10(2)(3)(4), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
37. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 11-12.
38. Article 207, Treaty on the Function of the European Union (adopted 13/12/2007, entered 
into force 01/12/2009).
39. Articles 8.4, 8.6 & 8.7, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Articles 8.4, 8.5 and 
8.6, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 30/06/2019, 
entrance into force still pending). Maria Laura Marceddu, ‘The Emerging Profile of the 
European IIAs’ [2016] 13 Transnational Dispute Management 1. Pp. 13-14.
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Although the liberal economic theory has had the most significant influence on 
the content of IIA’s, it has not gone uncontested.40 The dependency theory, for 
instance, emphasizes the detrimental effects of FDI and argued that FDI may 
make developing countries economically dependent on developed countries.41 
Several studies showed that although FDI might initially create an inflow of capital, 
related repatriations of profits were sometimes so significant that they exceeded 
the initial inflow.42 Also, it has been argued that the transfer of technology which 
took place, primarily concerned outdated technology: when the end of the 
product cycle of a given technology was reached in the home State, it would be 
introduced in the developing country.43 Furthermore, it was submitted that the 
interests of the foreign investor and the host State diverged. Whereas the host 
State required labor intensive industries – to create employment for its population 
– the foreign investor often made use of capital-intensive techniques which did 
not require a large labor force.44 Additionally, if FDI and projects financed by 
FDI were not properly regulated, it could actually turn out to be destructive for 
the host State.45 This might be the case, for example, when a foreign investor 
would be allowed to extract sub-soil minerals in a developing country which 
lacks adequate environmental regulations and the investment would lead to 
environmental degradation due to pollution.46
This theory was influential in Latin-America, Africa, and parts of Asia and starts 
with the presumption that most foreign investments are made by Transnational 
Corporations (TNC’s) from developed countries in developing countries.47 These 
40. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2004). P. 54. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct 
Investment (Ashgate Publishing 2002). P. 12.
41. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 53. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
History, Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 77. Leon E. Trakman 
& Nicola W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview’ in Leon E. Trakman et al 
(eds.), Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2013). Pp. 
4 & 17. Leon E. Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: A Historical 
Perspective’ in Leon E. Trakman et al (eds.), Regionalism in International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013). P. 17. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct 
Investment (Ashgate Publishing 2002). Pp. 20-21. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the 
Admission of FDI (Eleven International Publishing 2006). Pp. 5-7.
42. Sherif H. Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (Ashgate Publishing 2002). 
P. 20.




47. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
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subsidiaries would primarily serve the interests of the parent company and make 
the developing country economically dependent on the developed country.48 
Neo-Marxists regarded this as a form of neocolonialism.49 Economic nationalists 
and neo-Marxists emphasized the importance of reducing dependency on 
developed countries by advocating economic self-sufficiency of the developing 
State.50 In the most extreme cases this lead to the expropriation of investments 
owned by foreigners.51
The content of most IIA’s, such as the ECT, is primarily influenced by liberal 
economic doctrines.52 For instance, the European Energy Charter (EEC), whose 
objectives are incorporated into the ECT by reference, states that the signatories 
‘undertake to promote the development of an efficient energy market throughout 
Europe, and a better functioning global market, in both cases based on the 
principle of non-discrimination and on market-oriented price formation, taking 
due account of environmental concerns. They are determined to create a climate 
favorable to the operation of enterprises and to the flow of investments and 
technologies by implementing market principles in the field of energy.’53 In that 
regard, the shift with which Eastern-European and Central-Asian countries, that 
adhered to Communist ideology until the early ‘90’s changed their views and 
accepted such a liberal document is noteworthy. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
ECT does not provide for pre-establishment rights has been named as a motive 
University Press 2010). P. 53. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, 
Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 77. Leon E. Trakman & Nicola 
W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview’ in Leon E. Trakman et al (eds.), 
Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2013). P. 4. Leon E. 
Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: A Historical Perspective’ in Leon 
E. Trakman et al (eds.), Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University 
Press 2013). P. 17.
48. Id.
49. Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development (Longman 1994). Pp. 81-82. Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford 
University Press 2010). Pp. 76-77. This view of ‘neo-Marxists’ diverges from the original 
view of Marxists. They believed that FDI could be beneficial to developing countries.
50. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 53. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
History, Policy, and Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 77. Michael P. Todaro, 
Economic Development (Longman 1994). Pp. 491-492.
51. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 77.
52. Ibid. P. 78.
53. Title I, European Energy Charter (adopted 17/12/1991). The objectives of the EEC are 
incorporated into the ECT by reference, see: Article 2, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 
17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
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for the US to decline signing the ECT.54 Thus, although by all means a liberal 
document, the ECT was perhaps not liberal enough for the neoliberal US.
2.2. MICRO-ECONOMIC THEORIES
The section above elaborated on the motives of States to participate in IIA’s from 
a macro-economic point of view. However, that does not explain why investors 
will invest abroad. Since investors are important beneficiaries of IIA’s, especially 
of the investment protection standards and the procedural Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, this section will explain why investors invest 
abroad from a micro-economic perspective. It has to be noted that the literature 
on FDI is voluminous and that many theories have been put forward. Since the 
aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive overview of all FDI theories, 
but rather to provide an insight into the most basic deliberations of investors, 
some theories have been omitted. Reference will primarily be made to those 
theories that are most relevant for RES investors. Moreover, one should keep in 
mind that investment decisions are often based on multiple considerations, and 
not just one.
The most obvious reason for an investor to invest abroad is because of the 
expectation that a higher rate of return can be realized there.55 However, this 
theory fails to explain why certain States simultaneously experience inward and 
outward flows of FDI.56 Moreover, investors may have reasons to invest abroad 
that are not directly related to profits.57 For instance, TNC’s may invest abroad 
for logistical and operational reasons.58 By establishing a foreign subsidiary, 
for example, TNC’s may be able to avoid trade barriers such as import tariffs 
54. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 11. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-
West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 143-152.
55. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 24. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary 
Fund 1990). P. 2. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ [2000] 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469. P. 473. Jamuna P. Agarwal, 
‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey’ [1980] 116 Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 739. P. 741. Stephen Husted & Michael Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 
2007). P. 393. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions 
and Nations – Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). P. 51.
56. Id.
57. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 25.
58. Id.
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   88 04/12/2019   11:36:04
89
Economic Theoretical Framework of Investment and Trade Agreements
or Local Content Requirements (LCR’s).59 Samsung, a South-Korean company, 
for instance, established itself in the Canadian province of Ontario in order 
to circumvent the LCR of the support scheme for RES.60 On the basis of the 
differential rate of return theory, RES investments would primarily be made in 
areas with favorable market conditions, such as the abundance of RES or high 
electricity prices, or – and at present this is more likely the case – in jurisdictions 
where favorable support schemes are in place that guarantee an favorable rate 
of return. For example, after putting in place a very generous Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) 
scheme in 2007, a very significant number of investments were made in the 
Spanish solar sector, amounting to over 2700-Megawatt (MW) in 2008 which 
accounted for 50 percent of the globally installed Photovoltaic (PV) capacity 
that year.61
On the basis of the theory of portfolio diversification, it has been argued that FDI 
flows are not only directed by quests for profit but also by the desire of investors 
to diversify their portfolio in order to spread and reduce risks.62 This theory would 
explain why countries experience FDI inflows and outflows simultaneously.63 
In relation to RES investments this theory is relevant. Since RES is, in many 
59. For an explanation of LCR’s, see section 3.4.2.1. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct 
Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 2002). P. 25. Stephen 
Husted & Michael Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 2007). P. 397. Boris Ricken 
& George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions and Nations – Technology 
Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). P. 50.
60. Sustainable Prosperity, ‘Domestic Content Requirements for Renewable Energy 
Manufacturing’ (Sustainable Prosperity, April 2012) <http://www.sustainableprosperity.
ca/sites/default/files/publications/files/Domestic%20Content%20Requirments%20
for%20Renewable%20Energy%20Manufacturing.pdf> accessed on 26/05/2016. p. 5. 
Dawn Kurtz Crompton, ‘Cooperative Renewable Energy Policies to Avoid Trade Related 
Disputes and Litigation’ (University of Delaware, 2013) <http://www.udel.edu/MAST/873/
AP%20Proposals/Dawn%20Kurtz%20Crompton-%20Analytical%20Paper%20Final.pdf> 
accessed on 26/05/2016. P. 4.
61. FIT’s typically provide for a specified price for each unit of energy produced. Pedro A. 
Prieto, Charles A. S. Hall & Rigoberto Melgar, Spain’s Photovoltaic Revolution: the Energy 
Return on Investment (Springer 2013). P. 21.
62. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 26. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary 
Fund 1990). P. 3. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ [2000] 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469. P. 473. Jamuna P. Agarwal, 
‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey’ [1980] 116 Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 739. P. 744. Stephen Husted & Michael Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 
2007). Pp. 393 & 397. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of 
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jurisdictions, still dependent on support to be economically viable, investors 
might favor investing in several jurisdictions in order to reduce the regulatory risk 
that support is reduced or withdrawn. That this risk is not merely hypothetical 
is evidenced by the significant number of RES investment disputes in various 
countries, as will be illustrated in chapter 3.5.64
According to the market size theory, a country will attract FDI when its market is 
large enough for the exploitation of economies of scale.65 On a micro-economic 
level this is usually done by reference to the output of a company and on a 
macro-economic level by reference to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a 
State. The idea behind this theory is that TNC’s will increase their investment 
in an economy when sales increase.66 For example, the Spanish wind turbine 
manufacturer Gamesa tripled its investment in China in 2010 in order to meet 
the demand for wind turbines in China.67
Flows of FDI may also be explained by the internalization of companies of certain 
activities into their own supply chain in order to reduce transaction costs and gain 
other advantages.68 This could lead to vertical integration.69 For instance, the US 
company SolarCity that is active in the development, financing, and installment 
of PV projects, has recently purchased a PV manufacturer.70
64. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018).
65. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 27. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary 
Fund 1990). Pp. 4-5. Jamuna P. Agarwal, ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Survey’ [1980] 116 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 739. P. 746. Stephen Husted & Michael 
Melvin, International Economics (Pearson 2007). P. 398.
66. Jamuna P. Agarwal, ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey’ [1980] 116 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 739. P. 746. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive 
Advantage of Regions and Nations – Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct 
Investment (Gower 2011). P. 51.
67. Gamesa, ‘Gamesa will Triple its Investment in China to Expand and Adapt its 
Manufacturing Plants for the Local Development of New Turbine Systems’ (Gamesa, 15 
september 2010) <http://www.gamesacorp.com/recursos/noticias/100914-pr-gamesa-
china-eng.pdf> accessed on 26/05/2016.
68. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 32. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary 
Fund 1990). Pp. 7-8. Jamuna P. Agarwal, ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Survey’ [1980] 116 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 739. Pp. 753-754.
69. In case of vertical integration, a single company owns/carries out various activities in the 
supply chain of a good or service.
70. Rosana Francescato, ‘SolarCity Aim: Most Vertically Integrated Solar Company In World’ 
(Clean Technica, 23 June 2014) <http://cleantechnica.com/2014/06/23/solarcity-getting-
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The so-called location theory is particularly relevant for the energy sector. This 
theory argues that certain FDI flows exist because some factors of production 
are not mobile; such as labor or natural resources.71 Therefore, one would expect 
that investments in the upstream oil and gas sector will primarily be made in 
jurisdictions that are endowed with these natural resources. In a similar vein, 
one may expect that PV investments are made in sunny areas while investment 
in wind energy are made in windy areas.
Finally, the presence of political instability and political and/or regulatory risk in 
a country can have an influence on the inflow of FDI.72 As Adam Smith already 
stated in the Wealth of Nations: ‘[c]ommerce and manufacturers, in short, seldom 
flourish in any State in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in 
the justice of government.’73 Political risk encompasses regulatory changes 
to the legal and fiscal framework, which can have a significant influence on 
the economic viability of an investment.74 This factor plays an important role in 
investment decisions in the (renewable) energy sector.75 The lack of political 
stability might explain, for instance, why North-African countries that have a great 
potential for RES investments are not at all successful in attracting investors. 
However, political risk is currently also present in developed countries. At the 
moment, investors often require investment incentives from the State before 
making their investment. In these States, one of the most obvious forms of political 
and regulatory risk is related to amendments to the applicable support scheme. 
Over the last decade this risk did materialize in various countries where RES 
investors invested. The regulatory changes made to the RES support scheme in 
manufacturing-solar-power-bright-future/> accessed on 26/05/2016. Robert McIntosh & 
James Mandel, ‘Why Solar Installers Are Becoming Vertically Integrated’ (Clean Technica, 
19 July 2014) <http://cleantechnica.com/2014/07/19/5-reasons-solar-installers-integrating-
vertically/> accessed on 26/05/2016.
71. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 33. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage 
of Regions and Nations – Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 
2011). P. 50.
72. Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 50. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary 
Fund 1990). Pp. 17-18.
73. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd 2012). P. 915.
74. José S. Lizondo, Foreign Direct Investment (International Monetary Fund 1990). Pp. 17-18. 
Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). P. 50.
75. Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford 
University Press 2010). Pp. 3-26.
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Spain, for example, had very significant effects on investors. Consequently, RES 
investors invoked the ECT to obtain redress. The case of Spain will be discussed 
later in chapter 3.5.
This section has introduced several theories that try to explain why investors 
engage in investing abroad. In the following section, the importance of transaction 
costs will be introduced.
2.3. THE NOTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
In the classic macro-economic liberal theory, as developed by Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo and introduced in section 2.1 above, international trade 
would occur as a result of the comparative (dis)advantages between countries 
concerning the production of goods and services. International trade, however, 
does not arise spontaneously – it requires market transactions that have to be 
organized and this entails costs: transaction costs.76 Traditionally, transaction 
costs encompass the costs of finding a trading partner, negotiating and 
concluding contracts as well as enforcing contracts.77 As Ronald Coase, who 
is widely considered as the ‘founding father’ of transaction cost economics, put 
it in 1960:
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover 
who it is that one deals with, to inform people that one wishes to deal 
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, 
to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make 
sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.”78
A particularly problematic aspect of market transactions is that economic entities 
are not necessary fully rational – as some economists like to believe – since they 
are not capable of acquiring and processing all relevant information necessary 
to engage in a fully rational transaction that maximizes welfare.79
76. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Nederland Handelsland – Het 
Perspectief van de Transactiekosten (SDU Uitgevers 2003). P. 22.
77. Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ [1937] 4 Economica 386. Pp. 390-391.
78. Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ [1960] 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1. P. 15.
79. Michael Dietrich, Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond – Toward a new Economics 
of the Firm (Routledge 1994). P. 16. Herbert Simon, ‘Organizations and Markets’ [1991] 5 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 25.
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When interpreted broadly, transactions costs also include the costs related to 
transport, import duties, taxes, as well as ‘investments in legal, social, cultural, 
and physical capital’ required to facilitate transactions.80 The total costs involved 
can be very significant: one study found that transaction costs in the US in the 
year 1970 amounted to 47 to 55 percent of GDP while in Germany they were 
estimated at 60 to 70 percent of GDP.81 When transaction costs are too high, 
favorable economic transactions, that would have been carried out if the pricing 
mechanism operated without imposing costs, may not take place.82
In the RES sector, transaction costs do not only find their origin in the functioning 
of the market, but investors also deal with policy induced transaction costs, such 
as administrative requirements and monitoring activities.83 In particular, as will be 
referred to at various points throughout this dissertation, trade and investment 
distorting legislation may impose additional transaction costs on investors by 
favoring domestic goods and services providers over foreign competitors.
2.4. COST OF CAPITAL
Before taking the decision to invest in a given jurisdiction or project, investors 
carry out extensive risk assessments that take into account all risks associated 
with an investment, covering the entire lifetime, that could affect the profitability 
of an investment.84 In this process, the general ‘investment climate’ of a country 
80. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Nederland Handelsland – Het 
Perspectief van de Transactiekosten (SDU Uitgevers 2003). Pp. 22-23.
81. Ibid. P. 23. John Wallis & Douglass North, ‘Measuring the Transaction Sector in the 
American Economy, 1870-1970’ in Stanley Engerman et al (eds.), Long-Term Factors in 
American Economic Growth (University of Chicago Press 1988). Eirik Furubotn & Rudolf 
Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory – The Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics (The University of Michigan Press 2000).
82. Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ [1960] 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1. P. 15. 
See also: Douglas C. North, ‘Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History’ [1984] 
140(1) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 7. Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The 
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’ [1981] 87 American Journal 
of Sociology 548.
83. Barbara Breitschopf, Anne Held & Gustav Resch, ‘A Concept to Assess the Costs and 
Benefits of Renewable Energy Use and Distributional Effects Among Actors: The Example 
of Germany’ [2016] 27(1) Energy & Environment 55. P. 63.
84. This section draws from an article co-written by the present author, see: Cees Verburg & 
Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy Technology – 
The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign Direct Investment 
and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 7. John Dewar & Oliver Irwin, ‘Project Risks’ in 
John Dewar (ed.), International Project Finance: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 
2015). P. 85.
 2
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   93 04/12/2019   11:36:05
94
Chapter 2
plays an important role.85 The higher the risks associated with an investment, 
the higher the required rate of return because investors will add a higher risk 
premium to the proposed investment.86 This, in turn, also means that the higher 
the risks associated with an investment the higher the costs of capital and the 
smaller the pool of investors that are willing to invest. In that regard, reducing 
investment risks can contribute to investment promotion since a lower risk profile 
may make a particular investment attractive to a larger pool of investors while at 
the same time reducing the costs of capital.87
The cost of capital, which includes the costs of both debt as well as equity, has 
been defined as the ‘the expected rate of return that market participants require in 
order to attract funds to a particular investment.’88 It is, in essence, an opportunity 
cost since making a particular investment implicates that the investor has to 
forego the best available alternative.89 The cost of capital is usually expressed in 
annual percentage terms and is set by the market.90 The most important aspect 
in the valuation process of the cost of capital, which will also run through this 
dissertation as a common thread, is pricing risk.91 Risk can be defined as ‘the 
degree of certainty (or lack thereof) of achieving future expectations at the times 
and in the amounts expected.’92
For any investment, the cost of capital will thus be determined by a combination 
of the following factors:93
85. Phillip Fletcher, ‘Approaching Legal Issues in a Project Finance Transaction’ in John Dewar 
(ed.), International Project Finance: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2011).
86. Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, ‘Relationship between Risk and the Cost of Capital’ 
in Shannon Pratt et al (eds.), Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Wiley 2014). 
Pp. 70-87. Alexander Lehmann, ‘Country Risks and the Investment Activity of U.S. 
Multinationals in Developing Countries’ (IMF WP/99/133, 1999). Pp. 21-22. Stephen 
Arbogast & Praveen Kumar, ‘Financing Large Energy Projects’ in Betty Simkins et al (eds.), 
Energy Finance and Economics: Analysis and Valuation, Risks Management, and the 
Future of Energy (Wiley 2013). Pp. 332-337.
87. Id.
88. Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, ‘Defining Cost of Capital’ in in Shannon Pratt et al 
(eds.), Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Wiley 2014). P. 3.
89. Id.
90. Ibid. Pp. 3-4.
91. Ibid. P. 4.
92. David Laro & Shannon Pratt, Business Valuation and Federal Taxes: Procedure, Law, and 
Perspective (John Wiley & Sons 2010). Chapter 12.
93. Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, ‘Relationship Between Risk and the Cost of Capital’ in 
Shannon Pratt et al (eds.), Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Wiley 2014). P. 70.
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1) Risk-free rate: this is the rate of return that can be made on 
an investment without assuming any risk. This is often done by 
reference to the yield to maturity on government bonds of countries 
like Germany or the US, i.e. countries that are unlikely to default on 
their financial obligations.
2) Risk premiums: this is the rate of return over and above the risk-
free rate that is aimed at compensating the investor for accepting the 
risks associated with an investment.
As said, the higher the risk associated with an investment, the higher the cost 
of capital will be.94
Political and regulatory risks are mayor concerns for every RES project.95 This 
statement holds true for RES investment in both developed and developing 
countries.96 Investments in the energy sector are particularly exposed to a 
relatively high level of regulatory and political risk: investments are often made 
for the long term and the private and public interests involved are usually 
significant.97 During the long life span of energy investments ‘economic cycles 
change, elections are held and other significant political and social changes are 
expected to occur.’98 Since the RES sector is highly innovative, this means that 
technical risks may be significant if new technologies are involved. Therefore, 
even when such investments are made in jurisdictions with a low general risk 
profile, the risks may still be significant.
Reducing the cost of capital is of great importance for reducing the LCOE 
from RES sources. As a report demonstrates, reducing the cost of capital from 
10 percent to 5 percent, as has approximately happened in the North Sea 
offshore wind sector, reduced the LCOE of the project by over 30 percent.99 
94. Ibid. Pp. 70 & 76.
95. John Dewar & Oliver Irwin, ‘Project Risks’ in John Dewar (ed.), International Project Finance 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 85.
96. For an assessment of the EU, see: Luc van Nuffel, Koen Rademaekers, Jessica Yearwood 
& Verena Graichen, ‘European Energy Industry Investments’ (European Union 2017). Pp. 
48-49.
97. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 8.
98. Id.
99. Giles Hundleby, ‘LCOE – Weighted Cost of Capital (WACC)’ <https://bvgassociates.com/
lcoe-weighted-average-cost-capital-wacc/> accessed on 30/01/2019. Cees Verburg & 
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The importance of reducing the cost of capital for RES investments in order to 
increase the competitiveness of RES can therefore not be understated, nor can 
the importance of reducing risks associated with investment be understated 
simply because the two are so closely related.
Thus far, investments in the RES have been considered as ‘regulatory driven’, 
meaning that investments will be made in those jurisdictions where favorable 
conditions for investments were created, for example by providing for financial 
and/or regulatory support.100 This reliance on support measures also exposes the 
investments to a particular kind of regulatory risk, namely that the support will be 
altered or withdrawn during the lifetime of an investment.101 As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, this risk is not merely hypothetical.
2.5. CONCLUSION
After having discussed the issues above, the first sub-question can now be 
answered. This question read:
‘On the basis of economic theory, what factors are to be taken into 
account for the investment chapter of the ECT to enhance economic 
efficiency of RES investments and reduce associated risks?’
On the basis of the above, it becomes clear that the following factors should be 
kept in mind:
· On the basis of economic liberal theory, which underlies much of 
the international economic regime currently in existence, undistorted 
investment and trade in the RES sector can reduce the costs of, for 
example, RES generation equipment: specialization may lead to 
comparative advantages that can result in economies of scale which 
can result in lower prices.
Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy Technology – 
The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign Direct Investment 
and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 4.
100. Petri Mäntysaari, EU Electricity Trade Law – The Legal Tools of Electricity Producers in the 
Internal Electricity Market (Springer 2015). P. 445.
101. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 9.
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· FDI in the RES sector can, from a macro-economic point of view, 
result in more economic activity in a given State as well as create 
jobs, enhance competition, result in the transfer of technology and 
lead to more integration in the world economy. In the past some of 
these arguments were contested by States that favored domestic 
oriented economic development policies. However, since the early 
1990’s, many States that previously resisted economic liberalism 
have revised their positions. One could argue that the ECT itself is 
evidence of this.
· From a micro-economic point of view, it may allow investors to 
obtain higher rates of return, diversify risk, avoid trade barriers, and 
integrate economic activities in their own supply chain.
· In particular the necessity to reduce risk is important, not only 
for investors themselves, but also for the energy transition in general 
since the cost of capital significantly affects the LCOE of a given 
project. This means that countries where political and regulatory 
risks are perceived as high may be unsuccessful in attracting FDI 
which may adversely affect their energy transition if insufficient 
domestic financial resources are available to finance RES projects. 
Furthermore, due to the innovative character of the RES sector, 
capital may itself be already more expensive than economic sectors 
that are perceived as less risky. Also, States ought to be aware that 
RES policy can either reduce risk, as may be the case of FITs which 
in essence should guarantee the price of electricity, or increase risk, 
for example when trade and investment barriers increase the level of 
risk associated with an investment.
· In addition to raising risks associated with investments, barriers 
to trade and investment may also increase transaction costs. For 
example, when a foreign investor is compelled, by virtue of a LCR, 
to cooperate with domestic goods and services suppliers instead 
of with known foreign alternatives with proven track records in 
the industry, the investor will have to establish the financial and 
technical capabilities of potential suppliers. Since RES projects are 
usually preceded by extensive risks analysis, this may make certain 
transactions more costly than necessary.
 2
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3. THE ENERGY SECTOR AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
SOURCES
Since this dissertation concerns the application of international investment law 
in a specific sector, namely the renewable energy sector, this chapter will briefly 
outline to organization of the energy sector. Subsequently, the main investors 
in the RES sector will be introduced. This will primarily concern investors in 
larger projects where RES generate electricity. Thereafter, I will explain the 
interrelatedness of international investment and trade in the RES sector, where 
a distinction will be made between the value chain of generation equipment and 
the development of RES projects. Subsequently, the main barriers to investment 
and trade – both in goods and services – will be introduced. Where it concerns 
barriers to trade – in both goods and services – specific emphasis will be on 
trade barriers that affect investment and where one can make a connection to 
provisions often found in investment treaties. Finally, this chapter will illustrate the 
regulatory risks to which RES investors are exposed by reference to developments 
in the Spanish RES sector where regulatory changes adversely affected investors 
which has resulted in dozens of investor-State disputes.
3.1. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ENERGY SECTOR AND 
CHALLENGES FOR THE ENERGY TRANSITION
In order to appreciate the peculiarities of investing in the (renewable) energy 
sector, this section will briefly outline the organization of the energy sector 
and highlight the challenges that the sector is facing concerning the energy 
transition. Since most forms of RES generate a form of energy into electricity, I 
will exclusively focus on the electricity sector.
Physically, electricity is nothing more than a flow of electrons. However, the fact 
that it is not tangible and cannot be stored easily on a large scale has significant 
implications for the organization of the sector.1 For example, an electricity grid 
has to be in balance at any given time, which means that electricity supply and 
demand must always meet, otherwise blackouts may occur.2 The demand for 
1. Glen Swindle, Valuation and Risk Management in Energy Markets (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). Pp. 63-64. Delia Vasilica Rotaru, ‘Specifics of the Energy Markets’ (2014) CES 
Working Papers Vol. 6 Issue 3. P. 77.
2. Delia Vasilica Rotaru, ‘Specifics of the Energy Markets’ (2014) CES Working Papers Vol. 
6 Issue 3. P. 77. Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe & Karsten Burges, ‘Pros and cons of 
exposing renewables to electricity market risks— A comparison of the market integration 
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electricity was traditionally relatively inelastic, which means that the balance must 
primarily be achieved on the supply side.3
In the production segment of the electricity supply chain, electricity is generated 
by transforming primary forms of energy, either fossil or renewable, into 
electricity.4 Since the Second World War, large production facilities would be 
connected to high voltage transmission lines that transported the electricity from 
the generation facility to the demand centers. Customers connected directly to 
the transmission grid include large industrial customers as well as the low voltage 
distribution networks. At the distribution level, the supply and sale of electricity 
to customers takes place.5 The distribution network is often connected to the 
transmission grid at various points and, contrary to the transmission network, 
delivers electricity to a (very) large number of (smaller) customers.
Since the transmission and distribution of electricity depends on the availability 
of a grid, the electricity sector is network bound and it is recognized that this 
represents a natural monopoly.6 That is to say, due to the extremely high fixed 
costs of a transmission and distribution network, it does not make economic 
sense for different market entities to construct their own network. This was 
also one of the reasons that in the past many electricity markets were vertically 
integrated, which means that several stages of the electricity supply chain were 
in the hands of the same company.7 Often, but not necessarily always, these 
companies were owned by the (local) government.8 As of today, the electricity 
approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK’ [2008] 36 Energy Policy 3646. P. 3647.
3. Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe & Karsten Burges, ‘Pros and cons of exposing 
renewables to electricity market risks— A comparison of the market integration 
approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK’ [2008] 36 Energy Policy 3646. P. 3647.
4. Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Hesamzadeh, The Economics of Electricity Markets (Wiley 
2014). Pp. 45-46.
5. Glen Swindle, Valuation and Risk Management in Energy Markets (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). P. 64.
6. Glen Swindle, Valuation and Risk Management in Energy Markets (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). P. 64. Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Hesamzadeh, The Economics of 
Electricity Markets (Wiley 2014). P. 59. Delia Vasilica Rotaru, ‘Specifics of the Energy 
Markets’ (2014) CES Working Papers Vol. 6 Issue 3. P. 78.
7. Glen Swindle, Valuation and Risk Management in Energy Markets (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). P. 64. Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Hesamzadeh, The Economics of 
Electricity Markets (Wiley 2014). P. 77. Delia Vasilica Rotaru, ‘Specifics of the Energy 
Markets’ (2014) CES Working Papers Vol. 6 Issue 3. P. 78.
8. Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Hesamzadeh, The Economics of Electricity Markets 
(Wiley 2014). P. 77. In the United States, for example, many electricity supply companies 
were owned by private investors. See: Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, ‘The U.S. 
Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring’ (2015) Energy Institute at Haas 
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markets in various parts of the world have been privatized and liberalized to 
various degrees.9 Due to these developments it has become easier for private 
entities to enter the electricity market and generate and sell electricity. Therefore, 
liberalized electricity markets might be more open to investors that want to 
generate and sell electricity, including those that make use of RES.
As becomes clear from the above, the supply chain of electricity was designed 
in a top-down way, which is to say that the generation took place at the top 
and that through transmission and distribution, the electricity was consumed 
at the bottom. However, a significant amount of the renewable electricity is 
being produced by decentralized generators, such as rooftop PV panels and 
individual wind turbines at the distribution level.10 This means that the supply 
chain of renewable electricity does not necessarily follow the traditional pattern as 
outlined above. Instead, the vertically-designed supply chain with a unidirectional 
electricity flow will have to evolve into a more horizontal system that allows for 
bidirectional flows of electricity.11 For the purpose of this dissertation, it suffices 
to say that adapting the structure of the electricity supply chain to this new reality 
poses significant technical and legal challenges that will have to be resolved.12
Working Paper <https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP252.pdf> accessed on 
06/09/2016. P. 2.
9. Darryl R. Biggar & Mohammad Hesamzadeh, The Economics of Electricity Markets (Wiley 
2014). Pp. 46 & 82-85..
10. Jennie C. Stephens, Elizabeth J. Wilson & Tarla Rai Peterson, Smart Grid (R)Evolution 
(Cambridge University Press 2015). P. 53. P.J.F. Torres, L. Ekonomou & P. Karampelas, 
‘The Correlation Between Renewable Generation and Electricity Demand: A Case Study 
of Portugal’ in P. Karampelas et al (eds.), Electricity Distribution: Intelligent Solutions for 
Electricity Transmission and Distribution Networks (Springer 2016). Pp. 130-131.
11. Jens Christian Boemer, On Stability of Sustainable Power Systems - Network Fault 
Response of Transmission Systems with Very High Penetration of Distributed Generation 
(CPI-Koninklijke Wöhrmann 2016). P. V. Final Report to the European Commission, 
‘Study on the Effective Integration of Distributed Energy Resources for Providing 
Flexibility to the Electric System’ (2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/
documents/5469759000%20Effective%20integration%20of%20DER%20Final%20
ver%202_6%20April%202015.pdf> accessed on 06/09/2016. Pp. 32-33. P.J.F. Torres, 
L. Ekonomou & P. Karampelas, ‘The Correlation Between Renewable Generation and 
Electricity Demand: A Case Study of Portugal’ in Panagiotis Karampelas et al (eds.), 
Electricity Distribution: Intelligent Solutions for Electricity Transmission and Distribution 
Networks (Springer 2016). Pp. 130-131.
12. See for example: Imke Lammers & Lea Diestelmeier, ‘Experimenting with Law and 
Governance for Decentralized Electricity Systems: Adjusting Regulation to Reality?’ [2017] 
9 Sustainability 212. Pp. 214-215. Martha Roggenkamp & Hannah Kruimer, ‘EU Climate 
Regulation and Energy Network Management’ in Edwin Woerdman et al (eds.), Essential 
EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar 2015).
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Another peculiar aspect of RES that is worth mentioning relates to the costs 
structure thereof. The fixed costs of RES generation facilities are usually large 
but the subsequent marginal costs to produce an additional unit of energy are 
rather low to non-existent since wind and solar radiation are free.13 In that regard 
it has been said that ‘[b]uilding a renewable energy plant is similar to building a 
fossil energy plant plus buying all the fuel that the plant will use over its lifetime.’14 
The only recurring costs of these RES are related to operation and maintenance 
of the facility.15 Notwithstanding the low marginal costs, the final LCOE may still 
be relatively high for some RES because of the high fixed costs, although RES 
are gradually becoming more price competitive.16
Despite the fact that the LCOE of RES are relatively high, their increasing 
penetration in primarily the electricity sector is having a profound impact on the 
functioning of electricity markets. This is particularly relevant for RES investors 
that have invested in jurisdictions where RES generators are exposed to market 
signals. The existing effects of RES arise mainly because of the low marginal 
costs of RES, which is creating a downward pressure on wholesale electricity 
prices.17 This has several consequences.
13. Geoffrey Heal, ‘The Economics of Renewable Energy’ (2009) NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 15081. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15081.pdf> accessed on 07/04/2016. P. 4. 
David Timmons, Jonathan Harris & Brian Roach, ‘The Economics of Renewable Energy’ 
(2014) Global Development and Environment Institute. <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/
education_materials/modules/renewableenergyecon.pdf> accessed on 07/04/2016. P. 
22. Cheuk Wing Lee & Jin Zhong, ‘Financing and Risk Management of Renewable Energy 
Projects with a Hybrid Bond’ [2015] 75 Renewable Energy 779. P. 780.
14. David Timmons, Jonathan Harris & Brian Roach, ‘The Economics of Renewable Energy’ 
(2014) Global Development and Environment Institute. <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/
education_materials/modules/renewableenergyecon.pdf> accessed on 07/04/2016. P. 22.
15. Geoffrey Heal, ‘The Economics of Renewable Energy’ (2009) NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 15081. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15081.pdf> accessed on 07/04/2016. P. 4.
16. International Energy Agency, ‘Projected Costs of Generating Electricity’ (International 
Energy Agency, 2015) <https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ElecCost2015SUM.pdf> 
accessed on 08/04/2016. Pp. 4-5.
17. José Pablo Chaves-Ávila, Klaas Würzburg, Tomás Gómez & Pedro Linares, ‘The Green 
Impact: How Renewable Sources Are Changing EU Electricity Prices’ [2015] 13 IEEE 
Power and Energy Magazine 29. P. 32. Dogan Keles, Massimo Genoesa, Dominik Möst, 
Sebastian Ortlieb & Wolf Fichtner, ‘A Combined Modeling Approach for Wind Power 
Feed-in and Electricity Spot Prices’ [2013] 59 Energy Policy 213. Pp. 213-214. Paul 
Deane, ‘Quantifying the “Merit-Order” Effect in European Electricity Markets’ (2015) Rapid 
Response Energy Brief <http://www.kic-innoenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
RREB_III-Merit_order_Final.pdf> accessed on 09/09/2016. P1. Malcolm Keay, ‘Electricity 
Markets are Broken – Can they be Fixed?’ (2016) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
Paper: EL 17 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
Electricity-markets-are-broken-can-they-be-fixed-EL-17.pdf> accessed on 09/09/2016. P. 
10.
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Firstly, it has become challenging for non-RES generators to recover their fixed 
costs which disincentives investment in new generation facilities that may be 
necessary as back up, while it incentives continued use of old facilities that 
have been written off.18 Secondly, RES producers whose generated electricity is 
dispatched in priority, which may be required by law and entails that electricity 
produced from RES will be fed into the grid in priority, barely have an incentive 
to cease production.19 Since electricity cannot be stored easily, this means that 
electricity markets with large quantities of RES may experience negative prices 
on windy and sunny days.20 The greater the share of RES in a given market, the 
more pressing these issues become and the greater the risk of imbalance of 
the electricity grid.
3.2. INVESTORS IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR
This section will explore what actors are currently engaged in RES investments 
and, therefore, may benefit from the legal framework of the ECT. Since the scope 
of application of the investment provisions of the ECT is determined by the 
definition of ‘investor’ contained in Art. 1(7) ECT, it is briefly recalled here:
“”Investor” means:
a) With respect to a Contracting Party:
i) A natural person having the citizenship of nationality of or who is 
permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its 
applicable law;
18. The International Energy Agency observed that investments in conventional power 
generation have essentially come to a halt in Europe in 2015. See: International Energy 
Agency, ‘World Energy Investment 2016’ (International Energy Agency, 2016) < https://
www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEI2016SUM.pdf> accessed on 22/09/2016. P. 16. 
Malcolm Keay, ‘Electricity Markets are Broken – Can they be Fixed?’ (2016) Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Paper: EL 17 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Electricity-markets-are-broken-can-they-be-fixed-EL-17.pdf> 
accessed on 09/09/2016. P. 10-11. Corinna Klessmann, Christian Nabe & Karsten Burges, 
‘Pros and cons of exposing renewables to electricity market risks— A comparison of the 
market integration approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK’ [2008] 36 Energy Policy 
3646. P. 3649.
19. Malcolm Keay, ‘Electricity Markets are Broken – Can they be Fixed?’ (2016) Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Paper: EL 17 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Electricity-markets-are-broken-can-they-be-fixed-EL-17.pdf> 
accessed on 09/09/2016. P. 12.
20. Ibid. Pp. 5-6.
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ii) A company or other organization organized in accordance with 
the law applicable in that Contracting Party;”
This provision clearly states that ‘investors’ can be both natural and legal persons. 
Traditionally, investments in the energy sector were characterized as ‘large’ and 
‘long-term’.21 Therefore, ‘traditional’ investors are often corporate entities, as is 
evidenced by the fact that most investment claims under the ECT have been 
brought by corporations, although there are a few examples to the contrary.22 
While many forms of RES, such as hydro, thermal solar, tidal, biomass, and wind 
still require significant investments, forms such as PV solar and geothermal can 
more easily be exploited by less wealthy investors. This makes it more likely that 
natural persons may invoke the provisions of the ECT.23
Even though smaller investors are increasingly able to participate in the financing 
of RES projects through innovative ways, such as crowdfunding, this section will 
primarily focus on the larger RES investors that are engaged in transboundary 
projects.24 Attention will be paid to diverging investment motives and strategies.
Electricity production and/or supply companies, both major international and 
national ones, are an obvious category of investors.25 These companies invest 
21. Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford 
University Press 2010). P. xlvii.
22. See for example: Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/18. Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, SCC - Case No. V (064/2008). 
Anatolie and Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group S.A., Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, 
SCC – Case No. 116/2010.
23. Of the ‘Solar Panel’ cases based on the ECT, the following were brought by at least one 
natural person: Antaris Solar and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Ad hoc, 
PCA Administered. Mathias Kruck, Ralf Hofmann, Frank Schumm, Joachim Kruck, Peter 
Flachsmann, Rolf Schumm, Karsten Reiss, Jürgen Reiss v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/15/23. Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3.
24. Dinand Drankier, ‘Het Participatie- en Financieringstekort in de Energietransitie: 
Crowdfunding als Panacee?’ [2017] 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Energierecht 262. David 
Blair, Mark Wesker, Alan John & Aisling Pringleton, ‘Review of Crowdfunding Regulation 
& Market Developments – Unleashing the Potential of Crowdfunding for Financing 
Renewable Energy Projects’ (Osborne Clark 2015).
25. Luc van Nuffel, Koen Rademaekers, Jessica Yearwood & Verena Graichen, ‘European 
Energy Industry Investments’ (European Union 2017). Pp. 80-81. Clean Energy Pipeline, 
‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global Capital Finance & Clean 
Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/Resources/CE/ResearchReports/
The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed 
on 31/05/2016. Pp. 4-7. For example, Eneco is currently the sole remaining owner of the 
Amalia Wind park while HVC Energie 10 percent stake in the Gemini Wind park, both 
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in RES projects to diversify their portfolio and adapt to a changing market that 
increasingly demands renewable energy.26 The increasing share of renewables 
has, as explained above, put a downward pressure on electricity prices, making 
RES attractive because it can still count on lucrative government support.27
Independent power producers form a second group of investors that actively 
engage in RES investments.28 These producers generate electricity to sell it 
directly to either supply companies or large end users. Their activities are usually 
restricted to electricity production and they do not sell electricity directly to small 
consumers.29
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), primarily those of PV panels and wind 
turbines, are also investing significantly in RES projects as equity participants.30 
Their primary investment motive is to ensure sales for their equipment in a market 
that has become very competitive due to overcapacity.31 In return of supplying 
located before the coast of the Netherlands. The Trianel Wind farm near the German 
island of Borkum is an example of a joint venture of 33 municipal electricity companies 
from the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. The German offshore wind 
parks Sandbank and DanTysk are both joint ventures between Vattenfall (51 percent in 
each wind park) and Stadtwerke München (49 percent in each wind park).
26. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. Pp. 4-7.
27. Id.
28. Sebastian Zank, Timo Schilz, Britta Holt & Florian Stapf, ‘European Alternative Energy – 
Application study & Outlook’ (Scope Ratings, 2 March 2015) <https://www.scoperatings.
com/scoperatings/study/download%3Bjsessionid=01545FFE5F32E096689811067E18
1984?id=475c2cce-dc53-4811-8c97-368602a5516d&q=1> accessed on 31/05/2016. 
P. 4. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ 
(Global Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.
com/Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 8.
29. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 8. Silver Ridge Power B.V. and 
Alten Renewable Energy B.V. are examples of independent power producers active in 
various countries that are currently engaged in ECT proceedings.
30. For example, Siemens Wind Power holds a 20 percent share in the Gemini Windfarm 
in the Netherlands. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy 
Investor Landscape’ (Global Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://
cleanenergypipeline.com/Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20
Renewable%20Energy%20Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 11.
31. Id.
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generation equipment for a particular project, participants in that project may 
demand an equity participation by the OEM. For the other project partners, this is 
an effective manner to hedge risks associated with the design and construction 
of the project. Therefore, OEMs will primarily get involved in a project at a very 
early stage. Their intention, however, is often not to remain a project partner for 
the long-term. A few years after the project has become operational is usually 
the moment that these investors divest their share in a project to recycle their 
capital.32
For similar reasons, contractors may also become equity participant in RES 
projects. In offshore wind projects, maritime engineering companies are 
increasingly assuming the role of equity partner.33
Infrastructure funds also engage in RES investments.34 These funds are often 
seeking low-risk and long-term investments with stable yields.35 Therefore, they 
often enter a project at a rather late stage, preferably at the operational phase.36 
Infrastructure funds are often passive participants in projects and therefore prefer 
project partners with significant operating experience.37
Private equity funds are usually looking for more risky investments that yield 
higher returns.38 Investments by private equity funds are often made at an 
32. Id.
33. Van Oord, for example, is a project partner in the Gemini wind farm and successfully 
applied for a tender to build a wind farm of the coast of Zeeland together with other 
partners. Likewise, DEME is a project partner in German and Belgian wind parks.
34. Luc van Nuffel, Koen Rademaekers, Jessica Yearwood & Verena Graichen, ‘European 
Energy Industry Investments’ (European Union 2017). P. 80. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The 
European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global Capital Finance & Clean Energy 
Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20
European%20Renewable%20Energy%20Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 
31/05/2016. P. 12. Sophie Justice, ‘Private Financing of Renewable Energy’ (Chatham 
House, December 2009) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/
public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/1209_financeguide.




38. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 13. Sophie Justice, 
‘Private Financing of Renewable Energy’ (Chatham House, December 2009) <https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20
Environment%20and%20Development/1209_financeguide.pdf> accessed on 01/06/2016. 
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earlier stage of project development than those by infrastructure funds, at the 
development or construction phase. However, private equity funds tend to hold 
on to their investment for a shorter period of time.39
The last few years, infrastructure and private equity funds are increasingly 
confronted with competition from institutional investors, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies.40 These latter investors used to invest in RES projects 
through the former but the volatile equity markets and low returns on bonds 
have forced these investors to engage more directly in RES projects.41 The 
investment will often be made for the long-term but usually only a few years 
after commissioning of the project to minimize risks associated with the early 
stages of project development.42 Both insurance companies (20-100 mln) and 
pension funds (100-250 mln) are often in the market for large investments per 
transaction, which limits the pool of potential investments primarily to offshore 
wind farms or portfolios of RES assets.43 Moreover, given the aim of institutional 
P. 7. Luc van Nuffel, Koen Rademaekers, Jessica Yearwood & Verena Graichen, ‘European 
Energy Industry Investments’ (European Union 2017). P. 80.
39. Id.
40. In 2010, for example, the Dutch pension fund PGGM acquired a minority stake 
in the Walney offshore wind farm from Dong Energy. Tom Murley, ‘EU Renewable 
Energy Infrastructure Market Report’ (Two Lights Energy Advisors, 2016) <http://www.
twolightsenergy.com/images/Research/2016/Two%20Lights%20EU%20Q4%202016%20
Report.pdf> accessed on 12/09/2017. Luc van Nuffel, Koen Rademaekers, Jessica 
Yearwood & Verena Graichen, ‘European Energy Industry Investments’ (European Union 
2017). P. 80.
41. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 14. Sophie Justice, 
‘Private Financing of Renewable Energy’ (Chatham House, December 2009) <https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20
Environment%20and%20Development/1209_financeguide.pdf> accessed on 01/06/2016. 
P. 7.
42. Id. Tom Murley, ‘EU Renewable Energy Infrastructure Market Report’ (Two Lights Energy 
Advisors, 2016) <http://www.twolightsenergy.com/images/Research/2016/Two%20
Lights%20EU%20Q4%202016%20Report.pdf> accessed on 12/09/2017.
43. This is primarily due to the high acquisition costs associated with these transactions. 
Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 14. Sophie Justice, 
‘Private Financing of Renewable Energy’ (Chatham House, December 2009) <https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20
Environment%20and%20Development/1209_financeguide.pdf> accessed on 01/06/2016. 
P. 7.
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investors to invest in low-risk projects in jurisdictions that entail little political risk, 
their geographic scope is primarily restricted to North-West Europe.44
A relatively new form of investor in RES is a so-called ‘YieldCo’.45 These 
companies usually have a sponsor company that puts a cash-generating 
asset, or a portfolio thereof, in a limited liability company which than goes public 
with the aim of raising capital.46 This form of investment structure allows small 
investors to participate in larger projects, also abroad, because they can simply 
obtain shares of such a company. An additional benefit may be that investment 
protection may be obtained through YieldCo’s that, otherwise, would have been 
unavailable.47 Also, it allows small investors to unite in a YieldCo by swapping 
investment in RES installations for shares in a YieldCo, which strengthens the 
bargaining power of RES investors.48
3.3. THE INTERRELATEDNESS OF INVESTMENT AND 
TRADE IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR
From a legal perspective, it seems that the international rules concerning 
investment and trade have developed into two almost separate fields of 
‘international law’ since the failure of the International Trade Organization in the 
late 1940’s.49 In practice, however, there is an important relationship between 
trade and investment. One of the main arguments of this dissertation will be 
that any legal framework that is aimed at facilitating RES investments should 
44. Id.
45. Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’ (Global 
Capital Finance & Clean Energy Pipeline, 2014) <http://cleanenergypipeline.com/
Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20Renewable%20Energy%20
Investor%20Landscape.pdf> accessed on 31/05/2016. P. 16.
46. EY, ‘The YieldCo Structure – Unlocking the Value in Power Generation Assets (EY, 2015) 
<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-yieldco-brochure/$FILE/ey-yieldco-
brochure.pdf> accessed on 01/06/2016. P. 3.
47. See for example the YieldCo European Solar Holdings N.V., a limited liability company 
incorporated in the Netherlands. This company actively advertises with offering investment 
protection to investors. See: <http://www.europeansolarholdings.com/> accessed on 
01/06/2016.
48. Ben Willis, ‘Solar Yield Co Launched to ‘Protect EU PV Investors’’ (PV Tech, 2014) <http://
www.pv-tech.org/news/solar_yield_co_launched_to_protect_eu_pv_investors > accessed 
on 09/02/2017.
49. Mark Wu, ‘The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving International 
Investment Regime’ in Zachary Douglas et al (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law – Bridging Theory into Practice (Oxford University Press 2014). P. 172.
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acknowledge and reflect this interrelatedness as a barrier to investment may 
constitute a barrier to trade, in goods and/or services and vice versa.
This section will briefly clarify the link between investment and trade in the 
RES sector. It is argued that any legal framework which is aimed at facilitating 
investments in the RES sector should take into account the entire value chain of 
RES, including the value chain of generation equipment and project development.
3.3.1. The Value Chain of Renewable Energy Generation 
Equipment
On various occasions, the OECD has identified that the value chain of RES 
generation equipment is increasingly globally organized.50 This means that RES 
generation equipment is manufactured and traded in GVC’s. GVC’s have been 
described as follows:
“GVCs encompass the full range of activities that are required 
to bring a good or service from conception through the different 
phases of production – provision of raw materials; the input of 
various components, subassemblies, and producer services; the 
assembly of finished goods – to delivery to final consumers, as well 
as disposal after use.”51
The consequence of GVC’s is that goods that are produced by a company from 
a specific country, say Vestas from Denmark, may contain relatively few – or even 
none – components that actually originate in Denmark. Thus, a wind turbine may 
be designed in one country, while components are made in another country, 
assembled in yet another country, branded in a fourth country and sold in a fifth 
country.52
Notwithstanding the general trend towards GVC’s of RES generation equipment, 
the value chain may differ to some extend depending on the technology. In 
50. OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2016 (2016). P. 159. OECD, Overcoming 
Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance and Investment (2015). 
Pp. 59-60.
51. Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi & Cornelia Staritz, ‘Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis 
World: Resilience, Consolidation, and Shifting End Markets’ in Olivier Cattaneo et al (eds.), 
Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World: A Development Perspective (World Bank 2010). 
P. 1.
52. Veena Jha, ‘Trade Flows, Barriers and Market Drivers in Renewable Energy Supply Goods: 
The Need to Level the Playing Field’ (ICTSD issue Paper No. 10, 2009). P. 2.
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the case of solar PV, panels can easily be assembled in China, incorporating 
components that originate elsewhere, and from there be shipped easily to any 
destination in the world in containers. In the case of wind energy, the story is 
more complicated given the size of contemporary wind turbines. Hence, it may 
be more convenient to assemble them relatively close to a project site in order 
to mitigate challenges associated with transport and logistics.53
Besides the global organization of value chains in the RES sector, it is notable 
that much of the current world trade is actually intra-firm trade: meaning that 
goods, often intermediate goods, which are traded internationally are traded 
within the same company. For example, a wind turbine manufacturer may ship 
components from various jurisdictions to an assembly facility in the proximity of 
a project. In this scenario, the trade cannot take place without an investment: in 
order for international trade to be intra-firm, the company has to set up a local 
subsidiary in the jurisdictions involved.54 According to the OECD, this is one 
of the reasons that investment and trade should ideally be regulated through 
comprehensive agreements that address both.55
3.3.2. Project Development and Equity Participation by Suppliers
Having discussed the value chain of RES generation equipment, the next 
step becomes project development where generation equipment is deployed. 
Especially in the value chain of project development there is great potential for 
host States to reap the economic benefits of RES even if the country is only 
marginally involved in the manufacturing process of RES generation equipment.56 
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), PV modules 
only account for 30 percent of the costs of a PV project, inverters for 10 percent 
and the remaining 60 percent is spent on so-called balance of system costs.57 This 
latter category includes various costs, such as non-module hardware (cables, 
grid connection, racking and mounting, safety and security, and monitoring and 
control), installations costs (mechanical and electric installations and inspection), 
53. H. Bucher, J. Drake-Brockman, A. Kasterine & M. Sugathan, Trade in Environmental 
Goods and Services: Opportunities and Challenges (International Trade Centre Technical 
Paper, 2014). P. 20.
54. OECD, Intra-Firm Trade: Patterns, Determinants and Policy Implications (OECD Trade 
Policy Working Paper No. 114, 2011). P. 8.
55. Id.
56. Diala Hawila & Arslan Khalid, ‘Renewable Energy Benefits – Leveraging Local Capacity for 
Solar PV’ (IRENA 2017). P. 11.
57. Ibid. P. 10.
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and certain soft costs (application for financial support, permitting, system 
design, acquisition and financing costs, and operational costs).58
At the stage of project development investment and trade in goods and services 
are again interrelated. Firstly, as discussed in section 3.2., OEM’s of generation 
equipment or contractors active in the RES sector regularly participate in projects 
as equity partner: in exchange for their equity participation they may deliver 
required goods and services that are necessary for completion of the project. 
Thus, when a OEM participates in a foreign project as equity partner it will most 
likely deliver the required goods that are subsequently traded internationally.
Furthermore, at the stage of project development RES services are of great 
importance. The market for RES services has been estimated at twice the size of 
RES goods.59 In practice, OEM’s often sell goods in combination with the required 
services relating to engineering, transport, constructions, and maintenance.60 
The reason that trade in goods and services in the RES sector are intrinsically 
intertwined is related to the high tech nature of the sector: it has been said 
that the development of RES technology lies ‘around the top of the complexity 
ladder.’61 This means that the purchaser of a wind turbine will most likely not 
only be interested in the physical hardware, but also in the knowledge and skills 
required to deploy and operate a wind turbine. Consequently, ‘they seek to 
acquire these goods in combination with ancillary services such as installation, 
technical support, training and maintenance.’62 The less mature a market for 
RES goods and services is in a given market, the more inputs will have to be 
imported. According to the OECD, wind and solar projects in the least-developed 
countries are particularly reliant on imported goods and services because of the 
lack of a local industry.63
58. Michael Taylor, Pablo Ralon & Andrei Ilas, ‘The Power to Change: Solar and Wind Cost 
Reduction Potential to 2025’ (IRENA 2016). P. 31.
59. Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Using Trade for Achieving the SDGs: The Example of the 
Environmental Goods Agreement’ [2017] 51 Journal of World Trade 575. P. 584.
60. United States International Trade Commission, Renewable Energy and Related Services: 
Recent Developments (Investigation No. 332-534, August 2013). Pp. xix and xx. Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-Up of 
Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the 
Policy Options’ [2017] 51 Journal of World Trade 933. P. 944. Tilak Doshi, Sector Study on 
Environmental Services: Renewable Energy (APEC Policy Support Unit, 2017). Pp. 3-5.
61. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 9.
62. Id.
63. Ronald Steenblik & Massimo Geloso Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate 
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To understand the link between trade in services and investment, the four ‘modes’ 
of services supply as defined by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will briefly be introduced:64
1) ‘from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other 
Member’ (cross border supply or mode 1). For example, a lawyer 
from Amsterdam who advises clients in Tokyo.
2) ‘in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any 
other Member’ (consumption abroad or mode 2). For example, a 
tourist visiting a museum abroad or a student attending a university 
abroad.
3) ‘by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial 
presence in the territory of any other Member’ (commercial presence 
or mode 3). For example, the Royal Bank of Scotland establishing 
a subsidiary in the US. This mode of services supply is very closely 
related to investment as the supply of services through this mode by 
definition requires an investment. It is on the basis of this mode of 
supply that GATS liberalizes FDI.
4) ‘by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural 
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member’ (presence 
of natural persons or mode 4). An engineer who travels abroad to 
engage in a construction project.
In practice, mode 3 – the establishment of a local presence, which by definition 
requires an investment – is by far the most important mode of services supply. 
Estimates by the WTO Secretariat over the year 2011 suggest that trade through 
mode 3 accounted for approximately 55 percent of the value of all services 
trade.65 Various sources indicate that the same holds true of RES services.66
Change: An Exploratory Analysis’ (OECD, 2011). P. 10.
64. See: Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Arwel Davies, World Trade Law – Text, Materials and 
Commentary (Hart Publishing 2012). P. 639.
65. The same research estimates that Mode 1 provides for 30 percent, Mode 2 for 10 percent 
and Mode 4 for merely five percent. See: Rainer Lanz & Andreas Maurer, ‘Services and 
Global Value Chains – Some Evidence on Servicification of Manufacturing and Services 
Networks’ (WTO Working Paper No. ERSD-2015-03 2015). P. 13.
66. United States International Trade Commission, Renewable Energy and Related Services: 
Recent Developments (Investigation No. 332-534, August 2013). P. 2-19. Jehan Sauvage 
 3
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   113 04/12/2019   11:36:07
114
Chapter 3
At the stage of project development, investment and trade in goods and services 
are thus also strongly interrelated. This in turn means that barriers to investment, 
and trade in goods and/or services in the RES sector should not be considered 
independently as a barrier to one may indirectly constitute a barrier to all three.67
3.4. BARRIERS TO INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN THE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR
Having established the link between investment and trade in the RES sector, this 
section will identify some of the most recurrent barriers to investment and trade. 
As will be seen, there is a relatively high level of protectionism in the RES sector.
3.4.1. Barriers to Investment
Direct general barriers to investment may include discriminatory screening 
procedures and restrictions on the acquisition of land and real estate by 
foreigners.68 Indirect investment barriers may be closely related to trade 
barriers and will be discussed below. Trade barriers can, for example, increase 
the costs of RES equipment which undermines cost competitiveness of RES, 
impose additional risks which may increase the cost of capital, and/or increase 
transaction costs.
3.4.2. Barriers to Trade in Goods
Liberal rules on trade in goods in the RES sector are of great importance due 
to the existence of GVC’s. Barriers to trade in intermediate products in the RES 
sector are likely to increase the overall costs of RES generation equipment. In 
the context of GVC’s, enacting trade barriers between jurisdictions can best be 
compared to enacting trade barriers within a single factory. Currently, applied 
tariffs on RES generation equipment are generally relatively low between 
developed States, below 10 percent.69 Developing countries, on the other hand, 
& Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ (OECD, 2017). P. 
10. Camilla Prawitz & Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – Environmental 
Goods and Indispensable Services’ (The National Board of Trade 2014). P. 17.
67. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). Pp. 8-9.
68. Ibid. P. 11.
69. H. Bucher, J. Drake-Brockman, A. Kasterine & M. Sugathan, Trade in Environmental 
Goods and Services: Opportunities and Challenges (International Trade Centre Technical 
Paper, 2014). P. 13. Veena Jha, ‘Trade Flows, Barriers and Market Drivers in Renewable 
Energy Supply Goods: The Need to Level the Playing Field’ (ICTSD issue Paper No. 10, 
2009). Pp. 13-14.
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often apply higher tariffs.70 Although the average applied tariff in relation to RES 
goods is relatively low, two specific types of measures have regularly affected 
trade in the RES sector over the last years: LCR’s and trade remedies. These 
measures have the ability to significantly alter flows of FDI in the RES sector: if 
certain markets are fended off by higher import duties or LCR’s, foreign investors 
may want to establish a local presence in that jurisdiction, rather than import 
goods, in order to avoid these trade barriers.71
3.4.2.1. Local Content Requirements
LCR’s require investors to source a specified amount of inputs in goods and 
services of a RES project locally. Due to the GVC’s in the manufacturing process 
of RES generation equipment, LCR’s ‘have had a detrimental effect on global 
international investment flows in solar and wind energy’ since they disrupt 
the value chain.72 According to the OECD LCR’s can, ‘by raising the cost of 
inputs for downstream businesses […] hinder the profitability of downstream 
investors and lead to increased overall costs, weakened price competitiveness, 
reduced international investment flows and higher electricity prices.’73 Therefore, 
international investors have held that LCR’s are ‘the main policy impediment to 
international investment across the solar and wind-energy value chain.’74
In a significant amount of States, LCR’s are attached to RES support schemes.75 
Thus, depending on the (level of) local content of a given project, an investor 
may be eligible for (higher) financial support.76 Arguments in favor of these 
70. Id.
71. Veena Jha, ‘Trade Flows, Barriers and Market Drivers in Renewable Energy Supply Goods: 
The Need to Level the Playing Field’ (ICTSD issue Paper No. 10, 2009). P. 13.
72. OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2016 (2016). P. 159. OECD, Overcoming 
Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance and Investment (2015). 
Pp. 59-60. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes 
- Government Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) 
International Energy Law Review 185. P. 186.
73. OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2016 (2016). P. 159.
74. OECD, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance 
and Investment (2015). P. 57. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable 
Energy Schemes - Government Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ 
[2017] 35(5) International Energy Law Review 185. P. 186.
75. Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Local Content Requirements and the 
Renewable Energy Industry: A Good Match?’ (ICTSD 2013). This study identified LCR’s 
attached to FIT’s in, amongst others: China, Canada, the US, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, 
India and several EU Member States.
76. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes - Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 185.
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requirements are the creation of a domestic RES industry and local jobs, and 
ensuring that tax payers’ or electricity consumers’ money – which is usually at 
stake in case of financial support to RES projects – is spend with maximum 
benefits for the host economy.77
Besides constituting barriers to trade, LCR’s can also represent barriers to 
investment since they may significantly impact the costs and risks involved 
in RES projects at different stages of the project.78 By forcing foreign 
investors to cooperate with local partners, it will be necessary to examine the 
creditworthiness of local project participants, contractors, and equity partners, 
which raises transaction costs.79 In addition, LCR’s can raise risks associated with 
construction, technology, planning, and design.80 This is particularly the case 
when local partners and equipment lacks an established track record, which is 
important because of the high level of innovation in the RES sector.81 These risks 
may also affect the operational and decommissioning phase of an investment.
As said, one way in which project developers of large RES projects often hedge 
risks associated with construction, operation, and technology is by requiring 
contractors or OEM’s to take a minority share in the project.82 In return of taking 
a minority share, contractors or OEM’s will be awarded the contract to construct 
and operate the project or supply the required generation equipment. This 
increases the exposure of OEM’s to aforementioned risks and thereby serves 
as a guarantee to the other partners that contractors or OEM’s will perform 
according to the agreed arrangements.83 Of course, when OEM’s cannot supply 
parts to the project through their normal supply chain but, due to the LCR, they 
would be compelled to establish a local production facility, the LCR may function 
as an additional barrier to investment and trade.
77. Id.
78. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 17.
79. John Dewar & Oliver Irwin, ‘Project Risks’ in John Dewar (ed.), International Project Finance 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2015). Pp. 117-118.
80. Roger McCormiek, ‘Project Finance’ in Sarah Paterson et al (eds.), The Law of International 
Finance (Oxford University Press 2017). P. 791.
81. John Dewar & Oliver Irwin, ‘Project Risks’ in John Dewar (ed.), International Project Finance 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2015). Pp. 88-90.
82. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 30.
83. Id.
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Even when RES generation equipment is supplied by companies that are not an 
equity partner in the project, construction, operational, and technology risks are 
also expected to increase due to the LCR. Instead of working with the preferred 
companies that have proven track records, project developers may be compelled 
to cooperate with producers and contractors that lack such a record.84 Thus, 
particularly projects in countries that lack knowledge and expertise in the RES 
sector can be affected by LCR’s due to increased risks and transaction costs.
The financial consequences of LCR’s can best be demonstrated by reference to 
a research conducted in the context of the LCR’s maintained in the RES support 
schemes of the Canadian provinces Ontario and Quebec. It was found that the 
LCR raised the costs of installed wind capacity with approximately ‘USD 386 
per kilowatt of electricity’ which amounted to 14 percent of the total costs per 
kilowatt of installed capacity.85 This made Canadian wind energy significantly 
more expensive than wind turbine capacity in the US.86 If one would translate 
these additional costs for a large wind farm of 600 MW, the total costs would 
increase by USD 231 mln.87
3.4.2.2. Trade Remedies
Trade remedies, such as anti-dumping or countervailing duties, are frequently 
applied in the RES sector.88 In many States these measures have been adopted 
against (perceived) unfair trade practices, such as dumping and the (unfair) 
subsidization of domestic producers of RES generation equipment such as PV 
panels.89 A relatively modest number of these cases were brought before the 
84. Ibid. P. 31.
85. Gary Hufbauer & Jeffrey Schott, Local Content Requirements – A Global Problem 
(Peterson Institute for Economic Studies 2013). Pp. 71–73.
86. Id.
87. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 32.
88. H. Bucher, J. Drake-Brockman, A. Kasterine & M. Sugathan, Trade in Environmental 
Goods and Services: Opportunities and Challenges (International Trade Centre Technical 
Paper, 2014). P. 16. Tilak Doshi, Sector Study on Environmental Services: Renewable 
Energy (APEC Policy Support Unit, 2017). Pp. 30-31. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh 
Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-Up of Clean Energy Technologies: 
Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the Policy Options’ [2017] 51 
Journal of World Trade 933. P. 937. Christopher Frey, ‘The Role of Mega-Regionals in 
the Decarbonization of the Economy’ in Thilo Rensmann (ed.), Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements (Springer 2017). P. 279.
89. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-
Up of Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the 
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body, including some of the largest trade disputes in 
WTO history if calculated on the basis of the value of trade affected. For example, 
a dispute between the EU and China, affecting trade with an annual value of 
EUR 21 bln, arose in 2013 after the EU imposed tariffs on Chinese solar panels.90 
After China threatened to retaliate by imposing import duties on European wine 
and steel, the dispute was quickly settled between the parties in order to avoid a 
trade war.91 A comparable dispute arose between the US and China in 2012 and 
it remains unresolved although it has been litigated to the very end at the WTO.92
The effects that trade remedies can have on investment and trade in the RES 
sector are significant: if the prices of generation equipment increase, demand 
for those products is expected to go down and investments are also expected 
to decrease as a result.93 Given the increased costs of inputs, trade remedies 
can also result in higher LCOE thereby undermining the price competitiveness 
of RES. Arguments that are often relied upon to justify them include the 
protection of domestic industries and jobs against unfair foreign competition. 
Besides reducing demand for affected goods, trade remedies can also force 
manufacturers to relocate their production facilities. For example, OEM’s may 
establish manufacturing facilities in the jurisdiction that is protected by the 
measure or – and this is more likely – relocate to a jurisdiction where labor 
costs are low and that are not targeted by the measures. In the past, Chinese 
manufacturers have, for example, relocated to other countries in South East Asia 
in order to avoid trade remedies in the US and the EU.94
Policy Options’ [2017] 51 Journal of World Trade 933. P. 937.
90. Robin Emmott & Ben Blanchard, ‘EU, China resolve solar dispute - their biggest trade row 
by far’ (Reuters 2013).
91. Id.
92. United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, DS437.
93. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-
Up of Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the 
Policy Options’ [2017] 51 Journal of World Trade 933. P. 937.
94. Also, after trade remedies were imposed on Chinese solar panels and the Fukushima 
disaster in Japan, a shift in PV exports from China was noticeable: instead of Europe and 
the US, Japan became a major importer of Chinese cells: Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Using 
Trade for Achieving the SDGs: The Example of the Environmental Goods Agreement’ 
[2017] 51 Journal of World Trade 575. P. 584. Christian Roselund, Malaysia, Korea and 
Vietnam dominate U.S. solar imports (PV-Magazine, 2018). Diala Hawila & Arslan Khalid, 
‘Renewable Energy Benefits – Leveraging Local Capacity for Solar PV’ (IRENA 2017). P. 9.
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3.4.3. Barriers to Trade in Services
Trade in services is also highly relevant for the development of RES projects. To 
illustrate, one can refer to offshore wind development and protectionist legislation 
in the maritime sector. In Europe, the offshore wind sector has become mature 
due to decades of experience and a large market for offshore wind projects, 
evidenced by the sheer amount of total offshore installed wind capacity: 18.5 
GW.95 To realize this growth and to meet the demand from the market, European 
companies engaged in offshore construction have developed a fleet of vessels 
that are capable of installing wind turbines offshore, so called jack-up vessels. In 
addition, these jack-up vessels are manned by crews specialized in this specific 
task. The participation of several of these maritime severices providers as equity 
partner in offshore wind farms shows that they are also becoming active as 
investors.
By comparison, in the US the first offshore wind farm has only been operational 
since December 2016 with a capacity of only 30 MW although ambitious plans 
are currently in the pipeline.96 It is, therefore, perceivable that European offshore 
wind developers and maritime services companies have more experience in 
the construction, operation, and maintenance of offshore wind facilities. For the 
US, attracting European developers and services providers as investors in US 
offshore wind farms might be benificial since this would allow the US to reap the 
benefits of the experienced gained over the last decades in Europe. Likewise, 
for European companies the US may be an interesting unexplored market for 
offshore wind farm development with a lot of ‘low hanging fruit’, i.e. easy to 
develop projects.
However, US legislation may not allow European vessels and their crews to be 
involved in the construction, operation, and maintenance of US offshore wind 
farms.97 On the basis of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and related legislation 
95. See: Wind Europe, ‘Offshore Wind in Europe – Key Trends and Statistics 2018’ (WE, 2018). 
<https://windeurope.org/about-wind/statistics/offshore/european-offshore-wind-industry-
key-trends-statistics-2018/> accessed on 11/02/2019.
96. Of course, the US did not ratify the ECT and is not bound by it. However, this example 
primarily serves to illustrate a barrier to trade and investment in the RES-sector. 
Cassius Shuman, ‘Wind Farm Begins Commercial Operation’ (The Block Island Times, 
2016) <http://www.blockislandtimes.com/article/wind-farm-begins-commercial-
operation/48318> accessed on 18/01/2017.
97. Charlie Papavizas, ‘Working with the Jones Act in the Offshore Wind Industry’ (Offshore 
Wind Journal, 2016). <http://www.owjonline.com/news/view,working-with-the-jones-act-in-
the-offshore-wind-industry_45102.htm> accessed on 17/01/2017.
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– often combinedly referred to as the ‘Jones Act’ – the US shipping industry is 
protected from foreign competition.98 For example, the transport of goods and 
persons between US ports requires that ships are owned by US citizens for at 
least 75 percent.99 Also, these vessels must be sailing under the US flag, be 
built in the US, and be manned by a US crew.100 By virtue of the 1953 Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the application of the Jones Act extends ‘to any 
man-made device permanently or temporarily affixed to the seabed […] out to 
200 nautical miles from the coast.’101 Although it is currently disputed to what 
extent these laws would be obstacles to the participation of foreign companies in 
US offshore wind farm development, the need for caution is clear and European 
vessels are therefore not being employed in the US.102 This means that efficiency 
gains that have been made in Europe may not necessarily be applied in the 
US offshore sector.103 A report found, for instance, that the Jones Act may 
‘may increase project costs by as much as USD 20-40 mln for a 100 turbine 
development.’104 For example, research conducted for the US Department of 
98. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988. Daniel Michaeli, 
‘Foreign Investment Restrictions in Coastwise Shipping: A Maritime Mess’ [2014] 89 New 
York University Law Review 1047. P. 1054.
99. Daniel Michaeli, ‘Foreign Investment Restrictions in Coastwise Shipping: A Maritime Mess’ 
[2014] 89 New York University Law Review 1047. P. 1054.
100. Peter C. Evans, ‘Strenghtening WTO Member Commitments in Energy Services: Problems 
and Prospects’ in Pierre Sauve et al (eds.), Domestic Regulation and Service Trade 
Liberalization (World Bank Publications 2003). P. 175. Charlie Papavizas, ‘Working with 
the Jones Act in the Offshore Wind Industry’ (Offshore Wind Journal, 2016). <http://www.
owjonline.com/news/view,working-with-the-jones-act-in-the-offshore-wind-industry_45102.
htm > accessed on 17/01/2017. Douglas Burnett & Michael Hartman, ‘The Jones Act 
– One More Variable in the Offshore Wind Equation’ (Squire Sanders) <http://www.
squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/events/2010/09/offshore-wind-seminar/files/
jones-act-paper/fileattachment/jones_actone_more_variable_in_the_offshore_equat__.
pdf> accessed on 17/01/2017. P. 3.
101. Charlie Papavizas, ‘Working with the Jones Act in the Offshore Wind Industry’ (Offshore 
Wind Journal, 2016). <http://www.owjonline.com/news/view,working-with-the-jones-act-in-
the-offshore-wind-industry_45102.htm > accessed on 17/01/2017.
102. Id. Douglas Burnett & Michael Hartman, ‘The Jones Act – One More Variable in the 
Offshore Wind Equation’ (Squire Sanders) < http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/
files/insights/events/2010/09/offshore-wind-seminar/files/jones-act-paper/fileattachment/
jones_actone_more_variable_in_the_offshore_equat__.pdf> accessed on 17/01/2017.
103. For example, when the Dutch maritime engineering company Van Oord constructed 
offshore wind turbines for the Gemini windfarm, it took them 24 hours to complete the first 
wind turbine while it only took 12 hours to complete the final turbine. This gain in efficiency 
was primarily due to the steep learning curve of the crew of Van Oord who had gained 
experience, competence, and skills in the construction of offshore wind turbines.
104. Douglas Westwood, ‘Assessment of Vessel Requirements for the U.S. Offshore Wind 
Sector’ (2013). P. 85. <https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/assessment_
vessel_requirements_US_offshore_wind_report.pdf> accessed on 11/02/2019.
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Energy estimated that it would cost 60 to 200 percent more to built a Jones 
Act compliant vessel in the US than it would overseas.105 Also, the fact that US 
offshore wind projects have to be developed by inexperienced contractors using 
untested American vessels and inexperienced crews may raise risks associated 
with such projects.
Although this example concerns trade in services under mode 1, and all modes of 
services supply are relevant for the development of RES projects, the remainder 
of this section will primarily highlight barriers associated with the modes of supply 
that are most relevant for the RES sector: modes 3 and 4.106
3.4.3.1. Supply of Services: Mode 3
Mode 3 of services supply, the establishment of a local commercial presence, 
is by far the most important mode of services supply for RES services.107 Since 
the establishment of a local commercial presence by definition requires an 
investment it is closely linked to FDI.
However, it has been said that there are several reasons why foreign services 
suppliers cannot compete on a level playing field in various countries, ‘many 
of which involve restrictions on foreign investment.’108 Discriminatory barriers to 
FDI that RES service suppliers may encounter include: economic needs tests 
for the establishment of a commercial presence, foreign equity limits, nationality 
or residency requirements for accreditation of certain types of services, 
restrictions on the acquisition of land and real estate, and investment screening 
procedures.109
105. Colin Grabow, Inu Manak, & Daniel J. Ikenson, ‘The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No 
Longer Bear’ (Cato Institute, Policy Analysis Nr. 845, 2018). P. 12. Available at: <https://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa845.pdf> accessed on 11/02/2019.
106. Markus Krajewski, ‘Liberalizing Trade in Energy Services and Domestic Regulation: 
New Approaches in Mega-Regionals?‘ in Thilo Rensmann (ed.), Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements (Springer 2017). P. 301.
107. United States International Trade Commission, Renewable Energy and Related Services: 
Recent Developments (Investigation No. 332-534, August 2013). P. 2-19. Jehan Sauvage 
& Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ (OECD, 2017). P. 
10. Camilla Prawitz & Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – Environmental 
Goods and Indispensable Services’ (The National Board of Trade 2014). P. 17.
108. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 10.
109. Ibid. P. 11.
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This means that while mode 3, which is intrinsically linked with FDI, is the most 
important mode of services supply in the RES sector, barriers to investment 
and trade in this area are manifold. From a development perspective, this may 
be undesirable. Currently, much of the RES technology and knowledge is in the 
hands of a relatively select groups of companies, primarily located in developed 
countries and China. However, when subsidiaries of multinational firms establish a 
local presence in a country they often rely on local labor markets for personnel.110 
This means that there are ample opportunities for local job creation, transfer of 
skills and knowledge, and local partnerships.111
3.4.3.2. Supply of Services: Mode 4
Mode 4 of services supply, the presence of natural persons, merely accounts 
for 5 percent of the value of all services traded internationally.112 Nevertheless, 
its share of services supply in the RES sector is likely much higher since it is not 
uncommon that a foreign company which provides services through mode 3 also 
provides accompanying services through mode 4, especially when supervision 
or inspection is required for a short period of time.113
In particular in relation to countries that lack a mature RES services market, 
obstacles to the movement of people can be a significant impediment to trade 
in services.114 Common barriers include: labor-market tests, limitations on the 
duration of stay of foreign personnel, and cumbersome and complex visa 
procedures.115
Given the fact that mode 4 of services supply involves the movement of natural 
persons across borders, it is also the most controversial mode of supply since 
it relates to issues of migration and labor policy.
110. Id.
111. Ibid. P. 27.
112. Rainer Lanz & Andreas Maurer, ‘Services and Global Value Chains – Some Evidence on 
Servicification of Manufacturing and Services Networks’ (WTO Working Paper No. ERSD-
2015-03 2015). P. 13.
113. Ronald Steenblik & Massimo Geloso Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate 
Change: An Exploratory Analysis’ (OECD, 2011). Pp. 4 & 10.
114. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 11. Camilla Prawitz & Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – 
Environmental Goods and Indispensable Services’ (The National Board of Trade 2014). P. 
17.
115. Id.
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3.4.4. Linkages between the ECT Investment Chapter and Trade in 
Goods and Services
Besides the close factual relationship between investment and trade in the 
RES sector, there are also various legal connections between the two in the 
investment chapter of the ECT.
Concerning trade in goods, Art. 5 ECT contains a provision on trade-related 
investment measures (TRIM). Although this article can be found in Part II of 
the ECT on ‘Commerce’, Art. 10(11) ECT, which is located in Part III ‘Investment 
Promotion and Protection’, in essence incorporates Art. 5 into Part III by reference. 
On the basis of this provision, ECT contracting parties may not apply TRIM’s, 
such as LCR’s, to investments of investors of other contracting parties existing 
at the time of such application. There is currently no link between import duties 
and trade remedies and the investment chapter.
Concerning trade in services, it has already been mentioned that establishing 
a commercial presence under mode 3 by definition requires an investment. As 
such, market access is a relevant aspect. Currently, Arts. 10(2)(3)(5)(6) ECT do 
not provide for any binding commitments on market access for investors. Hence, 
the ECT currently does not liberalize FDI. That liberalizing services under mode 
3 and market access for investors are closely related can be demonstrated 
by reference to CETA, where services under mode 3 is regulated through the 
investment chapter, which also contains rules on investment protection.116
Services supply under mode 4 relates to some extent to Art. 11 ECT on key 
personnel. Although the commitments undertaken on the basis of Art. 11 do not 
provide for market access of foreign personnel, it does recognize the importance 
to move personnel into the host State by foreign investors, including personnel 
engaged in ‘key technical services’.117
116. Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘The Evolution of the EU External Trade Policy in Services – CETA, 
TTIP, and TiSA after Brexit’ [2017] 20 Journal of International Economic Law 583. P. 595. 
Articles 8.4-8.5, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
117. Article 11(1), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
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3.5. POLITICAL AND REGULATORY RISKS IN THE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR: THE CASE OF SPAIN
In the previous chapter it was argued that political and regulatory risks can have a 
significant impact on the costs of the capital and the inflow of FDI. Although RES 
are increasingly becoming price competitive with conventional energy sources, in 
the past many (if not all) RES investment relied financial and regulatory support 
for their economic viability. This also means that these investments are exposed 
to a particular kind of regulatory risk, namely that the support will be altered or 
withdrawn during the lifetime of a project. Since RES projects are often heavily 
financed with debt, a decrease in financial support can have significant effects 
on the cash flow and leave an investment insolvent.118
That this risk is not merely hypothetical is evidenced by the current list of ECT 
disputes. In particular over the last decade, many ECT disputes relate to RES 
where the reduction of financial support is at the heart of the dispute. States like 
Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Spain are all respondent in ECT 
ISDS cases because of this reason.119 As illustration, the regulatory changes to 
the Spanish RES support scheme will be introduced here.120
3.5.1. Developments in Spanish Renewable Energy Laws and 
Regulations
The ‘boom’ in the Spanish RES sector, that would subsequently be followed by 
a ‘bust’, began over a decade ago.121 In 2007, the country adopted a generous 
118. IRENA & CPI, ‘Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance’ (2018). P. 12. <https://
irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/IRENA_Global_landscape_
RE_finance_2018.pdf > accessed on 31/01/2019.
119. Norah Gallagher, ‘ECT and Renewable Energy Disputes’ in Maxi Scherer (ed.), 
International Arbitration in the Energy Sector (Oxford University Press 2018). P. 250.
120. The remainder of this chapter draws from various articles co-written by the present author: 
Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Cees 
Verburg & Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases and the 
Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for Intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ [2018] 
3 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 197. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, 
‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy Technology – The Role of 
International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ 
[2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1.
121. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 68-69. 
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legal framework that foresaw in direct financial support in the form of FIT’s through 
Royal Decree 661/2007 (RD 661/2007). This support would span the entire 
lifetime of the project, although the FIT was reduced after a number of years.122 
Although RD 661/2007 did allow for future tariff adjustments, these would not 
affect existing investments.123 In line with EU law, RES projects would also enjoy 
priority dispatch. Eligibility for support under RD 661/2007 was contingent upon 
registration in a public registry within a specified timeline.
RD 661/2007 attracted a lot of RES investments: as much as 50 percent of all 
PV investments worldwide were made in Spain in 2008.124 This ‘success’ may 
arguably be attributed to the generosity of the framework, about which concerns 
had already been raised in 2007. As one author put it, RD 661/2007 ‘guarantees 
very attractive profitability levels for [RES] investors. Furthermore, it will continue 
to be provided even when [RES] plants are fully paid-off, which will entail an 
unnecessary burden for consumers.’125 For example, facilities with an output 
equal to or exceeding 100 KW would receive EUR 0,44 per KW/h for the first 25 
years and EUR 0,35 per KW/h thereafter.126
Due to the fact that the electricity tariff for consumers was regulated in Spain at 
the time, the distribution system operators – which were in charge of paying the 
Cees Verburg & Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases 
and the Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for Intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ 
[2018] 3 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 197. Pp. 198-200. Cees 
Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy 
Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign 
Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 10-13.
122. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). P. 68. Cees 
Verburg & Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases and the 
Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for Intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ [2018] 
3 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 197. P. 199. Cees Verburg & Jaap 
Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy Technology – The 
Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 10.
123. Article 44(3), Royal Decree 661/2007, Legislation Development of the Spanish Electric 
Power Act, Volume 11, 2009. P. 117.
124. Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments Under Cross-Fire? Renewable Energy 
and International Economic Tribunals’ [2015] 12(2) Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 117. P. 121.
125. Pablo del Río González, ‘Ten Years of Renewable Electricity Policies in Spain: An Analysis 
of Successive Feed-in Tariff Reforms’ [2008] 36(8) Energy Policy 2917. P. 2926.
126. See for example: Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction 
Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 121.
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FIT’s to generators, were not able to pass the costs of the subsidies on to the 
consumers, which created a so-called ‘tariff deficit’.127 It has to be noted that the 
FIT’s were not the only cause of this deficit, they did however, in combination 
with the subsequent financial and economic crises, further exacerbate the 
problem.128 Rating agency Moody’s estimated that the cumulative amount of 
the deficit amounted to EUR 28.8 bln in 2013.129
In late 2007 Spanish authorities were already aware of the rapidly increasing 
investments in the RES sector.130 Therefore, after the ‘boom’ had set in, and 
the authorities became aware of the fact that the support scheme might not be 
financially sustainable, various legislative measures were adopted with the object 
and purpose of reducing financial support.
Between 2008 and 2012 numerous measures were adopted that adjusted the 
existing legal regime. For example, in 2008 a Royal Decree was adopted that 
reduced support for new plants.131 In 2010 a Royal Decree was adopted that 
eliminated the FIT from the 25th year onwards.132 In the same year a Royal Decree 
Law was adopted that limited the amount of hours that a facility was eligible 
for the FIT while producing electricity and introduced a tariff for access to the 
electricity network.133 In 2012, a 7 percent tax was introduced on all generators of 
electricity, including those that made use of RES.134 These measures all adjusted 
the existing legal framework.
127. Iñigo del Guayo Castiella, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources by Regions: The 
Case of the Spanish Autonomous Communities’ in Marjan Peeters et al (eds.), Renewable 
Energy Law in the EU – Legal Perspectives on Bottom-Up Approaches (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014). P. 67.
128. Iñigo del Guayo, ‘Energy Law in Spain’ in Martha Roggenkamp et al (eds.), Energy Law 
in Europe – National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University Press 2016). P. 
1041.
129. Global Credit Research, ‘Moody’s: Spanish Electricity System Heads Toward 
Sustainability, as Electricity Tariff Deficit Debt Falls’ (Moody’s 2016). <https://www.moodys.
com/research/Moodys-Spanish-electricity-system-heads-toward-sustainability-as-
electricity-tariff--PR_345353> accessed 13/11/2017.
130. Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments Under Cross-Fire? Renewable Energy 
and International Economic Tribunals’ [2015] 12(2) Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 117. P. 121.
131. Royal Decree 1578/2008. Pablo del Río González, ‘Ten Years of Renewable Electricity 
Policies in Spain: An Analysis of Successive Feed-in Tariff Reforms’ [2008] 36(8) Energy 
Policy 2917. P. 2919.
132. Article 3, Royal Decree 1565/2010, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 283, 2010. P. 97428.
133. Royal Decree Law 14/2010 and Article 2 First Transitory Provision, Royal Decree Law 
14/2010, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 312, 2010. P. 106386.
134. Article 8, Law 15/2012, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 312, 2012. P. 88081.
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More draconic measures followed in the period 2013-2014, as the previous 
measures did not sufficiently address the financial concerns. In essence, 
the entire legal regime on the basis of which the support was granted was 
repealed.135 In 2014 a new regime was introduced and subsequently applied 
to existing investments.136 The parameters used by the new regime to calculate 
remuneration for RES plants were based on assumptions, rather than the 
actual characteristics of production plants.137 The ECT tribunal in Eiser v. Spain 
summarized the new regime as follows:
“The tariff regime in RD 661/2007 is abandoned, substituting a new 
regime of reduced remuneration based on hypothetical “standard” 
investment and operating costs and characteristics of hypothetical 
“efficient” plants, with remuneration limited to an operating life 
of 25 years. Remuneration is calculated based on regulators’ 
projections of the revenues required to attain a prescribed lifetime 
pre-tax return of 7,398% based on the hypothetical costs of a 
hypothetical standard installation. The prescribed rate of return is 
potentially subject to change every six years. Remuneration is based 
on capacity, not production, eliminating the incentive potentially 
available under RD 661/2007 to build more expensive but more 
productive plants. Remuneration is capped at the hypothetical 
135. See footnote 50, Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of 
Renewable Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating 
Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 12: “First, 
Royal Decree Law 2/2013 (RDL 2/2013) eliminated the option of a FIP and also changed 
the mechanism that was used to update FITs. Several months later, Royal Decree Law 
9/2013 (RDL 9/2013) was adopted, which amended the provision of the Law of the 
Electricity Sector of 1997 (LES 1997) that had laid the legal foundation for the creation of 
the ‘Special Regime’ on the basis of which the later support schemes were based. Also, 
RD 661/2007 was repealed and the system of FITs and FIPs was eliminated and replaced 
by a system that provided ‘for ‘specific remuneration’ based on ‘standard’ (but not actual) 
costs per unit of installed power, plus standard amounts for operating costs. Law 24/2013, 
which was adopted in late 2013 superseded the LES 1997 and ‘completely eliminated the 
distinction between the Ordinary and Special Regimes. See: Article 1, Royal Decree Law 
2/2013. Article 1, Royal Decree Law 9/2013, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 167, 2013. P. 
52106. Article 9 Single Derogatory Provision, Royal Decree Law 9/2013, Boletin Oficial del 
Estado, nr. 167, 2013. P. 52106. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar 
Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Paras. 145-
146.”
136. Article 11, Royal Decree 413/2014, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 140, 2014. P. 43876. Final 
Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 147.
137. Ministerial Order IET/1045/2014 even explicitly uses the word ‘assumptions’: see Annex III, 
Ministerial Order IET/1045/2014, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 150, 2014. P. 46430.
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production of a “standard plant.” Payments already received by a 
facility under the prior regime can be credited against the lifetime 
remuneration due under the new one, thus allowing clawback of 
“excess” amounts received under the prior regime.”138
For investments that deviated from the hypothetical standard used to calculate 
remuneration, the financial consequences could be severe. In the Eiser v. Spain 
case, for example, the cash flow of the investors dried up by as much as 66 
percent, reducing the value of the investment to EUR 4 mln, while the investor 
had invested nearly EUR 125 mln.139
3.6. Conclusion
The second sub-question can now be answered. This question reads:
‘How does the current RES sector operate: who are the investors, 
how is the sector organized, and to what extend are investments 
cross-border? What are existing barriers to investment and trade in 
the RES sector and how do they affect investors/investments?’
From the analysis of the energy sector conducted in this chapter, the following 
points emerge:
· The electricity sector is currently still largely organized along 
typical lines where production takes place at the top and through 
transmission- and distribution grids, the electricity is consumed at 
the bottom. It has to be noted, however, that this model is coming 
under pressure in the energy transition where more and more 
production of electricity takes place at the bottom of the energy 
chain as well.
· A wide variety of investors is active in the RES sector, ranging 
from typical (inter)national electricity production and/or supply 
companies, to OEM’s of generation equipment and relevant services 
suppliers. Also, institutional investors from the financial sector are 
increasingly active in the sector. All of these parties have different 
138. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 148. Formatting altered.
139. Ibid. Paras. 151-154.
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investment motives and strategies. Some invest early on with the 
purpose of divesting once the project is completed while others 
enter only after projects have become operational with the purpose 
of staying on for the long term.
· One could say that RES investments, even if they are 
completely domestically financed, still have important cross-border 
components. The value chain of RES generation equipment is 
increasingly globally organized which means that inputs from various 
jurisdictions are involved in the development of a domestically 
financed RES project. This also means that trade and investment 
barriers, such as LCRs, import tariffs, and other measures affecting 
the ability of firms to invest abroad and/or supply relevant goods and 
services, can significantly affect the LCOE of RES projects.
· Besides the already mentioned trade and investment barriers, an 
important general issue that is taken into account by investors in any 
investment decision is the potential political and regulatory risk that 
the investment will be exposed to. As demonstrated by the Spanish 
example, these risks can be very significant. It is thus important to 
maintain investor confidence since private investors are responsible 
for the lion’s share of investments required for the energy transition.
 3
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4. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY – ORIGIN AND 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
The origins of the ECT date back to the early 1990’s and are more related to 
fossil fuels than RES. In the early 1990’s many politicians were struggling with 
the (future) relationship between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, where 
Communist regimes were crumbling after the Iron Curtain had lifted. Dutch Prime 
Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed a ‘European Energy Community’ that should 
create a win-win situation for all countries involved.1
For Western European countries, the creation of a legal framework that could 
facilitate trade and investment in the energy sector with the East would provide 
several opportunities. Firstly, the ECT might secure access to the vast oil and 
gas resources of the former USSR which, in the light of the political instability in 
the Middle East at the time, was considered to be of profound importance.2 More 
broadly, it provided Western companies with the chance of obtaining access to 
energy markets in Eastern Europe.3 The nuclear energy industry, for example, 
hoped that the ECT would provide them with the opportunity to retrofit Soviet-era 
nuclear power plants in accordance with Western safety standards.4
The ECT would also accrue benefits for Eastern European countries. In the early 
1990’s, these countries were heavily dependent on Russia for their oil and gas 
imports, as well as nuclear expertise. Enhanced relationships with the West could 
reduce their dependency on Russia.5 In addition, the ECT would provide the 
former Soviet Republics in Central Asia with the opportunity to develop their oil- 
and gas industries and fully exploit their potential to become energy exporters.6 
1. Ruud Lubbers, ‘Foreword’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-
West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. xiii.
2. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The 
Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law 
International 1996). Pp. 138-139. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2015). P. 114. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 
241-242. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International 
Publishing 2006). Pp. 106-107.
3. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy 
Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 
1996). Pp. 138-139.
4. Id.
5. Id. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 241-242.
6. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy 
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At the time this was seen as a precondition to become genuinely independent 
from Russia.7 The main interest of the Russian Federation was access to Western 
capital and technology which could revitalize its oil- and gas industries and 
secure a stable export destination that would supply the Russian economy with 
Western currencies.8 With regards to all former Communist countries, the hope 
was that the ECT would support the transition to market economies, an ambition 
wholeheartedly supported by Western States.9
To fully exploit this potential win-win situation; three elements were of pivotal 
importance. First of all, rules regarding trade had to be laid down since many 
of the former Communist countries had never participated in the multilateral 
trade regime that was established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade of 1947 (GATT 1947). Secondly, to carry the natural resources from the 
plains of Central Asia and Siberia to Europe several national borders had to be 
crossed. Therefore, rules on transit had to be laid down to secure unhindered 
flows of oil and gas.10 Finally, since the legal framework in the former Communist 
block exposed Western investors to significant investment risks, international 
rules on investment protection had to be established as well as an efficient 
dispute settlement mechanism to enforce these rules.11 The final ECT text would 
eventually contain obligations addressing all of these concerns.12
In December 1991 the European Energy Charter (EEC) would be adopted, a 
legally non-binding political declaration by which the signatories committed 
themselves to promoting access to energy markets, capital markets and 
liberalizing trade in energy.13 At the same time, the EEC also stressed the 
importance of environmental protection and the mitigation of environmental 
Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 
1996). Pp. 138-139.
7. Id.
8. Id. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 
114.
9. Ruud Lubbers, ‘Foreword’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-
West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. xiii.
10. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 241.
11. Id.
12. Part II of the ECT contains rules regarding trade and transit while investment rules is 
provided for in Part III of the treaty. In addition, rules on dispute settlement can be found in 
Part V.
13. Title I, European Energy Charter (adopted 17/12/1991).
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degradation.14 Furthermore, the EEC contained the ambition to conclude a 
binding treaty, which would eventually lead to the conclusion of the ECT three 
years later. It has to be noted that non-European members of the OECD such 
as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand also participated in 
the negotiations of the EEC and the ECT.15 In that regard, the ‘Energy Charter 
Process’ was from the very beginning more than merely a European project. 
Their motives were comparable to West-European States, i.e. to secure access 
to the promising energy markets in the former USSR. The US in particular was 
concerned that these markets would be monopolized by European companies.16
From the above it is clear that the initial ambitions of the ECT were primarily 
related to the upstream oil, gas, and electricity sectors. Nevertheless, the text 
is drafted broad enough to include RES as well. For example, where ECT trade 
provisions initially only covered trade in ‘energy materials and products’, by virtue 
of the 1998 Trade Amendment, the scope was expended to ‘energy related 
equipment’, which includes heat pumps and electrical generation devises.17 The 
transit provision contains obligations with regards to the transit of ‘energy materials 
and products’, which includes electrical energy – potentially electricity generated 
by RES.18 Finally, the investment chapter applies to investments ‘associated with 
an economic activity in the energy sector’, which on the basis of the definition 
provided for by the treaty, is broad enough to cover RES investments.19 The 
ECT therefore covers RES. One could consider this to be an advantage, after 
all negotiating trade and investment agreements may take many years – if not 
decades. If we can make use of an already existing legal framework to facilitate 
trade, transit, and investments in RES this could accelerate and facilitate a 
transition to a more decarbonized energy society. This especially holds true in 
a time where protectionism and economic nationalism seem to be on the rise 
and the conclusion of comprehensive trade and investment agreements seems 
increasingly challenging.
14. Id.
15. Note: From all of these States, Japan is the only one that actually ratified the ECT.
16. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 9.
17. Articles 29 & 31 and Annex EQ I (Ex 84.18 and 85.02), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 
17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
18. Ibid. Article 7(1) and Annex EM.
19. See Article 1(5) ECT. An economic activity in the energy sector is defined as follows: ‘an 
economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, 
land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing or sale of energy materials and 
products’.
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In order to elaborate on the potential of the ECT in its entirety to govern RES, 
this chapter will briefly introduce the ECT and analyze how its legal framework 
may affect trade, transit, and investments in the RES sector. Therefore, the 
ECT’s trade and transit obligations will be examined first and it will be explained 
how these may be relevant for facilitating the integration of RES. Since this 
dissertation specifically concerns investment promotion and protection, this 
chapter will briefly introduce some of the definitions that define the scope of the 
ECT’s investment chapter, namely those of ‘investment’, ‘investor’, and ‘economic 
activity in the energy sector.’ The substantive obligations of Part III of the Treaty 
will be examined in subsequent chapters.
4.1. TRADE
The ambition of the ECT regarding trade is expressed in Art. 3: “The Contracting 
Parties shall work to promote access to international markets on commercial 
terms, and generally to develop an open and competitive market, for Energy 
Materials and Products and Energy-Related Equipment.” To realize this aim, 
the ECT incorporates the provisions of GATT 1947 and those of GATT 1994 for 
countries that were to become a Member of the WTO.20 One should recall that 
for a period of time, the negotiations of the ECT and the WTO Agreements took 
place simultaneously and were even linked by some delegations.21 To ensure 
that there would be no conflict between the ECT and the WTO Agreements, Art. 
4 ECT emphasizes that the ECT does not derogate from the WTO Agreements 
for trade between WTO Members. In addition, incorporating the GATT regime 
into the ECT would provide the former Communist countries with the opportunity 
to implement GATT rules which would prepare them for full WTO membership.22 
During the ECT negotiations this meant that Western delegations and members 
of the ECT Secretariat had to spent a significant amount of time on explaining the 
concepts of trade rules to the delegations of several former Communist States, 
many of which had no earlier experience with the GATT.23
20. Articles 3 & 29, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
21. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy 
Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 
1996). Pp. 144-145.
22. Mary E. Footer, ‘Trade and Investment Measures in the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas 
W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade 
(Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 445-446.
23. Some countries behind the ‘Iron Curtain’, such as Poland and Romania, had participated 
in GATT 1947 long before the 1990’s. Julia Doré, ‘Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
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The legal regime that applied to trade depended on whether the countries 
involved in the trade were party to GATT 1947, GATT 1994 or neither.24 Due to 
this complexity, the ECT’s trade regime has been referred to as a ‘labyrinth’.25 This 
labyrinth will not be explained in-depth however, since an overwhelming majority 
of ECT contracting parties, including the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, has become a member to the WTO. Therefore, trade between most 
ECT contracting parties is governed by the WTO Agreements due to Art. 4 
ECT. Hence, the relevance of the ECT as a trade agreement has diminished 
significantly.26
Initially, the trade regime only applied to trade in ‘energy materials and products’ 
although this has been extended to ‘energy related equipment’ by virtue of the 
1998 ECT Trade Amendment that entered into force in 2010. The sole emphasis 
of the ECT’s trade regime on trade in goods can be considered as a shortcoming 
since services are therefore not covered by the arrangement. RES services are, 
however, of profound importance for the energy transition.27 In fact, it has been 
said that ‘the size of sustainable energy services is bigger than the market for 
related goods.’28
To conclude, in the 1990’s, the ECT’s trade provisions were of great importance 
since they applied the GATT regime to many countries that had no earlier 
experience with these rules. By doing so, the ECT arguably contributed to the 
integration of many former Communist countries into the world economy even 
before these countries acquired WTO membership. However, the ECT’s trade 
rules have lost significance since nearly the entire ECT constituency is now 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. 146. Andrew Ian Douglas, ‘East-West Trade: 
The Accession of Poland to the GATT’ [1972] 24 Stanford Law Review 748.
24. Olivia Q. Swaak-Goldman, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty and Trade – A Guide to the 
Labyrinth’ [2007] 90 Journal of World Trade 115.
25. Id.
26. At present, only Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Belarus are ECT contracting parties that have not acquired WTO membership.
27. Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced 
Disciplines?’ [2014] 5 Renewable Energy Law & Policy 40. P. 45. Joachim Monkelbaan, 
‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services’ (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, October 2013). <http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/10/trade-in-
sustainble-energy-services.pdf> accessed on 01/11/2016. Pp. 1 & 10.
28. Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services’ (International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development, October 2013). <http://www.ictsd.org/
downloads/2013/10/trade-in-sustainble-energy-services.pdf> accessed on 01/11/2016. P. 
vii.
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a WTO member. At the same time, however, one could argue that the WTO 
Agreements are also losing their relevance since the WTO has not been able to 
deliver new trade agreements since its inception in 1995 with the exception of one 
agreement addressing trade facilitation. Consequently, States are increasingly 
concluding FTA’s outside the auspices of the WTO, which means that growing 
amounts of world trade are no longer governed by the WTO Agreements but by 
FTA’s. Also, the fact that the ECT’s trade provisions exclusively govern trade in 
goods, thereby neglecting services, can be considered as a shortcoming with 
regards to RES since services are of great importance during all stages of a 
RES project.29
4.2. TRANSIT
Transit is addressed in Art. 7 ECT and is defined as the carriage of energy 
materials and products across at least two borders.30 Thus, it can include 
transport originating in State A through State B into State C, or the carriage can 
originate in State A through State B to another part of State A.31 Perhaps the most 
important obligation of Art. 7 ECT is laid down in paragraph 6 and prescribes 
that the transit State shall not interrupt or reduce the flow of existing energy 
materials and products in cases of conflict prior to the conclusion of the dispute 
resolution procedure as laid down in Art. 7(7) ECT. This is clearly advantageous 
for the energy consuming States involved, but for the transit State this means 
that it cannot exploit its leverage of cutting off supplies during disputes without 
violating its international obligations.32 Furthermore, Art. 7 ECT prescribes that 
the transit has to take place on a non-discriminatory basis although there is no 
obligation to provide mandatory third-party access.33
29. Markus Krajewski, ‘Liberalizing Trade in Energy Services and Domestic Regulation: 
New Approaches in Mega-Regionals?‘ in Thilo Rensmann (ed.), Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements (Springer 2017). P. 310.
30. Article 7, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
31. Catalin Gabriel Stanescu, ‘Article 7 – Transit’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on 
the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). Pp. 98-99.
32. Peter D. Cameron, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty and East-West Transit’ in Graham Coop 
(ed.), Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (JurisNet 2011). P. 307.
33. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 16. Martha M. Roggenkamp, 
‘Transit of Network-bound Energy: The European Experience’ in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), 
The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law 
International 1996). P. 511.
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Over the last two decades several transit disputes have occurred, most 
notably – but not exclusively – involving the carriage of Russian gas through 
the Ukraine to the EU.34 Because Art. 7 ECT has failed to prevent or mitigate 
these disputes, it has attracted criticism.35 One of the perceived shortcomings, 
for example, is the fact that Art. 7 ECT only creates obligations for contracting 
parties or entities under the control of a contracting party, but not for private 
companies.36 Moreover, in comparison to Art. V GATT, the ECT’s transit provision 
seems to put more emphasis on territorial sovereignty whereas the GATT places 
more emphasis on the principle of the freedom of transit.37 Regarding dispute 
settlement, perceived shortcomings are that dispute settlement procedures may 
last longer than the actual conflict, which would mean that any verdict is merely 
declaratory in effect.38 In order to address these shortcomings, negotiations have 
been held in order to conclude a Transit Protocol but these negotiations have 
failed to materialize in a binding Protocol.39
In relation to RES, Art. 7 ECT does not specifically incorporate nor exclude 
RES. However, since it applies to ‘energy materials and products’, this includes 
34. Transit disputes include: the 2002 Croatia-Slovenia oil transit dispute, the 2008 transit 
dispute concerning the carriage of Russian gas to Armenia through Georgia during 
the 2008 Russia-Georgia armed conflict, the 2008 disruption of gas deliveries to 
South-Ossetia, the 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas transit dispute, the 2010 Belarus-Russia 
gas transit dispute. See: Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and 
Countermeasures (Oxford University Press 2015). Pp. 89-94.
35. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 16. Beatriz Huarte Melgar, The Transit 
of Goods in Public International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 229.
36. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 16. It has to be noted that this 
argument can be rebutted since Art. 7(6) speaks of entities subject to its control or 
jurisdiction. See: Catalin Gabriel Stanescu, ‘Article 7 – Transit’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), 
Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 107.
37. Martha M. Roggenkamp, ‘Transit of Network-bound Energy: The European Experience’ in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. 509.
38. Colin M. Brown, ‘Transit Disputes, Supply Disputes and the ECT: Towards an East-West 
Thaw? Some Observations from an International Trade Law Perspective’ in Graham Coop 
(ed.), Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (JurisNet 2011). Pp. 293-294. Peter D. Cameron, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty 
and East-West Transit’ in Graham Coop (ed.), Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment 
Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty (JurisNet 2011). Pp. 305-306.
39. Danae Azaria, ‘Energy Transit under the Energy Charter Treaty and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ [2009] 27 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 
559. P. 563. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under 
the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 17. Beatriz Huarte Melgar, 
The Transit of Goods in Public International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 229.
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electrical energy. Since much of the renewable energy is actually electricity; Art. 
7 ECT covers the transit of electricity generated by RES.40
4.3. INVESTMENT: OBJECT, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE OF THE 
INVESTMENT CHAPTER
Due to its frequent invocation in practice, the ECT’s investment promotion and 
protection chapter, which can be found in Part III of the treaty, is probably the 
most relevant part of the ECT.
Part III contains first and foremost substantive investment protection standards 
that protect investors against, amongst others, discrimination, expropriation 
without compensation, and unreasonable treatment. These investment protection 
standards protect foreign investors against political and regulatory risk in a 
manner that is comparable to administrative law or human rights, by prescribing 
the rule of law.41 Through Art. 26 ECT, which is located in Part V of the treaty, 
investors can enforce these provisions and obtain damages if a State has failed 
to comply with its obligations under Part III of the Treaty. That the investment 
protection standards of the ECT are highly relevant in practice is evidenced by 
the number of investor-State disputes that has arisen under the treaty: there are 
currently more than 120 known cases.42 To put this number in perspective, there 
are currently approximately 3200 IIA’s and the total number of investor-State 
disputes that has arisen under all of these treaties amounts to approximately 950 
in total, which makes the ECT the most often invoked IIA in existence.43 In fact, 
40. Beatriz Huarte Melgar, The Transit of Goods in Public International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). 
Pp. 229-231.
41. Susan Karamanian, ‘Human Rights Dimensions in Investment Law’ in Erika de Wet et 
al (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press 2012). Pp. 236-271. Chester Brown, ‘Investment Treaty Tribunals and Human Rights 
Courts: Competitors or Collaborators?’ [2016] 15(2) The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 287. Daniel Kalderimis, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as Global 
Administrative Law: What this Might Mean in Practice’ in Chester Brown et al (eds.), 
Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
Pp. 145-159. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of 
Renewable Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating 
Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 6-7.
42. For an overview of all investor-State ECT disputes, see: <https://energycharter.org/what-
we-do/dispute-settlement/all-investment-dispute-settlement-cases/>
43. For statistics on IIA’s and investment dispute settlement, see: <https://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/>
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the energy sector in general is overrepresented in investor-State disputes, which 
evidences the importance of investment protection in this sector.44
At the time of conclusion, the investment protection standards were considered of 
great importance because the perception was that the newly independent States 
that used to comprise the USSR did not have the ‘adequate legal infrastructure 
for the protection’ of investments made by Western investors.45 By providing 
protection against undue government interference of an investment IIA’s could 
contribute to flows of FDI: mitigating risks associated with an investment may 
make an investment attractive to a larger pool of investors while at the same 
time reducing the cost of capital because risk premiums are reduced.46 As 
said, investments in the RES sector are at present largely regulatory driven, 
meaning that investments are most likely to occur in jurisdictions where favorable 
investment incentives are in place, RES investments are exposed to a specific 
regulatory risk, namely that regulatory frameworks governing RES production 
will be changed with unfavorable effects for investors.47 Practice under the 
ECT demonstrates that these risks are not merely hypothetical since a very 
significant number of ECT cases relates to regulatory changes experienced by 
RES investors.48
Besides promoting investment by protecting it, the ECT’s investment chapter 
also contains specific provisions that may promote investment by ‘permitting, 
44. Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford 
University Press 2010). Pp. 145-146. Maxi Scherer, ‘Introduction’ in Maxi Scherer (ed.), 
International Arbitration in the Energy Sector (Oxford University Press 2018). Pp. 1-2.
45. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 241.
46. Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, ‘Relationship Between Risk and the Cost of Capital’ in 
Shannon Pratt et al (eds.), Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Wiley 2014). Pp. 
70–87; René M. Stultz, ‘Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital’ [1999] 
12(3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8. Pp. 8–25.
47. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 4-9. Petri Mäntysaari, 
EU Electricity Trade Law – The Legal Tools of Electricity Producers in the Internal Electricity 
Market (Springer 2015). P. 149. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy 
Investment Disputes – Recent Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy 
Market Reforms’ in Martha Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report 
XII (Intersentia 2018). Yulia Selivanova, ‘Changes in Renewables Support Policy and 
Investment Protection under the Energy Charter Treaty: Analysis of Jurisprudence and 
Outlook for the Current Arbitration Cases’ [2018] 33(2) ICSID Review – Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 433.
48. Id.
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attracting, and facilitating’ FDI.49 During the ECT negotiations, for example, much 
of the debate over Art. 10 ECT related to investment liberalization by providing 
market access to foreign investors on a non-discriminatory basis.50 As will be 
explained in more depth in chapter 6, the ECT currently does not provide for 
binding market access commitments and, therefore, does not actively contribute 
to the liberalization of FDI by reducing or eliminating discriminatory barriers.51 
This means that the primary – if not sole – way in which the ECT can contribute 
to increased flows of FDI in the RES sector has to come from its investment 
protection standards. However, a recent meta-analysis shows that investment 
treaties that merely provide for post-establishment investment protection probably 
only have a marginal effect on flows of FDI.52 One of the main points of this 
dissertation will therefore be that by providing for binding non-discriminatory 
commitments in the pre-establishment phase of an investment, the ECT might 
become more effective in facilitating flows of FDI in the RES sector.
In the following paragraphs, the definitions of ‘investment’, ‘investor’, and 
‘economic activity in the energy sector’ will be analyzed. The definitions of these 
terms can be found in Art. 1, which is outside Part III of the treaty. However, since 
these definitions define the scope of the substantive obligations of Part III, they 
will briefly be introduced.
4.3.1. Definition of ‘Investor’
The definition of investor is important in both substantive and procedural terms: 
the obligations of Part III apply with regards to investments of investors of other 
contracting parties and only investors in the sense of the treaty may invoke the 
procedural ISDS mechanism.53 The term is as followed defined in Art. 1(7) ECT:
49. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 104-105.
50. The present author has done research at the archives of the Energy Charter Secretariat, 
where many of the documents surrounding the ECT’s negotiations are being stored.
51. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 105-107. Kaj Hober, ‘The Energy 
Charter Treaty – An Overview’ [2007] 8(3) Journal of World Investment & Trade 323. P. 
325.
52. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence (IISD 2017). <https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/assessing-
impacts-investment-treaties.pdf> accessed on 24/01/2019. Pp. 3-4.
53. See for example: Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 26, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 
17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998). Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the 
Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 2012). P. 16.
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(a) with respect to a Contracting Party:
(i) a natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is 
permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its 
applicable law;
(ii) a company or other organization organized in accordance with 
the law applicable in that Contracting Party”
This definition covers both natural and legal persons and requires a link between 
the investor concerned and a contracting party to the ECT.54 What becomes 
evident from this definition is that domestic law, relating to citizenship, permanent 
residence, and legal entities, plays an important role.55
Natural persons can be considered as ‘investors’ under the ECT when they either 
possess the citizenship or nationality of a contracting party or when they reside 
there permanently in accordance with the applicable law. Since investments in 
the energy sector are often characterized by their ‘large’ size and the fact that 
they are often made for the ‘long-term’, most investment disputes in the energy 
sector are brought by corporate entities, although ECT practice from the oil 
and gas sector demonstrates that such cases may also be brought by natural 
persons.56 Many forms of RES, such as hydro, thermal solar, tidal, biomass, and 
wind still require very significant investments, other forms of RES, such as PV 
solar and geothermal can more easily be exploited by less wealthy investors. 
This development has made it more likely that natural persons will be the affected 
investors that initiate arbitration proceedings, which is currently evidenced by 
the list of pending ECT RES disputes.57
54. Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 
2012). P. 16.
55. Award, Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, 
2004. Para. 55.
56. Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford 
University Press 2010). P. xlvii. Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/18. Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, SCC - Case No. V 
(064/2008). Anatolie and Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group S.A., Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. 
Kazakhstan, SCC – Case No. 116/2010.
57. Of the ‘Solar Panel’ cases based on the ECT, the following were brought by at least one 
natural personAntaris Solar and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Ad hoc, 
PCA Administered. Mathias Kruck, Ralf Hofmann, Frank Schumm, Joachim Kruck, Peter 
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It has been said that when ‘investment treaties only provide for investors to be 
nationals of a state in accordance with the law, tribunals have been reluctant 
to apply other requisites in addition to the plain language of the treaties, such 
as the rule of ‘genuine link’.’58 Since the ECT does not contain any additional 
requirements, the nationality or citizenship – which in the Cem Uzan v. Turkey 
case were considered to have identical meanings – of natural persons will 
thus have to be established by reference to the domestic law of the claimed 
home State.59 The same holds true with regards to investors that claim to be 
a permanent resident, although the amount of investment cases dealing with 
permanent residents is negligible.60 As in the case of nationality or citizenship, 
‘determinations by domestic authorities’ regarding the domestic law of a 
contracting party concerning permanent residence are not binding upon an 
investment tribunal although they are considered ‘highly persuasive.’61
With regards to legal persons, Art. 1(7)(a)(ii) contains a broad definition by 
referring to ‘a company or other organization organized in accordance with the 
law applicable in that’ contracting party.62 Contracting parties thus have a ‘broad 
discretion in deciding on the forms a company may take’ and, consequently, 
the legal forms an ‘investor’ may take for the purposes of the ECT.63 On the 
basis of this provision, the relevant test for the ECT concerns the place of 
incorporation: which ‘indicates that the company is viewed as possessing the 
Flachsmann, Rolf Schumm, Karsten Reiss, Jürgen Reiss v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/15/23. Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3.
58. Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 
2012). Pp. 76-77. Footnotes omitted.
59. Ibid. Pp. 76-80. Award on Respondent’s Bifurcated Preliminary Objections, Cem Cengiz 
Uzan v. Republic of Turkey, SCC Case No. V 2014/023, 2016. Para. 139. Partial Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC 
Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Paras. 129-132. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom 
Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 
2013. Paras. 742-743. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment 
Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 65.
60. Award on Respondent’s Bifurcated Preliminary Objections, Cem Cengiz Uzan v. Republic 
of Turkey, SCC Case No. V 2014/023, 2016. Para. 156.
61. Id. Lucy F. Reed & Jonathan E. Davis, ‘Who is a Protected Investor?’ in Marc Bungenberg 
et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 620.
62. Decision on Jurisdiction, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding 
Company Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-09, 2012. 
Para. 420. Craig Bamberger, ‘An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Wälde 
(ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer 
Law International 1996). P. 9.
63. Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 
2012). P. 104.
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nationality of the state of incorporation and the laws of this state are governing 
the company.’64 Is has been said that the definition of ‘investor’ is broad and, 
since the definition merely provides for the test of incorporation, the ECT can be 
used to strategically channel investments through foreign jurisdictions to obtain 
investment protection.65 This way, domestic investors may obtain investment 
protection by channeling their investments via foreign jurisdictions and since 
a ‘substantial business activities’ test is not included, mailbox companies are 
entitled to full range of investment protection standards.66
4.3.2. Definition of ‘Investment’
The definition of ‘investment’ is contained in Art. 1(6) ECT:
““Investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by an Investor and includes:
(a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property, 
and any property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and 
pledges;
(b) a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other 
forms of equity participation in a company or business enterprise, 
and bonds and other debt of a company or business enterprise;
64. Ibid. P. 106. Markus Perkams, ‘Protection for Legal Persons’ in Marc Bungenberg et 
al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 642. Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 2009. Paras. 411-415. Award, Masdar Solar & 
Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 2018. Paras. 176-
177.
65. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 247. Award, Libananco Holdings Co. 
Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 2011. Para. 556. Final Award, 
Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. Para. 671.
66. Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 
2012). Pp. 141-146. Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/
AA227, 2009. Paras. 411-417 & 435. Decision on Jurisdiction, Plama Consortium Limited v. 
Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2005. Para. 128. See also: Award, Antin 
Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 262. Unofficial Translation of the Final 
Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 
2016. Paras. 414-417. Decision on Jurisdiction, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and 
RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/30, 2016. Para. 145.
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(c) claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract 
having an economic value and associated with an Investment;
(d) Intellectual Property;
(e) Returns;
(f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licences 
and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector.”
In addition, the two subsequent paragraphs make the following specifications:
“A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect 
their character as investments and the term “Investment” includes all 
investments, whether existing at or made after the later of the date of 
entry into force of this Treaty for the Contracting Party of the Investor 
making the investment and that for the Contracting Party in the 
Area of which the investment is made (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Effective Date”) provided that the Treaty shall only apply to matters 
affecting such investments after the Effective Date.
“Investment” refers to any investment associated with an Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector and to investments or classes of 
investments designated by a Contracting Party in its Area as 
“Charter efficiency projects” and so notified to the Secretariat.”
In order to fall within the scope of the ECT, an investment thus has to be 
associated with an economic activity in the energy sector. This term will be 
analyzed in the next section.
It has been said that the ECT contains an extremely broad definition of investment: 
the provision makes clear that an investment can be ‘every kind of asset, owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly’.67 The subsequent list is non-exhaustive.68 The 
broadness of the definition has been emphasized by ECT tribunals as well as 
67. Crina Baltag, The Energy Charter Treaty: the Notion of Investor (Kluwer Law International 
2012). Pp. 167-183.
68. Ibid. P. 169.
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scholars.69 More recent investment treaties sometimes contain a slightly narrower 
definition of investment.70 For example, recent IIA’s concluded by the EU, such 
as the CETA, EU-Singapore BIT, and the EU-Vietnam BIT still emphasize that 
an investment can consist of ‘every kind of asset’, but only when it has the 
characteristics of an investment ‘which includes a certain duration and other 
characteristics such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.’71 A similar approach 
69. ECT tribunals: Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum, Cube 
Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 
2019. Para. 185. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans 
Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 2013. Paras. 806-807. Final 
Award, Remington Worldwide Limited v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. V(I 16/2008), 2011. P. 
194. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 
2008. Paras. 36 & 42. Dissenting Opinion of Marc Lalonde, Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic 
of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, 2012. Para. 7. Decision on Jurisdiction, Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2005. Paras. 125 
& 128. Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of 
Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 2009. Para. 
430. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 263. Unofficial Translation of the Arbitral Award, 
Energoalliance Ltd v. the Republic of Moldova, UNCITRAL, 2013. Para. 227. Award, 
Standard Chartered Bank v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/12, 
2012. Para. 255. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel 
S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 5.47. Decision on 
Jurisdiction, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure 
Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2016. Para. 156. Award, 
Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 
2018. Para. 195.
Scholars: Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 54-55. Richard Happ, ‘The 
Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 246. Thomas Wälde, ‘International Investment Under the 
1994 Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-
West Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 270-273. 
Esa Passivitra, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty and Investment Contracts: Towards Security of 
Contracts’ in Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for 
Investment and Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 356-358.
70. The NAFTA, a contemporary of the ECT, also had a different definition that was more 
restrictive by using a closed-list definition: Article 1139, North American Free Trade 
Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 
01/01/1994). Jan Asmus Bischoff & Richard Happ, ‘The Notion of Investment’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 
501-502.
71. Article 8.1, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 1.2(g), EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 30/06/2019, entrance into force still pending). 
Article 1.2(1), EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 19/10/2018, 
entrance into force still pending).
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has been adopted by the 2012 US Model BIT, 2015 Norway Draft Model BIT, 
and the Korea-US FTA .72 This is largely a codification of the so-called Salini 
criteria that are often used to define the term ‘investment’ under Art. 25(1) of 
the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).73 In ECT arbitration, tribunals 
have rendered inconsistent decisions on the relevance of the Salini criteria when 
interpreting the definition of ‘investment’ under the ECT.74 Also, some recent IIA’s 
concluded by the EU contain a slightly different non-exhaustive list of forms 
that an investment can take as the list is more elaborate and more specific.75 
The CETA and EU-Vietnam BIT for example explicitly exclude certain claims of 
money as an investment.76 The Comprehensive and Progress Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) adopts a similar yet not identical approach.77
4.3.3. Definition of ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’
In order to fall within the scope of the ECT, the investment has to be associated 
with an economic activity in the energy sector as defined in Art. 1(5) ECT:
““Economic Activity in the Energy Sector” means an economic 
activity concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production, 
72. Article 1, US Model BIT, 2012. Article 2(2), Norway Draft BIT, 2015. Article 11.28 Korea-
United States Free Trade Agreement (adopted 30/06/2007, entered into force 15/03/2012). 
Jan Asmus Bischoff & Richard Happ, ‘The Notion of Investment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al 
(eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 503.
73. Article 25(1), Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (adopted 18/03/1965, entered into force 14/10/1966). Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/4, 2001. Para. 52. Jan Asmus Bischoff & Richard Happ, ‘The Notion of 
Investment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook 
(C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 506-514.
74. Excerpts of Award, Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, 
2012. Paras. 382-383. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra 
Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V 116/2010, 2013. Paras. 806-807. 
Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Dominic Pellew, Energoalliance Ltd v. the Republic of 
Moldova, UNCITRAL, 2013. Paras. 20-21. Dylan Geraets & Leonie Reins, ‘Article 1 – 
Definitions’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward 
Elgar 2018). P. 27.
75. Cees Verburg, ‘De Bescherming en Bevordering van Buitenlandse Energie Investeringen 
in Europese Investeringsverdragen: Het Einde van de Nederlandse ‘Gouden Standaard’?’ 
[2017] (5) Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Energierecht 138. P. 142.
76. Article 8.1, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 1.2(g), EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 30/06/2019, entrance into force still pending).
77. Article 9.1, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(adopted 08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018).
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storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, 
or sale of Energy Materials and Products except those included 
in Annex NI, or concerning the distribution of heat to multiple 
premises.”
This requirement underlines that the ECT’s scope is limited to the energy 
sector, contrary to most other IIA’s that apply across all economic sectors. 
An understanding agreed upon at the conclusion of the ECT contains a list of 
illustrative activities that would qualify as such:
“(i) prospecting and exploration for, and extraction of, e.g., oil, gas, 
coal and uranium;
(ii) construction and operation of power generation facilities, 
including those powered by wind and other renewable energy 
sources;
(iii) land transportation, distribution, storage and supply of Energy 
Materials and Products, e.g., by way of transmission and distribution 
grids and pipelines or dedicated rail lines, and construction of 
facilities for such, including the laying of oil, gas, and coal-slurry 
pipelines;
(iv) removal and disposal of wastes from energy related facilities 
such as power stations, including radioactive wastes from nuclear 
power stations;
(v) decommissioning of energy related facilities, including oil rigs, oil 
refineries and power generating plants;
(vi) marketing and sale of, and trade in Energy Materials and 
Products, e.g., retail sales of gasoline; and
(vii) research, consulting, planning, management and design 
activities related to the activities mentioned above, including those 
aimed at Improving Energy Efficiency.”78
78. Understanding 2, Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference.
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This understanding explicitly mentions that the construction and operation of 
power generation facilities, including those powered by wind and other forms of 
RES are to be considered as an activity in the energy sector. According to the 
Blusun v. Italy tribunal, the words ‘construction and operation’ do not impose a 
cumulative requirement.79 For that reason, there seems to be little discussion that 
RES investments which generate electricity are covered.80
In the Amto v. Ukraine case, the tribunal had to elaborate on how closely an 
economic activity has to be associated with the energy sector as the claimant 
in that case provided technical services, such as ‘electrical installation, repairs 
and technical reconstruction or upgrading’ to a nuclear power plant.81 According 
to the tribunal:
“… the interpretation of the words ‘associated with’ involves a 
question of degree, and refers primarily to the factual rather than 
legal association between the alleged investment and an Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector. A mere contractual relationship with an 
energy producer is insufficient to attract ЕСТ protection where the 
subject matter of the contract has no functional relationship with the 
energy sector. The open-textured phrase ‘associated with’ must be 
interpreted in accordance with the object and purpose of the ЕСТ, 
as expressed in Article 2. The associated activity of any alleged 
investment must be energy related, without itself needing to satisfy 
the definition in Article 1(5) of an Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector.”82
In this case the tribunal would eventually consider that the investment was 
associated with an economic activity in the energy sector since the services 
79. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 263.
80. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. 
Para. 682. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 5.50.
81. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 2008. 
Para. 40. See also: Thomas Wälde, ‘International Investment Under the 1994 Energy 
Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway 
for Investment and Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 273-274.
82. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 2008. 
Para. 42.
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provided by the company in which the investor had invested were directly related 
to the production of energy.83
4.4. Conclusion
Having set out this general background of the ECT, the third sub-question can 
now be answered. This question reads in full:
‘Under what circumstances was the ECT negotiated and concluded, 
what are the main ‘pillars’ of the treaty, and to what extent do RES fall 
under the scope of the existing treaty?’
The ECT was negotiated and concluded in the early 1990’s with the purpose 
of establishing a legal framework that could promote long-term cooperation 
in the energy field. The main pillars of the treaty relate to trade, transit, and 
investment. All of these pillars were supplemented with specific procedures for 
dispute settlement. Over the last 25 years, the trade provisions of the ECT lost 
significance because of increased participation by ECT contracting parties in 
the WTO. Furthermore, the transit provision has not prevented transit disputes 
nor has it successfully settled such disputes.
In practice, this means that the investment chapter is currently the most relevant 
one. This is evidenced by the number of occassions in which foreign investors 
have invoked this part of the treaty. As becomes clear from an understanding 
that was adopted at the ECT’s conclusion, RES generation facilities are to be 
considered as economic activities in the energy sector. It has to be noted 
however, that this latter point can almost be taken as self-evident since it has 
never been questioned in ECT disputes.
83. Ibid. Para. 43.
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5. INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN PART III OF THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY
This chapter will examine the existing legal framework of the ECT concerning 
investment protection. These provisions can protect RES investors against 
regulatory and political risk by prescribing the rule of law.
The sections below will analyze the various standards of investment protection by 
reference to i) comparable provisions under other IIA’s, ii) ECT arbitral practice, 
to shed light on the interpretation and application of the norms in practice, and 
iii) the relevance of these standards for RES investors. Finally, some sections will 
also briefly recall recent treaty practice in relation to some standards.
5.1. STABLE, EQUITABLE, FAVORABLE AND TRANSPARENT 
INVESTMENT CONDITIONS
The first provision of the ECT that is relevant for this chapter is Art. 10(1) ECT. 
This rather lengthy provision contains various standards of investment protection 
and provides for the following:
“Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable 
and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting 
Parties to Make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall 
include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of 
Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. 
Such Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection 
and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair 
by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such 
Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that 
required by international law, including treaty obligations. Each 
Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered 
into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other 
Contracting Party.”1
1. Article 10(1), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
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The various standards of investment protection of Art. 10(1) ECT will be analyzed 
separately in the sections (5.2 through 5.6) below. This first section will address 
the first sentence of Art. 10(1): ‘Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable, 
and transparent conditions for Investors of Other Contracting Parties to Make 
Investments in its Area.’
5.1.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
The legal significance of the first sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT has been contested. 
For example, Happ argued that the first sentence refers primarily to the legal 
framework of each Contracting Party that is taken into account by investors 
when making their investment, which suggests that it is not meant as a post-
establishment investment protection standard.2 Roe and Happold argue that, 
due to the vagueness of the language used in the first sentence, it can hardly 
be said that this provision contains an actual obligation.3 This suggests that the 
first sentence may be more closely related to investment promotion rather than 
protection.
In other IIA’s, language comparable to Art. 10(1) first sentence ECT can most 
often be found in preambles rather than the operative part.4 The reference in the 
first sentence to ‘shall […] encourage and create’, and more particularly the word 
‘encourage’ is not normative but rather expresses a ‘best endeavors’ obligation.5
5.1.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
The ambiguity surrounding the first sentence is also evidenced in arbitral 
practice. In essence, the question is whether the first sentence contains an 
2. Richard Happ, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 248.
3. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 107.
4. See for example: Preamble, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (United Kingdom-Bolivia) (adopted 
24/05/1988, entered into force 16/02/1990). Preamble, Agreement between the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Belgium/Luxembourg-China) 
(adopted 06/06/2005, entered into force 01/12/2009). Preamble, Treaty between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Germany-Afghanistan) 
(adopted 20/04/2005, entered into force 12/10/2007).
5. Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007). Pp. 220-221.
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obligation and cause of action that can be used by investors to base a claim on, 
or whether it is merely an introductory sentence that aims to put the remainder 
of Art. 10(1) ECT in context.6
According to several ECT tribunals the first sentence provides for more than just 
an introduction for the remaining sentences of Art. 10(1) ECT. In Energoalliance 
v. Moldova, the tribunal established that Moldova had breached its obligation ‘to 
create “stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions” for Claimant’s 
Investment.’7 The Blusun v. Italy tribunal held that ‘[t]he five sentences of Art. 
10(1) embody commitments towards investments, in accordance with their terms. 
None is mere preambular or hortatory.’8
These views can be contrasted with those of other ECT tribunals. Quite 
unequivocally, the AES v. Kazakhstan tribunal held that the first sentence:
“[…] is an introductory sentence aimed at putting the further 
obligations laid out in Article 10(1) of the ECT into perspective. As 
such, it has mainly programmatic character and does not provide for 
an independent standard of protection or right of action of a kind that 
is sufficiently specific to be relied upon by an investor.”9
Similar views were adopted in Plama v. Bulgaria, Isolux v. Spain, Novenergia v. 
Spain, and Foresight v. Spain.10 These tribunals either consider the first sentence 
to introduce the subsequent provisions or consider the obligation to create stable, 
6. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) 
Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 314.
7. Unofficial Translation of the Arbitral Award, Energoalliance Ltd v. the Republic of Moldova, 
UNCITRAL, 2013. Para. 356.
8. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 319.
9. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/16, 2013. Paras. 380-382.
10. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Paras. 172-174. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
V2013/153, 2016. Paras. 764-766. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment 
(SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 
2015/063, 2018. Paras. 642-646. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., 
Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable 
Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 
2015/150), 2018. Para. 361.
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equitable, favourable, and transparent conditions for investors as part of the FET 
standard.11
5.1.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Notwithstanding the different views of ECT tribunals on the legal significance of 
the first sentence, it is quite relevant for RES investors.
In the RES cases Isolux v. Spain, Eiser v. Spain, Novenergia v. Spain and Foresight 
v. Spain, the tribunals all considered the relevance of the first sentence of Art. 
10(1) ECT, in particular when interpreting the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) 
standard.12 The fact that the first sentence explicitly refers to ‘stable, equitable and 
transparent conditions’ for investors therefore provides a context, in the sense of 
Art. 31(2) VCLT, in which the FET standard has to be interpreted. In practice, this 
means that investors can more easily argue that their legitimate expectations, 
which existed when making their investment, for example concerning the stability 
of regulatory regimes, are protected under the ECT. The legal significance of the 
first sentence, even when it is considered as an introductory sentence, should 
therefore not be underestimated as it can have a significant influence on the 
interpretation of the subsequent provisions of Art. 10(1) ECT in comparison to IIA’s 
which do not make reference to stable and transparent conditions for investors. 
However, since it is primarily viewed as part of the FET standard, it will not be 
further examined here.
5.2. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
The second sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT contains the FET standard, which in 
practice is one the most important provisions for RES investors since it may, 
11. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Paras. 73-74. See also: Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-22, 2019. Para. 529. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 483. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH 
v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 487. Award, WA Investments-
Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 570.
12. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. 
Para. 764-766. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 
646. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 
2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM 
Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 
361. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 381.
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amongst others, protect the legitimate expectations of investors, which may 
include the expectation that RES support schemes are not fundamentally altered 
after a RES facility has become operational.13
The FET standard is a common provision that can be found in most IIA’s, 
although differences in the phrasing of FET standards are plentiful.14 Strikingly, 
a more precise definition of what would amount to a breach of the FET standard 
is not provided for by the ECT. According to Brower, the FET standard is ‘an 
intentionally vague term, designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative 
authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty’s object 
and purpose in particular disputes.’15 The vagueness of the FET standard is 
both problematic and probably the key to its success. On the one hand, it is 
problematic since it is difficult to establish what amounts to a breach of FET, 
and expansive interpretations might infringe on the sovereign right to regulate. 
While, on the other hand, investors rely on the FET standard very often nowadays 
because, due to its vagueness, recourse to the FET standard is appealing for 
an aggrieved investor.16 Also, it is widely recognized that the provision is firmly 
rooted in international law and thereby operates independently from national 
law.17 As such it sets a minimum standard of treatment that has to be respected 
by contracting parties, regardless of the content of national law.
5.2.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Adding further to the complexity of the FET standard is the fact that various 
formulations of the standard exist in IIA’s, which means that the content may differ 
13. The second sentence reads: ‘Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all 
times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment.’
14. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
218.
15. Charles H. Brower II, ‘Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back’ 
[2001] 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43. P. 56. Charles H. Brower II, 
‘Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ [2003] 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 37. P. 66.
16. Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties [2005] 
39 International Lawyer 87. P. 87. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 218.
17. Stephan W. Schill, Cambridge International Trade and Economic Law: The 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2009). P. 
263. Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of 
Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001. Para. 367. Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 42. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 123.
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from treaty to treaty.18 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has identified roughly the following variations.19
Firstly, there are unqualified standards which were often adopted by capital 
exporting European countries.20 Sometimes these unqualified FET standards 
were linked to other standards of treatment, such as the most constant security 
and protection obligation, although linkages to National Treatment (NT) and Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment also exist.21 The lack of qualification gives a 
potentially broad scope to the FET standard which may provide for a high level 
of investment protection that goes beyond the international minimum standard 
of treatment as derived from customary international law.22
18. Marc Jacob & Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Content, Practice, Method’ 
in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 
2015). Pp. 704-707.
19. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). Pp. 17-35. Christopher Campbell, ‘House 
of Cards: The Relevance of Legitimate Expectations under Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Provisions in Investment Treaty Law’ [2013] 30 Journal of International Arbitration 361. P. 
373.
20. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 20. Article 3(1), Agreement between 
the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Tajikistan on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Belgium/Luxembourg-Tajikistan) 
(adopted 12/02/2009, entrance into force still pending). Article 2(2), United Kingdom 
Model BIT, 2008. Article 3(1), Netherlands Model BIT, 2004. Article 2(2), Germany Model 
BIT 2008. Article 4(1), Switzerland Model BIT, 1995.
21. Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign 
Investment (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 43. Article 4(2), Agreement between 
the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Chile on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (Switzerland-Chile) (adopted 24/09/1999, entered into force 
02/05/2002). Article 3(2), Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic 
of Belarus on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Switzerland-
Belarus) (adopted 28/05/1993, entered into force 13/07/1994). Article 2(2), Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (United Kingdom-Armenia) (adopted 27/05/1993, entered into force 
11/07/1996).
22. This is argued by the tribunal in the Vivendi v. Argentina case, which held that the standard 
‘can just as readily set a floor as a ceiling.’ Award, Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. 
and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2007. Para. 
7.4.7. Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development’ 
in August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 114. Award, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008. Para. 591. Christopher Campbell, ‘House of Cards: The 
Relevance of Legitimate Expectations under Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions in 
Investment Treaty Law’ [2013] 30 Journal of International Arbitration 361. P. 376. Hussein 
Haeri, ‘A Tale of Two Standards: ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and the Minimum Standard 
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Secondly, there are IIA’s that link the FET standard to international law by 
stating that treatment ‘shall in no case be less favorable than that required by 
international law’ as was the case in many BIT’s concluded by the US in the 
1990’s.23 Comparable to the unqualified standard, these provisions appear to ‘set 
the floor of protection that can be claimed by an investor’, which means expansive 
interpretations can result in a relatively high level of investment protection.24 
An alternative formulation of this standard states that FET shall be granted ‘in 
accordance with international law’, which allows tribunals to take into account 
other sources of international law as well, including customary international law 
and general principles of law.25
in International Law [2011] 27 Arbitration International 27. Pp. 36, 45. Christoph Schreuer, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ [2005] 6 Journal of World Investment & 
Trade 357. P. 360. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). Pp. 11-13, 22.
23. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 22. Article 3(2), Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Sultanate of 
Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Croatia-Oman) 
(adopted 04/05/2004, entrance into force still pending). Article 2(3)(a), Treaty between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of 
Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (United 
States-Bahrain) (adopted 29/09/1999, entered into force 30/05/2001). Article II(2)(a), 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Argentina-United States 
of America) (adopted 14/11/1991, entered into force 20/10/1994). Article II(3)(a), Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States of America-
Ecuador) (adopted 27/08/1993, entered into force 11/05/1997). Article II(3)(a), Treaty 
between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (United States of America-Ukraine) (adopted 
04/03/1994, entered into force 16/11/1996).
24. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 23. Award, Enron Corporation and 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 2007. Paras. 
257-258. Award, Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2007. Para. 7.4.7. Award, Sempra Energy 
International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 2007. Para. 302. 
Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Para. 
361. Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008. Paras. 336-337. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, 2010. Para. 253.
25. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 22. Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, The Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law’ in Stephan W. Schill 
(ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 
2010). P. 159. Article 3(2), Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia 
and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments (Croatia-Oman) (adopted 04/05/2004, entrance into force still pending).
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   160 04/12/2019   11:36:13
161
Investment Protection in Part III of the Energy Charter Treaty
These formulations can primarily, but not exclusively, be found in older IIA’s, 
in particular those concluded in and before the 1990’s. While various tribunals 
have been struggling with the exact content of the vague norm, arbitral practice 
demonstrates that various elements fall within its scope.26 These may include: i) 
the protection of an investors’ legitimate expectations;27 ii) the requirement that 
the legal framework has to be transparent, consistent, stable and/or predictable;28 
iii) a prohibition on the denial of justice and the obligation to provide due process 
26. Sentence Arbitrale, Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 
2003. Para. 51. Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The 
Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001. Para. 367. Award, CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005. 
Para. 273. Final Award, Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Para. 
292. Marc Jacob & Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Content, Practice, 
Method’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. 
Beck 2015). Pp. 717-743.
27. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 9.3.6-9.3.12. Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.75. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and 
Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 486. Partial 
Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 302. 
Award, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 2003. Para. 154. Arbitral Award, International Thunderbird 
Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 147. Award, 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
2004. Para. 114. Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic 
of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008. Para. 347. Award, Jan de Nul N.V. and 
Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, 2008. 
Para. 186.
28. Final Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
LCIA Case No. UN3467, 2004. Para. 183. Award, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The 
Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005. Para. 274. Award, PSEG Global, 
Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret 
Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, 2007. Para. 250. Award, 
Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 2000. 
Para. 99. Award, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 2003. Para. 154.
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of law;29 iv) a prohibition on arbitrary and/or discriminatory conduct;30 and v) a 
prohibition on coercion and harassment by the host State.31
The ECT incorporates elements that resemble the characteristics of both 
formulations described above. On the one hand, the sentence containing the FET 
standard is unqualified while, on the other hand, the fourth sentence of Art. 10(1) 
ECT adds that ‘[i]n no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less 
favourable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations.’32 
The ECT’s FET standard therefore seems to set a floor of treatment that has to 
be accorded rather than a ceiling, which means that a potentially high level of 
investment protection is available.33
As a response to the sometimes expansive interpretations given to the FET 
standard by investment tribunals, various States have attempted to limit the 
scope of the FET provision. At present, it seems that two different approaches 
are emerging.34
Firstly, some treaties tie the FET standard to the international minimum standard of 
treatment under customary international law.35 Well-known examples include Art. 
29. Award, Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2, 2002. Para. 127. Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, 2005. Part IV Chapter C 
Para. 15. Partial Award, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2000. 
Para. 134. Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (“Number 2”), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 2004. Para. 98. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 308.
30. Final Award, Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, 
2012. Para. 221. Award, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 2009. Para. 178.
31. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 
308.
32. Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 628.
33. Id.
34. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 
2016). P. 416.
35. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 23. Article 5, Norway Draft Model BIT, 
2015. Article 7, Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Morocco-Nigeria) (adopted 03/12/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 
3, India Model BIT, 2015. The India Model BIT merely contains a reference to treatment 
in accordance with customary international law, the reference to FET is omitted. See: 
Sherina Petit, Mathew Buckle & Daniel Jacobs, ‘India Releases a New Model BIT’ [2016] 
19 International Arbitration Law Review N-32. Pp. N33-35.
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1105 NAFTA and Art. 9.6 CPTPP.36 The exact content of the international minimum 
standard is, however, contested. On the one hand, there are contemporary 
tribunals that consider the standard, as defined in the 1928 Neer case, to be 
applicable, which requires government measures to amount to an ‘outrage, to 
bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental actions 
so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency’ before a violation of international law 
can be established.37 There are also tribunals, on the other hand, that consider 
that the standard has evolved since 1928 which lowers the threshold of liability 
by requiring arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, or discriminatory 
36. Article 1105, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) 
(adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994). NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 
North American Free Trade Agreement Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, 31 July 2001. Article 9.6, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018). See also: 
Article 14.6, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (adopted 30/11/2018, entrance 
into force still pending). Article 6, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Hong Kong) (adopted 
10/02/2016, entered into force 06/09/2016). Article II, Agreement Between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Latvia) (adopted 05/05/2009, entered into force 24/11/2011). 
Article 6, Agreement Between Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Canada-Mali) (adopted 28/11/2014, entered into force 08/06/2016). Article 5, 
Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Canada-Peru) (adopted 14/11/2006, entered into force 20/06/2007). Article 
6, Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Senegal) (adopted 27/11/2014, entered into force 
05/08/2016). Article III, Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Slovakia) (adopted 20/07/2010, entered 
into force 14/03/2012). Article 6, Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Serbia) (adopted 01/09/2014, 
entered into force 27/04/2015). Article 5, Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) (adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 
01/11/2006). Article 5, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, 
entered into force 01/01/2012). Article 4, Mexico Model BIT, 2008.
37. Decision, L.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, United States-
Mexico Claims Commission 1926. Award, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of 
America, UNCITRAL, 2009. Para. 627. Award, Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, 2009. Para. 284. The Eli Lilly v. Canada Tribunal 
adopted the definition of the international minimum standard of the Glamis Gold Tribunal 
without making a statement on the relationship to the Neer case: Final Award, Eli Lilly and 
Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 2017. 
Para. 222.
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conduct that exposes the investor to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a 
lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety.38 
When applying this standard tribunals have considered it ‘relevant that the 
treatment is in breach of representations made by the host Sate which were 
reasonably relied on’ by the investor.39
Benefits of adopting this standard are that it places the burden of proof 
of establishing the content of this standard on the investor, which may be 
challenging considering that it requires evidence of State practice and opinio 
iuris.40 Also, the threshold of liability is higher in comparison to the formulations 
that were discussed previously.41 Nevertheless, one could say that the standard 
is equally vague as the undefined standard, notwithstanding the fact that the 
threshold of liability might be higher.42
38. Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (“Number 2”), ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, 2004. Paras. 98-99. Award, Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 2002. Paras. 116-117. Award, ADF Group Inc. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 2003. Para. 180. Award, Merrill 
and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, 2010. Paras. 193 & 213.
39. Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (“Number 2”), ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, 2004. Paras. 98-99. Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, William Ralph 
Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware 
Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, 2015. Paras. 427, 
442-443. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2012-17, 2016. Paras. 491-502.
40. Award, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, 2009. Paras. 602-
618. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13. P. 20 Para. 27. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226. P. 253 Para. 64. Malcolm N. 
Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008). P. 74. Stephan W. Schill, 
‘Case Note – Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America’ [2010] 104 American Journal 
of International Law 253. P. 258.
41. Award, Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, 
2009. Para. 285. Excerpts of Award, Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH 
and Others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, 2012. Paras. 263-265. Ursula Kriebaum, 
‘FET and Expropriation in the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and Canada (CETA)’ [2016] 13 Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 
15. Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, The Rule of Law, and Comparative 
Public Law’ in Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 153.
42. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘FET and Expropriation in the Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA)’ [2016] 13 Transnational 
Dispute Management 1. P. 15. Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, The Rule 
of Law, and Comparative Public Law’ in Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 153.
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A second emerging approach that attempts to curtail the scope of the FET 
standard is one that clearly spells out the content of the norm by providing an 
(exhaustive) list of elements that are to be considered as a breach of FET.43 
This approach is adopted by the EU in recent IIA’s concluded with Canada, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Mexico.44 Commonly included elements that are 
considered to violate the FET standard are i) denial of justice; ii) fundamental 
breach of due process; iii) manifest arbitrariness; iv) targeted discrimination; and 
v) abusive treatment.45 It has to be noted, however, that while these lists may 
sometimes be comparable, they are not necessarily identical.
In comparison to the undefined FET standards, these more recent IIA’s provide 
for more clarity on the relevant norm although in practice they may also provide 
for less investment protection – depending of course on the exact content of the 
(exhaustive) list.
On the basis of this comparison it becomes clear that the undefined FET standard 
of the ECT potentially provides for a high level of investment protection which 
goes beyond the FET standards of for example NAFTA or CETA.46
5.2.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
The conclusion that the ECT’s FET standard provides for a higher level of 
investment protection than for example NAFTA is confirmed by the Liman 
Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan tribunal:
“[…] the Tribunal considers that the purpose of ECT Article 10(1), 
second sentence, is to provide a protection which goes beyond the 
minimum standard of treatment under international law. The ECT 
was intended to go further than simply reiterating the protection 
43. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (United Nations 2012). P. 29.
44. Article 8.10, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 2.4, EU-Singapore 
Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 19/10/2018, entrance into force still pending). 
Article 2.5, EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 30/06/2019, entrance 
into force still pending). Investment Chapter, Article 15, EU-Mexico Global Agreement 
(adoption and entrance into force are still pending).
45. See also: Article 9, Netherlands Model BIT, 2019. Article 4, Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union Model BIT, 2019.
46. Stephan W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, The Rule of Law, and Comparative Public 
Law’ in Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 152.
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offered by the latter. In this respect, ECT Article 10(1), second 
sentence, differs from NAFTA Article 1105 (in its interpretation 
given by the Free Trade Commission on 31 July 2001) which 
contains an express reference to international law. Therefore, when 
assessing Respondent’s actions, a specific standard of fairness and 
equitableness above the minimum standard must be identified and 
applied for the application of the ECT.”47
Contrary to NAFTA tribunals, ECT tribunals have refrained from establishing 
a general outline of the content of the ECT’s FET standard. Instead, they 
have primarily examined and applied the standard on a case-by-case basis 
while focusing on the specific facts of each individual case. Nevertheless, an 
examination of ECT jurisprudence identifies that the following elements are part 
of the FET obligation: i) the obligation to comply with due process requirements 
and avoid a denial of justice;48 ii) a prohibition on arbitrary or discriminatory 
treatment;49 iii) a prohibition on corruption;50 and iv) a prohibition on coercion 
or harassment.51 Also, it is a widely held view in ECT arbitration that the FET 
47. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic 
of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 263. See also: Award, Antin 
Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 530. Decision on Responsibility and on 
the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European 
Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. 
Paras. 258 & 263.
48. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case 
No. (080/2005), 2008. Para. 75. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.74. 
Unofficial Translation of the Arbitral Award, Energoalliance Ltd v. the Republic of Moldova, 
UNCITRAL, 2013. Para. 356. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL 
Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 
221. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 321. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL 
Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Paras. 
273-279.
49. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.74. Decision on Responsibility and on 
the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European 
Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. 
Paras. 428-429.
50. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 422.
51. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 221. Award in Respect of Damages, 
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2002. Para. 68. Award, 
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standard protects legitimate expectations, and tribunals have considered the 
FET standard in light of the first sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT. Since these latter 
two aspects are of great importance to RES investors, they will be addressed 
more in-depth in the following sections.
5.2.2.1. Legitimate Expectations
It is widely acknowledged by ECT tribunals that the FET standard protects the 
legitimate expectations of an investor.52 This is highly relevant to RES investors 
since it potentially means that commitments undertaken by States towards 
investors, such as those contained in national support schemes for RES, may 
be protected under international law. This may provide RES investors with a 
ground to challenge measures that alter the regulatory framework which they 
relied upon when making their investments.
From an analysis of ECT cases concerning legitimate expectations claims, it 
becomes clear that, in order to successfully bring a claim under the notion 
of legitimate expectations of the FET standard, several aspects seem to be 
important. As stated by several tribunals, for example, only legitimate expectations 
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2, 2003. Para. 154. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA 
and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 2013. Paras. 
1086-1092.
52. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. 
v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.74. Award, Electrabel 
S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2015. Para. 155. Award, AES 
Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 9.3.8-9.3.12. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 
2009. Para. 200. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf 
Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 2013. Para. 941. Award, 
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 695. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne 
and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 486. Final 
Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 362. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, 
BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. Paras. 775-784. Decision on 
Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and 
RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 260. Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 
158/2015, 2019. Para. 184. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Quantum Principles, 
NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, 2019. Para. 582.
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that were present at the time the investment was made are relevant.53 Although 
assurances made by the State towards the investor post-establishment can be 
highly relevant when considering a legitimate expectations claim, as is evidenced 
by the Masdar v. Spain case.54
In addition, several tribunals have stressed that the expectations must have 
arisen because the host State made certain representations or assurances that 
were relied upon by the investor when making the investment and with which 
the host State eventually failed to comply.55 In the absence of such specific 
commitments, most tribunals have concluded that the ECT does not limit the 
53. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Award, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2015. Para. 193. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza 
Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 9.3.9. 
& 9.3.17. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of 
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 695. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV 
v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. Para. 784. Unofficial Translation of the 
Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 
2016. Para. 498. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin 
Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 
362. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 
V 2015/095, 2018. Para. 447. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) 
(Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 
2018. Para. 649. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF 
Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 263.
54. Award, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/1, 2018. Paras. 119, 123, 511-522.
55. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 9.3.17. Unofficial Translation 
of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 
062/2012, 2016. Para. 486. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar 
Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 200. 
Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Paras. 542-545. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Paras. 496-499. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Paras. 500-503. Award, WA Investments-Europa 
Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Paras. 583-586.
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States’ power to modify its legislation.56 To use the words of the Blusun v. Italy 
tribunal: ‘tribunals have so far declined to sanctify laws as promises.’57
Also, the Blusun tribunal held that:
“In the absence of a specific commitment, the state has no 
obligation to grant subsidies such as feed-in tariffs, or to maintain 
them unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, and 
if it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a 
manner which is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative 
amendment, and should have due regard to the reasonable 
reliance interests of recipients who may have committed substantial 
resources on the basis of the earlier regime. These considerations 
apply even more strongly when the context is subsidies or the 
payment of special benefits for particular economic sectors.”58
Thus, in order for a general legal framework to give rise to legitimate expectations 
that are protected under international law, an investor will require a commitment 
that this general legal framework will not be modified.59
Also, the expectations have to be reasonable, legitimate and/or justifiable, which 
has to be assessed in an objectified manner, which means that the subjective 
expectations and desires of investors are not conclusive.60 The Mohammad 
56. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 362. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-
Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. 
Para. 372. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg 
Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and 
GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. 
Para. 356. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia 
Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Paras. 530, 
531 and 538. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & 
Environment (SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC 
Case No. V 2015/095, 2018. Para. 450-452.
57. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 367.
58. Ibid. Para. 372, see also para. 319.
59. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 498-499. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power 
B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 289.
60. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Award, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2015. Para. 165. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech 
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Ammar Al-Bahloul tribunal quoted an Award where ‘legitimate’ was defined as 
follows:
“[…] the investor received an explicit promise or guaranty from 
the host-State, or if implicitly, the host-State made assurances or 
representations that the investor took into account in making the 
investment. Finally, in the situation where the host-State made 
no assurance or representation, the circumstances surrounding 
the conclusion of the agreement are decisive to determine if the 
expectation of the investor was legitimate. In order to determine the 
legitimate expectation of an investor, it is also necessary to analyse 
the conduct of the State at the time of the investment.”61
Finally, it has to be emphasized that the host State retains its right to regulate in the 
public interest, which means that an ECT tribunal has to engage in a balancing 
exercise when determining whether the State has violated the expectations of 
the investor.62 Hence, since the protection of legitimate expectations under the 
ECT is not absolute, this balancing exercise requires that a measure is ‘unfair 
Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 304. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-
Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 9.3.9. 
Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 200. Unofficial Translation of the 
Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 
2016. Para. 495. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. 
Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 731. Award, AES Corporation 
and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 
400. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 
2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM 
Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 
355.
61. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the 
Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 202. Award, Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 2007. Para. 331.
62. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 177. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.77. Award, Electrabel S.A. 
v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2015. Para. 165. Award, Mamidoil 
Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 731. ECT tribunals have made reference to the following non-ECT 
Awards: Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. 
Paras. 305-307. Award, Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/23, 2013. Para. 537.
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or inequitable.’63 Alternatively, ECT tribunals have referred to a requirement of 
‘reasonableness’.64
It has to be noted that the various tribunals have sometimes dealt differently 
with the considerations addressed above. Also, whether the requirements are 
complied with always depends on the specific facts of the case.
5.2.2.2. Stable, Equitable, Favorable, and Transparent Conditions for 
Investors
As was already discussed above, the relevance of the first sentence of Art. 
10(1) has been construed differently by various tribunals. Several tribunals have 
considered that the first sentence, and the elements contained therein, are 
(clearly) part of the FET standard.65
In practice this can be used by investors to argue that, even in the absence of 
specific representations made by the State to the investor which could give rise 
to legitimate expectations that are protected under international law, regulatory 
changes may still violate the FET standard because the boundaries of fairness 
and equitableness are violated. As such it can be relied upon as subsidiary 
argument.
63. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 401.
64. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-
22, 2019. Paras. 542 & 552-556. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Paras. 496 & 508-512. Award, Voltaic Network 
GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Paras. 500 & 508-512. Award, 
WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 
2019. Paras. 583 & 599-603.
65. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 74. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, 2008. Para. 173. The view that a lack of stability and transparency of the legal 
framework is unfair and inequitable is also supported by the Mamidoil tribunal: Award, 
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 599. See also: Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 
2009. Para. 183. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-22, 2019. Para. 529. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 483. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH 
v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 487. Award, WA Investments-
Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 570.
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5.2.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
In current investment cases related to RES, the FET standard is arguably the 
most important investment protection standard which investors rely upon.
For example, in the NAFTA case Windstream Energy v. Canada, the investor 
successfully invoked Art. 1105 NAFTA. This case concerned the FIT program 
of Ontario, where the investor was awarded a FIT contract in 2010.66 After being 
awarded the contract, the authorities put in place a moratorium on offshore 
wind park development that effectively cancelled the project.67 Having put in 
place the moratorium, the authorities subsequently did little to address ‘the 
legal and contractual limbo in which Windstream found itself.’68 According to 
the tribunal, the failure by the authorities ‘to take the necessary measures […] 
within a reasonable period of time after the imposition of the moratorium to bring 
clarity to the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the status and the development 
of the [investors] project […] constitutes a breach’ of NAFTA’s FET standard.69
Under the ECT, the FET standard is primarily being relied upon in RES cases 
dealing with regulatory changes to the RES support scheme which adversely 
affected the investors. As stated by Reuter, ‘[t]aking into account that support 
reductions are characterized by the withdrawal or reduction of support expressed 
to be granted by the host State to the relevant facilities at the time of the 
investment, the principles of consistency, transparency and reasonableness 
as well was the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations appear to 
be at the heart of the matter.’70 Under the ECT, such disputes have arisen with 
regards to Italy, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Spain. Below an overview is 
given of the application of the ECT, and in particular the protection of legitimate 
expectations under the FET standard.
66. Award, Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, 2016. 
Paras. 117-127.
67. Ibid. Paras. 189-192.
68. Ibid. Para. 379.
69. Ibid. Para. 380.
70. Alexander Reuter, ‘Retroactive Reduction of Support for Renewable Energy and 
Investment Treaty Protection from the Perspective of Shareholders and Lenders’ [2015] 12 
Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 17. Joe Tirado, ‘Renewable Energy Claims under 
the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. 
P. 14. Saverio Francesco Massari, ‘The Italian Photovoltaic Sector in Two Practical Cases: 
How to Create an Unfavorable Investment Climate in Renewables’ [2015] 12 Transnational 
Dispute Management 1. Pp. 22-24. Anna De Luca, ‘Renewable Energy in the EU, the 
Energy Charter Treaty, and Italy’s Withdrawal Therefrom’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute 
Management 1. Pp. 7-8.
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5.2.4. Application of the FET Standard in ECT in Renewable 
Energy Investment Disputes
In response to regulatory changes made to RES support schemes, international 
investors initiated more than 40 ECT cases against Spain. For similar reasons, 
other ECT contracting parties, such as Italy, the Czech Republic, Greece, and 
Bulgaria have also been confronted with investment claims, either under the ECT 
or applicable BIT’s.71
Although investors in these cases initiated various ECT standards from both Arts. 
10 and 13 ECT, the primary argument of the investors is often the same, namely 
that these regulatory changes violated their legitimate expectations as protected 
under the FET standard.
At present, it seems that two alternative arguments are often put forward by 
investors, both closely related to the protection of legitimate expectations. Firstly, 
that they had the legitimate expectation that the specific regulatory regime relied 
upon when making the investment, in the case of Spain often RD 661/2007, would 
remain in place unaltered. Secondly, that even in case no such expectation could 
exist and the respondent State was therefore allowed to amend its regulatory 
framework, these changes would be implemented within the boundaries set by 
the FET standard of the ECT.
Arbitral awards regarding both arguments will be analyzed.
5.2.4.1. Legal Stability Expectation
In investment disputes concerning RES, the legal stability expectation is often 
put forward along the following lines: the investment was made on the basis of a 
specific regulatory regime, in the case of Spain RD 661/2007 for example, and 
investors had the legitimate expectation that their investment would solely be 
governed by this regulatory framework. Therefore, the subsequent regulatory 
changes to the initial framework are in violation of the FET standard.
Accepting the argument that a general legal framework can give rise to legitimate 
expectations would have far reaching consequences for host States as any 
71. Cees Verburg & Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases 
and the Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for Intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ 
[2018] 3 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 197. P. 198.
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regulatory change could then lead to a violation of international obligations.72 
Therefore, numerous ECT tribunals have rejected this argument in RES disputes.73
In Charanne v. Spain, the first ECT tribunal to issue a final award in a RES case, 
the tribunal refused to acknowledge that, absent explicit representations made by 
the State to the investor, a general legal framework could give rise to a legitimate 
expectation – protected under international law by the ECT – that regulatory 
regimes would not change.74 The tribunal considered that accepting such an 
argument would amount to equating the FET standard with a stabilization clause, 
which the tribunal considered unacceptable.75
Comparable statements were made in the RES cases, Eiser v. Spain, Foresight 
v. Spain, Antin v. Spain, Blusun v. Italy, and RREEF v. Spain.76 Also, an arbitral 
tribunal that ruled in four Czech ECT disputes concerning RES, which will 
combinedly be referred to as the PV Investors v. Czech Republic cases, made 
a statement along comparable lines.77
72. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). P. 184.
73. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. 
Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 499 & 503. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure 
Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 362. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., 
Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable 
Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 
2015/150), 2018. Para. 356. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and 
Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. 
Paras. 530, 531 and 538.
74. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 499 & 503.
75. Ibid. Para. 503.
76. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 362. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg 
Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, 
GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of 
Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 356. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services 
Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Paras. 530, 531 and 538. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre 
Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 
319. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure 
(G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 321.
77. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-
22, 2019. Paras. 539-540 & 544. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Paras. 494-499. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Paras. 498-503. Award, WA Investments-
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In conformity with other ECT awards unrelated to RES, tribunals thus emphasize 
that specific representations must be made by the State to the investor that 
contains a guarantee that a general legal framework will not be altered to 
the detriment of the investor before such an argument can be accepted.78 
For example, the AES v. Kazakhstan tribunal held rather unequivocal that ‘[i]
nvestments are made in the context of the general regulatory framework of the 
host State, and it would require the very clearest of commitments on the part of 
the State to refrain from adjusting that regulatory framework in some specified 
manner to give rise to any expectation that an investment would be insulated 
from the effects of normal legal and regulatory evolution.’79 In the 2018 RES case 
Antaris v. Czech Republic, the tribunal did state, however, that ‘[a]n expectation 
may arise from what are construed as specific guarantees in legislation.’80 This 
latter statement could open the door to a broader interpretation of the legitimate 
expectations doctrine which seems to take the debate back to whether general 
legislation is capable of generating legitimate expectations per se, a discussion 
to which earlier ECT tribunals answered in the negative.81
Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Paras. 580-
586.
78. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 176. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-
Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Paras. 200-202. 
Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 9.3.17-9.3.18. Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2012. Paras. 7.76-7.78. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. 
Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, 2013. Paras. 289-291. Award, 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2015. Para. 155.
79. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 289.
80. Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-01, 2018. Para. 360. It has to be noted, however, that the Antaris tribunal makes 
several general statements about the relevant principles that are seemingly at odds with 
one another. This general outline repeated in the CEF Energia B.V. v. Italy case: Award, 
CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019. Para. 185.
81. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. 
Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 499 & 503. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure 
Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 362. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., 
Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable 
Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 
2015/150), 2018. Para. 356. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and 
Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. 
Paras. 530, 531 and 538.
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In some RES cases, such representations may well have been given by the 
State. In the Masdar v. Spain case, for instance, the project companies in 
which Masdar had invested obtained written communications from the relevant 
authorities after the investment had been made that explicitly confirmed that the 
conditions as laid down in RD 661/2007 would be applicable to its CSP plants 
throughout the operating lifetime of the facilities.82 Under these circumstances, 
the tribunal considered that it ‘would be difficult to conceive of a more specific 
commitment than a Resolution issued by Spain addressed specifically to each 
of the Operating Companies, confirming that each of the Plants qualified under 
the RD 661/2007 economic regime for their “operational lifetime”.’83 In this case, 
a violation of the FET standard was thus accepted because the investor had 
obtained written confirmation that its investments would be governed by RD 
661/2007 for their entire operational lifetime.
In the NextEra v. Spain case, such representations had also been made to the 
investor.84 In line with ECT tribunals named above, the tribunal held that a general 
legal framework cannot give rise to legitimate expectations since ‘legislation 
can be changed.’85 In this case, the investor had nevertheless obtained specific 
statements and assurances which the tribunal subdivided into five categories:
‘1) Statements made in writing to NextEra by Spanish officials; 2) 
Statements made in writing by NextEra representatives to Spanish 
officials that were not contradicted or disagreed with by Spanish 
officials (although not responded to or agreed to); 3) NextEra’s 
internal memoranda reporting on meetings with the Spanish officials; 
4) Witness statements indicating NextEra’s understanding of the 
Spanish position’ 5) Statements made to industry, and statements 
made to the [project companies].’86
According to the tribunal, the statements made in writing to NextEra constitute 
‘the best evidence of Spanish assurances that could be the basis for legitimate 
82. Award, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/1, 2018. Paras. 516-519.
83. Ibid. Para. 520.
84. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Quantum Principles, NextEra Energy Global 
Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/11, 2019. Para. 583.
85. Ibid. Para. 584.
86. Ibid. Para. 588.
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expectations.’87 In these letters, written by the Spanish Secretary of State for 
Energy Pedro Marin to a representative of NextEra, the Secretary of State held: 
‘the absolute vocation of said legislation is to preserve the legal security of 
all investments currently underway, thereby guaranteeing the forecasts under 
which said investments are to be made’ and ‘the new framework for the 
promotion of renewable energies is governed by the principles of judicial and 
regulatory stability and visibility, and that the actual pre-assignment in the registry 
guarantees the promoter the benefits of the economic regime under which it 
made its investment decision.’88 Under such circumstances, the tribunal held 
that the investors could have the legitimate expectation that RD 661/2007 ‘would 
not be changed in a way that would undermine the security and viability of 
their investment.’89 Nevertheless, the regime was ‘fundamentally and radically 
changed’ and deprived the investors of ‘the security and certainty that, in light of 
the assurances they had received from Spanish authorities about guaranteeing 
the legal security of investments underway as well as the forecasts under which 
the investments were made and affirming legal and regulatory stability, they 
could have expected.’90 Hence, Spain breached the FET standard.91
In Italian ECT cases concerning RES, such representations may also well be 
made to investors by the State, because it was laid down in relevant decrees 
and the investors received a ‘tariff recognition letter’ from the SOE in charge 
of implementing the support scheme that ‘recognized’ that the tariff will be 
‘constant’ for twenty years.92 Also, investors would enter into a written agreement 
with that SOE that laid down the applicable FIT that was ‘constant’ for a period 
of twenty years.93
87. Ibid. Para. 590.
88. Ibid. Para. 592.
89. Ibid. Para. 596.
90. Ibid. Para. 599.
91. See also: Award, NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings 
B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, 2019. Para. 6.
92. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Para. 127.
93. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 69-71. 
Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Paras. 127-130.
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In light of such circumstances, the Greentech v. Italy tribunal held that ‘[t]he 
repeated and precise assurances to specific investors amounted to guarantees 
that the tariffs would remain fixed for two decades.’94 Thereby, Italy ‘effectively 
waived its right to reduce the value of the tariffs’ according to the tribunal.95 
In fact, the tribunal considered the commitments undertaken by Italy vis-à-vis 
foreign investors ‘sufficiently specific’ to give rise to obligations that are entered 
into for purposes of the umbrella clause.96
Under comparable circumstances, the tribunal in CEF Energia v. Italy held that ‘a 
party in the shoes of claimant would be left in no doubt but that it was to receive 
incentives, in constant currency, for a twenty year period, and all pursuant to 
private law contracts.’97 Since these assurances were taken into account by the 
investor when making the investment, it had the legitimate expectation that the 
incentives would remain in place.98 Nevertheless, the tribunal embarked on an 
exercise of balancing the private and public interests involved in order to analyze 
whether a breach of the ECT could be established, and eventually found in favour 
of the former.99
Even in the context of regulatory changes in Spain, legal stability claims have 
been accepted by ECT tribunals, even though the circumstances were not 
comparable to those of the Masdar and NextEra cases.100 In Novenergia v. 
Spain for example, a case decided after the awards from the Charanne and 
Eiser cases had already become public, the tribunal accepted the legal stability 
expectation. In essence, the Novenergia tribunal accepted that RD 661/2007 
and several documents regarding the Spanish RES scheme – the very same 
documents as in other Spanish ECT cases – were a credible source to base a 
legitimate expectations claim on.101 Notwithstanding that, and contrary to the 
94. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Para. 450.
95. Id.
96. Ibid. Paras. 464-467.
97. Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019. Para. 217.
98. Ibid. Para. 234.
99. Ibid. Paras. 235-247.
100. See also: Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum, Cube 
Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 
2019. Paras. 276 & 310.
101. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), 
SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Paras. 666-681. 
Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
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Masdar and NextEra cases, none of these documents were directed specifically 
at the investor or its investments, something the tribunal itself would acknowledge 
in its award.102
In a similar vein, in 9REN Holding v. Spain, the tribunal held that a specific 
provision of RD 661/2007 constituted a ‘specific undertaking’ from Spain vis-
à-vis the investor, notwithstanding the fact that this representation arose from 
regulatory law and there was no individual representation made to the investor 
comparable to the Masdar and NextEra cases.103 The tribunal subsequently held 
that these legitimate expectations, which were relied upon when making the 
investment, were frustrated in violation of the FET standard:104
‘The financial vulnerability of renewable energy projects is the heavy 
up-front capital costs. Once money is “sunk” in the PV facilities, 
the funds of the developer (and its bankers) are locked into the FIT 
contracts with their investments effectively (as the Claimant put it) 
long-term hostages. If energy prices rise, the benefit accrues to 
Spain not the operators who, in Spain’s view, will recover only what 
Spain unilaterally declares to be a reasonable return by reference 
to the bond market. On the other hand, if energy prices fall, Spain 
claims the right to resile from what the Tribunal has concluded was a 
regulatory guarantee of price stability. Spain’s position is that it alone 
should benefit from rising prices, but the burden of falling prices is 
to be off-loaded onto investors. As a matter of Spanish domestic law, 
such treatment of local investors has been held to be constitutional, 
but in the Tribunal’s view, such one-sided treatment is neither fair 
nor equitable. Under the ECT, the Claimant, as a foreign investor, 
was entitled to fair and equitable treatment and in this case did not 
receive it.’105
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 81-82.
102. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), 
SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 715.
103. Award, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15, 2019. 
Paras. 257, 293-297.
104. Ibid. Para. 307.
105. Ibid. Para. 311.
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These cases, and the Masdar v. Spain, NextEra v. Spain, CEF Energia v. Italy, 
and Greentech v. Italy cases more specifically, demonstrate that the application 
of the legal stability expectation is thus greatly dependent on the facts of the 
specific case at hand. Nevertheless, the presence of inconsistencies is once 
again demonstrated by reference to the Novenergia and 9REN Holding awards, 
which adopted a significantly broader interpretation of the legitimate expectations 
doctrine than other ECT tribunals are generally willing to acknowledge.
5.2.4.2. Regulatory Changes Within the Boundaries of FET
The second argument, which is often put forward as an alternative to the 
legal stability expectation, in essence stresses that the FET standard can 
still be breached by regulatory changes – even in the absence of a specific 
representation by the State – when the regulatory changes exceed the boundaries 
of fairness and equitableness.106
In the Charanne v. Spain case, the investor had argued that ‘the legitimate 
expectations of the investor [...] are frustrated, even in the absence of specific 
commitments, when the receiving State performs acts incompatible with a 
criterion of economic reasonableness, with public interest or with the principle 
of proportionality.’107 Although the tribunal would eventually reject the argument, 
it did accept the rationale of it, by stating that ‘an investor has a legitimate 
expectation that, when modifying the existing regulation based on which the 
investment was made, the State will not act unreasonably, disproportionately 
or contrary to the public interest.’108 With regards to proportionality, the tribunal 
considered ‘that this criterion is satisfied as long as the changes are not 
capricious or unnecessary and do not amount to suddenly and unpredictably 
eliminate the essential characteristics of the existing regulatory framework.’109 The 
tribunal considered the FIT and priority dispatch as fundamental characteristics 
of the support scheme.110
106. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows 
of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 16-17. See for 
example: Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case 
No. 2014-01, 2018. Para. 360(7).
107. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 513.
108. Ibid. Para. 514.
109. Ibid. Para. 517.
110. Ibid. Para. 533.
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The tribunal in the Blusun v. Italy case would comment on the standard of review 
proposed by the Charanne tribunal as the Charanne case was the first ECT RES 
dispute to be decided on the merits. Interestingly the Blusun tribunal, which 
would eventually dismiss all claims on the merits, quite openly criticized the 
proposed standard of review:
“Of the three criteria suggested in Charanne, ‘public interest’ is 
largely indeterminate and is, anyway, a judgement entrusted to the 
authorities of the host state. Except perhaps in very clear cases, it is 
not for an investment tribunal to decide, contrary to the considered 
view of those authorities, the content of the public interest of 
their state, nor to weigh against it the largely incommensurable 
public interest of the capital- exporting state. The criterion of 
‘unreasonableness’ can be criticized on similar grounds, as an 
open-ended mandate to second-guess the host state’s policies. 
By contrast, disproportionality carries in-built limitations and is 
more determinate. It is a criterion which administrative law courts, 
and human rights courts, have become accustomed to apply to 
governmental action.”111
Rather, the Blusun tribunal held that ‘[i]n the absence of a specific commitment, 
the State has no obligation to grant subsidies such as feed-in-tariffs, or to 
maintain them unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, and if 
it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a manner which 
is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative amendment, and should 
have due regard to the reasonable reliance interests of recipients who may have 
committed substantial sources on the basis of the earlier regime.’112 The Blusun 
tribunal thus proposes a proportionality test.
The first ECT RES case where the boundaries of fairness and equitableness 
were crossed would come in 2017 in the Eiser v. Spain case, which held that:
“[…] Article 10(1)’s obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment 
necessarily embraces an obligation to provide fundamental stability 
in the essential characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by 
111. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 318.
112. Ibid. Para. 319.
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investors in making long-term investments. This does not mean that 
regulatory regimes cannot evolve. Surely they can. [...] However, the 
Article 10(1) obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment means 
that regulatory regimes cannot be radically altered as applied to 
existing investments in ways that deprive investors who invested in 
reliance on those regimes of their investment’s value.”113
In this case, the investors’ investments deviated from the hypothetical standard 
employed by the Spanish authorities to determine the FIT. Therefore, the tribunal 
considered that the new regime retroactively prescribed design standards with 
regards to facilities that were built years before.114 As a consequence of the 
regulatory changes, revenues went down by 66 percent.115 In light of these factual 
circumstances, the tribunal considered that Spain had violated the FET standard.
The standard of review from the Eiser tribunal, as quoted above, received the 
approval of the Antin v. Spain tribunal in 2018.116 The Antin tribunal likewise 
found a violation of the FET standard since the remuneration methodology 
applied to Antin’s investment was not based on ‘any identifiable criteria’ but 
rather depended on governmental discretion.117 This was contrary to the previous 
regime, which did make use of identifiable criteria for purposes of remuneration.
The Eiser standard of review also received the approval of the Foresight v. Spain 
tribunal.118 The tribunal would establish that the 2013-2014 measures introduced 
by Spain were in violation of the FET standard because they ‘did not merely 
modify the fixed FIT’s […] rather, it introduced a number of fundamental changes 
to the support scheme.’119 The changes were so fundamental that they ‘crossed 
113. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 382. This paragraph was partially 
referred to in Cube Infrastructure v. Spain: Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial 
Decision on Quantum, Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 2019. Para. 354.
114. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 414.
115. Ibid. Para. 151 & 417.
116. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. 
v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 532.
117. Ibid. Para. 568.
118. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 
S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM 
Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Paras. 
359, 365, 385 & 388.
119. Ibid. Para. 390.
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the line from a non-compensable regulatory measure to a compensable breach 
of the FET standard in the ECT.’120
The Eiser approach likewise received the approval of the RREEF v. Spain 
tribunal.121 It held that investors could expect that any changes to FIT’s would 
be ‘reasonable and equitable.’122 The tribunal in this case found that the investors 
could only have a legitimate expectation to receive a ‘reasonable rate of return’ 
rather than a general legitimate expectation of regulatory stability.123
The standard of review of Eiser v. Spain has not gone completely uncontested, 
however. In Novenergia v. Spain, the tribunal did not agree with the finding of the 
Eiser tribunal that a deprivation of value has to have taken place:
“The Tribunal disagrees with the approach adopted by the arbitral 
tribunal in Eiser, […]. In the Tribunal’s view, the assessment of 
whether the FET standard has been breached is a balancing 
exercise, where the state’s regulatory interests are weighed against 
the investors’ legitimate expectations and reliance. It is not simply 
sufficient to look at the economic effect that the challenged 
measures have had. Destruction of the value of the investment 
is clearly determinative in the assessment of whether a state has 
breached Article 13 [Expropriation] of the ECT, but it is but one of 
several factors to consider when determining whether a state has 
breached Article 10(1) of the ECT. Nevertheless, in the Tribunal’s 
opinion, the economic effect on a claimant’s investment is an 
important factor in the balancing exercise pursuant to Article 10(1) 
as well, as it can go towards showing a change in the essential 
characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors in making 
long-term investments.”124
120. Ibid. Para. 398.
121. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) 
Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Paras. 314 & 316.
122. Ibid. Para. 399.
123. Id.
124. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), 
SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 694.
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Instead, because the Spanish measures were so ‘radical and unexpected’ that 
they ‘fell outside the acceptable range of legislative and regulatory behaviour’ 
since they ‘entirely transform[ed] and alter[ed] the legal and business environment 
under which the investment was […] made’, the consequential ‘significant 
damaging economic effect’ on the investment sufficed to establish a violation of 
the FET standard.125 By requiring ‘significant damaging economic effect’ instead 
of a deprivation of value, one could argue that the threshold of liability is lower 
under the Novenergia approach.126
That the effects of regulatory changes on the economic viability of an investment 
can be a relevant consideration in RES ECT cases is also confirmed by the PV 
Investors v. Czech Republic cases. In these cases, the investors were still making 
‘a more than reasonable return’ which confirmed the tribunal in its conclusion.127
5.2.4.3. Observations
On the basis of the awards discussed above a few observations can be drawn. 
Firstly, they make clear that the ECT allows investors to obtain redress for 
violations of the ECT. In the absence of a specific commitment to the contrary, 
the FET standard does not preclude regulatory modifications to existing support 
schemes provided that these do not amount to the elimination of fundamental 
characteristics of support schemes, such as FIT’s or the privilege of priority 
dispatch. Given the fact that many investments in the RES sector depend on such 
support, this is a highly relevant conclusion for RES investors. Secondly, these 
cases also demonstrate that the more specific a right to a FIT is – for example 
when it is laid down in a contract – the more likely it is that regulatory changes in 
violation of such commitments will amount to a violation of the ECT. This means 
that RES investors in for instance Italy and the UK, where FIT contracts are being 
concluded with investors, are better protected against regulatory changes than 
125. Ibid. Para. 695. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of 
Renewable Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating 
Flows of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 20.
126. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 20.
127. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 536. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 490. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 494. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 577.
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RES investors in States were financial support is granted on the basis of a general 
legal framework, such as Spain.
However, as these awards also demonstrate, tribunals do not necessarily agree 
on the applicable standard of review, which adversely affects the predictability 
of the application of the ECT. Therefore, in order for the ECT to fulfil its object of 
mitigating investment risks, it is desirable that the investment protection standards 
become more predictable.128
5.2.5. Recent Treaty Practice
As stated earlier, as a reaction to the sometimes expansive interpretations given 
to FET standards, States have started to limit the level of investment protection 
by better describing the content of the standard. It seems that some of the RES 
investment cases have also triggered a reaction. For example, Art. 9.6(5) CPTPP, 
which contains the CPTPP’s FET standard, states:
“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a subsidy or grant has 
not been issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or 
reduced, by a Party, does not constitute a breach of this Article, 
even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a 
result.”
In a very similar vein, Arts. 8.9(3) and (4) CETA, that precedes CETA’s FET 
standard, state:
“3. For greater certainty, a Party’s decision not to issue, renew or 
maintain a subsidy:
(a) in the absence of any specific commitment under law or contract 
to issue, renew, or maintain that subsidy; or
(b) in accordance with any terms or conditions attached to the 
issuance, renewal or maintenance of the subsidy, does not constitute 
a breach of the provisions of this Section.
128. Cees Verburg, ‘Modernizing the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal 
Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 425.
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4. For greater certainty, nothing in this Section shall be construed as 
preventing a Party from discontinuing the granting of a subsidy or 
requesting its reimbursement where such measure is necessary in 
order to comply with international obligations between the Parties or 
has been ordered by a competent court, administrative tribunal or 
other competent authority, or requiring that Party to compensate the 
investor therefor.”
In a footnote to the final paragraph quoted above it is clarified that with regard to 
the EU, a ‘subsidy’ includes state aid ‘as defined in its law’ and that the European 
Commission should be considered as a competent authority in accordance with 
Art. 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
One could consider the CETA provision a reaction to two types of investment 
cases.
First of all, these provisions seem to be related to the RES investment cases where 
reduced government support is at the heart of the dispute. These provisions can 
have clear implications for RES investors seeking investment protection on the 
basis of these IIA’s since the level of investment protection is reduced. In that 
regard, the CETA leaves more room for for successful claims by RES investors 
than the CPTPP. In the RES case Blusun v. Italy, the tribunal held that:
“In the absence of a specific commitment, the state has no 
obligation to grant subsidies such as feed-in tariffs, or to maintain 
them unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, and 
if it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a 
manner which is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative 
amendment, and should have due regard to the reasonable 
reliance interests of recipients who may have committed substantial 
resources on the basis of the earlier regime.”129
Although this statement does not contain a reference to either CETA or the 
CPTPP, its language does show some similarity with the treaty innovations in the 
more recent two agreements.
129. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 372.
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Secondly, the CETA provision seems to address certain controversial aspects 
of investment cases allegedly involving EU State aid rules, such as AES v. 
Hungary, Electrabel v. Hungary, EDF v. Hungary, and Micula v. Romania.130 In 
that regard, it is of interest to note that early versions of the ECT did contain a 
provision concerning State aid, although the current text does not mention it.131 
Also, in pending ECT RES disputes involving Spain and the Czech Republic, 
investors complain about regulatory changes to RES support schemes that were 
not notified to the European Commission in accordance with EU State aid rules. 
Consequently, the European Commission has already stated that it considers 
any damages that are to be awarded in ECT arbitration as notifiable State aid 
pursuant to Art. 108(3) TFEU.132 This may make the enforcement of an award 
difficult, if not impossible, in the EU.133
5.3. MOST CONSTANT PROTECTION AND SECURITY
The third sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT contains two obligations, the first one is 
the obligation that ‘investment shall also enjoy the most constant protection and 
security’ (MCPS). The origin of the MCPS standard dates back to at least the 
eighteenth century.134 Like the FET standard, the MCPS obligation has been 
130. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited 
and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. 
Award, EDF International S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, UNCITRAL, 2014. Final Award, Ioan 
Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack 
S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, 2013.
131. See for example, Article 31, Draft Basic Agreement, 31 October 1991. <https://
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/3_-_BA_4__31.10.91_.pdf> 
accessed on 07/02/2019. This provision provided for the following: ‘State aid should not 
be granted when it would distort competition in trade between the Contracting Parties. 
Deatiled provisions implementing the principles and defining the circumstances in which 
state aid is permitted shall be included in appropriate Protocols.’
132. European Commission, State aid SA.40348 (2015/NN) — (Spain) Support for electricity 
generation from renewable energy sources, cogeneration and waste, C(2017) 7384 final, 
10/11/2017. Para. 165.
133. Judgment, Ioan Micula, S.C. Multipack S.R.L., S.C. European S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., 
Viorel Micula v. Romanian Ministry of Public Finance, District Court Nacka, Case No. Ä 
2550-17, 2019. Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., 
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania [2017] EWHC 31, High Court of Justice England. Viorel 
Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania [2018] EWCA Civ 1801, Court of Appeal England. Lucian Ilie & Amy Seow, ‘Ioan 
Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack 
S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013’ [2017] 2 
European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 151.
134. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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formulated differently across IIA’s. As observed by Salacuse, MCPS provisions 
as laid down in the ECT fail to provide answer to ‘three difficult but essential 
questions.’135 Namely, i) against whom should the investment be protected?; ii) 
against what action or whom is the host State supposed to provide protection?; 
and iii) when do measures of the host State fall short of its obligation to provide 
security and protection?136
5.3.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
The obligation to provide MCPS can be found in many IIA’s. However, the wording 
often differs. The very first BIT, concluded between Germany and Pakistan, 
merely stated that investments of either Party ‘shall enjoy protection and security 
in the territory of the other Party.’137 Perhaps the most common formulation 
nowadays calls for ‘full protection and security.’138 It has been argued that these 
broad provisions could include both physical and legal protection and security.139 
In addition, there are provisions that refer specifically to ‘full physical security and 
protection’ and those that refer to ‘full legal protection and full legal security.’140 
Also, there are IIA’s that initially contain the ‘full protection and security’ standard, 
but which subsequently specify the content of this obligation. The CPTPP, for 
example, clarifies that ‘full protection and security’ does not require treatment 
beyond the requirements of customary international law as well as that each 
Party has ‘to provide the level of police protection required under customary 
Pp. 208 & 218. See for example: Article 14, Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 
between His Britannick Majesty and The United States of America (United States of 
America-United Kingdom) (adopted 19/11/1794, entered into force 29/2/1796).
135. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
208.
136. Id.
137. Article 3(1), Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Germany-Pakistan) (adopted 25/11/1959, 
entered into force 28/04/1962).
138. Article 4(1), Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Colombia for the 
Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment (Japan-Colombia) (adopted 
12/09/2011, entrance into force still pending). Article 1105(1), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 
01/01/1994).
139. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 162-165.
140. Article 3(2), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Netherlands-Nigeria) (adopted 02/11/1992, entered into force 01/02/1994). Article 4(1), 
Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Argentine Republic on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Germany-Argentina) (adopted 
09/04/1991, entered into force 08/11/1993).
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international law.’141 Similar provisions can be found in various BIT’s concluded 
by the US and Canada, and various Model BIT’s.142 The CETA provides that ‘full 
protection and security’ refers to ‘the Party’s obligations relating to the physical 
security of investors and covered investments.’143
Besides the phrasing of the provision, other differences can be distinguished. 
There are, for example, quite a few provisions where the MCPS obligation is 
mentioned as ‘a specification’ of the FET standard.144 There are also provisions 
141. Articles 9.6(1) & (2)(b), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (adopted 08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018).
142. Article 6, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Hong Kong) (adopted 10/02/2016, 
entered into force 06/09/2016). Article II, Agreement Between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Latvia) (adopted 05/05/2009, entered into force 24/11/2011). 
Article 6, Agreement Between Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Canada-Mali) (adopted 28/11/2014, entered into force 28/11/2014). Article 5, 
Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Canada-Peru) (adopted 14/11/2006, entered into force 20/06/2007). Article 
6, Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Senegal) (adopted 27/11/2014, entered into force 
05/08/2016). Article III, Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Slovakia) (adopted 20/07/2010, entered 
into force 14/03/2012). Article 6, Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Serbia) (adopted 01/09/2014, 
entered into force 27/04/2015). Article 5, Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) (adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 
01/11/2006). Article 5, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, 
entered into force 01/01/2012). See also: Article 5, Norway Draft Model BIT, 2015. Article 
4, Mexico Model BIT, 2008. Article 7, Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Morocco-Nigeria) (adopted 03/12/2016, entrance into 
force still pending).
143. Articles 8.10(1) & (5), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
144. Giuditta Cordero Moss, ‘Full Protection and Security’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards 
of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 133. Article 8.10(1), 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) (adopted 
30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 2.5(1) & (5), EU-Vietnam Investment 
Protection Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 30/06/2019, entrance into 
force still pending). Article 3(2), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic 
(Netherlands-Czech Republic) (adopted 29/04/1991, entered into force 01/10/1992). 
Article 3(2), Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of 
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where the MCPS obligation is a separate standard.145 Finally, there are also 
combinations where a link is made to either ‘public international law’ or ‘customary 
international law.’146
As one can see, the deviations in the phrasing are plentiful. However, in 
comparison to the FET standard, it has been argued that where the FET standard 
primarily deals with the decision-making process, the obligation to provide the 
MCPS is more concerned with ‘failures by the State to protect the investor’s 
property from actual damage caused by either miscreant State officials, or by 
the actions of others, where the State has failed to exercise due diligence.’147 
Good illustrations are cases like AMT v. Zaire, Wena Hotels v. Egypt, and AAPL 
v. Sri Lanka, that all concerned the destruction of property during internal armed 
conflicts, riots, or other acts of violence.148
It is generally recognized that the standard of liability is one of due diligence and 
not of strict liability.149 As held by the ICJ in the ELSI case, the MCPS standard 
Poland on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Netherlands-Poland) 
(adopted 07/09/1992, entered into force 01/02/1994). Article 2(2), Agreement Between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of El Salvador for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(United Kingdom-El Salvador) (adopted 14/10/1999, entered into force 01/12/2000).
145. Article 2(3), Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Belgium/Luxembourg-China) (adopted 06/06/2005, entered into force 
01/12/2009). Article 2(2), Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (China-Germany) (adopted 01/12/2003, entered into force 11/11/2005).
146. Article II(a), Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (United 
States-Argentina) (adopted 14/11/1991, entered into force 20/10/1994). Article II(2)(a), 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Ecuador) 
(adopted 27/08/1993, entered into force 11/05/1997). Articles 5(1) & (2), US Model BIT, 
2012.
147. Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore & Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration – Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press 2007). P. 247. Peter D. 
Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford University 
Press 2010). P. 171.
148. Ibid. P. 248. Award, American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/93/1, 1997. Paras. 6.09-6.14. Award, Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 2000. Paras. 80-85. Final Award, Asian Agricultural 
Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 1990. Paras. 85-86.
149. Award, Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/28, 2014. Para. 430. Award, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/11, 2005. Para. 164. Award, MNSS B.V. and Recupero Credito Acciaio 
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‘cannot be construed as giving of a warranty that property shall never in any 
circumstances be occupied or disturbed.’150 It is ‘an obligation of means’ and not 
one of result although a State cannot absolve its international liability by arguing 
a lack of resources.151
Concerning the substantive protection offered by the MCPS standard, it protects 
first and foremost against physical violence and harassment by either government 
officials or a third party, as evidenced by cases such as AAPL v. Sri Lanka and 
AMT v. Zaire.152
However, it is possible that the MCPS obligation extends beyond physical security, 
especially when it is qualified by ‘full’ and ‘no other adjective or explanation.’153 
With regards to the obligation to provide legal security and protection, one can 
think of the obligation of the host State to provide access to the judicial system.154
The CME v. Czech Republic tribunal went a step further when it held that the host 
State is obliged ‘to ensure that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions 
of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and protection 
N.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, 2016. Para. 351. Final Award, Asian 
Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 1990. Paras. 
45-48. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 
2010). P. 217. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 161-162. Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore 
& Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles (Oxford 
University Press 2007). P. 250. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 361.
150. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United State of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1989, p. 15. Para. 108.
151. Award, Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, 2009. Paras. 71-82. Giuditta Cordero Moss, ‘Full Protection 
and Security’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford 
University Press 2008). P. 139.
152. Award, American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/93/1, 1997. Paras. 6.09-6.14. Award, Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 2000. Paras. 80-85. Final Award, Asian Agricultural Products 
Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 1990. Paras. 85-86. Rudolf Dolzer 
& Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). Pp. 162-163. Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the Pursuit of 
Stability (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 171. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 361.
153. Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Paras. 
406-408.
154. Final Award, Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Para. 314.
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of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or devalued.’155 In this case, the 
Czech media regulatory body had created a legal situation in which the local 
partner of CME could terminate a contract that was essential to the investment, by 
virtue of which the Czech Republic violated the obligation to provide full security 
and protection.156 It has to be noted, however, that in the factually comparable 
Lauder v. Czech Republic case, which was almost simultaneously decided with 
the CME case, the tribunal reached the opposite conclusion.157
In the Siemens v. Argentina case, the tribunal also adopted an interpretation 
that was wider than merely physical protection.158 However, in the applicable 
BIT between Germany and Argentina, the term ‘security’ was qualified by ‘legal’, 
which justifies such an interpretation.159
Perhaps the most expansive interpretation given to a MCPS standard was 
given by the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania tribunal, which held that when ‘the terms 
“protection” and “security” are qualified by “full”, the content of the standard 
may extend to matters other than physical security. It implies a State’s guarantee 
of stability in a secure environment, both physical, commercial and legal.’160 
One could consider this reference to ‘commercial security’ as an expansive 
interpretation.
5.3.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
The MCPS standard has been addressed by various ECT tribunals. Several of 
these have endorsed the view that the obligation under this standard is one of 
155. Partial Award, CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Para. 
613.
156. Id.
157. Final Award, Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Paras. 305-314. 
This case was decided on the basis of another treaty, however.
158. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 
303.
159. Article 4(1), Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Argentine Republic 
on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Germany-Argentina) (adopted 
09/04/1991, entered into force 08/11/1993).
160. Award, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, 2008. Para. 729.
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due diligence.161 Therefore, the standard is not one of strict liability.162 This means 
that host States must take ‘reasonable steps to protect […] investors’ while there 
is no obligation to ‘prevent each and every injury.’163 According to the Electrabel 
tribunal, ‘the obligation is generally understood as requiring that the State take 
reasonable actions within its power to avoid injury when it is, or should be, aware 
that there is a risk of injury. The precise degree of care, of what is “reasonable” or 
“due,” depends in part on the circumstances.’164 The Plama tribunal held that the 
obligation is one of ‘vigilance’, which means that a State must take ‘all measures 
necessary’ to fulfil obligations and that a State may not be allowed to ‘invoke its 
own legislation to detract from any such obligation.’165
The MCPS standard of the ECT provides first and foremost for physical security 
and protection.166 According to the tribunal in the Liman Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan 
case, the purpose of the standard is ‘to protect the integrity of an investment 
161. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 179. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 13.3.2. Award, Mamidoil 
Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24, 2015. Paras. 821-822. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.83.
162. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 181. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 13.3.2. Award, Mamidoil 
Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 821. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad 
Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 
246.
163. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 13.3.2. Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.83. Award, El Paso Energy International Company v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 2011. Para. 523.
164. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.83. Award, El Paso Energy 
International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 2011. Para. 
523.
165. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 179.
166. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 180. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 13.3.2. Partial Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC 
Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 246. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV 
and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 
2010. Para. 289.
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against interference by the use of force and particularly physical damage.’167 
The AES v. Hungary tribunal held that a State should take reasonable steps or 
enable an investor to take such steps against ‘harassment by third parties and/
or State actors.’168 The obligation thus covers damage caused by State and 
non-State actors.
Several ECT tribunals have also addressed the notion of legal security.169 
According to the Plama tribunal, claims regarding legal security become closely 
related to the notion of the FET standard although another ECT tribunal held that 
the MCPS standard must have a ‘meaning beyond, and distinct from,’ the FET 
standard.170 According to the Mamidoil and Electrabel tribunals, the principles 
of treaty interpretation – must notably the ‘effet utile’ rule – require that a different 
scope and role must be given to the MCPS and the FET standards.171
With regards to legal security, the AES v. Hungary case is of particular interest. 
The claimant in this case had argued that the introduction of a new pricing regime 
for electricity resulted in price cuts of 35 and 43 percent in comparison to an 
earlier Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) that was terminated by Hungary.172 
AES argued that the MCPS provision of the ECT was breached by Hungary 
because the implementation of the new pricing regime had ‘substantially 
devalued their investment’ while the previous pricing method was based on 
contractual arrangements.173 The tribunal, however, rejected these claims and 
held that the security provision ‘can, in appropriate circumstances, extend 
beyond a protection of physical security, it certainly does not protect against a 
State’s right (as was the case here) to legislate or regulate in a manner which may 
negatively affect a claimant’s investment, provided that the State acts reasonably 
167. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 289.
168. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 13.3.2.
169. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 246.
170. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 180. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment 
BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 289.
171. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 819. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 
7.83.
172. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 4.24.
173. Ibid. Para. 13.1.2.-13.1.3.
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in the circumstances and with a view to achieving objectively rational public policy 
goals.’174 Therefore, the tribunal refused to accept an argument that essentially 
claims that no change in law may take place which adversely affects the value 
of the investment since this would be ‘practically the same as to recognizing 
the existence of a non-existent stability agreement as a consequence of the full 
protection and security standard.’175
Thus, according to the AES tribunal, the MCPS standard does not provide legal 
protection against regulatory changes that adversely affect an investment when 
such changes are reasonable in the circumstances and pursue an objectively 
rational public policy goal.
In the factually comparable Electrabel v. Hungary case, the claimant argued 
that the standard was breached because Electrabel’s Hungarian subsidiary had 
suffered a 34 percent price reduction due to a new pricing regime which violated 
Hungary’s international obligations because it had failed to ‘take positive steps 
to protect Electrabel’s investment and to prevent infringements of Electrabel’s 
rights by the operation of law.’176
The analysis of the Electrabel tribunal deviates from the analysis in the AES case 
because it does not focus on the issue of whether a substantive change in the 
regulatory framework would violate the MCPS standard, but it rather focusses 
on the availability of tools for obtaining redress for such changes.177 The tribunal 
concluded that such tools were provided for by Hungary since it provided for 
means by which Electrabel’s Hungarian subsidiary could settle its contractual 
PPA disputes with the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) to which it supplied the 
generated electricity.178 Moreover, any disputes between Electrabel and Hungary 
could be settled in various ways, including those provided for by Art. 26 ECT.179
The Electrabel and AES tribunals thus adopt a rather different approach when 
examining the MCPS standard in cases where the facts are comparable. While 
the AES tribunal focusses on the question of whether the substantive legal 
174. Ibid. Para. 13.3.2.
175. Ibid. Para. 13.3.5.
176. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.81.
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environment may change in such a way as to adversely affect the investment, 
the Electrabel tribunal adopts a less intrusive and more formalistic approach 
by merely focusing on the possible avenues that are available to the investor to 
obtain redress in case such regulatory changes occur. Depending on the margin 
of appreciation accorded to the host State by a tribunal, the AES approach is 
potentially more invasive in the regulatory freedom of the State.
5.3.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The MCPS standard may first of all provide protection against physical damage 
caused by State and non-State actors. However, the author is not aware of any 
situations of damage caused by insurgents to RES facilities comparable to, for 
example, the problems faced by international oil companies in the Niger Delta 
in Nigeria where facilities are regularly attacked by local militants. Nevertheless, 
it has to be noted that developers and contractors of onshore windfarms in the 
Netherlands have received threats from local opponents.180 Thus far, this has 
resulted in contractors withdrawing from proposed projects.181
At present it nevertheless seems more likely that RES investors appeal to the 
notion of legal security and protection. It has to be noted, however, that the 
existence of an obligation to provide legal protection was put in question by the 
Liman Caspian Oil tribunal, which held that the standard ‘does not extend to any 
contractual rights but whose purpose is rather’ to protect the physical integrity 
of the investment.182
By reference to the non-ECT CME v. Czech Republic case, RES investors 
could argue that statutory or regulatory changes to a legal framework may be 
in breach of the MCPS standard if these amendments fundamentally alter the 
legal landscape in which the RES facility operates.183 It has been said that the 
180. See for example: RTL Nieuws, ‘Vierde Dreigbrief Windmolenactivisten: ‘Uw Onderneming 
Wordt Vogelvrij Verklaard’ (RTL Nieuws, 2019). <https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/
nederland/artikel/4679071/weer-dreigbrief-over-windmolenpark-opgedoken> accessed on 
14/06/2019.
181. Bastiaan Nagtegaal, ‘Drents Bouwbedrijf Stapt uit Windpark na Bedreiging van Activisten’ 
(NRC, 2019). <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/03/27/drents-bouwbedrijf-stapt-uit-
windpark-na-bedreiging-van-activisten-a3954739> accessed on 26/07/2019.
182. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 289.
183. Partial Award, CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Para. 
613.
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approach of the CME tribunal has been followed in a considerable number of 
cases.184
An example of cases where the host State may have failed to provide legal 
security and protection are the currently pending ECT cases against Bulgaria, 
which are related to RES.185 Claimants in these cases are not renewable energy 
producers, however, but rather investors that invested in the electricity distribution 
grids of Bulgaria. Under Bulgarian law, the Distribution System Operator (DSO) 
has to ‘absorb’ the costs of the FIT offered to RES investors under Bulgarian 
legislation.186 To offset these costs, some of the DSO’s tried to pass these costs 
on to the consumer which lead to increased energy tariffs.187 These increased 
costs caused mass protests against high energy bills.188 This forced the national 
regulator to reduce the tariffs, primarily at the expense of the DSO’s.189 Under 
such circumstances, an investor can argue that Bulgaria failed to provide legal 
protection and security since it is forced – by law – to incur the costs associated 
with RES generation while the energy regulator does not provide enough room 
to pass these costs on to consumers.
5.4. NON-IMPAIRMENT STANDARD
The third sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT also contains the obligation that contracting 
parties shall not ‘impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the 
184. Ralph Alexander Lorz, ‘Protection and Security (Including the NAFTA Approach)’ in 
Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 
2015). P. 784. See for example: Award, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The 
Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 2004. Para. 170. Award, Azurix Corp. v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Para. 408.
185. EVN AG v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/17. ENERGO-PRO a.s. v. 
Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/19. ČEZ, a.s. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/16/24.
186. Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments under Cross-Fire? Renewable Energy 
and International Economic Tribunals’ [2015] 12 Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 117. P. 136. Article 31, Energy from Renewable Sources Act, Bulgaria 
(2011).
187. Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments under Cross-Fire? Renewable Energy 
and International Economic Tribunals’ [2015] 12 Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 117. P. 136.
188. Reuters, ‘EVN Prepares Legal Action on Bulgarian Electricity Dispute’ 
(Reuters, 19/03/2013) <http://www.reuters.com/article/austria-evn-bulgaria-
idUSL6N0CB6DU20130319> accessed on 03/11/2016.
189. Id. Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments under Cross-Fire? Renewable 
Energy and International Economic Tribunals’ [2015] 12 Manchester Journal of 
International Economic Law 117. P. 136.
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management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal’ of investments. This 
provision will be referred to as the ‘non-impairment’ standard.
5.4.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
In this paragraph a legal comparative analysis of the non-impairment obligation 
will be provided. After some general remarks, the elements ‘unreasonable’ 
and ‘discriminatory’ will be examined more in-depth to establish the level of 
investment protection as provided for by these elements.
The provision that protects investors against unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures is one that is often found in BIT’s, although it is absent in some well-
known IIA’s such as the NAFTA, CPTPP, and CETA.190 The language used to 
describe this standard, however, varies. For example, where the first element 
of the ECT standard – like many other IIA’s – refers to ‘unreasonable’ measures, 
other IIA’s refer to ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustifiable’ measures.191 However, there is 
190. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 191. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable Measures’ in 
August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). 
P. 87. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
790.
191. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). 
P. 792. For treaties that refer to ‘unreasonable’ see: Article 3(2), Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of the Republic of Armenia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Austria-Armenia) (adopted 17/10/2001, 
entered into force 01/02/2003). Article 2(2), Agreement Between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Czech 
Republic and Slovak Federal Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(United Kingdom-Czech Republic) (adopted 11/07/1990, entered into force 26/10/1992). 
Article 3(1), Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (China-Argentina) (adopted 05/11/1992, entered into force 01/08/1994). For 
treaties that refer to ‘arbitrary’ see for example: Article II(2)(b), Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment (Argentina-United States of America) (adopted 14/11/1991, 
entered into force 20/10/1994). Article 2(3), Treaty Between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (Germany-Argentina) (adopted 09/04/1991, entered into force 08/11/1993). 
Article 2(2), Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of 
Botswana concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(Germany-Botswana) (adopted 23/05/2000, entered into force 06/08/2007). For treaties 
that refer to ‘unjustifiable’, see for example: Article 4(2), Agreement Between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Australia-Argentina) (adopted 23/08/1995, entered into 
force 11/01/1997). Article 2(4), Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
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jurisprudence that accepts that the meaning of these different words is essentially 
the same.192 The second element of the non-impairment standard – discriminatory 
– is used in a more uniform manner.
The fact that the elements ‘unreasonable’ and ‘discriminatory’ are linked by the 
conjunction ‘or’ indicates that the obligation is disjunctive and that only one 
of the two elements has to be breached in order to establish a violation of the 
standard.193
Another notable difference between various IIA’s is that in some treaties the non-
impairment standard can be found in a separate provision, while in other IIA’s 
it is combined in the same provision as either the FET standard or the MCPS 
obligation, or it is a combination of both.194 This may raise issues concerning 
of Bulgaria and the Government of the Republic of Argentina on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Bulgaria-Argentina) (adopted 21/09/1993, entered 
into force 11/03/1997).
192. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184. Award, National Grid plc v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, 2008. 
Para. 197. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 191. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or 
Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 792-793.
193. Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Para. 
391. Award, Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 2009. Para. 457. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or 
Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 793-794. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable 
Measures’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). P. 87. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘“Unreasonable and Discriminatory Measures” as a 
Cause of Action under the Energy Charter Treaty’ [2007] 10 International Arbitration Law 
Review 104. P. 107.
194. In the ECT, for example, it can be found in Art. 10(1), which includes both the FET 
standard and the most constant security and protection obligation. This is in line with the 
policy of the Netherlands. See for example: Article 3(1), Netherlands Model BIT, 2004. 
Article 3(1), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
Between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Cambodia-
Netherlands) (adopted 23/06/2003, entered into force 01/03/2006). In many Austrian BIT’s, 
the non-impairment standard is often contained in a separate provision. See: Article 3(2), 
Austria Model BIT, 2008. Article 2(2), Agreement Between the Republic of Chile and the 
Republic of Austria for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Chile-
Austria) (adopted 08/09/1997, entered into force 22/10/2000). The Australia-Argentina 
BIT is an example of an IIA where the non-impairment obligation is combined with the full 
protection and security obligation: Article 4(2), Agreement Between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Australia-Argentina) (adopted 23/08/1995, entered into force 11/01/1997). 
The Argentina-Finland BIT combines the non-impairment obligation with the FET standard: 
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overlap of the various standards. For example, in the ECT case Plama v. Bulgaria, 
the tribunal acknowledged that the FET standard and the non-impairment 
obligation ‘can overlap on certain issues’ but that ‘they can also be defined 
separately.’195 Nevertheless, there are also investment cases where the tribunal 
considered the overlap between the FET and non-impairment standards so 
significant that it considered that there is essentially no difference in meaning.196 
This was for example the opinion of the tribunal in the Saluka v. Czech Republic 
case, where the applicable IIA, the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT, contained 
a provision incorporating both the FET and non-impairment standards in the 
same sentence.
A survey by Kriebaum reveals that both approaches have received significant 
support in practice, with almost an equal number of tribunals considering the FET 
and non-impairment standard separately as different standards and considering 
the non-impairment standard as part of the FET standard.197
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Schreuer and Kriebaum, there may be good 
reasons to examine both standards separately since it is illogical that treaty 
drafters would incorporate different obligations with exactly the same meaning.198 
This point of view is also in line with the general rules of treaty interpretation, 
more specifically the rule of effectiveness.199 According to the Appellate Body 
of the WTO, for example, ‘interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the 
terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result 
Article 2(2), Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the Republic of Argentina on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (Finland-Argentina) (adopted 05/11/1993, entered into force 03/05/1996).
195. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184.
196. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 
460.
197. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). 
Pp. 794-797. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg 
Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and 
GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. 
Para. 412.
198. Ibid. P. 797. Christoph Schreuer, ‘Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures’ 
in Catherine A. Rogers et al (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2009). P. 192.
199. Gillian D. Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (LexisNexis 
Buttersworths 2011). P. 124. Jean-Marc Sorel & Valerie Bore Eveno, ‘Article 31 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention: General Rule of Interpretation’ in Olivier Corten et al, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press 2011). P. 818.
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in reducing whole clauses of paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.’200 
Thus, while there may well be overlap between the different standards, they 
should also be considered and applied separately.201
The following paragraphs will examine the elements ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘discriminatory’ more in-depth.
5.4.1.1. Unreasonable Measures
Like most IIA’s, the ECT does not provide a definition of the notion of ‘unreasonable.’ 
As a consequence of the vagueness of the notion of ‘unreasonable’, investment 
tribunals have been struggling to give content and meaning to this term.202 As 
put forward by Heiskanen, two different approaches have emerged in practice.203
The first approach is referred to as the ‘I know it when I see it’ approach by 
Heiskanen. Under this approach a measure is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘arbitrary’, terms 
that are often used interchangeably by investment tribunals, when it does not 
pass the test as laid down by the ICJ in the ELSI case.204 According to the ICJ, 
a measure is arbitrary when it opposes, not so much ‘a rule of law’ but rather ‘the 
rule of law’ and when the measure willfully disregards due process of law and 
‘shocks, or at least surprises a sense of judicial propriety.’205 Thus, for a measure 
to be ‘unreasonable’ or ‘arbitrary’ it has to, first, disregard due process and, 
second, it has to shock, or at least surprise a sense of judicial propriety.206 This 
200. Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/9, 1996. P. 23. Reports of the Appellate Body, Japan - 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 1996. P. 
12.
201. Christoph Schreuer, ‘Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures’ in Catherine 
A. Rogers et al (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009). 
P. 192. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
797.
202. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable Measures’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 101.
203. Ibid. Pp. 101-106.
204. Ibid. Pp. 101-103. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United State of America v. Italy), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 15. Para. 128. In the ECT case Plama v. Bulgaria, the 
tribunal used the terms ‘unreasonable’ and ‘arbitrary’ interchangeably. Award, Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2008. Para. 184.
205. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United State of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1989, p. 15. Para. 128.
206. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
799.
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test, or approaches based thereon, have been applied by various investment 
tribunals based on different IIA’s.207 According to Heiskanen this approach has 
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, this approach is flexible 
and arbitrators will merely have to apply the ELSI test to the facts of the case 
and the evidence produced without having to venture into the difficult exercise 
of providing doctrinal insight into the meaning of ‘unreasonable’ or ‘arbitrary.’208 
On the other hand, this also means that the non-impairment obligation will always 
be fact-dependent and examined on a case-by-case basis.209
The second approach, which Heiskanen refers to as the ‘due process approach’, 
provides for a more invasive substantive test: it requires both a rational policy to 
be put forward by the respondent and a reasonable relationship between the 
implemented measure and the policy that is being pursued.210 This approach 
has been adopted by various investment tribunals and seems to be the 
prevailing approach in ECT arbitration.211 An advantage of this approach is that 
it provides a method to examine the compatibility of the national measures with 
the international obligations of the State concerned in a more objectified and 
207. See for example: Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, 2006. Para. 392. Award, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/11, 2005. Paras. 177-178. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 318. Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & 
Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008. Para. 378. 
Award, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, 2007. Para. 281. Award, Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 2007. Para. 318. Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit 
Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001. 
Para. 371. Final Award, Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2001. Para. 
232.
208. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable Measures’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 103.
209. Id.
210. Ibid. Pp. 103-104. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ 
in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 
2015). Pp. 800-801. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 328.
211. ECT tribunals: Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, 2008. Para. 184. It has to be noted that the Plama tribunal seems to make 
reference to some elements that can be related to the ELSI test. Award, AES Summit 
Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 10.3.7. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products 
Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Para. 791. Non-ECT 
tribunals: Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. 
Paras. 460-461. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E 
International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006. Paras. 156-158.
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generalized manner.212 However, especially the second element of the test – 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the measure and the policy 
pursued – places a lot of power in the hand of investment tribunals.213 One could 
consider this almost as a ‘proportionality test’ which could have implications 
for the margin of appreciation of State conduct, especially if the test is strictly 
applied.214
5.4.1.2. Discriminatory Measures
It has been said that customary international law does not contain a prohibition 
on discrimination.215 Therefore, before an investor can successfully argue the 
contrary, it has to be able to invoke a treaty provision which does establish a 
prohibition on discrimination.216
At first sight, the prohibition on discriminatory measures overlaps with the 
NT and MFN obligations contained in Art. 10(7) ECT that protect investors 
against discrimination vis-à-vis domestic and other foreign investors from third 
countries.217 However, where the NT and MFN obligations primarily concern 
discrimination based on nationality, the non-impairment obligation contains an 
arguably broader discrimination prohibition, that includes other grounds for 
discrimination as well.218
It is generally acknowledged in practice that discriminatory intent is not a 
prerequisite to establish discrimination under international law; all that is required 
212. Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and Unreasonable Measures’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 105.
213. Ibid. Pp. 105-106.
214. Id. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
801.
215. Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of 
Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001. Para. 368. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 196.
216. Id.
217. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). 
P. 797. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 117.
218. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
802.
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is that there is a discriminatory effect, ‘either through the action of State organs 
or the law.’219
Concerning the definition of discrimination, the tribunal in the Lemire v. Ukraine 
case provided the following:
Discrimination, in the words of pertinent precedents, requires more 
than different treatment. To amount to discrimination, a case must be 
treated differently from similar cases without justification; a measure 
must be “discriminatory and expose[s] the claimant to sectional 
or racial prejudice”; or a measure must “target[ed] Claimant’s 
investments specifically as foreign investments”.220
The ECT tribunal in the Plama case held that discrimination ‘corresponds to the 
negative formulation of the principle of equality of treatment. It entails like persons 
being treated in a different manner in similar circumstances without reasonable or 
justifiable grounds.’221 Thus, to violate the prohibition on discrimination two issues 
have to be addressed: first of all, that different treatment is accorded to a specific 
investor and that, secondly, there is no justification for such differentiation.222
To establish differential treatment, it is important to determine the basis of 
comparison.223 According to Kriebaum, three distinctions have been made in 
arbitral practice.224 First of all, there are cases where the situation of the investor 
219. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. 
Para. 321. Partial Award, Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC 
Case No. 088/2004, 2007. Para. 338. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or 
Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 803.
220. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/18, 2010. Para. 261. (Footnotes omitted).
221. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184.
222. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). 
Pp. 803-806. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Edward Elgar 2016). P. 351-352.
223. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 
803-804. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 196-197.
224. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 
803-804.
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is compared to the situation of companies active in the same economic activity.225 
However, in cases where there is not enough available information to compare the 
situation of the investor with the situation of others active in the same economic 
activity, the issue becomes more complicated.
Secondly, there are various examples of tribunals that refuse to make cross-
sector comparisons.226 For example, in various cases concerning Argentina, 
tribunals refused to accept that all ‘public service providers’ were in similar 
circumstances.227 In the BG v. Argentina case, for instance, the tribunal refused 
to accept that the treatment accorded to gas DSO’s was comparable to the 
treatment given to electricity DSO’s.228
Thirdly, there are cases where tribunals did accept cross-sector comparisons.229 
In the Occidental v. Ecuador case, for example, the tribunal compared the 
situation of Occidental, a producer and exporter of oil, with the situation of, 
amongst others, exporters of flowers, bananas, seafood, and palm oil that were 
225. Id. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 196-197. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Paras. 303-326. Final Award, Gami Investments, Inc. v. The 
Government of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, 2004. Paras. 111-115. Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, 
2010. Paras. 384-385. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel 
S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152. Award, 
AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 10.3.45-10.3.53. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek 
Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 
2015. Paras. 788-796. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The 
Republic of Latvia, SCC, 2003. Para. 4.3.2.(a).
226. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
804.
227. Award, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, 2005. Para. 287-295. See also: Award on the Merits (Unofficial English 
Translation), Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/5, 2008. Paras. 160-164.
228. Final Award, BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, 2007. Paras. 357-
360.
229. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
804. Award, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3, 2007. Para. 282. Award, Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 2007. Paras. 318-319. Award, National Grid plc v. 
The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, 2008. Paras. 197-201.
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eligible for the reimbursement of value added taxes while Occidental did not 
receive such reimbursements.230
With regards to the possible justifications for differential treatment, Kriebaum 
noted that ‘[a]stonishingly little discussion has so far emerged on the possibilities 
to justify differences in treatment.’231 It seems that a justification has to be rational 
and objectively verifiable and that in cases of cross-sector comparisons a 
reasonable and ‘justified differentiation will be more likely than in a narrow field’ 
of comparisons.232
5.4.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Various ECT tribunals have addressed the non-impairment standard, thereby 
addressing both unreasonable and discriminatory measures. However, before 
examining how these elements have been interpreted and applied, I will first 
address the impairment requirement.
5.4.2.1. Impairment Requirement
Since only unreasonable or discriminatory measures that impair an investment 
are prohibited, it is important to establish when a measure actually impairs an 
investment.
In Electrabel v. Hungary, the tribunal held that the impairment caused by a 
measure must be ‘significant’, without elaborating on when this threshold would 
be met.233 In the PV Investors v. Czech Republic cases, the tribunal held that 
the impairment needs to be ‘substantial.’234 Again, without any further statement 
230. Final Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
LCIA Case No. UN3467, 2004. Paras. 167-179.
231. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
804. Federico Ortino, ‘Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes’ in Pierre-
Marie et al (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2009). Pp. 351-353.
232. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc 
Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 
805. Award, National Grid plc v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, 2008. Para. 200.
233. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152.
234. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 636. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 596. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 601. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 683.
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on when this standard was met. According to the AES v. Hungary tribunal, a 
measure impairs an investment when it reduces income while the operational 
costs have remained unchanged since this alters the regular income of the 
investor in a negative way.235 In Greentech v. Italy, the majority of the tribunal 
considered that the impairment did not have to be ‘significant’ since the provision 
states that no contracting party ‘shall in any way impair’ an investment, which is 
suggestive of a low impairment requirement.236
In the Nykomb case, the tribunal did not address the impairment requirement, 
although it would establish a breach of the non-impairment obligation due to 
discriminatory treatment. In this case, the investor received a lower electricity 
tariff by virtue of the discriminatory treatment and thereby implicitly accepting 
reduced revenue as a sufficient impairment.
5.4.2.2. Unreasonable Measures
With regards to unreasonable measures it seems that most ECT tribunals have 
adopted the ‘due process approach’. The clearest examples of these are AES 
v. Hungary, Mamidoil v. Albania, and the PV Investors v. Czech Republic; these 
tribunals all required the existence of a rational policy and that the measure was 
reasonable in the light of the objective pursued.237
In the Plama v. Bulgaria case, which was quoted in Mohammad Ammar Al-
Bahloul v. Tajikistan, the tribunal held that ‘[u]nreasonable or arbitrary measures’ 
– thereby using the terms interchangeably – ‘are those which are not founded in 
reason or fact but on caprice, prejudice or personal preference.’238 The Plama 
tribunal nevertheless quotes the Saluka v. Czech Republic tribunal, which 
235. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 10.3.3-10.3.6.
236. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Para. 461.
237. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 10.3.7-10.3.44. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil 
Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 
2015. Paras. 791-796. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-22, 2019. Para. 637. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 597. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH 
v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 602. Award, WA Investments-
Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 684.
238. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 248.
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adopted the ‘due process approach’ by stating that reasonableness ‘requires 
[…] a showing that the State’s conduct bears a reasonable relationship to some 
rational policy[…].’239
In the Greentech v. Italy case, an Italian measure which reduced support for RES 
investors was considered ‘unreasonable’ although the tribunal did not elaborate 
on the applicable standard of review.240
5.4.2.3. Discriminatory Measures
Several ECT tribunals have analyzed discrimination claims in the context of the 
non-impairment standard. From these analyses, the following picture emerges.
Firstly, ECT tribunals have most often adopted a narrow base of comparison; 
by looking at the treatment accorded to other investors active in the same 
economic activity.241 Secondly, under the non-impairment standard discrimination 
claims are not restricted merely to nationality.242 Whether discriminatory intent 
is required is somewhat disputed, according to the Amto v. Ukraine tribunal it 
has to be established by the investor while the Electrabel v. Hungary came to 
the opposite conclusion.243 On the basis of arbitral jurisprudence as well as 
academic literature, it seems that the conclusion of the Electrabel tribunal is more 
in line with the currently prevailing legal opinion.244
239. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. the Czech Republic, PCA, 17/3/2006. Para. 460.
240. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Para. 462.
241. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Para. 4.3.2.(a). Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152. 
Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 10.3.45-10.3.53. Award, Mamidoil 
Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24, 2015. Paras. 788-796.
242. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 248. Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152.
243. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 
2008. Para. 108. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152.
244. Final Award, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of 
Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, 2004. Para. 177. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 321. Partial Award, Eastern Sugar B.V. 
(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, 2007. Para. 338. Ursula 
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With regards to establishing whether reasonable or justifiable grounds exist for 
according diverging treatment, the Mamidoil case is of particular interest.245 While 
the tribunal does not explicitly spell out the test that it applies to the facts, it seems 
to be in line with the test as laid down by the Plama tribunal.246 For example, it first 
establishes that Albania makes a distinction between international and domestic 
traders in oil products.247 Subsequently, it examines Albania’s justification for this 
diverging treatment. In doing so, it applies a test very similar to the ‘due process 
approach’ applied by the AES tribunal in relation to ‘unreasonable’ measures: the 
tribunal identifies a rational policy and that the measure was reasonable in relation 
to the policy pursued.248 In reaching its findings, the tribunal allowed Albania 
to temporarily adopt discriminatory measures in order to protect its domestic 
industry.249 Since the tribunal believed that the period of discrimination is ‘neither 
extravagant nor unreasonable’, there is no violation of Albania’s international 
obligations since the ‘situation does not exceed the limits of acceptability.’250 
The tribunal thus provides the Albanian authorities with a relatively wide margin 
of appreciation, by virtue of which Albania did not violate its ECT obligations.
In the Nykomb v. Latvia case, a discrimination claim would be accepted. In this 
case a subsidiary of a Swedish investor had concluded a PPA with a Latvian 
SOE on the basis of which it was supposed to construct a co-generation plant 
and sell the electricity to the SOE and the heat to a municipal company. In order 
to incentivize domestic investments in the electricity generation sector, Latvian 
law provided for a double tariff to be paid for electricity generated in Latvia for 
the first eight years of operation, an incentive relied upon by Nykomb.251 After 
the conclusion of the PPA, however, this tariff was reduced to 75 percent of 
the initial tariff. According to Nykomb, it was accorded discriminatory treatment 
Kriebaum, ‘Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures’ in Marc Bungenberg et al 
(eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 803. Rudolf Dolzer 
& Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). P. 197.
245. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 184. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-
Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 248. Award, 
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Paras. 788-796.
246. Ibid. Para. 795.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Ibid. Paras. 795-796.
250. Id.
251. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Para. 3.5.2.
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since the SOE was still paying the double tariff to several domestic electricity 
generators.252 Latvia did not contest this, but rather claimed that the situations 
were not comparable. The tribunal accepted that ‘in evaluating whether there 
is discrimination in the sense of the [ECT] one should only “compare like with 
like”.’253 According to the tribunal, the evidence presented to it suggested 
that the companies were in fact ‘comparable, and subject to the same laws 
and regulations.’254 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the tribunal 
considered that the respondent did not meet the burden of proof that refuted 
the discrimination claim.255 Therefore, the tribunal concluded that Nykomb had 
been accorded discriminatory treatment in violation of Art. 10(1) ECT.256
5.4.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
That the non-impairment standard is of relevance to RES investors is proven by 
existing ECT case law.
The Nykomb v. Latvia case involved the refusal of a State to pay agreed support 
to a foreign investor. To attract foreign investors, Latvian law had entitled electricity 
generators that made use of RES or co-generation installations to a double 
tariff.257 In addition, Nykomb’s Latvian subsidiary had concluded a PPA with a 
SOE, that was then the monopolist electricity supplier, which explicitly referred 
to the double tariff.
The tribunal concluded that the investor ‘had both a statutory and a contractually 
established right to the double tariff for an eight year period’ and also held that 
the SOE did continue to pay the double tariff to domestic investors in violation 
of the non-impairment standard.258 Since the tribunal ruled that the Latvian 
State was responsible for the failure of the SOE to pay the double tariff, the 
investor could successfully invoke the ECT provisions against Latvia and obtain 
compensation.259





257. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 
2015). Pp. 622-624.
258. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Paras. 4.2. & 4.3.2.(a).
259. Ibid. Para. 4.2.
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Various authors have pointed to the Nykomb case as an example of how the ECT 
can foster RES investments.
Sussman, for example, pointed out that the Nykomb case shows that the ECT 
creates ‘rights for investors against a host government for changing incentives 
and subsidies committed to a foreign investor or other laws or regulations in 
violation of the ECT investor protection provisions.’260 She also emphasizes 
that the investment certainty afforded by the ECT should ‘serve to significantly 
increase the availability of funds for investment in [greenhouse gas] mitigation 
projects’ since reduced risk should lead to reduced investment costs which 
should allow for ‘a greater number of investments to be made.’261
In a similar vein, Boute argued that Nykomb ‘is of considerable importance for 
low-carbon investors.’262 Since the case exemplifies ‘the potential protection that 
investment arbitration might offer against illegitimate interference by the state 
with the financial and regulatory basis of investments.’263 Nevertheless, as Boute 
rightfully emphasizes; in this case Latvia violated the ECT because it afforded 
differential treatment to foreign and domestic investors.264 Thus, the Nykomb 
case is of little precedential value in cases where support is reduced for foreign 
and domestic investors alike, i.e. those cases where the host State does not 
discriminate.265
Wälde and Hober also emphasized that in Nykomb the investor had to rely 
on investment incentives to make its investment economically viable because 
it would otherwise not be able to compete on the Latvian electricity market 
that was still (partially) dominated by inexpensive electricity supplied by former 
Soviet nuclear power plants in Russia that did not internalize the external costs 
associated with such generation.266 They therefore argue that this case shows 
the potential environmental benefits of investment protection under the ECT.267
260. Edna Sussman, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’s Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to 
Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote Sustainable Development’ [2008] 14 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 391. P. 402.
261. Id.
262. Anatole Boute, ‘Combating Climate Change Through Investment Arbitration’ [2012] 35 
Fordham International Law Journal 613. P. 643.
263. Id.
264. Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 624.
265. Id.
266. Thomas W. Wälde & Kaj Hober, ‘The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award’ [2005] 22 
Journal of International Arbitration 83. Pp. 102-103.
267. Id.
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In the Greentech v. Italy case, unreasonable measures violated the non-
impairment standard in a RES case.268 In Italy, the authorities attempted to control 
the costs of a support mechanism at the time when the targets were reached 
in order to ‘reduce the electricity costs burden on consumers attributable to the 
incentive programs.’269 Therefore, legislation was introduced that modified the 
previously granted tariffs.270 In essence, the investor had to choose between 
three options and a failure to indicate a choice would mean that the third option 
would apply by default:271 i) a new and reduced tariff would apply over twenty-
four years (as calculated from the PV plant’s entry into operation), instead of 
the original twenty-year term, whereby the level of reduction was based on 
the number of years that remained in the original period of twenty year; ii) the 
original period of twenty years would be the same, however the tariff would be 
reduced between 2015 and 2019 and subsequently increased in accordance 
with percentages determined by the Ministry of Economic Development; or iii) 
the twenty-year period would remain in place but the tariff would be reduced in 
accordance with a fixed percentage based on the nominal capacity of the PV 
plant: a 6 percent reduction for plants with a nominal capacity between 200 Kw 
and 500 Kw; 7 percent reduction for plants with a nominal capacity between 500 
Kw and 900 Kw; and a 8 percent reduction for plants with a nominal capacity 
over 900 Kw.272
The majority of the tribunal concluded that ‘the interests of investors must be 
considered in determining whether a measure is reasonable.’273 Therefore, it was 
concluded that the tariff reduction ‘was an “unreasonable measure” that impaired 
the claimant’s investments’ in violation of the non-impairment standard.274
In the PV Investors v. Czech Republic cases, the tribunal would reject the 
submission of the claimants under the non-impairment standard. In these cases, 
a Solar Levy introduced by the Czech Republic amounted to a de facto reduction 
of FIT’s. However, the tribunal considered that this measure was ‘motivated by the 
State’s desire to safeguard the State budget in the midst of a global economic 
268. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Para. 462.
269. Ibid. Para. 143.
270. Ibid. Para. 144.
271. Ibid. Para. 145.
272. Id.
273. Ibid. Para. 462.
274. Id.
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crisis’ by lowering a financial burden to electricity consumers that was perceived 
as excessive.275 The tribunal held ‘that a “balancing” policy whereby electricity 
prices are lowered for the benefit of the general public and there is an equivalent 
diminution in excessive profits of PV investors, such that an excessive burden 
put on consumers might be alleviated, qualifies as a rational policy.’276 Since the 
affected investments were still making a reasonable return after the introduction 
of the Solar Levy, even though the excessive profits had been reduced, the 
tribunal considered that the measures were reasonable as well.277
5.5. NO TREATMENT LESS FAVORABLE THAN REQUIRED 
BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The penultimate sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT states that ‘[i]n no case shall such 
Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by 
international law, including treaty obligations.’ The main question is whether 
this provision merely clarifies the content of other provisions, such as the FET 
standard and the MCSP obligation or whether it provides for additional investment 
protection.
On the basis of the first proposition, the penultimate sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT 
merely clarifies that the treatment accorded to investors on the basis of the ECT 
should be the most favorable one available to it, regardless of the source of this 
obligation.278 If this is accepted, the fourth sentence will only ‘set a floor but not 
275. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 638. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 598. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 603. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 685.
276. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 639. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 599. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 604. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 686.
277. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 640. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 600. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 605. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 687.
278. Christoph H. Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with Other 
Standards’, in Graham Coop et al (eds.), Investment Protection and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (JurisNet 2008). P. 76.
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a ceiling’ on the basis of which host States should accord FET and MCPS.279 
This sentence then clarifies that the treatment accorded to investors on the 
basis of the FET standard must go beyond the international minimum standard 
of treatment.280
According to the second proposition, the fourth sentence does not merely 
clarify previously listed obligations, but rather incorporates specific obligations 
by reference.281 Roe and Happold, for example, argue that the obligations of 
States arising under the WTO Agreements could be incorporated under Part III 
of the ECT by virtue of the fourth sentence.282 An Understanding related to Arts. 
26 and 27 ECT clarifies that:
“The reference to treaty obligations in the penultimate sentence 
of Article 10(1) does not include decisions taken by international 
organizations, even if they are legally binding, or treaties which 
entered into force before 1 January 1970.”283
On the basis of this understanding, EU Regulations and Directives cannot be 
incorporated into Part III of the ECT but the WTO Agreements, for instance, 
possibly could.284 According to Roe and Happold, this incorporation-by-reference 
is plausible given the fact that the reference to ‘treaty obligations’ would ‘be 
largely otiose if they referred only to obligations whose breach was already 
actionable’ by the investor.285 Nevertheless, the investor must establish a link 
between his investment and the provision invoked.286
279. Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 628.
280. Christoph H. Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with Other 
Standards’, in Graham Coop et al (eds.), Investment Protection and the Energy Charter 
Treaty (JurisNet 2008). P. 88.
281. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 118-119.
282. Id.
283. Understanding Concerning Articles 26 & 27 ECT, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 
17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
284. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 118-119.
285. Ibid. P. 119.
286. Id. Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana 
Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana, UNCITRAL, 1989. 95 I.L.R. 184 at 203. 
In this case – based on an investment contract – the investor argued that the host State 
violated certain human rights obligations. However, the tribunal was of the opinion that 
the claimant did not succesfully establish a link between his investment and the treatment 
accorded to it, i.e. the alleged human rights violation.
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5.5.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Many BIT’s concluded by the US in the 1990’s contain clauses that state 
that investments shall not be ‘accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law’, usually in the same sentence as the FET standard and the 
MCPS obligation.287 This was fully in line with US policy at the time, as becomes 
clear from the 1994 and 1998 US Model BIT’s.288 These clauses were interpreted 
by various tribunals as setting a floor but not a ceiling to the FET and MCPS 
obligations.289
From the 2004 US Model BIT onwards, however, a shift has taken place in 
US practice.290 New US BIT’s, such as the US-Uruguay BIT, no longer require 
treatment ‘no less favourable than that required by international law’, but rather 
‘in accordance with customary international law.’291 On the basis of the arbitral 
practice under the pre-2000 BIT’s, these new treaties no longer prescribe a 
‘floor’ but rather a ‘ceiling’, the ceiling being the international minimum standard 
of treatment under customary international law.292
287. Article II(2)(a), Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Bulgaria 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-
Bulgaria) (adopted 23/09/1992, entered into force 02/06/1994). Article 2(3)(a), Treaty 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
State of Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(United States-Bahrain) (adopted 29/09/1999, entered into force 30/05/2001). Article II(2)
(a), Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (United States-Argentina) 
(adopted 14/11/1991, entered into force 20/10/1994). Article II(3)(a), Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Ecuador) (adopted, 27/08/1993, 
entered into force 11/05/1997). Article II(3)(a), Treaty between the United States of America 
and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(United States-Ukraine) (adopted, 04/03/1994, entered into force 16/11/1996).
288. Article II(3)(a), US Model BIT, 1994. Article II(3)(a), US Model BIT, 1998.
289. Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Para. 
361. Similar statements can be found in: Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & 
Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008. Paras. 336-337. 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/18, 2010. Para. 253.
290. Article 5, US Model BIT, 2004. Article 5, US Model BIT, 2012.
291. Article 5(1), Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic 
of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 
(United States-Uruguay) (adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 01/11/2006). Article 5(1), 
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment (United States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, entered into force 01/01/2012).
292. This is explicitly stated in the following paragraph. See: Article 5(2), Treaty Between 
the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the 
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An analysis of US treaty practice and arbitral practice under US BIT’s thus 
confirms the proposition that the penultimate sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT is merely 
a clarification; most likely of the FET standard and the MCPS obligation.
5.5.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Just a few investors have explicitly invoked the fourth sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT 
in ISDS cases against host States. Hence, only a very limited number of ECT 
tribunals has addressed the standard.
In the Nykomb v. Latvia case, for example, the investor held that an SOE’s refusal 
to pay the double tariff ‘constitutes a treatment less favorable than required by 
international law, including treaty obligations.’293 Since the tribunal would establish 
that the non-impairment standard had been violated, it considered it unnecessary 
to adjudge any other claims based on Art. 10(1) ECT.294 Consequently, the tribunal 
did not grasp the opportunity to elaborate on the content of the fourth sentence.
Electrabel also invoked the fourth sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT in its case against 
Hungary. According to the tribunal, ‘the content of this standard is, at the present 
time, similar to the other standards expressly mentioned in Article 10(1) ECT, 
which also exist as standards of protection in customary international law.’295 
Since Electrabel had not been able to establish a breach of the FET standard, the 
tribunal considered that the measures of Hungary did not ‘constitute treatment 
which is less favourable than the minimum standard required by international 
law.’296 Subsequently, Electrabel’s claims were rejected.
The Electrabel tribunals’ brief analysis indicates that the fourth sentence does 
indeed provide a clarification on other obligations of Art. 10(1) ECT, primarily that 
Art. 10(1) ECT is intended to provide for a higher level of investment protection 
than the international minimum standard. In that regard, it follows the proposition 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) 
(adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 01/11/2006). Article 5(2), Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United 
States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, entered into force 01/01/2012).
293. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Para. 1.2.3.
294. Ibid. Para. 4.3.2.(b).
295. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.158.
296. Ibid. Para. 7.159.
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that the fourth sentence primarily has a clarifying character rather than being a 
standard which provides for additional protection.
In the Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan case, the investor also invoked 
the fourth sentence. However, the tribunal considered its claim under this header 
to be ‘essentially the same as those made under the heading’ of a denial of due 
process under the FET standard.297 Since the tribunal had already dismissed 
these claims, it also dismissed the claim made under the penultimate sentence 
of Art. 10(1) ECT.298
ECT arbitral practice with regards to the fourth sentence, although it is scarce, 
thus supports the view that the fourth sentence clarifies the content of other 
standards of treatment contained in Art. 10(1) ECT such as the FET standard, 
and the MCPS obligation.
5.5.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Since it is established that the most logical interpretation of the fourth sentence 
of Art. 10(1) ECT would not add anything to the other standards of treatment 
contained in Art. 10(1) ECT, but rather clarify the content of these standards, it 
is superfluous to address the relevance of the fourth sentence for RES investors. 
After all, a finding that, for example, the FET standard would have been violated 
in a RES case would automatically mean that the fourth sentence would also 
be violated.
5.6. UMBRELLA CLAUSE
The final sentence of Art. 10(1) ECT prescribes that each contracting party ‘shall 
observe any obligations it has entered into with’ an investor of another contracting 
party. This clause is often referred to as the ‘umbrella clause’ because, by virtue of 
this clause, an investor can bring contractual obligations and other commitments 
undertaken by the host State under the protective umbrella of the treaty.299
This is highly relevant for energy investors since the termination of contracts 
or concessions has been one of the most common ways in which host States 
297. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Paras. 254-255.
298. Id.
299. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 166.
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interfered with foreign investments.300 Well known classical examples from the 
energy sector include arbitrations initiated by foreign investors against the USSR, 
Iran, Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.301 The historic roots of the umbrella clause 
have, for example, been traced back to the Anglo Iran Oil Company dispute of 
the 1950’s which involved Iran.302
Although the umbrella clause of the ECT might sound straightforward, the 
contemporary interpretation and application of such clauses has, however, ‘given 
rise to disturbingly divergent lines of jurisprudence’ according to Dolzer and 
Schreuer.303
Practice concerning the umbrella clause will now be examined followed by an 
analysis of ECT arbitral practice. Finally, the relevance of the umbrella clause for 
RES investors will be explained.
5.6.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
From the outset, it has to be noted that not all IIA’s contain an umbrella clause. 
Crawford estimates that approximately 40 percent of all IIA’s contain an umbrella 
clause.304 Nevertheless, many different variations of the umbrella clause are 
in existence, which needs to be taken into account when considering the 
jurisprudence.
300. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation 
(Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 258-259.
301. See for an overview: Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – the 
Pursuit of Stability (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 106-130. Award, Lena Goldfields, 
Ltd. v. The Soviet Union, 3/9/1930. Text of the award retrieved from: Arthur Nussbaum, 
‘The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government’ [1950] 
36 Cornell Law Quarterly 31. Pp. 42-53. Award, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil 
Company, 1958, 27 I.L.R. 117. Award, Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National 
Iranian Oil Company, 1963, 35 I.L.R. 136. Award, BP Exploration (Libya) Ltd. v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 1973, 53 I.L.R. 297. Award, Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum Co/California Asiatic Oil Co v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
1977, 53 I.L.R. 389. Award, Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic, 1977, 62 I.L.R. 140. Award, The Government of the State of Kuwait v. American 
Independent Oil Co, 1982, 21 International Legal Materials 976 (1982).
302. Anthony C. Sinclair, ‘The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of 
Investment Protection’ [2004] 20 Arbitration International 411. Anglo-Iran Oil Co. Case 
(jurisdiction), Judgment of July 22nd, 1952: I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 93. P. 112.
303. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 169.
304. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 367. Jonathan B. Potts, ‘Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization’ [2011] 51 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1005. P. 1007.
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Although the very first BIT of 1959 already contained an umbrella clause, it would 
only be in the year 2000 that investors started to invoke the clause.305
This section will first describe the divergent approaches adopted by tribunals 
by reference to the specific umbrella clause contained in the applicable IIA. 
Furthermore, the notion of privity of contract will also be discussed as well the 
possibilities of extending the umbrella clause to unilateral, statutory or regulatory 
obligations of States.
5.6.1.1. Umbrella Clauses in IIA’s and Arbitral Practice
According to Crawford, whose analysis has been reiterated in arbitration practice, 
the jurisprudence concerning umbrella clauses can be divided into ‘four schools 
of thought’ although the reasoning of a tribunal may contain elements of multiple 
schools.306
Firstly, there are tribunals that adopt an extremely narrow interpretation of the 
clause, according to which they can only be operative in the literal sense of 
the phrase when ‘it is possible to discern a shared intent of the parties that 
any breach of contract is a breach of the’ IIA.307 In both arbitral practice as well 
as academic literature, this approach has been criticized for being too narrow 
although one has to keep in mind that the exact wording of a specific umbrella 
clause may warrant a narrow interpretation.308
305. Article 7, Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Germany-Pakistan) (adopted 25/11/1959, entered into force 
28/04/1962).
306. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. Pp. 367-368. The tribunal in the Toto v. Lebanon case reiterated the 
analysis of Crawford on an almost word-by-word basis, see: Decision on Jurisdiction, Toto 
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 2009. 
Paras. 196-201.
307. Id. See for example: Award on Jurisdiction, Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 2004. Paras. 80-81. Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 2003. Paras. 166-172.
308. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 171-173. Decision on Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2010. Paras. 
167-170. Article 11, Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Switzerland-
Pakistan) (adopted 11/07/1995, entered into force 06/05/1996). James Crawford, ‘Treaty 
and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration International 351. P. 367. Note 
on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland 
and Pakistan in the Light of the Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of ICSID in SGS 
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Secondly, some tribunals distinguish between the actions of a State in its capacity 
as sovereign and as merchant, only extending the protection of the umbrella 
clause to investment disputes concerning the former.309 While one may question 
whether this would be correct in all situations, given the fact that ‘a breach of 
international law does not depend on the characterization of the conduct in 
question as ‘governmental’, or as involving the exercise of sovereign authority.’310 
Therefore, this approach has received criticism in arbitral practice.311 Again, the 
exact phrasing of the applicable clause may be determinative. The Netherlands 
Model BIT 2019 for example contains an umbrella clause where the exercise of 
governmental authority may be determinative for a breach of international law:
‘When a Contracting Party has entered into a written commitment 
with investors of the other Contracting Party regarding a specific 
investment, that Contracting Party shall not, either itself or through 
an entity exercising governmental authority, breach the said 
commitment through the exercise of governmental authority in a way 
that causes loss or damage to the investor or its investment.’312
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, dated 1 October 2003.
309. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 368. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 172-173. Decision on Jurisdiction, 
El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, 2006. Paras. 66-88. Decision on Preliminary Objections, Pan American Energy 
LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/13, 2006. Para. 108. Award on Jurisdiction, Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 2004. Para. 72. Award, CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005. 
Para. 299. Award, Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, 2007. Paras. 310-311. Decision on Jurisdiction, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, 2005. Paras. 260-261. In the Impregilo 
case, the investor tried to incorporate an umbrella clause contained in BIT’s signed by 
Pakistan by virtue of the MFN clause contained in the Pakistan-Italy BIT.
310. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 356.
311. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 
206. Decision on Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic 
of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2010. Para. 168. Award, SGS Société Générale 
de Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2012. 
Paras. 89-91.
312. Article 9(5), Netherlands Model BIT, 2019.
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Thirdly, there are cases where the umbrella clause can be seen to ‘internationalize’ 
the dispute, ‘thereby transforming the contractual claims into treaty claims direct 
subject to treaty rules.’313 This approach has equally not gone un-criticized.314
313. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 368. Partial Award, Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, ad-Hoc 
Arbitration, 2005. Paras. 244-260. Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Rajski, Eureko B.V. 
v. Republic of Poland, ad-Hoc Arbitration, 2005. Paras. 10-11. Award, Fedax N.V. v. 
The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, 1998. Para. 29. Award, Noble 
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 2005. Paras. 46-62. Award, In 
the Matter of Revere Copper and Brass, Incorporated v. Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, American Arbitration Association, Case No. 16 10 0137 76, 1978, 17 
International Legal Materials 1321 (1978). Pp. 1337-1340. Award, Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. 
The Soviet Union, 3/9/1930. Para. 25. Text of the award retrieved from: Arthur Nussbaum, 
‘The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government’ [1950] 36 
Cornell Law Quarterly 31. P. 36. André von Walter, ‘Investor-State Contracts in the Context 
of International Investment Law’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Peter D. Cameron, International Energy Investment 
Law – the Pursuit of Stability (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 108-109. V.V. Veeder, 
‘The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas’ [1998] 47 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 747. P. 751. Wayne Mapp, The Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal – The First Ten Years 1981-1991 (Manchester University Press 
1993). Pp. 210-216. George H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal (Clarendon Press 1996). Pp. 397-411. For cases involving ‘unjust enrichment’ see: 
Award, Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 35-219-2, 1983, 2 Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal Reports 1984. Pp. 237-238. Award, Dallal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award No. 53-149-1, 1983, 3 Iran-United Stats Claims Tribunal Report 1984. P. 32. Award, 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Ports and Shipping Organization of 
Iran, Award No. 135-33-1, 1984, 6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1986. Pp. 
168-169.
314. Award, Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, 2010. Paras. 349-350. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans 
Issues in France (France v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovene), PCIJ Judgment, 
1929, PCIJ Reports, Series A (1929). P. 41. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the 
Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95. Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/12, 2009. Paras. 196-201. Award, MTD Equity v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7, 2004. Para. 187. Decision on Annulment, MTD Equity v. Republic 
of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 2007. Paras. 73 & 75. Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of 
the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003. Para. 126. Decision on Annulment, 
Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2002. Paras. 96 & 102. Arbitral Award, Petrobart Limited v. The 
Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. (126/2003), 2005. P. 23. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law 
of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 303. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The 
Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual, and International Frameworks 
for Foreign Capital (Oxford University Press 2013). P. 391. Similar views are shared by the 
following authors: Ivar Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and International 
Arbitration (Hart Publishing 2011). P. 189. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement 
of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 
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The final category of cases as identified by Crawford are those where an umbrella 
clause may provide aggrieved investors with an operative cause of action under 
international law with regards to a breach of a contract, but the applicable law 
to the contractual dispute remains the law that applies to the contract.315 This 
can imply that investors have to comply with the dispute settlement mechanism 
contained in the contract.316 The conclusion that contractual dispute settlement 
mechanisms have to be complied with has nevertheless been criticized.317 
However, Crawford considered that pacta sunt servanda is ‘not a one-way street’, 
which means that ‘[a]n investor invoking contractual jurisdiction pursuant to an 
2011). P. 125. Jonathan B. Potts, ‘Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization’ [2011] 51 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1005. P. 1007. Anthony Sinclair, ‘Umbrella Clause’ in Marc Bungenberg 
et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 915. Sinclair is 
nevertheless of the opinion that ‘Tribunals must […] be prepared to act as check against a 
host State’s attempts to frustrate claims simply by denying the existence of an obligation to 
which the umbrella clause may attach, particularly by manipulating its law-making process 
to that end.’
315. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 368. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic 
of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95. Decision on Liability, Burlington 
Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 2012. Paras. 214-215. 
Final Award, Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and 
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, 2013. Paras. 417-419. 
Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019. Para. 255.
316. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 368. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic 
of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95. Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of 
the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003. Para. 126-128 & 155. Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment 
and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, 2009. 
Para. 159. Decision on Jurisdiction, Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of 
Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 2009. Para. 201. Award, Bosh International, Inc 
and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, 2012. 
Paras. 251-254. Decision on Annulment, Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 2002. Para. 98.
317. Dissenting Opinion of Antonio Crivellaro, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003. Para. 4. Rudolf Dolzer & 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). P. 170. Christoph Schreuer, ‘Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies 
in Investment Arbitration’ [2004] 4 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 1. Pp. 11-12. Decision on Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 2010. Para. 172.
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offer made by the state must itself comply with its contractual arrangements for 
dispute settlement with that state.’318
As becomes clear, the interpretation and application of umbrella clauses has 
not been uniform although one always has to keep textual differences between 
the various clauses in mind.
5.6.1.2. Privity of Contract and the Umbrella Clause
On the basis of the umbrella clause, a contracting party has the obligation to 
observe any obligations it has assumed vis-à-vis investors. However, does the 
umbrella clause apply in situations where foreign investors have signed contracts 
with sub-entities of the host State, SOE’s, or perhaps the entity responsible for the 
implementation of a RES policy?319 Also, there are situations where the investment 
contract was not signed by the foreign parent company of the investor but rather 
with a local subsidiary. This section will examine the relevance of these scenarios 
in the application of the umbrella clause.
Firstly, the situation where the investor has entered into a contract with an entity 
that is not the host State in its own name. Once again, arbitral practice shows 
divergent lines of jurisprudence. For example, in Impregilo v. Pakistan, the investor 
had concluded a contract with the Pakistan Water and Power Development 
Authority which possessed separate legal personality under Pakistani domestic 
law. The tribunal refused to accept that the umbrella clause could provide 
protection for the investor in cases where the contract was concluded with a 
‘separate and distinct entity.’320 In a similar vein, the Azurix v. Argentina tribunal 
refused to apply the umbrella clause in a case where the contract was concluded 
by the investor with the Province of Buenos Aires, instead of the Republic of 
Argentina.321 This narrow approach has been applied in a number of cases.322
318. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 363.
319. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 175-177.
320. Decision on Jurisdiction, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/3, 2005. Paras. 223.
321. Award, Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 2006. Paras. 
51-52.
322. Award, Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, 2010. Paras. 342-346. Final Award, William Nagel v. The Czech Republic, SCC 
Case No. 049/2002, 2003. Paras. 162-163. Award, EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, 2009. Paras. 316-319. Final Award, Limited Liability Company 
Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. Paras. 109-112. Rudolf Dolzer & 
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There is also a line of jurisprudence which adopts a broader approach. For 
example, in the Noble Ventures v. Romania, the contract was concluded between 
the investor and a State Ownership Fund which had separate legal personality.323 
In this case, the tribunal saw no reason not to apply the umbrella clause because 
the Fund exercised governmental power.324 Similarly, in the Bosh International v. 
Ukraine case, the tribunal concluded that the investor can rely on the umbrella 
clause if it can establish that the acts of its contracting party, which does not 
necessarily has to be the State itself, can be attributed to the State on the basis 
of the Draft Articles of State Responsibility of the International Law Commission 
(ILC).325
According to Roe and Happold, the approach of the Noble Ventures v. Romania 
tribunal is the correct one for the purpose of the ECT since ‘the reference to ‘[e]
ach Contracting Party’ in Article 10(1) should be taken to mean that the conduct 
covered by the provision is conduct attributable to the relevant Contracting Party 
as a matter of international law.’326
In the second situation, the contract might have been concluded directly with 
the host State but by a subsidiary of the foreign investor and not the foreign 
investor itself.327 The Burlington v. Ecuador case serves as a good example in 
this regard. The tribunal did not allow Burlington to rely on the umbrella clause 
of the Ecuador-US BIT to enforce the rights of its subsidiary against Ecuador.328
As put forward by Dolzer and Schreuer, the second issue is not problematic to 
investors in ECT cases since the text of the ECT’s umbrella clause is sufficiently 
clear.329 The final sentence makes clear that the umbrella clause applies with 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). P. 175.
323. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 175. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment 
Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 126-127.
324. Award, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 2005. Paras. 82-86.
325. Award, Bosh International, Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, 2012. Para. 246.
326. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 127.
327. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 176.
328. Decision on Liability, Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5, 2012. Para. 220.
329. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 176.
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regard to ‘obligations […] entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an 
Investor.’330 This was explicitly confirmed in the Amto v. Ukraine case:
“The so-called ‘umbrella clause’ of the ЕСТ is of a wide character 
in that it imposes a duty on the Contracting Parties to ‘observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of 
an Investor of the other Contracting Party’. This means that the ЕСТ 
imposes a duty not only in respect of the investor which is otherwise 
customary in an investment treaty context, but also a subsidiary 
company, established in the host state.”331
Therefore, the ECT’s umbrella clause allows foreign parent companies to enforce 
contracts signed by their local subsidiaries with the host State.
5.6.1.3. Statutory, Unilateral, and Regulatory Obligations
The discussion of the umbrella clause has so far focused primarily on contractual 
obligations between States and investors. However, the protection offered by the 
clause may well extend beyond that, possible including commitments undertaken 
by the State as expressed in its national legal framework.332
In the SGS v. Pakistan case, the tribunal had to interpret an umbrella clause which 
stated that: ‘Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance 
of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the 
investors of the other Contracting Party.’333 Regarding this provision, the tribunal 
held that the ‘commitments’ under this clause are ‘not limited to contractual 
commitments.’334 Instead, the obligation to observe commitments could include 
330. Id. Emphasis added.
331. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 110.
332. Maria Cristina Gritón Salias, ‘Do Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?’ in 
Christina Binder et al (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009). P. 491. Rudolf Dolzer & 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). Pp. 177-178.
333. Article 11, Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Switzerland-
Pakistan) (adopted 11/07/1995, entered into force 06/05/1996).
334. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 2003. Para. 
166.
 5
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   225 04/12/2019   11:36:18
226
Chapter 5
commitments deriving from ‘municipal legislative or administrative or other 
unilateral measure of a Contracting Party.’335
The SGS v. Philippines tribunal adopted a more restrictive interpretation. Although 
the tribunal did acknowledge that the umbrella clause may extend beyond 
contractual obligations, it did not allow a construction of the clause which would 
bring general legislation within its reach.336 The umbrella clause in this case, 
however, required the observance of obligations to the extent that they were 
‘assumed with regard to specific investments.’337 Thus, in this case the narrower 
interpretation might have been required by the specific phrasing of the umbrella 
clause in the Switzerland-Philippines BIT.
In various cases based on US BIT’s, which often contain the requirement that 
obligations must have been ‘entered into’ with regard to investments, tribunals 
have also adopted potentially broad interpretations of the umbrella clause that 
may extend the scope of the provision beyond contractual commitments.338 
Nevertheless, there are also tribunals interpreting similar umbrella clauses that 
stress that the reference to ‘entered into’ ‘indicates that specific commitments are 
referred to and not general commitments.’339 The ICSID Annulment Committee 
in the CMS v. Argentina case, for example, emphasized that:
“In speaking of “any obligations it may have entered into with regard 
to investments”, it seems clear that Article II(2)I is concerned with 
335. Id.
336. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 2003. Para. 
121. Maria Cristina Gritón Salias, ‘Do Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?’ 
in Christina Binder et al (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009). P. 493.
337. Article X(2), Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the Swiss 
Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Philippines-
Switzerland) (adopted 31/03/1997, entered into force 23/04/1999).
338. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, 
Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006. Para. 175. Final Award, 
Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v. Department for Customs Control of the Republic 
of Moldova, UNCITRAL, 2002. Paras. 73-86. Award, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa 
Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 2007. Paras. 274-
277. Award, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, 2005. Para. 303. Decision on Jurisdiction, Noble Energy, Inc. 
and Machalapower Cia. Ltda. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de 
Electricidad, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12, 2008. Para. 157.
339. Award, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 2005. Para. 51.
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   226 04/12/2019   11:36:18
227
Investment Protection in Part III of the Energy Charter Treaty
consensual obligations arising independently of the BIT itself (i.e. 
under the law of the host State or possibly under international law). 
Further they must be specific obligations concerning the investment. 
They do not cover general requirements imposed by the law of the 
host State.”340
Elaborating on what would constitute a consensual obligation, the Committee 
stated that these ‘are not entered into erga omnes but with regard to particular 
persons.’341 Nevertheless, as the Continental Casualty v. Argentina tribunal 
considered, this does not necessarily restrict the scope of the umbrella clause 
to contractual obligations.342
With regard to the umbrella clause of the ECT, this jurisprudence on the basis 
of US BIT’s is relevant since the ECT’s umbrella clause closely resembles the 
umbrella clauses of US BIT’s in the sense that it requires the observance of any 
obligations ‘entered into’ with an investor. Thus, the reach of the umbrella clause 
may to some extent depend on the wording.’343
5.6.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
The umbrella clause has been discussed by various ECT tribunals. Nevertheless, 
it has to be noted that Art. 26(3)(c) ECT provides for an ‘opt-out’ possibility in 
relation to umbrella clause claims. This means that States that are listed in Annex 
IA of the ECT do not give their unconditional consent to arbitration for disputes 
arising under the umbrella clause. Four countries have made use of this option 
of which only one would eventually ratify the ECT: Hungary. Therefore, ECT 
tribunals adjudicating investment disputes involving Hungary concerning the 
umbrella clause lack jurisdiction over these claims, as is explicitly stated in the 
AES v. Hungary and Electrabel v. Hungary cases, both of which concerned the 
premature termination of a PPA by Hungary.344
340. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine 
Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95(a).
341. Ibid. Para. 95(b).
342. Award, Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, 2008. Paras. 297, 300-302.
343. Maria Cristina Gritón Salias, ‘Do Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?’ in 
Christina Binder et al (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009). P. 495.
344. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.57. Award, AES Summit Generation 
Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
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As noted by various ECT tribunals, the umbrella clause is phrased broadly since it 
refers to ‘any obligation’ which may be broader than just contractual obligations.345 
It is not controversial that this includes contractual obligations, including those 
signed by local subsidiaries.346 Nevertheless, by reference to the Decision of 
the ICSID Annulment Committee in the CMS v. Argentina case, various ECT 
tribunals have also noted that the requirement that obligations must have been 
‘entered into’ subsequently narrows the scope of the provision to consensual 
obligations.347 This point was also put forward by the Liman Caspian Oil v. 
Kazakhstan tribunal, which considered that the umbrella clause ‘rather seems 
to suggest that a contractual or similar bilateral relationship must exist between 
the host State and the investor.’348 Nevertheless, in an analogical comparison 
between the possibility in international arbitration, where it is accepted that a 
State’s unilateral offer for arbitration in a foreign investment law can be relied upon 
by investors to establish jurisdiction for an arbitral tribunal, the Liman Caspian Oil 
tribunal argued about the umbrella clause and statutory obligations that:
2010. Paras. 9.3.1-9.3.4.
345. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 186. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 257. Award, AES 
Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, 
2013. Paras. 332-336, 373-375. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia 
II Energy & Environment (SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian 
Republic, SCC Case No. V 2015/095, 2018. Para. 464. Decision on Responsibility and on 
the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European 
Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 
284.
346. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Paras. 186-187. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-
Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 257. Final 
Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. Para. 
110.
347. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentina 
Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2008. Para. 186. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 
2009. Para. 257. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
V2013/153, 2016. Paras. 767-772. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment 
(SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 
2015/063, 2018. Para. 715. Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, 
RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à 
r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 284.
348. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 448.
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“[…] it could be argued that an abstract unilateral promise by the 
state in its national legislation and particularly in its laws directed to 
foreign investors is encompassed by the “umbrella clause”.”349
Since the investor did not establish that Kazakhstan had violated commitments 
arising under the Kazakh Investment Law, the tribunal dismissed the umbrella 
clause claim.350
The Khan v. Mongolia case is notable because the investor successfully 
established a breach of the umbrella clause with regards to statutory obligations 
of the host State. In this case, the investor tried to invoke a provision contained 
in Mongolia’s Foreign Investment Law.351 The tribunal held on the basis of Art. 
26 ECT that it only had jurisdiction over alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT, a 
formulation that – normally – would mean that it had no jurisdiction over disputes 
arising out of the Mongolian Foreign Investment Law.352 This issue could, however, 
be overcome by virtue of the umbrella clause. The investor had argued that the 
terms ‘any obligations’ include obligations arising out of the Foreign Investment 
Law, an argument that was not contested by Mongolia.353 The tribunal therefore 
concluded:
“Given the ordinary meaning of the term “any” and the fact that 
the Respondents have not submitted any arguments or authorities 
to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts the Claimants’ interpretation 
of Article 10(1) of the ECT. It follows that a breach by Mongolia 
of any obligations it may have under the Foreign Investment Law 
would constitute a breach of the provisions of Part III of the Treaty. 
Consequently, the Tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction under the ECT 
over Khan Netherlands’ Foreign Investment Law claims.”354
This conclusion would be reiterated in the tribunals’ Award on the Merits where 
the tribunal would also establish that Mongolia had breached its obligations vis-
349. Id.
350. Ibid. Para. 449.
351. Decision on Jurisdiction, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding 
Company Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-09, 2012. 
Para. 436.
352. Ibid. Para. 437.
353. Ibid. Para. 438.
354. Id.
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à-vis the investor on the basis of its Foreign Investment Law.355 In this case, the 
investor thus successfully enforced a statutory obligation of the State through the 
umbrella clause. It has to be noted, however, that the Khan tribunal neglected to 
discuss how these obligations under the Foreign Investment Law were ‘entered 
into’ by the State vis-à-vis the investor.
5.6.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The umbrella clause is potentially an important provision for RES investors. 
Firstly, in several jurisdictions support to RES producers is or was awarded on 
the basis of FIT contracts while in the hydroelectric sector operators are often 
awarded concessions or licenses.356 Therefore, there may well be situations 
where investors can establish a contractual relationship with a State, or a SOE 
or private company in charge of implementing a RES policy. Secondly, in some 
jurisdictions RES producers may be eligible for financial support on the basis of 
statutory or regulatory law.357 In Spain, for example, RES producers had to be 
355. Award on the Merits, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding 
Company Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-09, 2015. 
Paras. 295, 296 & 366.
356. Ontario, Canada: Independent Electricity System Operator (former Ontario Power 
Authority), Feed-in Tariff Contract (FIT Contract), Version 5.0, 2016. UK: Low Carbon 
Contracts Company, Contract for Difference (CfD), 2015. Italy: Gestore Servizi Energetici, 
Convenzione con il GSE. Greece: Electricity Market Operator/Hellenic Electricity 
Distribution Network Operator, Feed-in Tariff Operating Aid Contract (FiTC). See also: 
Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Content 
Requirements Consistent with WTO Law?’ in Freya Baetens et al (eds.), Frontiers of 
International Economic Law – Legal Tools to Confront Interdisciplinary Challenges (Brill 
Nijhoff 2014). P. 154. Watson Farley & Williams, ‘Greek Renewables Support Scheme: Draft 
Legislation July 2016’ (Watson Farley & Williams, 2016) <http://www.wfw.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/WFW-GreekRenewablesSupportScheme.pdf> accessed on 18/11/2016. 
Danai Fati & Panagiota Makri, ‘Greece: Major Changes to the Greek Support Scheme for 
Renewable Energy Production – The ‘New Deal’ Legislation and Its Implementation to 
Date’ [2015] 88 Renewable Energy Law & Policy Review 88. Saverio Francesco Massari, 
‘The Italian Photovoltaic Sector in Two Practical Cases: How to Create an Unfavorable 
Investment Climate in Renewables’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. 
Watson Farley & Williams, ‘Italy: New Decree with Incentives for Renewable Energy 
Plants (other than PV Plants) and Rules on Contiguity and Modifications Applicable 
also to PV Plants’ (Watson Farley & Williams, 2016) < http://www.wfw.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/WFW-Italy-NewFERDecree.pdf > accessed on 18/11/2016. Denmark: 
the Danish Energy Agency, Contract for a Price Premium for Electricity Generated 
at Solar Photovoltaic Installation(s), 2016. <https://www.ethics.dk/asp5/tender/
ens_0501_20160831.nsf/stddocsPub?OpenView&count=-1&ExpandView> accessed on 
07/02/2017.
357. Spain: Royal Decree 661/2007, Legislation Development of the Spanish Electric Power 
Act, Volume 11, 2009..
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registered before they could be eligible to receive support.358 Arguably, investors 
can invoke the umbrella clause in cases where the State does not honor its 
statutory commitments vis-à-vis the investor.
In cases involving contractual disputes, a few issues are important to point 
out which will be done by reference to the contracts awarded to ‘low carbon 
electricity generators’ in the UK on the basis of the Contracts for Difference 
(CfD) program. The CfD and the standard conditions attached to these contracts 
contain a detailed legal framework for the generation of ‘low carbon’ electricity, 
including the remuneration scheme.359 On the basis of the standard terms, the 
law governing the CfD is English law.360 In addition, the terms and conditions also 
contain a dispute resolution mechanism which provides for alternative dispute 
resolution as well as arbitration at the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA).361 On the basis of a considerable number of investment arbitration cases 
this means that foreign investors in the UK that conclude a CfD should resort to 
the dispute settlement mechanism as contained in the contract in the case of a 
dispute concerning the CfD.362 In case a contractual dispute would nevertheless 
be submitted to an ECT tribunal, for example because the ECT tribunal accepts 
jurisdiction over the CfD despite the arbitration clause, the ECT tribunal would 
have to interpret and apply the CfD in accordance with English law, which on 
the basis of the standard terms is the applicable law.363
358. Ibid. Articles 9, 14 & 17.
359. See: Contracts for Difference. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-
market-reform-contracts-for-difference> accessed on 18/11/2016.
360. Article 86.1, FiT Contract for Difference Standard Terms and Conditions, 2015. <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492815/CfD_-_
Standard_Conditions_-_26_October_2015.pdf> accessed on 18/11/2016.
361. Ibid. Part 14.
362. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Bureau Veritas, Inspection, 
Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/9, 2009. Para. 159. Decision on Jurisdiction, Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. 
v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 2009. Para. 202. Award, Bosh 
International, Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/11, 2012. Para. 251. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, 2003. Paras. 142-143
363. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Bureau Veritas, Inspection, 
Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/9, 2009. Para. 159. Decision on Jurisdiction, Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. 
v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 2009. Para. 201. Award, Bosh 
International, Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/11, 2012. Paras. 251-254. Decision on Annulment, Compañiá de Aguas 
del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, 2002. Para. 98.
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A final notable characteristic of the CfD program is the fact that the RES generator 
will enter into the contract with a SOE called the Low Carbon Contracts Company, 
which is fully owned by the British Department of Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy. The contractual partner for the RES investor will, therefore, not be the 
UK government but a SOE.
This should not, however, be problematic since the tribunal should determine 
whether the acts of the SOE that is party to a contract are attributable to the 
host State on the basis of Art. 5 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
This provision states:
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State 
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered 
an act of the State under international law, provided the person or 
entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”364
According to the commentary of the ILC Draft Articles the purpose of Art. 5 is:
“[…] to take account of the increasingly common phenomenon 
of parastatal entities, which exercise elements of governmental 
authority in place of State organs, as well as situations where former 
State corporations have been privatized but retain certain public or 
regulatory functions.”365
The ECT tribunal Amto v. Ukraine supports this line of reasoning.366 An interesting 
precedent in this regard is the NAFTA case Mesa v. Canada, where the tribunal 
held that acts of the corporate entities responsible for the implementation of 
the FIT program of Ontario were attributable to Canada.367 It has to be noted, 
however, that this conclusion was reached on the basis of a lex specialis rule 
on attribution contained in NAFTA and did not specifically involve a claim under 
364. Article 5, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(with commentaries), November 2001, International Law Commission, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf > accessed on 21/11/2016.
365. Ibid. Article 5 paragraph 1.
366. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 102.
367. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Paras. 348-377.
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the umbrella clause. In the NAFTA case Windstream v. Canada, the tribunal 
came to a similar conclusion by stating that under the Electricity Act of 1998, 
the Government of Ontario had the power to ‘issue directions’ to the Ontario 
Power Authority, the entity that was responsible for the implementation of the 
FIT Program.368 As a consequence the tribunal believed that ‘to the extent that 
[Ontario Power Authority] acted on the basis of such directions, its conduct could 
be considered attributable to Canada, depending on whether the direction in 
question involved a delegation of governmental authority to the’ Ontario Power 
Authority.369 Thus, in cases where an SOE or private company is by law in charge 
of the implementation of RES policy, attribution is of profound importance. 
Nevertheless, regulatory changes to RES policy as implemented by these SOE’s 
or private parties may still be attributable to the State to the extent that they 
exercised governmental authority.
Another example would be Italy, where investors in the PV sector would receive 
a letter confirming their entitlement to a FIT from the SOE in charge of the RES 
support scheme, after having qualified for the incentives. Subsequently, the PV 
investors would also enter into a contract with that SOE, which sets forth the 
specific FIT that it would receive and the relevant dates. The tribunal in Greentech 
v. Italy interpreted the umbrella clause broadly and, while considering the facts 
of the case as a whole – including relevant legislative decrees as well as the 
letters from the SOE and the contracts signed therewith – the tribunal held that 
the obligations assumed by Italy were ‘sufficiently specific’ in order to fall within 
the scope of the umbrella clause.370
In CEF Energia v. Italy, the tribunal nevertheless held that the relevant contracts 
were subject to a unilateral modification option under Italian law.371 Due to this 
delineation under Italian law, a breach of the umbrella clause of the ECT could 
not be established.372
368. Award, Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, 2016. 
Para. 234.
369. Id.
370. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Paras. 464-467.
371. Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 2019. Paras. 248-
255.
372. Ibid. Paras. 254-255.
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As the Khan v. Mongolia case showed, investors can also invoke the umbrella 
clause to rely on ‘obligations’ arising from national law. Interesting RES cases 
where investors relied on national law to make their investment involve Spain. 
In these cases, many investors relied on RD 661/2007. This decree laid down 
FIT’s and the requirement that in order to receive the support provided under 
this scheme, investors had to be registered in the ‘Administrative Register of 
Production Facilities under the Special Regime’ (RAIPRE).373
Arguably, the FIT’s laid down in such a scheme would constitute an obligation 
within the scope of the umbrella clause. By reference to ECT cases like Plama 
v. Bulgaria, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, and Khan v. Mongolia, 
investors can point to authorities that held that statutory obligations fall within the 
scope of the umbrella clause.374
A literal reading of the ECT’s umbrella clause requires that the investors also 
establish that the obligations under statutory law were ‘entered into’ by the host 
State with an investor or an investment of an investor. Although the Khan v. 
Mongolia tribunal did not address this requirement, there is more ECT arbitral 
practice to the contrary, with several ECT tribunals referring to the Decision on 
Annulment in the CMS v. Argentina case.375
In cases concerning the Spanish FIT program investors can argue that the 
registration requirement and, more particularly, the moment that they are admitted 
into the RAIPRE would constitute the moment that the obligations arising under 
RD 661/2007 are ‘entered into’ with an investor or an investment of an investor.376 
373. See for an overview of the regulatory system in Spain: Unofficial Translation of the Final 
Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. 
Paras. 110-128.
374. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 186. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul 
v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 257. Decision on 
Jurisdiction, Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. 
v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011-09, 2012. Para. 438.
375. Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine 
Republic, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, 2007. Para. 95. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2008. Para. 186. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 
2009. Para. 257. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment 
BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 448.
376. See for an overview of the regulatory system in Spain: Unofficial Translation of the Final 
Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. 
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In essence, it is from this moment that RD 661/2007 entitles RES investors to 
very specific support and, hence, it is from this moment that obligations arise 
under Spanish national law vis-à-vis the RES investor.377 A failure to observe 
these obligations could be considered to be a violation of the ECT. Whether the 
umbrella clause would be breached in cases of amendments to the support 
schemes remains to be seen. As argued by Crawford:
“The enactment of a law by a state, whether it is specific or general, 
is not the entry by the state into an obligation distinct from the law 
itself. No doubt a state is obliged by its own laws, but only for so 
long as they are in force. In the absence of express stabilization, 
investors take the risk that the obligations of the host state under its 
own law may change, and the umbrella clause makes no difference 
to this basic proposition.”378
The Isolux v. Spain case was the first occasion where this line of reasoning was 
tested in practice. The tribunal nevertheless rejected these arguments by stating 
that only specific commitments between States and investors are protected 
under the umbrella clause, while general regulatory acts that apply to both 
domestic and foreign investors are not.379 Similar lines of reasoning were adopted 
by the Novenergia v. Spain and RREEF v. Spain tribunals.380 The Foresight v. 
Spain tribunal adopted a similar approach and held that the umbrella clause 
only applies with regards to specific commitments instead of general legislative 
Paras. 110-128.
377. The importance of the RAIPRE registration and the fact that the benefits contained in RD 
661/2007 were dependend on such registration were acknowledged by arbitrator Tawil 
in his dissenting opinion. Note, however, that the umbrella clause was not invoked in the 
Charanne case, and the discussion of Tawil was in relation to a FET claim. See: Dissenting 
Opinion of Prof. Dr. Guido Santiago Tawil, Charanne and Construction Investments v. 
Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 9-10.
378. James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ [2008] 24 Arbitration 
International 351. P. 370.
379. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. 
Paras. 767-772. Interestingly, the tribunal did acknowledge that certain exceptions may 
exist and referred to the Liman Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan case to point out that legislation 
specifically addressed to foreign investors may be invoked through the umbrella clause.
380. Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), 
SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 715. Decision on 
Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and 
RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/30, 2018. Paras. 285-287.
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acts.381 The tribunal considered that neither RD 661/2007 nor the registration in 
RAIPRE amounted to an obligation entered into by Spain.382 In 9REN Holding v. 
Spain, the tribunal also rejected this argument, stating that the umbrella clause 
‘is apt for a bilateral contract, such as a concession or licence agreement’ but 
not for ‘a State’s public legislation or administrative regulations’ since a ‘State 
does not “enter into” such legislation with a private party.’383
Thus, a distinction apparently has to be made in applying the umbrella clause in 
relation to statutory obligations: it can be directly invoked if it concerns a Foreign 
Investment Law which directly addresses foreign investors, but it cannot be 
invoked to enforce renewable energy law that applies to foreign and domestic 
investors alike.
5.7. NATIONAL- AND MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT
On the basis of Art. 10(7) ECT, investors are to be accorded treatment no less 
favorable than that the host State accords to its own investors or investors from 
other contracting parties or any third State, whichever is the most favorable.384 
These obligations are known as the NT and MFN obligations. These obligations 
prevent discrimination between a foreign investor vis-à-vis domestic investors or 
vis-à-vis other foreign investors. In the absence of these rules, host States might 
sometimes be inclined to treat domestic investors more favorable as this might 
be considered to be in the national interest of the State.385 With these rules, an 
investor, once established in the host State, should be allowed to compete on a 
level playing field. According to economic theory, this should ‘foster competition 
and economic growth.’386
381. Final Award, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 
S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM 
Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 
413.
382. Id.
383. Award, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15, 2019. Para. 
342.
384. Article 10(7) states: “Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of 
Investors of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities including management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, treatment no less favourable than that which 
it accords to Investments of its own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting 
Party or any third state and their related activities including management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most favourable.”
385. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
245.
386. Id.
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Under the ECT, the content of the NT and MFN obligations may overlap with 
the prohibition on discriminatory measures under the non-impairment standard. 
However, there are at least two differences. Firstly, under the NT and MFN 
obligations there is no requirement that a discriminatory measure ‘impairs’ 
an investment, a mere difference in treatment suffices. Secondly, the NT and 
MFN prohibits discrimination based on nationality, while the prohibition on 
discriminatory treatment under the non-impairment standard may include other 
forms of discrimination as well.
5.7.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
The most significant deviation in IIA’s regarding the NT and MFN obligations 
is related to the scope of the provision, i.e. whether it applies in the pre-
establishment phase of an investment or merely post-establishment.387 In case 
of the ECT, NT and MFN treatment is only accorded in the post-establishment 
phase of an investment, contrary to for example NAFTA where NT and MFN 
treatment also applies with regards to the establishment, acquisition, and 
expansion of an investment.388 As will be discussed more in depth in chapter 
6.1, this has significant implications for the scope of the NT and MFN obligations.
Other differences are less significant. Sometimes NT and MFN obligations are 
incorporated separately, while in other IIA’s they are contained in the same 
provision.389 In the case of the ECT, both obligations are incorporated in the 
same provision and the investor is entitled to receive the treatment ‘whichever 
is more favourable.’ Sometimes, NT and MFN are linked to other standards of 
treatment. The Russian Model BIT of 2002, for example, links the NT and MFN 
obligations to the FET standard.390
The test that is usually applied when the NT and MFN provisions are invoked 
largely resembles the test that is applied under the prohibition of discriminatory 
387. Compare, for example, Article 1102 NAFTA with Article 10(7) ECT. Jeswald W. Salacuse, 
The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 246-247.
388. Articles 1102 & 1103, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-
Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994).
389. August Reinisch, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 815. August Reinisch, 
‘National Treatment’, in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: 
A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 850. In the NAFTA, for example, the NT and MFN 
obligations are contained in separate provisions: Articles 1102 & 1103.
390. Article 3(1) & (2), Russian Model BIT, 2002.
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measures under the non-impairment standard.391 This means that the base of 
comparison has to be established first, followed by an examination of whether 
differential treatment has been accorded to the investor in the absence of a 
justification.392 Like the prohibition on discriminatory measures under the non-
impairment standard, the most widely held view is that discriminatory intent 
does not have to be proven to establish a breach of the NT or MFN obligations 
although arbitral practice is not completely consistent in this regard.393
In relation to the base of comparison, it is interesting to note that during the 
ECT negotiations it was discussed whether or not an explicit requirement that 
investors are ‘in like circumstances’ should be incorporated in Art. 10(7) ECT. 
Canada and the US, who had included this requirement in NAFTA Arts. 1102 and 
1103, argued in favor of such inclusion.394 According to the US it was important 
to clarify that foreign investors cannot make claims to the same treatment as 
accorded to ‘any domestic investor, but rather to the treatment offered to a 
domestic investor who is in a similar situation.’395 The US supported this argument 
with the, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, example that an investor in the energy 
sector cannot claim that it should be subjected to the same safety regulations 
391. See chapter 5.4.
392. August Reinisch, ‘National Treatment’, in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 856-864. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 
199-204. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 
2010). Pp. 248-251. Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘National Treatment’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 38-54.
393. August Reinisch, ‘National Treatment’, in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 864-866. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 
203-204. For arbitral tribunals that did not require discriminatory intent, see: Award, Marvin 
Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 2002. Para. 
181. Decision on Responsibility, Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, 2008. Para. 138. Award, Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. 
Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 2007. Para. 368. For Arbitral Tribunals 
that held the contrary, see: Award, Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil 
v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 2001. Para. 369. Final Award of 
the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, 2005. Part IV Chapter B Para. 12.
394. Article 13, Specific Comment 13.1, CONF 64, Draft ECT – Fourth version, 7 July 
1993. <http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/18_-_
ECT_4__07.07.93_.pdf> accessed on 20/12/2016.
395. Article 10, Binder 3/4, Plenary Session 28 June-2 July 1993, Room Document 23.
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as a domestic investor engaged in book publishing.396 The US and Canadian 
proposal would, however, never make it to the final ECT text.397
It has to be noted that in many IIA’s the NT and/or MFN obligations may be 
subject to exceptions. The most common exceptions are related to taxation or 
Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIO).398 In the ECT, Art. 24(4) 
contains an REIO exception for the MFN obligation and Art. 21(3) one regarding 
taxation. The consequences thereof will be discussed in chapter 7.
In relation to the MFN obligation, it is worth noting that there is a significant 
body of arbitral case law where investors have tried to ‘import’ more favorable 
substantive or procedural provisions from other IIA’s to their dispute.
In Bayindir v. Pakistan and CME v. Czech Republic for example, the investors 
relied on the MFN provision in the basis treaty to import a FET standard or a more 
favorable expropriation provision, respectively.399 According to Reinisch, ‘[i]t is 
widely accepted that MFN clauses may be relied upon by investors in order to 
claim a better substantive treatment accorded by a host State to investors of a 
third State.’400 Perhaps the strongest authority in favor of this point can be found 
in the SCC Berschader v. Russia case, where the tribunal held:
“[…] it is universally agreed that the very essence of an MFN 
provision in a BIT is to afford to investors all material protection 
provided by subsequent treaties […]”401
396. Id.
397. Article 10, Binder 3/4, Points discussed in Sub-Group on 1 and 2 July 1993 on Article 13. 
Pp. 4-5.
398. August Reinisch, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 818-819.
399. Ibid. Pp. 819-823. Decision on Jurisdiction, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. 
v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 2005. Paras. 231-232. Award, 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/29, 2009. Paras. 155-160. Final Award, CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2003. Paras. 497-500.
400. August Reinisch, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 820. For similar 
statements, see: Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 211. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 354.
401. Award, Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case 
No. 080/2004, 2006. Para. 179.
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Whether investors can invoke the MFN provision to incorporate more favorable 
ISDS provisions from other IIA’s is less clear.402 Investment tribunals have come 
to diverging conclusions with regards to this question, although it has to be 
noted that the language of a specific MFN obligation may be determinative in a 
specific case.403 One of the tribunals that rejected an attempt by an investor to 
import a more favorable ISDS provision through the MFN obligation is the Plama 
v. Bulgaria case.404 In essence, the claimant tried to circumvent Art. 17 ECT 
regarding denial of benefits under the ECT, in case this provision would affect 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the basis of the ECT, and base the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID Tribunal on the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT as an alternative source of 
402. Id. August Reinisch, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 824-840. Rudolf Dolzer 
& Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). Pp. 270-275. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes 
under the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 128-130.
403. August Reinisch, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 824-840. For tribunals 
allowing investors to rely on the MFN provision to import a more favorable ISDS 
provision, see: Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Emilio Agustín 
Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 2000. Para. 56. Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
2004. Paras. 102-103. Decision on Jurisdiction, Hochtief AG v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, 2011. Para. 72. Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary 
Questions on Jurisdiction, Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/10, 2005. Para. 31. Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
Telefónica S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, 2006. Paras. 102-
105. Award on Jurisdiction, RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case 
No. V079/2005, 2007. Paras. 132-139. Decision on Jurisdiction, Teinver S.A., Transportes 
de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/1, 2012. Paras. 182-186. For tribunals that have rejected such an 
interpretation of MFN clauses, see: Decision on Jurisdiction, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and 
Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, 2004. 
Para. 119. Award, Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/15, 2006. Para. 100. Award, Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader 
v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, 2006. Paras. 194 & 208. Award 
on Preliminary Objections, Renta 4 S.V.S.A, Ahorro Corporación Emergentes F.I., Ahorro 
Corporación Eurofondo F.I., Rovime Inversiones SICAV S.A., Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A., 
Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC No. 
24/2007, 2009. Para. 119. Award, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 2008. Para. 171. Final Award, Austrian Airlines v. The Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, 2009. Para. 135. Award on Jurisdiction, European American 
Investment Bank AG (EURAM) v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-17, 
2012. Paras. 451-456.
404. Decision on Jurisdiction, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/24, 2005. Para. 183.
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jurisdiction for the tribunal.405 The Plama tribunal, however, rejected this in an 
unequivocal manner:
“[…] an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by 
reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in 
another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no 
doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.”406
Regarding the MFN provision of the ECT, Roe and Happold have argued that it 
cannot be used to import an ISDS provision that is more favorable to the investor 
than Art. 26 ECT. According to them, one of the most important rules of treaty 
interpretation is that ‘interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms 
of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.’407 
Allowing an investor to invoke an ISDS provision that is more favorable to it than 
Art. 26 ECT, because Art. 26 contains certain limitations, would reduce parts of 
the ECT to redundancy or inutility while there is nothing in the text of the ECT’s 
MFN provision that would allow for such a construction.408
5.7.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Although various investors have relied on Art. 10(7) ECT, there is surprisingly 
little jurisprudence on this provision that could provide doctrinal guidance on 
the interpretation of this provision. In some cases, claims regarding Art. 10(7) 
ECT are quickly dismissed because there is overlap with claims under other 
standards of treatment that had already been dismissed by the tribunal.409 While 
in other cases claims regarding discrimination are merely brought under the non-
impairment standard or the tribunal considers the overlap to be so significant 
that it simply refers claims based on Art. 10(7) ECT to the analysis of the tribunal 
under the non-impairment standard.410 In yet other cases, the claimant has failed 
405. Id.
406. Ibid. Para. 223.
407. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 129. Report of the Appellate Body, 
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
1996. P. 23.
408. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 129-130.
409. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Paras. 271-277.
410. In Nykomb v. Latvia, the investor did not even invoke Art. 10(7) ECT but merely brought 
a discrimination claim under the non-impairment standard: Arbitral Award, Nykomb 
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to substantiate the claim on Art. 10(7) which leads the tribunal to dismiss the 
claim.411
Even in literature, ECT case law on discriminatory treatment under the non-
impairment standard is sometimes equated with NT, although both obligations 
are contained in separate provisions.412
5.7.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The lack of ECT case law on Art. 10(7) ECT does not mean, however, that it is 
not a relevant provision. Current ECT case law involving discrimination already 
demonstrates its value for RES investors. As was already discussed in Chapter 
5.4.3 on the non-impairment standard, the Nykomb v. Latvia case demonstrates 
that support for energy production is sometimes reduced in a discriminatory 
manner, by altering the level of support paid to foreign investors while sparing 
domestic producers.
Another interesting dispute involving the NT and MFN obligations is the NAFTA 
case Windstream Energy v. Canada. In this RES case, the investor had obtained 
a FIT Contract under the Ontario FIT Program to construct an offshore wind park. 
However, the investor was subsequently unable to construct its wind park since 
a moratorium for offshore wind parks was put in place for various reasons.413 
According to the investor, both the NT and MFN obligations were breached.
Regarding the NT claim, Windstream argued that there was a Canadian investor, 
TransCanada, that had also successfully applied for a FIT Contract but that also 
ran into difficulties when trying to get the project of the ground.414 Contrary to 
Windstream however, the Canadian investor was awarded a new project and 
was compensated for any costs associated with the cancellation of the initial 
project.415
Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, SCC, 2003. Para. 1.2.3. 
Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras. 11.3.2 & 12.3.2.
411. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Paras. 7.160-164.
412. August Reinisch, ‘National Treatment’, in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 861.
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Concerning the MFN claim, Windstream compared its situation to that of 
Samsung, a South Korean investor.416 After the moratorium was put in place, 
Windstream had proposed to the authorities to construct a solar park instead 
of the offshore wind park. The authorities in Ontario did not approve of this 
proposal while they did allow Samsung to construct a similar project. Hence, this 
constituted preferential treatment that should also be accorded to Windstream, 
according to the claimant.
Finally, Windstream argued that all developers of large wind parks were allowed 
to proceed through the regulatory process and that it was the only one that was 
confronted with a moratorium notwithstanding the fact that it was the only one 
who was awarded a FIT Contract for an offshore wind park.417
The reasoning of the tribunal concerning these claims is highly interesting for 
RES investors, specifically in relation to its findings on the basis of comparison. 
Contrary to Art. 10(7) ECT, NAFTA contains a specific requirement under Arts. 
1102 and 1103 that investors must be ‘in like circumstances’. According to the 
tribunal, however, developers of offshore wind farms are not ‘in like circumstances’ 
as developers of onshore wind parks or solar projects:
“Unlike TransCanada and Samsung, the Claimant had a FIT Contract 
for offshore wind development, and indeed it was the only holder 
of such a contract. Accordingly, the moratorium and the related 
measures did not apply to TransCanada and Samsung in the first 
place, which therefore were not affected by them. The Tribunal 
further notes that the moratorium only applied to offshore wind 
and that it was not applied in a non-discriminatory manner in that 
it resulted in the cancellation of all offshore wind projects, with the 
exception of that of the Claimant, which was the only holder of a FIT 
Contract. The Tribunal is therefore unable to agree that the Claimant 
was treated less favorably than other prospective developers of 
offshore wind projects, which were the only proponents that could 
be said to have been in “like circumstances.””418
Hence, the claims were rejected.
416. Ibid. Para. 389.
417. Ibid. Para. 390.
418. Ibid. Para. 414.
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Despite the fact that, contrary to NAFTA, the ECT does not contain an explicit 
‘in like circumstances’ requirement, ECT practice under the non-impairment 
standard has so far adopted an approach along comparable lines in cases 
involving claims of discrimination where a base of comparison had to be 
established. In Nykomb v. Latvia, the tribunal held that one has to ‘compare like 
with like’, which in that case meant that the position of the foreign investor in a 
co-generation facility had to be compared to the treatment accorded to domestic 
investors subjected to the same laws and regulations.419 In a similar vein, in the 
AES v. Hungary and Electrabel v. Hungary the ECT tribunals also adopted a 
narrow base of comparison; by comparing the treatment accorded to the foreign 
investors to the treatment accorded to domestic investors active in the same 
activity, namely the generation of electricity.420
It is therefore not unthinkable that in an ECT case a tribunal would come to the 
same conclusion as the Windstream tribunal. There may be compelling reasons 
why one cannot compare the situation of offshore wind park developers to 
the situation of onshore wind park developers. The technical, environmental, 
jurisdictional, and financial considerations are very different between onshore 
and offshore wind parks. Also, the regulatory process offshore may well be very 
different than onshore because the interests involved are very different: onshore 
one has to take local residents into account while this is not the case offshore 
where maritime traffic, sea-lanes, and the protection of the marine enviroment 
may be important considerations to take into account. Therefore, much can be 
said in favor of the conclusion of the Windstream tribunal.
These cases show that the NT and MFN obligations may be relevant for RES 
investors: if host States differentiate between foreign and domestic investors in 
the post-establishment phase of an investment, this may amount to a violation of 
the international obligations of the State. However, when establishing the basis 
of comparison for a NT or MFN claim, it may not always be suitable to compare 
the situation of a wind developer to the situation of a solar or hydro project as 
there are significant differences between the various forms of RES. Of course, 
419. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Para. 4.3.2.(a).
420. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 7.152. Award, AES Summit Generation 
Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
2010. Paras. 10.3.45-10.3.53.
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the extent to which this holds true may depend to a large degree on the facts of 
each individual case.
5.7.4. Recent Treaty Practice
Recent treaty practice, specifically concerning the MFN obligation, sometimes 
specifically addresses the possibility of importing more favorable ISDS or 
substantive provisions from other IIA’s. The CPTPP, for example, clarifies in its 
MFN provision that: “For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article 
does not encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, 
such as those included in Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement).”421 
Practice of the EU goes even further than merely excluding the possibility of 
importing more favorable ISDS provisions by also stating that ‘[s]ubstantive 
obligations in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements 
do not in themselves constitute “treatment”, and thus cannot give rise to a breach 
of this Article, absent measures adopted or maintained by a Party pursuant to 
those obligations.’422
These treaties thus provide more clarity in relation to some of the most contested 
issues in the application of the MFN-standard by specifically excluding the 
possibility to import a (more favorable) ISDS provision or a standard of treatment 
from another IIA that provides for a higher level of investment protection.
5.8. EFFECTIVE MEANS CLAUSE
The final paragraph of Art. 10 ECT contains the so-called ‘effective means clause’ 
and prescribes that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall ensure that its domestic 
law provides effective means for the assertion of claims and the enforcement 
of rights with respect to Investment, investment agreements, and investment 
authorizations.’ During the ECT negotiations the US and Japan had lobbied for 
the inclusion of this provision.423 Their main concern was that, while the ISDS 
provision of the ECT by that time provided jurisdiction for investment arbitration 
or domestic courts over disputes concerning the ECT, the domestic court avenue 
was not a ‘genuine’ option as long as there was no treaty obligation under the 
421. Article 9.5(3), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(adopted 08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018).
422. Article 8.7(4), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
423. Specific Comment to Article 23(2) in 3/93 Annex 1, BA 32, Basic Agreement, 18 January 
1993.
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ECT to provide for effective means for an investor to assert claims and enforce 
rights through the domestic courts.424
5.8.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
The effective means clause can primarily, but not exclusively, be found in US 
BIT’s concluded up and to the early 2000’s.425 Interestingly, from the 2004 US 
Model BIT onwards the clause moved from the operative part of the treaty to the 
preamble.426 According to Vandevelde, this policy change is brought about by 
a believe on behalf of US officials that ‘the customary international law principle 
prohibiting denial of justice provides adequate protection and that a separate 
treaty obligation’ was no longer necessary.427 Until recently, the standard was 
rarely invoked, arguably because investors considered that the provision overlaps 
with the FET standard’s prohibition on denial of justice.428 It has been said that 
the overlap between the two standards is indeed significant.429
In the Duke Energy v. Ecuador case, for example, the tribunal held that the 
provision ‘seeks to implement and form part of the more general guarantee 
against denial of justice.’430 A much broader meaning was given to the effective 
424. Specific Comment 23.2, BA-35, Basic Agreement, 9 February 1993 <http://www.
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/13_-_BA_35__09.02.93__.
pdf> accessed on 05/01/2017.
425. See for example: Article II(4), US Model BIT, 1994. Article II(4), US Model BIT, 1998. Article 
II(6), Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (United States-Argentina) 
(adopted 14/11/1991, entered into force 20/10/1994). Article II(7), Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Ecuador) (adopted, 27/08/1993, 
entered into force 11/05/1997). Article II(7), Treaty between the United States of America 
and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(United States-Ukraine) (adopted, 04/03/1994, entered into force 16/11/1996). For a 
non-US BIT with the effective means standard, see: Article 3(3), Agreement Between the 
Government of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The Government of the State of 
Kuwait for the Encouragement and Protection of Investments (Jordan-Kuwait) (adopted 
21/05/2001, entrance into force still pending).
426. Preamble, US Model BIT, 2004. Preamble, US Model BIT, 2012. Jessica Wirth, ‘”Effective 
Means” Means? The Legacy of Chevron v. Ecuador’ [2013] 52 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 325. P. 333.
427. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. International Investment Agreements (Oxford University Press 
2009). Pp. 412-415.
428. Jessica Wirth, ‘”Effective Means” Means? The Legacy of Chevron v. Ecuador’ [2013] 52 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 325. P. 334.
429. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 130.
430. Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/19, 2008. Para. 391.
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means standard by the tribunal in Chevron v. Ecuador. Essentially, the tribunal 
held that ‘an “effective means” standard, constitutes a lex specialis and not a 
mere restatement of the law on denial of justice.’431 Accepting that the effective 
means clause constitutes a lex specialis instead of a mere restatement of a 
prohibition on denial of justice under customary international law means that the 
threshold of liability to establish a breach of international law is lowered. As the 
tribunal itself explains:
“[T]he Tribunal agrees with the Claimants that a distinct and 
potentially less-demanding test is applicable under this provision as 
compared to denial of justice under customary international law. The 
test for establishing a denial of justice sets, as the Respondent has 
argued, a high threshold. While the standard is objective and does 
not require an overt showing of bad faith, it nevertheless requires the 
demonstration of “a particularly serious shortcoming” and egregious 
conduct that “shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial 
propriety”. By contrast, under Article II(7) [of the US-Ecuador BIT], a 
failure of domestic courts to enforce rights “effectively” will constitute 
a violation of Article II(7), which may not always be sufficient to find a 
denial of justice under customary international law.”432
A more concrete elaboration on what the standard requires was subsequently 
provided for by the tribunal. A State has to provide for laws and a judicial system 
that is capable of rendering effective results, which means that there may be 
no “indefinite or undue delay.”433 The statement of the Chevron tribunal was so 
broad that it gave rise to diplomatic tensions between Ecuador and the US and 
even led to inter-State arbitration on the basis of the US-Ecuador BIT between 
the two States.434
Despite the controversy surrounding the Chevron tribunals’ findings, its 
interpretation was subsequently followed by the White Industries v. India 
431. Partial Award on the Merits, Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, 2010. Para. 242.
432. Ibid. Para. 244.
433. Ibid. Para. 250. Jessica Wirth, ‘”Effective Means” Means? The Legacy of Chevron v. 
Ecuador’ [2013] 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 325. P. 340.
434. Award, Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-05, 2012. 
Para. 41. Jessica Wirth, ‘”Effective Means” Means? The Legacy of Chevron v. Ecuador’ 
[2013] 52 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 325. P. 327.
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tribunal.435 The White tribunal summarized the content of the effective means 
clause as follows:
(a) “the “effective means” standard is lex specialis and is a distinct 
and potentially less demanding test, in comparison to denial of 
justice in customary international law;
(b) the standard requires both that the host State establish a 
proper system of laws and institutions and that those systems work 
effectively in any given case;
(c) a claimant alleging a breach of the effective means standard 
does not need to establish that the host State interfered in judicial 
proceedings to establish a breach;
(d) indefinite or undue delay in the host State’s courts dealing with 
an investor’s “claim” may amount to a breach of the effective means 
standard;
(e) court congestion and backlogs are relevant factors to consider, 
but do not constitute a complete defence. To the extent that the host 
State’s courts experience regular and extensive delays, this may be 
evidence of a systemic problem with the court system, which would 
also constitute a breach of the effective means standard;
(f) the issue of whether or not “effective means” have been 
provided by the host State is to be measured against an objective, 
international standard;
(g) a claimant alleging a breach of the standard does not need 
to prove that it has exhausted local remedies. A claimant must, 
however, adequately utilise the means available to it to assert claims 
and enforce rights. It will be up to the host State to prove that local 
remedies are available and the claimant to show that those remedies 
were ineffective or futile;
435. Final Award, White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, 2011. 
Paras. 11.3.2-11.3.3.
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(h) whether or not a delay in dealing with an investor’s claim 
breaches the standard will depend on the facts of the case; and
(i) as with denial of justice under customary international law, 
some of the factors that may be considered are the complexity of 
the case, the behaviour of the litigants involved, the significance of 
the interests at stake in the case and the behaviour of the courts 
themselves.”436
The relatively recent pronouncements of the Chevron and White tribunals, the 
latter of which received the approval of the Gavazzi v. Romania tribunal, have 
potentially turned the effective means clause from a standard that lay dormant 
for years to one that may be appealing to investors that have experienced 
proceedings at ineffective foreign judiciaries.437
5.8.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Various ECT tribunals have discussed the effective means clause.
In Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, the tribunal would eventually establish a violation 
of the provision.438 In this case, the investor had obtained a domestic court 
judgment in its favor against an SOE in the amount of USD 1.5 mln. However, 
before the investor was able to execute the judgment, the Vice Prime Minister 
of the country successfully requested a domestic court to stay the execution 
for three months. During these three months the SOE was restructured and 
its valuable assets were transferred to other SOE’s. As a consequence, the 
company was bankrupt by the time the three months were over and Petrobart 
could not obtain the proceeds from its judgment.
Without providing any clarity or insight on the meaning of Art. 10(12) ECT, the 
tribunal held that it considered ‘the Vice Prime Minister’s letter to the Chairman 
of the Bishek Court, which gave support for a stay of execution of the [judgment] 
violated […] the Kyrgyz Republic’s obligation under Article 10(12) of the [ECT] to 
436. Id.
437. Decision on Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Liability, Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, 2015.
438. For a description of the facts, see: Arbitral Award, Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz 
Republic, SCC Case No. (126/2003), 2005. Para. I.
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ensure that its domestic law provides effective means for the assertion of claims 
and the enforcement of rights with respect to investments.’439
The tribunal in the Amto v. Ukraine case provided clarity on the effective means 
standard although it rejected Amto’s claim based on Art. 10(12).440 According 
to the tribunal:
“The fundamental criteria of an ‘effective means’ for the assertion of 
claims and the enforcement of rights within the meaning of Article 
10(2) is law and the rule of law. There must be legislation for the 
recognition and enforcement of property and contractual rights. 
This legislation must be made in accordance with the constitution, 
and be publicly available. An effective means of the assertion of 
claims and the enforcement of rights also requires secondary rules 
of procedure so that the principles and objectives of the legislation 
can be translated by the investor into effective action in the domestic 
tribunals.”441
According to the Amto tribunal, ‘’effective’ is a systematic, comparative, 
progressive and practical standard’:442
“It is systematic in that the State must provide an effective 
framework or system for the enforcement of rights, but does not 
offer guarantees in individual cases. Individual failures might be 
evidence of systematic inadequacies, but are not themselves a 
breach of Article 10(12). It is comparative in that compliance with 
international standards indicates that imperfections in the law might 
result from the complexities of the subject matter rather than the 
inadequacies of the legislation. It is progressive in the sense that 
legislation ages and needs to be modernized and adapted from 
time to time, and results might not be immediate. Where a State is 
taking the appropriate steps to identify and address deficiencies in 
its legislation -in other words improvement is in progress- then the 
progress should be recognized in assessing effectiveness. Finally, it 
439. Ibid. Pp. 28-29.
440. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 89.
441. Ibid. Para. 87.
442. Ibid. Para. 88.
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is a practical standard in that some areas of law, or the application of 
legislation in certain circumstances, raise particular difficulties which 
should not be ignored in assessing effectiveness.”443
Although the tribunal would eventually reject Amto’s claims, its analysis did 
provide more clarity on the content of the effective means clause.
In the RES case Charanne v. Spain the claimants also invoked Art. 10(12). Their 
argument was essentially that the Spanish government, when adopting measures 
that affected the economic viability of PV investments, opted for a Royal Decree 
Law as a legal instrument with ‘the sole purpose of avoiding the political and 
social debate that may generate controversial legislative modifications.’444 The 
claimants added to this that ‘Spanish law does not allow a filing of a contentious-
administrative claim against a [Royal Decree Law] and the use of this measure 
with the aim of “avoiding the myriad of contentious-administrative claims that 
the members of the photovoltaic industry would have presented to challenge 
the measures” constitutes a violation of the obligation under Article 10(12) of 
the ECT’.445
According to the tribunal, Art. 10(12) ‘requires States to provide a legal framework 
that guarantees effective remedies to investors for the realization and protection 
of their investments.’446 Although this does not impose ‘any obligation on States 
regarding the way in which it organizes its judicial system’, it does require an 
examination of the legal system of the State as a whole.447
The tribunal would reject the arguments of the claimants in the Charanne case 
since it was of the opinion that the Spanish means were sufficient to satisfy Art. 
10(12) ECT.448 Also, the tribunal believed that the effective means clause cannot 
impose ‘on the State specific requirements for organizing its review system, such 
as forcing the State to provide a system of direct control of the constitutionality 
of acts with a legislative character.’449
443. Ibid. Para. 88.
444. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 469.
445. Id.
446. Ibid. Para. 470.
447. Id.
448. Ibid. Para. 472.
449. Id.
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Under the ECT, Art. 10(12) thus obliges States to provide a system of judicial 
rules and institutions through which investors can effectively enforce rights and 
assert claims. Effective, in this regard, means that the standard is ‘systematic, 
comparative, progressive and practical.’450 The standard does not, however, 
impose specific requirements upon the State for organizing its review system 
for legislative or executive acts in a certain way.
5.8.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The added value of effective means clause in the ECT for investors is that one 
could argue that it provides a lex specialis rule regarding due process and denial 
of justice with a lower threshold of liability than the FET standard. Nevertheless, 
whether the standard will be beneficial to RES investors in cases where justice is 
not denied to them remains to be seen. Cases like Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, 
White Industries v. India, and Chevron v. Ecuador all had as common denominator 
that the claimants complained about treatment accorded to them by domestic 
courts of the host State. In that sense, the argument put forward by claimant in 
Charanne was very different since it turned around the legal instrument adopted 
by the authorities which adversely affected claimants’ investment. From the award 
it does not become clear that they had actually pursued local remedies, which 
is a requirement according to the Chevron tribunal.451 From the Isolux v. Spain 
case, which concerned the same investments as those in the Charanne case, it 
does become apparent that the investors had been engaged in domestic court 
proceedings.452
It therefore seems most likely that Art. 10(12) is of interest to investors that have 
been accorded questionable treatment in domestic courts although, as the Amto 
tribunal acknowledged, the substantive domestic law may also give rise to Art. 
10(12) claims when it is ‘antiquated and totally ineffective.’453
However, there is no reason to believe that RES investors are particularly often 
confronted with a denial of justice. Rather, it seems to be a problem related 
450. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 88.
451. Partial Award on the Merits, Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, 2010. Paras. 323-327.
452. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. 
Paras. 789-800.
453. Final Award, Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. (080/2005), 2008. 
Para. 87.
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to specific countries that are struggling with providing investors with a judicial 
process that is capable of handling investment cases in accordance with 
international standards. Therefore, the relevance of the effective means clause 
in relation to RES investors will not be developed further.
5.9. COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES
On the basis of Art. 12(1) ECT, except in those situations where Art. 13 ECT 
applies, ‘an Investor of any Contracting Party which suffers a loss with respect 
to any Investment in the Area of another Contracting Party owing to war or other 
armed conflict, state of national emergency, civil disturbance, or other similar 
event in that Area, shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party, as regards 
restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, treatment which 
is the most favourable of that which that Contracting Party accords to any other 
Investor, whether its own Investor, the Investor of any other Contracting Party, or 
the Investor of any third state.’
As discussed under the MCPS obligation under Art. 10(1) ECT, a host State is 
not liable for any and all damages suffered by investors, rather host States have 
a due diligence obligation.454 The same goes for damage arising due to war, 
civil disturbance, or a state of national emergency. It has been said that the main 
purpose of provisions like Art. 12 ECT is to ensure that in times of emergency, 
foreign investors are not ‘adversely discriminated against with respect to whatever 
protection a host state affords to its own investors.’455
This section will briefly introduce Art. 12 ECT by reference to other IIA’s. Since 
claims based on Art. 12 ECT will most likely only arise after a rather exceptional 
course of events, it cannot be said that RES investors have a specific interest 
in this provision. Therefore, Art. 12 ECT will not be elaborated upon extensively. 
Since, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no ECT cases where 
tribunals discussed Art. 12, the section discussing ECT arbitral practice will be 
omitted.456
454. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
336.
455. Id.
456. It does seem, however, that Article 12 was invoked in the Plama v. Bulgaria case: Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, 2005. Para. 132. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2008. Paras. 236 & 249.
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5.9.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Like Art. 12 of the ECT, most IIA’s do not provide investors with an absolute right 
to compensation in cases of emergency, but rather entitle them to the same 
treatment as the host State accords to either its own investors or investors of 
a third State with regards to restitution, indemnification, compensation or other 
settlement, i.e. the NT and MFN obligations apply.457 Nevertheless, there are also 
BIT’s where the reference to NT is omitted and only a MFN obligation applies.458 
Hence, the host State may provide more favorable treatment to its domestic 
investors in comparison to foreign investors.
Again in line with many IIA’s, Art. 12(2) ECT provides that an investor who suffers 
a loss resulting from ‘requisitioning of its Investment or part thereof by the [host 
State’s] forces or authorities’ or the ‘destruction of its Investment or part thereof 
by the [host State’s] forces or authorities, which was not required by the necessity 
457. Ibid. Para. 337. See, for example: Article 5(3), Accord Entre Ie Gouvernement 
de la République Française et le Gouvernement de la République Argentine sur 
L’Encouragement et la Protection Réciproques des Investissements (France-Argentina) 
(adopted 03/07/1991, entered into force 03/03/1993). Article 5(1), Agreement Between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Spain on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (China-Spain) (adopted 14/11/2005, entered into 
force 01/07/2008). Article 8, Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Australia-India) (adopted 26/02/1999, enterd into force 04/05/2000). Article 5(1), 
Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of New Zealand 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Hong Kong-New Zealand) (adopted 
06/07/1995, entered into force 05/08/1995). Article 7, Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Suriname (Netherlands-Suriname) (adopted 31/03/2005, entered into force 
01/09/2006). Article 12(1), Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Iraq for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment (Japan-Iraq) (adopted 07/06/2012, entered into 
force 01/02/2014). Article 8.34, Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic 
Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 
of the Other Part (Eurasian Economic Union-Vietnam) (adopted 29/05/2015, entered into 
force 05/10/2016). Article 5, Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Denmark-Russia) (adopted 04/11/1993, entered into 
force 26/08/1996).
458. Article 7, Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection 
of Capital Investments (Russia-Egypt) (adopted 23/09/1997, entered into force 
12/06/2000). Article 4(5), Federal Republic of Germany and Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(Germany-Soviet Union) (adopted 13/06/1989, entered into force 05/08/1991). Article 
5, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Canada-
Soviet Union) (adopted 20/11/1989, entered into force 27/06/1991).
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of the situation’ ‘shall be accorded restitution or compensation which in either 
case shall be prompt, adequate and effective.’459
5.9.2. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Since the provision on compensation for foreign investors for losses in cases of 
war, armed conflict, state of national emergency, or civil disturbance is related to 
potential investment risks to which all investors are exposed, there is no reason 
to believe that this provision may be particularly interesting for RES investors. In 
addition, as argued by Salacuse, provisions like Art. 12 are primarily intended ‘to 
compensate for physical damage caused by war, revolution, or civil disturbance, 
not injuries resulting from a state’s regulatory measures.’460 Therefore, it is very 
unlikely that investors who suffer from reduced FIT’s because the State had 
to implement austerity measures in the wake of a severe economic crisis can 
successfully invoke Art. 12 ECT. Hence, the provision will not be elaborated upon.
5.10. EXPROPRIATION
It has been said that the notion of private property is central to the very existence 
of international investment law and this is most clearly enshrined in Art. 13 ECT, 
which lays down the criteria that have to be met to lawfully expropriate, directly 
or indirectly, assets from foreign investors.461
5.10.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
The ECT provides for the following in Art. 13(1):
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any 
other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated 
or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent 
to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
“Expropriation”) except where such Expropriation is:
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) not discriminatory;
459. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
337.
460. Ibid. P. 339.
461. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). P. 47.
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(c) carried out under due process of law; and
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.”
This is a traditional expropriation provision as advocated by capital exporting 
States and is currently often found in many IIA’s.462
That does not mean, however, that the norm as laid down in Art. 13 ECT was 
never contested. Quite, to the contrary, during the 20th century international 
rules regarding expropriation were amongst ‘the most bitterly debated issues of 
international law’.463 Newly independent capital importing countries, Communist 
States and Latin American countries adopted views that diverged significantly 
from the positions held by capital exporting States and which were also reflected 
in pre-war international jurisprudence, as became clear during the debate on the 
New International Economic Order that culminated in several resolutions from 
the UN General Assembly.464 Particularly thorny issues were the requirement of 
462. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 
2016). P. 192. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties 
(Cambridge University Press 2014). Pp. 232-233. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 99-101.
463. Patrick M. Norton, ‘Back to the Future: Expropriation and the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 366-367, 375-377. Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, ‘Compensation for Nationalization: The Provision in the European Energy 
Charter’ in Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for 
Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 386-393. Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels, Jeffrey C. Isaac & Steven Lukes, The Communist Manifesto (Yale University Press 
2012). P. 85. Judgment, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, US Supreme Court, 376 
U.S. 398 (1964). P. 428.
464. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UNGA Res 3171 (XXVII) (17 December 
1973). This clearly went beyond what was adopted by UNGA Resolution 1803, which held: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking 
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (14 December 
1962). Rudolf Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ 
[1981] 75 American Journal of International Law 553. Pp. 558-559. Green H. Hakworth, 
Digest of International Law, Vol. III (United States Government Printing Office 1942). Pp. 
658-659. For the Mexican objection to the statement of Secretary of State Hull, see: 
Eduardo J. de Aréchaga, ‘The Duty to Compensate for the Nationalization of Foreign 
Property’ [1963] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 237. P. 238. ‘The 
Government of Mexico stated in its reply to the United States that “ the transformation of 
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compensation in case of an expropriation and the method of judicial review. As a 
consequence, many authors in the 1980’s were cautious to make any statement 
status of protection against expropriation under customary international law.465
Despite the controversy over expropriation in international law, the IIA’s concluded 
in the 1990’s would mark a definite return of the expropriation provisions as 
a country, that is to say, the future of the nation, could not be halted by the impossibility 
of paying immediately the value of the properties belonging to a small number of 
foreigners who seek only a lucrative end “.’ Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International 
Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1998). P. 142. Award of the Tribunal, Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway 
v. United States of America), PCA Case No. 1921-01, 1922. Note: this tribunal applied 
a mix of both municipal law as well as international law, see p. 25. Nevertheless, the 
tribunal concluded that, on the basis of both municipal US law (the Fifth Amendment) 
and international law, the claimants were entitled to ‘just compensation.’ Award, Lena 
Goldfields, Ltd. v. the Soviet Union, 3/9/1930. Text of the award retrieved from: Arthur 
Nussbaum, ‘The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government’ 
[1950] 36 Cornell Law Quarterly 31. Pp. 42-53. Note: In this case it was argued, and 
the tribunal seems to have concurred with that, that in relation to performance of the 
concession contract USSR Russian law was the proper law of contract but that for other 
purposes, general principles of law, as recognized in Art. 38(1)(c) of the PCIJ Statute, was 
the proper law of the contract. See also: V.V. Veeder, ‘The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The 
Historical Roots of Three Ideas’ [1998] 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
747. Pp. 750-751. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 Report of International 
Arbitration Awards (1925). P. 615. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Germany 
v. Poland) (Claim for Indemnity) (the Merits) [1928], PCIJ Reports Series A No. 17. P. 
47. Note: this case of often used to support the view that full compensation is required 
under international law. However, the PCIJ made this statement in a case where it had 
established that an illegal seizure of property had taken place in violation of a treaty 
obligation. Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009). P. 377.
465. Patrick M. Norton, ‘Back to the Future: Expropriation and the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. 365. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 
‘Compensation for Nationalization: The Provision in the European Energy Charter’ in 
Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. 386. Oscar Schachter, ‘Compensation 
for Expropriation’ [1984] 78 American Journal of International Law 121. Pp. 121-122. 
Lee A. O’Connor, ‘The International Law of Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property: 
The Compensation Requirement and the Role of the Taking State’ [1983] 6 Loyola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 355. P. 356. Eduardo J. de 
Aréchaga, ‘State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property‘ [1978] 
11 New York University of International Law and Politics 179. P. 179-180. Rudolf Dolzer, 
‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’ [1981] 75 American 
Journal of International Law 553. P. 553. Burns H. Weston, ‘The Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth’ [1981] 75 
American Journal of International Law 437. Pp. 437-439. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 
Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
12/4/1977, [1981] 20 International Legal Materials 1. P. 76.
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advocated by capital exporting States.466 Article 13 ECT contains four cumulative 
conditions that have to be satisfied for an expropriation to be lawful, namely:
1) The expropriation must be in the public interest;
Given the broad meaning, this element is rarely contested by investors and even 
if, tribunals usually grant States a wide margin of discretion to determine what 
constitutes ‘public interest’ in their respective jurisdictions.467
2) Not discriminatory;
Expropriatory measures should not be discriminatory by according different 
treatment to various investors without a reasonable justification.
3) Carried out under due process of law;
This requirement ‘demands an actual and substantive legal procedure for a 
foreign investor to raise its claims against the depriving actions already taken or 
about to be taken against it.’468
4) And accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.
The compensation requirement contains three elements.469 Prompt refers to a 
temporal aspect, an investor should not have to wait years for its compensation. 
Adequate refers to a quantum element, an investor has to receive the ‘fair market 
value’ of the investment as becomes evident from Art. 13 ECT. Effective refers to 
a functional element, meaning that an investor should be granted compensation 
466. Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ [1990] 24 The International Lawyer 
655. P. 670.
467. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 99-100.
468. Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/18, 2010. Para. 395. Award of the Tribunal, ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC 
& ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 
2006. Para. 435.
469. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 
2016). P. 192.
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in a currency that is actually of use to it. This implies that compensation should be 
granted in a freely convertible currency that can be repatriated to the home State.
It has been said that the adoption of this standard in the ECT in the early 1990’s 
is of special significance because of the multilateral nature of the ECT, which 
includes the participation of many former Communist States that had fiercely 
opposed the standard only years earlier.470 This overhaul is partially related to 
economics: autarkic self-dependency policies in many Second and Third World 
countries failed utterly, forcing these countries to compete for FDI to revive their 
economy.471 This enhanced the bargaining power of capital exporting States that 
were now able to set the terms.
Currently, provisions on expropriation in IIA’s are relatively uniform and resemble 
the ECT’s provision.472
Recent innovations in IIA’s related to the drafting of expropriation provisions 
most often concern the concept of indirect expropriation rather than direct 
expropriation. Direct expropriations have become relatively rare and, if they 
occur, are easy to identify.473 Indirect expropriations, on the other hand, are 
more problematic: they occur when a legal title may not be taken formally but 
where the consequences of a (series of) measure(s) is similar to expropriation. 
Nevertheless, most government regulations that affect foreign investors do not 
constitute indirect expropriations and are thus non-compensable. However, 
drawing the exact line between non-compensable government regulation and 
470. Patrick M. Norton, ‘Back to the Future: Expropriation and the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 366-367, 375-377. Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, ‘Compensation for Nationalization: The Provision in the European Energy 
Charter’ in Thomas Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for 
Investment & Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). Pp. 386-393.
471. Patrick M. Norton, ‘Back to the Future: Expropriation and the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment 
& Trade (Kluwer Law International 1996). P. 375.
472. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 
2016). P. 192. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties 
(Cambridge University Press 2014). Pp. 232-233. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 99-101. For 
examples of treaties that deviate from the standard expropriation formula, see: Article 7, 
Brazil Model BIT, 2015. The Brazilian Model BIT only provides protection against direct 
expropriation, and not against indirect expropriation.
473. Ibid. P. 230. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards 
of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 151.
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indirect expropriation is difficult since many IIA’s do not contain guidance on 
this matter. This was acknowledged by a tribunal in the Saluka v. the Czech 
Republic case:
“[…] international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive 
and definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered 
“permissible” and “commonly accepted” as falling within the police 
or regulatory power of States and, thus, non-compensable. In other 
words, it yet has to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line 
between non-compensable regulation on the one hand, and, on the 
other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors 
of their investment and are thus unlawful and compensable in 
international law.”474
Annexes to expropriation provisions in various recent IIA’s try to respond to 
these needs by providing more guidance on where to draw this line.475 These 
474. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. the Czech Republic, PCA, 17/3/2006. Para. 263.
475. Annex 8-A, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Annex 9-B, Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 08/03/2018, entered into 
force 30/12/2018). Annex B.13(1), Canada Model BIT 2004 and Annex B, US Model BIT 
2012 contain similar clauses and have made it into the following BITs: Annex I, Agreement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Hong Kong) (adopted 10/02/2016, entered into force 06/09/2016). 
Annex B, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Latvia) 
(adopted 05/05/2009, entered into force 24/11/2011). Annex B.10, Agreement Between 
Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Mali) (adopted 
28/11/2014, entered into force 28/11/2014). Annex B.13(1), Agreement Between Canada 
and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-
Peru) (adopted 14/11/2006, entered into force 20/06/2007). Annex B.10, Agreement 
Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Senegal) (adopted 27/11/2014, entered into force 05/08/2016). 
Annex B.10, Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Serbia) (adopted 01/09/2014, entered into 
force 27/04/2015). Annex A, Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Slovakia) (adopted 20/07/2010, 
entered into force 14/03/2012). Annex B, Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) (adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 
01/11/2006). Annex B, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, 
entered into force 01/01/2012).
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innovations, however, should not be considered as signs of changed perceptions 
on the notion of private property and the protection thereof, but should rather be 
considered as responses to deficiencies in existing IIA’s that lead to unexpected 
or undesirable outcomes of investment cases.476 Therefore, they contain more 
guidance on where to draw the line between non-compensable governmental 
regulation and indirect expropriation without altering the conditions that have to 
be met for an expropriation to be lawful.
The debate in international law in relation to expropriation has thus moved from 
the issues of compensation and the method of judicial review to the issue of 
whether or not a taking has actually occurred.477 In relation to the former debate, 
the ECT is very unequivocal: compensation is required and affected investors 
can invoke the ECT’s ISDS provision to settle any disputes which, at the time of 
conclusion in 1994, represented a major shift in policy of primarily the former 
Communist contracting parties of the ECT. In relation to the latter debate, the 
ECT is clearly lacking any textual guidance. Nevertheless, would the ECT be 
concluded today it is not unimaginable that the ECT’s expropriation provision 
would be supplemented with an interpretive annex that is similar to the annexes 
contained in recent IIA’s.
The following sections will describe the concepts of direct and indirect 
expropriation by reference to arbitral practice. Also, it will be analyzed how the 
recent treaty innovations relate to arbitral practice.
5.10.1.1. Direct Expropriation
It has been said that cases of direct expropriation have become rare in recent 
years, although they still occur from time to time.478 As recognized by the 
NAFTA tribunal in the Feldman v. Mexico case, if they do occur then they are 
relative easy to recognize: ‘governmental authorities take over a mine or factory, 
476. An example of such an outcome is the Metalclad v. Mexico case: Award, Metalclad v. the 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 30/8/2000.
477. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 152-153. Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press 
2004). P. 344.
478. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). 
P. 296. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 971. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect 
Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford 
University Press 2008). P. 151. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 234.
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depriving the investor of all meaningful benefits of ownership and control.’479 
According to Kriebaum, ‘the transfer of title is the decisive criterion to distinguish 
a direct expropriation from an indirect one.’480 Also, a loss of control over the 
investment can be considered as a sign of direct expropriation.481 One of the 
reasons that direct expropriations are rare these days is the perception that it 
may be detrimental to the investment climate of the host State.482
5.10.1.2. Indirect Expropriation
Nowadays, the most common form of expropriation is indirect expropriation, 
which usually does not involve the transfer of title or loss of control over an 
investment, but where the ownership rights associated with an investment erode 
by State interference(s).483 As stated by Hoffmann, ‘[i]ndirect expropriations 
appear in a great multiplicity and although the general concept is not new, 
the unanswered questions surrounding them are manifold.’484 Perhaps the 
main contested issue and most difficult question to answer in cases involving 
indirect expropriation is where to draw the line between legitimate government 
regulation on the one hand and indirect expropriation on the other hand. After 
all, even if it is obvious that the government is acting in the pursuit of a public 
interest this ‘cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that no expropriation 
has occurred.’485 Also, most IIA’s require a ‘public purpose’ for an expropriation 
to be lawful, which implies that the existence of such purpose alone cannot lead 
479. Award, Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, 2002. Para. 100.
480. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 971. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in 
August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). 
P. 151.
481. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
294.
482. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 971. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in 
August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). 
P. 151. Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward 
Elgar 2016). P. 234.
483. UNCTAD, Taking of Property – UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements (United Nations, 2000). P. 20. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in 
August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). 
P. 151.
484. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 152.
485. Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 1000.
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to the conclusion that no expropriation took place, since it is a requirement of 
lawfulness.486
Because investment tribunals have adopted various approaches and nuances to 
these approaches when examining claims of indirect expropriation, this section 
will merely outline the two main doctrines that have been adopted in practice.487 
These are the so-called ‘sole effects doctrine’ and the ‘police powers doctrine.’
i. Sole Effects Doctrine
On the basis of the sole effects doctrine, the effect of the contested measures on 
the investment is the most important criterion and in some cases even the only 
one.488 Dolzer wrote in 2002 that ‘[n]o one will seriously doubt that the severity of 
the impact upon the legal status, and the practical impact on the owner’s ability 
to use and enjoy his property, will be a central factor in determining whether 
a regulatory measure effects a taking.’489 Therefore, Dolzer believes that the 
controversial issue is merely ‘the question of whether the focus on the effect will 
be the only and exclusive relevant criterion (“sole effect doctrine”), or whether the 
purpose and the context of the governmental measure may also enter into the 
takings analysis.’490 The sole effects doctrine has been adopted by the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) and various tribunals constituted under IIA’s.491
486. Id.
487. Ben Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under 
International Law’ [2008] 15 Australian Journal of International Law 267. P. 267. It is 
sometimes suggested that more than two approaches have been applied in practice. 
See for example: Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 1006-1010. Krista N. 
Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). Pp. 
242-256.
488. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 156. Anders Nilsson & Oscar 
Englesson, ‘Inconsistent Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Is an Appeals Court 
Needed?’ [2013] 30 Journal of International Arbitration 561. P. 565.
489. Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’ [2002] 11 New York 
University Environmental Law Journal 64. P. 79.
490. Ibid. Pp. 79-80.
491. See for example: Interlocutory Award, Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, 
Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc. v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Bank Omran, Bank Mellat, Bank Markazi, Award No. ITL 32-24-1, 4 Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal Reports 1985. P. 154. Award, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. 
TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Civil Aviation Organization, Plan and Budget Organization, Iranian Air Force, Ministry of 
Defence, Bank Melli, Bank Sakhteman, Mercantile Bank of Iran and Holland, Award No. 
141-7-2, 6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1986. Pp. 225-226. Award, Técnicas 
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For example, the NAFTA Metalclad v. Mexico tribunal held:
“Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure 
or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, 
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property 
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant 
part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host 
State.”492
The Pope & Talbot v. Canada tribunal stated that the required threshold for 
interference in order to constitute indirect expropriation is the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ of property.493 The ICSID Ad-hoc Annulment Committee in the 
Mitchell v. Congo case held that mere reference to the effect of a measure is 
practice amongst the majority of arbitrators.494 In this case the ICSID tribunal had 
applied the sole effect doctrine which, according to the Annulment Committee, 
was within the powers of the tribunal to do so.495
Despite the fact that tribunals have used different terminology in the application 
of the sole effect doctrine, the body of case law adopting the doctrine provides 
‘an authoritative basis’ for the doctrine according to Mostafa.496
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, 2003. Paras. 115-116. Award, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008. Para. 463.
492. Award, Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, 2000. Para. 103.
493. Interim Award, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2000. Para. 
102.
494. Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, 2006. Para. 53.
495. Ibid. Para. 54. Extracts of the Award, Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, 2004. Paras. 70-71.
496. Ben Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under 
International Law’ [2008] 15 Australian Journal of International Law 267. P. 287. Ursula 
Kriebaum, ‘Expropriation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A 
Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 984-985.
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ii. Police Powers Doctrine
On the basis of the police powers doctrine, a measure that is taken by the 
authorities in the exercise of its police powers will not give rise to the liability 
of that State on the basis of expropriation if certain requirements are complied 
with.497 This doctrine was already adopted by the IUSCT in 1989 in the Too v. 
Greater Modesto Insurance case, where the IUSCT held that a ‘State is not 
responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting 
from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted 
as within the police power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is not 
designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the State or to sell it at 
a distress price.’498
The doctrine was applied in various NAFTA cases, such as Feldman v. Mexico, 
Methanex v. the United States, and Chemtura v. Canada.499 The Chemtura 
tribunal argued the following:
“[…] the Tribunal considers in any event that the measures 
challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the 
Respondent’s police powers. As discussed in detail in connection 
with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the PMRA took measures within 
its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the 
increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for 
human health and the environment. A measure adopted under such 
circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers and, 
as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.”500
The doctrine has also been adopted outside NAFTA, for example in the Saluka 
v. Czech Republic case, where the tribunal stated:
497. Ben Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under 
International Law’ [2008] 15 Australian Journal of International Law 267. Pp. 272-273.
498. Award, Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and the United States of 
America, Award No. 460-880-2, 23 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1994. Para. 
26.
499. Award, Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/1, 2002. Paras. 103-104. Final Award, Methanex Corporation v. The United 
States of America, UNCITRAL, 2005. Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7. Award, Chemtura 
Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2010. Para. 266.
500. Award, Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2010. Para. 266.
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“[…] the principle that a State does not commit an expropriation 
and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien 
investor when it adopts general regulations that are “commonly 
accepted as within the police power of States” forms part of 
customary international law today. There is ample case law in 
support of this proposition. As the tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. 
USA said recently in its final award, “[i]t is a principle of customary 
international law that, where economic injury results from a bona fide 
regulation within the police powers of a State, compensation is not 
required.”501
The El Paso v. Argentina tribunal, which applied the doctrine, nevertheless 
recognized that unreasonable measures may constitute indirect expropriation if 
they result in the ‘neutralisation of the foreign investors property rights.’502 Other 
limitations may be related to the legitimate expectations of the investor or a lack 
of proportionality of the contested measures.
The argument put forward by investment tribunals that adopt the police powers 
doctrine can be summarized as acknowledging that under international law, 
States are allowed to adopt measures that are detrimental to investors as long 
as they are applied in a non-discriminatory manner with a public purpose and 
provided that the measure is enacted in accordance with due process of law.
5.10.1.3. Interpretive Annexes in Recent IIA’s
The difficulty concerning indirect expropriation is thus primarily where to draw 
the line between non-compensable government regulation and compensable 
indirect expropriation. To provide more clarity to investment tribunals, several 
recent IIA’s contain interpretive annexes that contain guidelines in this matter.503 
501. Partial Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 2006. Para. 
262. See also: Award, El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 2011. Para. 240.
502. Award, El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15, 2011. Para. 241. See also: Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., 
LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, 2006. Para. 195.
503. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 166-167. Annex 8-A, 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) (adopted 
30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Annex B.13(1), Canada Model BIT 2004 and 
Annex B, US Model BIT 2012 contain similar clauses and have made it into the following 
BITs: Annex I, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
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These, often comparable but not identical annexes, provide for something along 
the following lines:
“The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a 
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation 
requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that takes into 
consideration, among other factors:
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, 
although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a 
Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment 
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures of a Party;
(c) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes 
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(d) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their 
object, context and intent.”504
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Hong Kong) (adopted 10/02/2016, 
entered into force 06/09/2016). Annex B, Agreement Between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Latvia) (adopted 05/05/2009, entered into force 24/11/2011). 
Annex B.10, Agreement Between Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Canada-Mali) (adopted 28/11/2014, entered into force 28/11/2014). 
Annex B.13(1), Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Peru) (adopted 14/11/2006, entered into force 
20/06/2007). Annex B.10, Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of 
Senegal for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Senegal) (adopted 
27/11/2014, entered into force 05/08/2016). Annex B.10, Agreement Between Canada 
and the Republic of Serbia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-
Serbia) (adopted 01/09/2014, entered into force 27/04/2015). Annex A, Agreement 
Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Canada-Slovakia) (adopted 20/07/2010, entered into force 14/03/2012). Annex B, Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) 
(adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 01/11/2006). Annex B, Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United 
States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, entered into force 01/01/2012).
504. Annex 8-A(2), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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Also, these annexes contain the following presumption:505
“For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the 
impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of 
its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory 
measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”506
It has been said that interpretive annexes on the meaning of indirect expropriation 
can be traced back to jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court regarding 
‘regulatory takings’ and also codify the police powers doctrine, which would 
greatly enhance the legitimacy of this doctrine.507 Also, these provisions 
emphasize that a mere loss of value of the investment does not mean that an 
expropriation has occurred by stating that ‘the sole fact that a measure or series 
of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred.’
As said, these annexes are by no means identical. For example, both the US and 
Canada Model BIT’s contain the paragraphs quoted above, which incorporates 
505. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 167.
506. Annex 8-A(3), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
507. Award, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. 
v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, 2016. Para. 300. August 
Reinisch, ‘The Interpretation of International Investment Agreements’ in Marc Bungenberg 
et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 391. Jonathan 
Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). Pp. 263-270. Matthew C. Porterfield, ‘International Expropriation Rules and 
Federalism’ [2004] 23 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 3. Pp. 42-43. Céline Lévesque 
& Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Evolution of IIA Practice in Canada and the United States’ in 
Armand de Mestral et al (eds.), Improving International Investment Agreements (Routledge 
2013). P. 36. Judgment, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, US Supreme 
Court, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Pp. 124-125. Judgment, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
US Supreme Court, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). P. 175. Award, Marvin Feldman v. the United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 2002. 98. Partial Award, S.D. Myers Inc. 
v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 2000. Paras. 280-283. Award, Generation Ukraine 
v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 2003. Paras. 20.34-20.35. Award, Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1, 2006. 
Para. 176. Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Methanex Corporation 
v. the United States of American, UNCITRAL, 2005. Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7. Partial 
Award, Saluka Investments B.V. v. the Czech Republic, PCA, 2006. Para. 262.
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US Supreme Court jurisprudence and the police powers doctrine.508 The IIA’s 
concluded by the EU, and the Netherlands Model BIT 2019 and the Belgium-
Luxembourg Model BIT 2019, also codify the sole effects doctrine.509 Given the 
fact that these annexes were intended to bring more clarity to the concept of 
‘indirect expropriation’, codifying alternative standards of review might not be 
the most clarifying approach.
As evidenced by the Philip Morris v. Uruguay case, these annexes can influence 
the outcome of investment cases based on older treaties that do not yet contain 
this new practice. The tribunal interpreted the expropriation provision of the 
applicable BIT by reference to new treaty practice, in this case the clarification 
on expropriation of CETA.510 The Philip Morris tribunal was of the opinion that the 
annex reflected ‘the position under general international law.’511
5.10.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Although the threshold to establish an (in)direct expropriation is rather high and 
successful claims are therefore rare, Art. 13 is nevertheless often invoked in 
ECT arbitration. The body of jurisprudence is therefore voluminous. To make it 
comprehensible, this section will first provide an overview of cases concerning 
direct expropriation, followed by indirect expropriation. Finally, the criteria to make 
an expropriation lawful will be discussed.
5.10.2.4. Direct Expropriation
Only a few ECT tribunals have addressed direct expropriation. A case where 
the tribunal accepted a claim of direct expropriation is the Kardassopoulos v. 
Georgia case.
The tribunal established that ‘a classic case of direct expropriation’ had taken 
place.512 In this case, claimants jointly owned a company that had formed a joint 
508. Annex B.13(1), Canada Model BIT, 2004. Annex B, US Model BIT, 2012.
509. Article 12(3), Netherlands Model BIT, 2019. Article 1(b), Belgium-Luxembourg Model 
BIT, 2019. Annex 8-A (1)(b), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European 
Union-Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Annex 1(1), EU-
Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 19/10/2018, entrance into force still 
pending). Annex 4 (1)(b), EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (European Union-
Vietnam) (adopted 30/06/2019, entrance into force still pending).
510. Award, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, 2016. Para. 300.
511. Ibid. Para. 301.
512. Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/18, 2010. Para. 387.
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venture – called GTI – with a Georgian SOE. In 1993, this joint venture obtained 
a 30-year concession over Georgian oil pipelines.513 However, three years later 
the concession would be terminated by a Cabinet Decree and some of GTI’s 
rights would be turned over to a consortium of international oil companies, 
essentially because this consortium could offer ‘a better deal’ to the Georgian 
government.514 Demands for compensation by the foreign investors were rejected 
by Georgian authorities in a domestic review procedure.515
Under these circumstances, the tribunal established that an unlawful direct 
expropriation had taken place. Also, the tribunal found that this expropriation 
was not ‘an exercise of the State’s bona fide police powers.’516
5.10.2.5. Indirect Expropriation
A much more contested issue in ECT arbitration is indirect expropriation. In 
practice, this concept has been interpreted and applied quite consistently. Most 
tribunals have required a ‘substantial deprivation’ of the attributes of ownership 
to establish indirect expropriation.
An example of a successful indirect expropriation claim can be found in the 
Yukos cases. The former shareholders of the Yukos Oil Company had argued 
that the imposition of excessive tax bills by the Russian authorities had driven 
the company into bankruptcy. According to the tribunal, ‘the primary objective 
of the Russian Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos 
and appropriate its valuable assets.’517 Since the Russian authorities had not 
‘explicitly expropriated Yukos or the holdings of its shareholders’ the measures 
amounted to indirect expropriation that was unlawful since the four cumulative 
conditions of Art. 13 had not been satisfied.518
The other claims of indirect expropriation were less successful. Nevertheless, 
the interpretations of the tribunals in these cases are of interest. From a 
513. Ibid. Para. 95.
514. Ibid. Para. 393.
515. Ibid. Paras. 205-207.
516. Ibid. Para. 387.
517. Final Award, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 2014. Paras. 756 & 1579. Final Award, Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/
AA227, 2014. Paras. 756 & 1579. Final Award, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The 
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 2005-05/AA228, 2014. Paras. 756 & 1579.
518. Ibid. Para. 1580.
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review of arbitral practice in this regard it appears that most tribunals adopt 
an interpretation of the sole effects doctrine by emphasizing the necessity of 
a substantial deprivation of the attributes of ownership to establish indirect 
expropriation. This can be seen in Nykomb v. Latvia, Plama v. Bulgaria, Liman 
Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan, Electrabel v. Hungary, AES v. Hungary, Mohammad 
Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, Mamidoil v. Albania, Charanne v. Spain, Isolux 
v. Spain, and Foresight v. Spain.519
Less unequivocal in laying down the applicable standard of review were the 
tribunals in Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic and Blusun v. Italy.520 Although the latter 
tribunal did refer to cases where the sole effects doctrine was adopted, it held 
that in the case at hand:
“[…] the Respondent, by non-discriminatory laws ostensibly passed 
in the public interest, significantly changed the terms laid down in 
the Third Energy Account for investment in the green energy sector. 
These changes, combined with operational decisions made by the 
investors and the lack of prearranged Project financing, meant that 
the Project remained radically incomplete, never qualified for feed-in 
tariffs, and inevitably went into liquidation. As a general matter the 
519. Arbitral Award, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, 2003. Para. 4.3.1. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/24, 2008. Paras. 191-193. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil 
BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 
2010. Para. 293. Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. 
v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 2012. Paras. 6.53-6.64. Award, AES 
Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 14.3.1. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 
2009. Paras. 279-281. Award, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. 
v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, 2015. Paras. 559-572. Unofficial 
Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, SCC 
Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 456-467. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. 
Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. Paras. 835-839. Final Award, Foresight 
Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy 
System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A 
v. Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 429. Krista N. Schefer, 
International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 2016). P. 242.
520. Arbitral Award, Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. (126/2003), 2005. 
P. 77. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Paras. 398-400.
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situation was not analogous, still less tantamount, to expropriation of 
the Project by Italy.”521
The emphasis on the public interest and the fact that the measures were applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner recalls elements of the police powers doctrine.
5.10.2.6. Criteria of Lawfulness
Since in both the Yukos cases and the Kardassopoulos v. Georgia case the 
tribunals held that an expropriation had taken place, it was necessary in these 
cases to analyze whether the expropriation was lawful. As held by the Liman 
Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan tribunal, for an expropriation to be lawful the conditions 
of Art. 13(1) have to be satisfied.522
The Yukos tribunal held, firstly, that it was ‘profoundly questionable’ whether 
the expropriation was in the public interest.523 Although the SOE Rosneft would 
eventually take over much of Yukos’ assets ‘virtually cost-free’, that ‘is not the 
same as saying that it was in the public interest of the economy, polity and 
population of the Russian Federation.’524 Secondly, the tribunal also believed 
that the expropriation ‘may well have been discriminatory’ since the treatment 
accorded to Yukos was different than the treatment accorded to other Russian 
oil companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom.525 In the end, the tribunal did not 
fully decide on this matter. Thirdly, the expropriation of Yukos was not ‘carried 
out under due process of law’ for many reasons, such as the ‘harsh treatment’ 
accorded to various Yukos officials, ‘the mistreatment of counsel of Yukos’, and 
the fact that the ‘pace of the legal proceedings’ did not ‘comport with the due 
process of law.’526 The tribunal was of the opinion that ‘Russian courts bent to 
the will of Russian executive authorities to bankrupt Yukos, assign its assets to a 
State-controlled company, and incarcerate a man who gave signs of becoming 
a political competitor.’527 Finally, the tribunal concluded that it was ‘incontestable’ 
that the respondent did not compensate the investors for the expropriation.528 
521. Ibid. Para. 401.
522. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 293.
523. Final Award, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, 2014. Para. 1581.
524. Id.
525. Ibid. Para. 1582.
526. Ibid. Para. 1583.
527. Id.
528. Ibid. Para. 1584.
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Since the requirements of Art. 13 ECT of a lawful expropriation were not met by 
Russia, it was in breach of its international obligations and, hence, liable under 
international law.529
In the Kardassopoulos case, the tribunal started by emphasizing that demands 
for compensation by the foreign investors were rejected by Georgian authorities 
in a domestic review procedure.530 The tribunal therefore quickly noted that 
it was ‘undisputed that the Georgian Government never compensated Mr. 
Kardassopoulos for the taking of GTI’s rights, let alone met the standard of 
“prompt, adequate and effective compensation” as prescribed in Article 13(1).’531
In addition, the tribunal was of the opinion that the expropriation had not taken 
place in accordance with due process of law.532 According to the tribunal, due 
process of law in the context of expropriation, demands:
“[…] an actual and substantive legal procedure for a foreign investor 
to raise its claims against the depriving actions already taken or 
about to be taken against it. Some basic legal mechanisms, such 
as reasonable advance notice, a fair hearing and an unbiased and 
impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute, are expected 
to be readily available and accessible to the investor to make such 
legal procedure meaningful. In general, the legal procedure must be 
of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance within 
a reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims 
heard. If no legal procedure of such nature exists at all, the argument 
that “the actions are taken under due process of law” rings hollow. 
And that is exactly what the Tribunal finds in the present case.”533
The tribunal labelled the process accorded to claimants as ‘opaque’ and 
especially criticized Georgia for failing to ‘grant Mr. Kardassopoulos a 
529. Ibid. Paras. 1584-1585.
530. Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 
2010. Paras. 205-207.
531. Ibid. Para. 389.
532. Ibid. Para. 404.
533. Ibid. Para. 395. The tribunal quotes: Award of the Tribunal, ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC 
& ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 
2006. Para. 435.
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reasonable chance within a reasonable time to have his claim heard following 
the expropriation’.534
The public interest requirement was satisfied in this case according to the Tribunal, 
which also acknowledged that the State ‘is entitled to a measure of deference 
in this regard.’535 The tribunal also did not consider that the expropriation had 
taken place in a discriminatory manner.536 Regarding the non-discrimination 
requirement, the tribunal held that discriminatory intent is not required to satisfy 
this criterion.537
In conclusion, any expropriation claim will thus be analyzed as follows: first, the 
tribunal will examine whether an expropriation has taken place. In ECT cases 
concerning indirect expropriation, the application of the sole effects doctrine in 
some form seems to be the prevailing method to distinguish expropriatory from 
non-expropriatory measures. Secondly, if it is established that expropriation has 
taken place the tribunal will examine the conditions to determine whether the 
expropriation was lawful.
5.10.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The jurisprudence on Art. 13 ECT shows that the threshold of liability is high: 
an investor has to be deprived of its investment, the value and control thereof, 
to a substantial or significant degree. Reduced profitability in itself does not 
suffice. This means that for RES investors that are confronted with governmental 
measures that reduce the economic viability of their investment, by reducing FIT’s 
for example, a claim based on expropriation may not be credible, as is already 
shown by the Charanne v. Spain, Isolux v. Spain, Novenergia v. Spain, Foresight 
v. Spain, 9REN Holding v. Spain and Blusun v. Italy cases.538
In these cases, the control and ownership over the investment is often in no way 
impaired despite the fact that these measures may affect the economic viability of 
an investment. In that sense, the currently pending RES cases against Italy, Spain, 
and the Czech Republic have much in common with the ECT cases brought by 
534. Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 
2010. Paras. 397 & 404.
535. Ibid. Para. 391.
536. Ibid. Para. 393.
537. Id.
538. See for example: Award, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/15, 2019. Paras. 369-372.
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   274 04/12/2019   11:36:22
275
Investment Protection in Part III of the Energy Charter Treaty
Electrabel and AES against Hungary. In these cases, Hungary terminated PPA’s 
which led to reduced income for the electricity generators, in the same way as 
reduced FIT’s lead to reduced revenues for RES investors. However, the ECT 
tribunals refused to label the termination of PPA’s as expropriation because it did 
not sufficiently deprive the investors of their investment and it left the ownership 
rights of the investors over their electricity generation facilities completely intact.539 
A similar line of reasoning can be applied in the RES cases as well.
In Charanne v. Spain, for example, the claimants argued that reduced government 
support had such a ‘brutal impact on the profitability of the activity’ of their 
investment that it constituted ‘an expropriaton of a substantial part of the value 
and of the returns on the investment.’540 Despite the fact that the measures did 
not affect the ownership of their investment, the claimants still believed that the 
threshold of liability was met since ‘total destruction of the investment or loss of 
control is not required […] a significant interference with the enjoyment of the 
investment or its profits can be enough.’541
Applying the sole effects doctrine to the facts of the case, the tribunal first pointed 
out that the governmental measures that had the effect of reducing support to 
PV facilities did not affect the property rights of the investors since their shares 
in a Spanish corporation, T-Solar, were not affected or limited.542 Furthermore, 
the company in which the claimants had invested was still making a profit.
While the tribunal did concur with the claimants that a loss of value of an 
investment or loss of control over it may constitute indirect expropriation, the 
loss of value ‘has to be of such a magnitude as to amount to a deprivation of 
property.’543 This would only be the case when the value of the investment has 
been destroyed.544 In the case at hand the tribunal accepted that the measures 
539. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Para. 14.3.2. Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2012. Para. 6.64.
540. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 456.
541. Id.
542. Ibid. Paras. 460-462.
543. Ibid. Para. 464.
544. Id.
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may have had a ‘serious economic and financial’ impact, but this did not destroy 
the value of the investment.545 The claim was consequently rejected.
Furthermore, one may question the likelihood that States adopt measures that 
would meet the high threshold of liability of expropriation in the RES sector. After 
all, the exploitation of RES does not involve the same sensitive considerations 
as the exploitation of hydrocarbons: contrary to RES, hydrocarbons are finite. In 
addition, it is difficult to claim ownership over RES whereas this is an important 
issue in relation to hydrocarbons. Neither can it be said that the exploitation 
of most RES is accompanied by the same detrimental external effects as the 
exploitation of hydrocarbons.
Perhaps the main exception to this in the RES sector is hydropower. The potential 
of hydropower in a State is often limited due to the fact that the number of 
favorable sites is limited. Also, the exploitation of hydropower can have very 
significant external effects for both humans and the environment. In France, for 
example, hydropower is considered as a ‘rare natural resource.’546 In various 
countries, the exploitation of hydropower is therefore regulated by a concession 
regime.547 The duration of hydropower concessions can vary greatly, from a few 
years to an unlimited period of time.548
As the Kardassopoulos v. Georgia case illustrates, the termination of a 
concession can ‘present a classic case of expropriation’ under the ECT.549 In 
addition, contractual rights may also be protected under the ECT if the State 
terminates the contract or definitively refuses to perform its obligations.550 In 
fact, that the taking of contractual rights is contrary to international law, and 
545. Ibid. Para. 466.
546. Thierry Lauriol, ‘Energy Law in France’ in Martha M. Roggenkamp et al (eds.), Energy Law 
in Europe – National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University Press 2016). P. 
542.
547. Ibid. Pp. 542-543. See also: Finn Arnesen, Ulf Hammer, Per Håkon Høisveen, Knut 
Kaasen & Dagfinn Nygaard, ‘Energy Law in Norway’ in Martha M. Roggenkamp et al 
(eds.), Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University 
Press 2016). Pp. 860-862.
548. Jean-Michel Glachant, Marcelo Saguan, Vincent Rious & Sébastien Douguet, ‘Regimes 
for Granting the Right to Use Hydropower in Europe’ (European University Institute, 2015). 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/37519/Glachant_Saguan_Rious_Douguet.
pdf?sequence=1> accessed on 13/01/2017.
549. Award, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/18, 2010. Para. 387.
550. Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. the Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case No. V (064/2008), 2009. Para. 281.
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may amount to expropriation, has been acknowledged by various international 
claims commissions, tribunals, and courts since the early 20th century.551 It is 
a widely held view that in order for the violation of a contract or concession to 
amount to an expropriation, the State has to act in its ‘public capacity’ or make 
use of its ‘public authority.’552 Also, in order to bring a successful expropriation 
claim in cases involving concessions or contracts, it is important to establish 
that the contract or concession gave rise to ‘an asset owned by the claimant to 
which monetary value can be ascribed’, since it is the asset and not so much 
the contractual source that gave rise to the expropriation claim.553
Several investment disputes, brought under various IIA’s, involved hydroelectric 
projects although not a single dispute has so far resulted in an award on the 
merits.554
Several investors have relied on the ECT in disputes involving the hydroelectric 
sector. First of all, there are the Uzan cases: various claims brought by different 
551. See for example: Decision on Merits, Rudloff Case, American-Venezuelan Mixed Claims 
Commission, 1903. P. 250. <http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_IX/113-318.pdf> accessed 
on 17/01/2017. Award of the Tribunal, Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United 
States of America), PCA Case No. 1921-01, 1922. Pp. 18 & 28. Award, Phillips Petroleum 
Company v. Iran, Award No. 425-39-2, 21 Iran-United States Claims Tribunals Reports 
1990. Para. 105. Award, Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 310-
56-3, 15 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports 1988. Para. 108. Award, Siemens 
A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 267. Case 
Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ 
Judgment, 1926, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 7 (1926). Pp. 44. Decision No. 13-E, Claim of 
Jalapa Railroad and Power Co., US-Mexican Claims Commission. As quoted in: Marjorie 
M. Whiteman, 8 Digest of International Law 1967. Pp. 908-909. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). Pp. 
126-129.
552. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). Pp. 126-129. Irmgard Marboe, ‘Valuation in Cases of Expropriation’ 
in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 
2015). Pp. 1064-1065. Decision on Jurisdiction, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, 2005. Para. 281. Award, Siemens A.G. v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 2007. Para. 253. Sentence Arbitrale, 
Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 2003. Para. 65. 
Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (“Number 2”), ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, 2004. Paras. 174-175.
553. Award, Emmis International Holding, B.V., Emmis Radio Operating, B.V., MEM Magyar 
Electronic Media Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/2, 2014. Para. 169.
554. Attila Tanzi, ‘International Law and Foreign Investment in Hydroelectric Industry: A 
Multidimensional Analysis’ [2016] 18 International Community Law Review 183. P. 188.
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companies and Cem Uzan against Turkey.555 All of these cases, where the claims 
added up to almost USD 20 bln, were rejected on jurisdictional grounds.
In all the Uzan cases, the claimants argued – unrightfully so – that they were 
shareholders of two Turkish companies called CEAS and Kepez.556 These 
companies were progressively privatized between the 1950’s and 1990’s and 
were involved in the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity 
in various regions of southern Turkey.557 The companies were amongst the largest 
hydroelectric companies in Turkey.558
In 1998 both companies entered into new concession agreements with the Turkish 
government, on the basis of which both companies were granted the right to 
operate the companies for 60 years, until 2058.559 In 2003 the concessions were 
terminated and the assets were seized by the Turkish authorities, the claimants 
argued that compensation had never been paid for this direct expropriation.560 
Since the claimants in all the Uzan cases failed to provide evidence that they 
555. See: Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/8, 2011. Award, Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, 2009. Award, Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. 
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, 2009. Cem Uzan also brought a 
claim at the SCC, which he allegedly lost. See: Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Latest Uzan v. Turkey 
Arbitration Fails, as SCC Tribunal looks past Claimant’s Permanent Residence in France 
and Dwells on ‘Domestic’ Origins of Disputed Investment’ (IA Reporter, 2016). <http://
www.iareporter.com/articles/latest-uzan-v-turkey-arbitration-fails-as-scc-tribunal-looks-
past-claimants-permanent-residence-in-france-and-dwells-on-domestic-origins-of-dispu-
ted-investment/> accessed on 17/01/2017.aganization, Iranian Air Force, be applied in the 
Solar Panel cases as well.Hollandand Budget Organization, Iranian Air Force,
556. Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
2011. Paras. 88-97 & 530-536. Award, Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, 2009. Paras. 3 & 149. Award, Europe Cement 
Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, 2009. 
Paras. 2 & 120.
557. Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
2011. Para. 90.
558. Stephen Jagusch & Jeffrey Sullivan, ‘Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty: 
Recent Decisions and a Look to the Future’ in Graham Coop et al (eds.), Energy Dispute 
Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty (JurisNet 2011). P. 
77.
559. Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
2011. Para. 92.
560. Ibid. Para. 95. Stephen Jagusch & Jeffrey Sullivan, ‘Arbitration Under the Energy Charter 
Treaty: Recent Decisions and a Look to the Future’ in Graham Coop et al (eds.), Energy 
Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty (JurisNet 
2011). P. 77.
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acquired shares in CEAS and Kepez before the expropriation took place, all 
claims were rejected for a lack of jurisdiction.561
Secondly, there is currently one ECT hydro dispute pending against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.562 Although little information is available in relation to this case, it 
allegedly concerns the termination of a concession to construct hydroelectric 
facilities that were not built.563
Another hydro case is Impregilo v. Pakistan, based on the Italy-Pakistan BIT. 
In this case, the Italian company Impregilo participated in a joint venture 
called GBC, which was incorporated under Swiss law.564 The purpose of the 
joint venture was to participate in tenders in Pakistan for the construction of 
hydroelectric facilities.565 On the basis of two contracts, concluded between 
GBC and the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority in 1995, GBC 
was supposed to construct a barrage that would control the flow of the Indus 
River and a 52 kilometer channel that would convey water from the barrage to a 
powerhouse.566 Completion of the projects was delayed due to various obstacles 
created by Pakistan and unforeseen conditions in the project.567 Attempts to 
settle the dispute in accordance with the contracts were frustrated by Pakistan.568
Amongst other claims, Impregilo argued that the failure of Pakistan to ‘honor the 
Contracts had destroyed the value of Impregilo’s investment’ in violation of the 
BIT’s expropriation provision.569 The tribunal would establish, however, that ‘only 
measures taken by Pakistan in the exercise of its sovereign power (“puissance 
561. Award, Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
2011. Paras. 88-97 & 530-536. Award, Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, 2009. Paras. 3 & 149.. Award, Europe Cement 
Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, 2009. 
Paras. 2 & 120.
562. Viaduct d.o.o. Portorož, Vladimir Zevnik and Boris Goljevšček v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/16/36.
563. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is Hit with Treaty-Based Claim over 
Hydroelectric Project’ (IA Reporter, 2016). <http://www.iareporter.com/articles/bosnia-
herzegovina-is-hit-with-treaty-based-claim-over-hydroelectric-project/> accessed on 
17/01/2017.
564. Decision on Jurisdiction, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/3, 2005. Para. 10.
565. Ibid. Para. 8.
566. Ibid. Para. 13.
567. Ibid. Para. 15.
568. Ibid. Para. 22.
569. Ibid. Para. 34.
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publique”), and not decisions taken in the implementation or performance of 
the Contracts, may be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
expropriation.’570 This case would not reach the merits stage since it was settled 
in 2005 when Pakistan agreed to pay USD 98 mln to GBC.571
Another attempt by an investor to claim damages in a hydro case on the basis of 
expropriation is the NAFTA case AbitibiBowater v. Canada. Although this case 
would not reach the merits stage either, the investor obtained a settlement in 
its favor of USD 130 mln, making it one of the largest settlements under NAFTA 
Chapter 11.572 AbitibiBowater, a forestry company, owned and operated several 
hydroelectric facilities and decided to close one of its plants in Canada and lay 
off a significant number of workers.573 As a reaction, the local authorities enacted 
legislation that expropriated a significant number of AbitibiBowater’s assets, 
including water- and hydroelectric contracts.574 According to AbitibiBowater itself, 
the effect of the Act of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador was the 
‘immediate expropriation of most of AbitibiBowater interests in the Province.’575
If the AbitibiBowater case had made it to the merits stage it is quite likely that a 
tribunal would have found that the legislative measures taken by the Province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador in its ‘Abitibi – Consolidated Rights and Asset Act’ 
amounted to expropriation.576 After all, not only did these measures expropriate 
physical assets of the investor, they also cancelled water rights associated with 
570. Ibid. Para. 281.
571. Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding, Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, 2005. Para. 4.
572. Statement on AbitibiBowater Settlement, 24-8-2010. <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0235.pdf> accessed on 13/01/2017. Bertrand Marotte, ‘Ottawa 
Pays AbitibiBowater $130-million for Expropriation’ (The Globe and Mail, 2010). <http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/ottawa-pays-abitibibowater-130-million-
for-expropriation/article1378193/> accessed on 17/01/2017.
573. See: Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, 2009.
574. Attila Tanzi, ‘International Law and Foreign Investment in Hydroelectric Industry: A 
Multidimensional Analysis’ [2016] 18 International Community Law Review 183. P. 189.
575. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, 2009. 
Para. 59.
576. See: Tab A, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, 
2009.
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hydro facilities.577 These water rights were thus cancelled by the Province, acting 
in its public authority.
Despite the lack of hydro investment cases that resulted in a final award, the fact 
that several of these cases were settled with the investor receiving a significant 
amount of damages shows the importance of the expropriation provision to RES 
investors. Nevertheless, the threshold of liability for claims based on (in)direct 
expropriation is very high, which means that investors that are merely confronted 
with measures that reduce the economic viability of their investment, which is the 
case in most currently pending ECT RES cases, probably cannot successfully 
invoke Art. 13 ECT.
5.11. Conclusion
After this extensive review of the ECT’s investment protection chapter, the fourth 
sub-question can now (partially) be answered. This question reads in full:
‘What does the current legal framework of the ECT concerning 
investment promotion and protection provide for?’
Since this chapter merely discussed the ECT’s legal framework concerning 
investment protection, I will only answer the sub-question with regards to 
investment protection.
The ECT‘s investment protection chapter resembles the characteristics of many 
investment treaties concluded in the early 1990’s: the definitions of terms that 
determine the scope of the treaty, such as those of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ 
are broad and the investment protection standards are plentiful yet usually 
undefined. The same holds true for the investment chapter of the ECT, which 
was initially based on the UK Model BIT of 1991.578 In practice, arbitral practice 
577. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, 2009. 
Paras. 41 & 61.
578. Compare Articles 18-23, Draft Treaty of the Basic Protocol to the European Energy Charter 
(20 August 1991) with Articles 2-7, 1991 UK Model BIT. The UK Model BIT was likely taken 
as inspiration simply because a member of the British delegation was the chairman of the 
working group where the ECT was being negotiated and, hence, it were the British that 
initiated the compilation of a full first draft of the treaty. See Letter from Martin Rickerd to 
Jonathan Cook (23 August 1991), which accompanied the first draft and read, ‘I enclose 
a copy of the first full draft of the Basic Protocol. I think you will agree that Andrew Young, 
our Legal Adviser, has done an excellent job in pulling together the contributions from
around Whitehall into a (remarkably concise) homogenous text.’ See also Letter from 
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has resulted in inconsistent decisions, which may adversely affect legal certainty 
in the interpretation and application of the treaty.579 Contemporary IIA’s tend to 
more clearly define comparable provisions or in some cases restrict them or 
omit them altogether. Even in comparison to the ECT’s contemporaries, some 
notable differences stand out.
· The fact that the ECT is a multilateral treaty negotiated by dozens 
of parties several of which had their own policy preferences as 
laid down in various BIT’s resulted in a treaty that encompasses 
provisions not always found in all BIT’s of participating States. A 
notable example of this is Art. 10(12) which is usually found in US 
BIT’s but uncommon in European practice.
· The emphasis on the energy sector, where long term investments 
are common, is reflected in the treaty provision setting out the 
purpose of the treaty. This reference to ‘long term’, which is not 
usually found in the text of BIT’s, could – and has – been used 
by tribunals to interpret the treaty in a teleological manner.580 In 
combination with the undefined standards of investment protection, 
this could lead to a potentially high level of investment protection.
· In a similar vein, Art. 10(1) first sentence is a provision that is 
more commonly found in the preamble rather than the operative part 
of a treaty. The fact that it refers to the notions of stability, equity, 
favorability, and transparency could equally be used to interpret 
the ECT teleologically. In comparison to recent IIA’s, this could 
then result in a relatively high level of investment protection that is 
available under the ECT.
Secretary-General Clive Jones to European Commissioner Cardoso E. Cunha (5 
September 1991), which likewise stated, ‘The major work during August has been the 
preparation by the UK of a draft Basic Protocol, in their role as Chairman of Working 
Group II. In the course of this work they have been supported by the NL Presidency and 
Conference Secretariat.’ See: Cees Verburg, ‘Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty: An 
Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ [2019] 20(2-
3) Journal of World Investment and Trade 425. P. 439.
579. Cees Verburg, ‘Modernizing the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal 
Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 425.
580. See for example: Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg 
S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Paras. 377-378.
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Even though the ECT does provide for a relatively high level of investment 
protection, this does not necessarily mean that it also contributes to increased 
flows of FDI between the contracting parties. In a recent meta-study, it was found 
that IIA’s that provide for post-establishment investment protection probably 
have some positive influence on FDI flows although some studies even found 
a negative link.581 In light of this, it is also important to analyze the investment 
promotion provisions of the ECT, which is the subject of the following chapter.
581. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence (Winnipeg, mb: iisd, 2017). Pp. 3-4. <https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/
files/publications/assessing-impacts-investment-treaties.pdf, accessed 1 November 
2018> accessed on 09/06/2019. It has to be noted that these studies ‘face a range of 
methodological challenges’ as a result of which the causality between the conclusion of 
IIA’s and flows of FDI is difficult to prove.
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6. INVESTMENT PROMOTION IN PART III OF THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the investment protection standards of 
the ECT, this chapter is dedicated to the investment promotion provisions of Part 
III of the ECT. These provisions have the potential of addressing (discriminatory) 
barriers to FDI, thereby facilitating flows of FDI between contracting parties. The 
provisions will be analyzed in the same manner as those relating to investment 
protection, namely that i) a legal comparison between IIA’s will be provided for, 
followed by ii) an examination of ECT arbitral practice – if there is any – and, 
finally iii) the relevance for RES investors will be explained. As will be seen, the 
provisions relating to investment promotion are often phrased in a hortatory 
manner. As will be concluded, this means that there is potentially room for 
improvement in the ECT which could be used to facilitate flows of FDI more 
effectively.
6.1. LIBERALIZATION OF FDI
The first relevant provisions of Part III of the ECT relating to investment 
promotion are Arts. 10(2) and (3) ECT.1 These provisions concern ‘the making of 
investments’, which is defined in Art. 1(8) ECT as ‘establishing new Investments, 
acquiring all or part of existing Investments or moving into different fields of 
Investment activity.’ Regarding the making of investments, host States ‘shall 
endeavor to accord investors’ non-discriminatory treatment in line with the NT 
and MFN obligations.2 However, this commitment is one of ‘best endeavors’.3 
Therefore, under the current legal framework of the ECT, investors do not derive 
benefits from the treaty in the pre-establishment phase of their investment. In 
other words, ECT contracting parties are currently under no obligation to admit 
1. Articles 10(2) and (3) ECT provide for the following:
“(2) Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to accord to Investors of other Contracting 
Parties, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, the Treatment described in 
paragraph (3).
(3) For the purposes of this Article, “Treatment” means treatment accorded by a 
Contracting Party which is no less favourable than that which it accords to its own 
Investors or to Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state, whichever is the 
most favourable.”
2. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 106.
3. Id. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International 
Publishing 2006). P. 108.
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foreign investors on the basis of the ECT.4 Whilst Art. 10(4) ECT does contain 
the ambition for a supplementary treaty that would provide for this, such a treaty 
has never been concluded.5
A draft of this supplementary treaty allowed for establishment of foreign investors 
on the basis of MFN or NT, whichever was more favorable, subject to certain 
exceptions.6 These exceptions primarily concerned issues related to privatization 
and real estate.7 In 2002 the negotiators decided to refrain from further negotiating 
the supplementary treaty while awaiting the conclusion of a WTO Agreement on 
this issue: trade and investment had been on the Doha Agenda as a so-called 
‘Singapore Issue’ since 1996.8 However, the WTO members decided in 2004 that 
trade and investment would be dropped from the Doha Agenda. Negotiations 
within the ECT have, however, never resumed.
6.1.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
In the absence of any treaty obligations to the contrary, States have the right 
to control the in- and outflows of FDI into their jurisdiction by virtue of their 
sovereignty and are thus ‘in no way compelled to admit foreign investment.’9
Generally, two different approaches can be identified in IIA’s regarding the 
admission of FDI.10
4. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
196.
5. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 106.
6. See: Supplementary Treaty to the Energy Charter Treaty, 1998. <http://www.energycharter.
org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECST_Text_en.pdf> accessed on 24/03/2017.
7. Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of FDI (Eleven International Publishing 
2006). P. 108.
8. See: WTO, Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler Procedures. <https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm> accessed on 23/03/2017.
9. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 88. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 191.
10. It has been argued that there is a third approach, namely the approach as adopted 
on the basis of the EU Treaties which Salacuse has reffered to as ‘an absolute right of 
establishment.’ Due to the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital 
within the EU, there is no IIA that has gone as far in liberalizing FDI as the EU Treaties. 
Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 
203-204.
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Firstly, there are IIA’s that admit FDI in accordance with the host State’s laws and 
regulations.11 For example, Art. 2 of the Georgia-Netherlands BIT states:
“Either Contracting Party shall, within the framework of its laws and 
regulations, promote economic cooperation through the protection 
in its territory of investments of nationals of the other Contracting 
Party. Subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws or 
regulations, each Contracting Party shall admit such investments.”12
On the basis of provisions like this one, which are often referred to as ‘admission 
clauses’ the host State is under no obligation to liberalize the entry conditions for 
foreign investors.13 Therefore, under these clauses, host States are not obliged to 
treat investors in a similar manner as national investors or investors of third States 
with regard to the making of investments.14 Also, these clauses could restrict 
the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals in cases where the investment is not made in 
accordance with national law.15 Thus, illegal investments or investments made 
contrary to national law may than not be protected under the treaty.16
11. Article 2, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Georgia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Georgia-the Netherlands) 
(adopted 03/02/1998, entered into force 01/04/1999). Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and 
Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards 
of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 11-12. Jeswald W. Salacuse, 
The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 196. Rudolf Dolzer & 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). Pp. 88-89
12. Article 2, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Georgia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Georgia-the Netherlands) 
(adopted 03/02/1998, entered into force 01/04/1999).
13. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ 
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 12. Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. 
v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 2005. Para. 147. Award, Fraport AG 
Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, 2007. Para. 335.
14. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
197.
15. Id.
16. Award, Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
2006. Paras. 206 & 257. Award, Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The 
Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 2007. Paras. 401-404. Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/18, 2007. Paras. 174-182.
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Under the second approach which has primarily been adopted by the US, 
Canada, and Japan, host States’ are obliged to accord NT and MFN treatment 
to foreign investors in the pre-establishment phase of an investment.17 This 
approach has also been adopted by the EU in several recent FTA’s.18 As Art. 
2(1) of the US-Bahrain BIT states:
“With respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
covered investments, each Party shall accord treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like situations, to investments in 
its territory of its own nationals or companies (hereinafter “national 
treatment”) or to investments in its territory of nationals or companies 
of a third country (hereinafter “most favored nation treatment”), 
whichever is most favorable (hereinafter “national and most favored 
nation treatment”). Each Party shall ensure that its state enterprises, 
in the provision of their goods or services, accord national and most 
favored nation treatment to covered investments.”19
Nevertheless, this obligation may be subject to exceptions laid down in the 
treaty.20 Thus, when deciding whether or not to admit FDI, a host State which 
is bound by this obligation must treat investors from its treaty partners in the 
17. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 
199-202. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment 
Protection’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). P. 13. Article 2, Treaty between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the State of Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Bahrain) (adopted 29/09/1999, entered 
into force 30/05/2001).
18. Articles 8.4, 8.6 & 8.7, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Articles 8.4, 8.5 and 
8.6, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 30/06/2019, 
entrance into force still pending). Maria Laura Marceddu, ‘The Emerging Profile of the 
European IIAs’ [2016] 13 Transnational Dispute Management 1. Pp. 13-14.
19. Article 2(1), Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the State of Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Bahrain) (adopted 29/09/1999, entered into force 
30/05/2001).
20. Article 2(2), Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the State of Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Bahrain) (adopted 29/09/1999, entered into force 
30/05/2001). Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University 
Press 2010). Pp. 199-202. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context 
of Investment Protection’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection 
(Oxford University Press 2008). P. 13.
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same way as its own investors or the investors of other countries.21 According 
to Joubin-Bret, this constitutes a limitation on the State’s right to regulate FDI.22
In some cases, an IIA contains a provision that provides for a combination of 
both approaches by, in principle, providing for an admission clause but with an 
attached MFN obligation.23
As said, the ECT merely contains a soft-law obligation to provide non-
discriminatory treatment in the pre-establishment phase of an investment. Also, 
Art. 10(5) prescribes that States shall endeavor to ‘limit to the minimum the 
exceptions’ to the non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in Art. 10(3) while 
also stating that States shall strive to ‘progressively remove existing restrictions 
affecting Investors of other Contracting Parties.’ Furthermore, Art. 10(6) ECT 
provides contracting parties with the possibility of voluntarily notifying to the 
Energy Charter Conference that it will not introduce new exceptions to non-
discriminatory treatment under Art. 10(3) or that it will voluntarily provide non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign investors in some or all economic activities of 
the energy sector. Finally, Art. 10(9) ECT states that upon accession to the ECT, 
contracting parties shall submit a report to the ECT Secretariat that summarizes 
all laws, regulations or other measures that contain exceptions to the MFN and 
NT obligations regarding the making of investments.24
During the negotiations of Art. 10 ECT, the inclusion of pre-establishment rights 
was one of the most contested issues. An early draft of the ECT provides for 
pre-establishment rights on the basis of both MFN and NT.25 For countries 
with SOE’s that were active in the energy sector and which were accorded 
significant privileges, such as the former Communist countries and Norway, this 
was problematic. For Norway for example, an unfettered NT obligation in the 
21. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
201.
22. Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection’ 
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 
2008). P. 13.
23. Ibid. P. 12-13. Article 2, Agreement Between Japan and the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment (Japan-Bangladesh) 
(adopted 10/11/1998, entered into force 25/08/1999).
24. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 106-107.
25. Article 13(2), CONF 56, Draft ECT – Second version, 1 May 1993. <http://www.
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/16_-_ECT_2__01.05.93_.pdf> 
accessed on 09/12/2016.
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pre-establishment phase would have required it to accord treatment to foreign 
investors in its oil and gas sector comparable to the treatment accorded to Statoil 
(nowadays Equinor).26 The US was on the other side of the spectrum, arguing that 
‘liberal rights of establishment’ were essential since very few foreign investors 
were established in the former USSR, and Eastern and Central Europe.27 Hence, 
achieving the goals of the ECT would require thousands of investors to ‘set up 
shop’ in these countries.28
The ECT’s current legal framework with regard to the admission of FDI provides 
for non-discriminatory treatment in the pre-establishment phase of an investment 
but on a voluntary – best endeavors – basis.29 Besides the fact that the ECT 
does not provide substantive rights to investors in the pre-establishment phase, 
there is also a jurisdictional hurdle to be overcome if investors want to refer a 
dispute to ECT arbitration. To establish jurisdiction for an ECT tribunal, Art. 26(1) 
requires that there is a dispute between a contracting party and an investor 
concerning an investment. However, if an investor would bring a claim regarding 
the discrimination accorded to it in the pre-establishment phase, the main 
problem is the fact that it is not able to make an investment in the first place.30 
Therefore, it might be very difficult to establish jurisdiction on the basis of the 
ECT for investors that are unable to make an investment.
6.1.2. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
The fact that the ECT’s current legal framework does not provide for pre-
establishment rights can be considered as a shortcoming simply because, 
currently, ECT contracting parties are under no obligation to admit RES investors 
from other contracting parties. In that regard, the ECT is more an investment 
protection agreement rather than one that actively promotes FDI by providing 
for liberalization and market access commitments.
26. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 10. See for a Norwegian attempt to 
omit the reference to NT in the pre-establishment paragraphs: the general comments to 
Art. 16, BA-37, Basic Agreement, 1 March 1993. <http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/
DocumentsMedia/ECT_Drafts/14_-_BA_37__01.03.93_.pdf> accessed on 16/02/2017.
27. Comments on Article 10(d) of Basic Agreement, United States Department of State, letter 
of 30/10/1991, Binder 1/4 Article 10, BP3 11/10/1991.
28. Id.
29. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 
201-202. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 106-107.
30. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 106-107.
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Nearly all of the currently pending ECT RES investment disputes are intra-EU, 
meaning that both the home State of the investor as well as the host State are 
an EU Member State. This could suggest that within the EU a lot of cross-border 
investments are made in the RES sector. Arguably, EU law, more specifically 
the right of establishment and the free movement of capital, creates an ‘open 
door’ for intra-EU FDI.31 Thus, EU law provides for market access of EU investors 
which facilitates cross-border investment.32 The ECT does not even contain 
obligations that are remotely comparable to the obligations under EU law nor 
does it reduce barriers to investment. Rather, it is in the post-establishment 
phase of an investment that the ECT becomes an interesting legal instrument 
for investors by providing investors with protection and an ISDS mechanism to 
enforce these rights under the ECT. Also, the fact that energy markets within the 
EU are liberalized significantly reduces investment barriers for market entrants.
For foreign investors in the RES sector the lack of pre-establishment rights means 
that they may be treated differently from domestic and/or foreign investors from 
third countries when making an investment. Thus, they may be discriminated in 
tender procedures and other measures that favor domestic investors over foreign 
ones, such as LCR’s, may be adopted by the host State.33 This may discourage 
foreign investors from competing in foreign tenders which reduces competition 
in the RES sector. Also, companies that are internationally active in the RES 
services sector often provide services abroad through the establishment of a 
commercial presence, which requires an investment. However, as identified by 
the OECD, foreign RES services supplier are often not able to compete on a level 
playing field with domestic suppliers because of restrictions on FDI, including 
economic needs tests, foreign equity limits, nationality or residency requirements, 
restrictions on the acquisition of land and real estate, and investment screening 
procedures.34 Therefore, the failure of the ECT to address barriers to investment 
31. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 
203-204. Articles 49 & 63, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (adopted 
13/12/2007, entered into force 01/12/2009).
32. Catherine Barnard, The Substantivew Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (Oxford 
University Press 2010). Pp. 322-323, 559-584.
33. Thomas W. Wälde and Walid Ben Hamida argued in 2008 that a public tender offer - in 
the context of corporate acquisition - could qualify as ‘investment.’ See: Thomas W. Wälde 
& Walid Ben Hamida, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty and Corporate Acquisition’ in Graham 
Coop et al (eds.), Investment Protection and the Energy Charter Treaty (JurisNet 2008). Pp. 
190-204.
34. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). Pp. 10-11.
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in the pre-establishment phase of an investment is a significant shortcoming of 
the current legal framework.
6.2. TRANSFER OF FUNDS
On the basis of Art. 14, contracting parties shall ‘guarantee the freedom of transfer 
into and out of its Area.’ Provisions regarding the transfer of funds are common in 
IIA’s. For investors, this provision is of profound importance since it establishes 
the right to transfer funds into the host State, in order to make the investment, 
as well as out of the host State.35 After all, an important reason for investors to 
invest abroad is to obtain a higher rate of return than which is possible at home; 
repatriating profits is therefore of pivotal importance to investors.36 Nevertheless, 
the interests of the host State may well diverge from the interests of the investor. 
As Dolzer and Schreuer stated:
“The host state will want to administer its currency and its foreign 
reserves. Large currency transfers into and out of the country need 
to be monitored and controlled in order to protect national policies. 
Experience has shown that sudden short-term capital inflows, 
and especially capital flight, may lead to instability in the domestic 
financial markets.”37
This section will analyze Art. 14 ECT by reference to other IIA’s, ECT arbitral 
practice, and explain how this provision is relevant for RES investors. Since 
investment disputes involving transfer of funds provisions most often originate 
in the wake of mayor economic and financial crises that force States to adopt 
capital restrictions, these disputes are not so much typical ‘RES’ disputes, but 
rather disputes arising from exceptional circumstances.38
35. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 212. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2010). P. 256.
36. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 871. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital 
Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 213-214.
37. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 212.
38. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment 
Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). P. 217. See, for example: Award, Continental Casualty Company v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 2008. Paras. 237-245.
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6.2.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
From the outset, it is important to note that the transfer of capital may be regulated 
by various international instruments, such as the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD Convention, EU law, and WTO 
law.39 According to Kern, the common denominator of all these instruments is 
that they allow States to adopt capital restrictions under certain circumstances.40 
An interesting, yet unsettled, discussion is how all of these instruments relate to 
IIA’s, especially when the text of an IIA does not contain any exceptions to the 
freedom of transfer.41 In the Continental Casualty v. Argentina case, for example, 
the ICSID tribunal considered the applicable BIT to be a more liberal lex specialis 
to the IMF Articles.42
Turning to IIA’s, even though transfer of funds provisions can commonly be found 
in IIA’s, they are by no means uniform.
A first difference relates to the direction in which the freedom of transfer applies. 
For example, the BIT between Belgium-Luxembourg and Hong Kong only 
provides for the transfer of funds out of the host State.43 The ECT, on the other 
hand, explicitly states in Art. 14(1) that the freedom of transfer applies ‘into and out 
of’ the area of a contracting party, thereby covering both directions. According to 
Dolzer and Schreuer, most IIA’s cover the transfer of funds in both directions.44
39. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 872-876. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, 
‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 206.
40. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 876.
41. Ibid. Pp. 880-881. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 214. Anna de Luca, ‘Umbrella Clauses 
and Transfer Provisions in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT’ [2014] 15 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 506. P. 528. Michael Waibel, ‘BIT by BIT: the Silent Liberalization’ in 
Christina Binder et al (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009). P. 517.
42. Award, Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, 2008. Para. 244.
43. Article 6(1), Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Belgium/
Luxembourg-Hong Kong) (adopted 07/10/1996, entered into force 18/06/2001).
44. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). P. 214.
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A second important point is related to the scope of the provision. Many IIA’s state 
that the funds that benefit from the freedom of transfer must be related to the 
investment, followed by a non-exhaustive illustrative list that contains transactions 
that are covered by the treaty.45 According to Salacuse, the ECT’s reference to 
‘a general ‘freedom of transfer’ […] appears to have been influenced by the 
Netherlands Model BIT.’46 It has been said that the scope of Art. 14 ECT as such 
is ‘very broad’ and includes, amongst others, the right of transfer for personnel.47
A third issue, and perhaps the most contested one, is related to the exceptions 
and restrictions on the transfer of funds. Various approaches exist in relation to 
this point. For example, some treaties, contain provisions that allow for the free 
transfer of funds ‘unrestrained’ by the domestic law or economic circumstances 
of the host State.48 It is currently unclear whether these treaties nevertheless allow 
States to impose transfer restrictions in times of economic and financial instability 
on the basis of either customary international law, such as the “state of necessity 
doctrine”, or the IMF Articles.49 Under another approach, which is the complete 
opposite, the right to transfer funds is subjected to the laws and regulations of 
the host State.50 This approach essentially allows host States to adopt restrictions 
on the transfer of funds ‘irrespective of economic circumstances or obligations 
45. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 876-877. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 214. Jeswald 
W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 258.
46. In particular the 1979 Netherlands Model BIT. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of 
Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 258. See, for example: Article 6, 
Accord Relatif à l’encouragement et la Protection des Investissements Entre le Royaume 
des Pays-Bas et la République du Sénégal (Netherlands-Senegal) (adopted 03/08/1979, 
entered into force 05/05/1981).
47. Anna de Luca, ‘Umbrella Clauses and Transfer Provisions in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT’ 
[2014] 15 Journal of World Investment & Trade 506. P. 525. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law 
of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 259.
48. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment 
Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). Pp. 213-214. See also: Article 5, Germany Model BIT, 2008. Article 7(1), 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of 
the Federative Republic of Brazil on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Finland-
Brazil) (adopted 28/03/1995, entrance into force still pending).
49. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment 
Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). Pp. 214-215, 217-227. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg 
et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 878-879.
50. Id. Article 6(1), Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the State of Kuwait for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(China-Kuwait) (adopted 23/11/1985, entered into force 24/12/1986).
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under other international treaties.’51 A middle ground between these two divergent 
approaches can be found in the third approach which provides for exceptions 
to the transfer of funds in cases of balance of payments problems.52 The final 
approach allows States to restrict the transfer of funds through measures that 
are taken in line with the WTO Agreements and/or the IMF Articles.53
It has been said that the ECT follows the first approach.54 However, the present 
author cannot completely concur with this statement. For example, Art. 14(4) 
ECT states, somewhat in line with the second approach, that ‘a Contracting 
Party may protect the rights of creditors, or ensure compliance with laws on the 
issuing, trading and dealing in securities and the satisfaction of judgements in 
civil, administrative and criminal adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, 
nondiscriminatory, and good faith application of its laws and regulations.’ In 
addition, the transfer of returns in kind, such as payments in crude oil, may be 
restricted when the GATT exceptions allow for this on the basis of Art. 14(6) ECT. 
Finally, on the basis of Art. 14(5) ECT payments within the former USSR may 
be regulated differently, provided that there is agreement between the parties 
involved. Thus, although Art. 14(1) ECT seems to provide for an absolute freedom 
of transfer of funds, subsequent paragraphs contain at least three exceptions, on 
the basis of which one cannot say that the freedom is completely unrestricted.
51. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 878-879. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, 
‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 215.
52. Article 6, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of France and the 
Government of the Republic of Uganda on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (France-Uganda) (adopted 03/01/2003, entered into force 20/12/2004). 
Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment 
Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 878-879. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, 
‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). P. 215. Rudolf Dolzer 
& Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 
2012). P. 215.
53. Article 14(7), Canada Model BIT, 2004. Article 6.7, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Republic of Singapore (India-
Singapore) (adopted 29/06/2005, entered into force 01/08/2005). Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer 
of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. 
Beck 2015). P. 880. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under 
Modern Investment Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection 
(Oxford University Press 2008). P. 216.
54. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment 
Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). P. 214. Carsten Kern, ‘Transfer of Funds’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 878.
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In line with common treaty practice, Art. 14 ECT states that the transfer ‘shall 
be effected without delay’ and in a freely convertible currency at the ‘market 
rate of exchange existing on the date of transfer.’55 The ECT adds to this that in 
‘the absence of a market for foreign exchange, the rate to be used will be the 
most recent rate applied to inward investments or the most recent exchange 
rate for conversion of currencies into special drawing rights, whichever is more 
favourable to the investor.’56
6.2.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
The only ECT case where an investor put forward a claim based on Art. 14 is 
AES v. Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan had imposed a so-called ‘tariff in exchange for 
investment’ scheme which obliged investors to re-invest operating revenue back 
into their electricity generation facilities.57 Consequently, investors were unable to 
make use of their income in any other way than re-investing it. The tribunal would 
eventually conclude that this measure violated the FET standard, but the tribunal 
also touched upon Art. 14, although its analysis was limited to the question of 
whether Art. 14 would ‘provide any additional protection to Claimants justifying 
to examine a separate breach of such provisions.’58
The tribunal held that Art. 14 ECT represents ‘a specific implementation of the 
general principle protected under the FET standard that an investor should have 
the right to earn and transfer reasonable returns of and on its investments.’59 
This means that the protection of Art. 14 goes further than the protection under 
the FET standard since Art. 14 establishes ‘more specific principles concerning 
the conditions to transfer of such returns and other capital.’60 Consequently, not 
all breaches of Art. 14 will amount to breaches of the FET standard while all 
breaches of the FET standard will amount to a breach of Art. 14, to the extent 
that they restrict earnings and the transfers of reasonable returns.61 The tribunal 
therefore concluded, albeit in a rather cryptic manner, that Art. 14 was breached.
55. Article 14(2)(3), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998). Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press 2012). P. 214.
56. Article 14(3), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
57. Award, AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/16, 2013. Para. 405.
58. Ibid. Para. 424.
59. Ibid. Para. 425.
60. Id.
61. Ibid. Para. 426.
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6.2.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Like all investors in the energy sector, RES investors have an interest in the 
freedom to transfer funds. However, most ISDS disputes regarding a transfer 
of funds provision seem to have originated in the wake of economic and/or 
financial crises.62 Therefore, disputes regarding transfer of funds do not seem 
to be inherently related to RES investments, but rather to investing abroad in 
general and will not be discussed in more detail here.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that various ECT contracting parties have 
adopted restrictions on the transfer of capital in the past, such as Iceland in 
2008, Cyprus in 2013, and Greece in 2015. However, Iceland was not bound 
by the ECT at the moment of such application since it only ratified the ECT in 
2015.63 At the moment it seems that the Cypriotic and Greek measures did not 
give rise to any ECT disputes.
6.3. TRADE RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES
On the basis of Art. 10(11) ECT, the application of a Trade Related Investment 
Measure (TRIM) as described in Art. 5 ECT can be considered as a breach of 
the host State under Part III of the ECT:
“For the purposes of Article 26, the application by a Contracting 
Party of a trade-related investment measure as described in Article 
5(1) and (2) to an Investment of an Investor of another Contracting 
Party existing at the time of such application shall, subject to Article 
5(3) and (4), be considered a breach of an obligation of the former 
Contracting Party under this Part.”
This is important since, in the absence of this explicit provision, Art. 5 would be 
outside the scope of ECT tribunals whose jurisdiction is limited to breaches of 
Part III of the ECT and Art. 5 is located in Part II of the treaty.64 Art. 5 provides 
62. Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment 
Treaties’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University 
Press 2008). P. 217. See, for example: Award, Continental Casualty Company v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 2008. Paras. 237-245.
63. See: Energy Charter, ‘Iceland Ratifies the Energy Charter Treaty’ (Energy Charter 2015). 
<https://energycharter.org/media/news/article/iceland-ratifies-the-energy-charter-treaty/> 
accessed on 13/06/2019.
64. Article 26(1), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
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examples of TRIM’s that are inconsistent with Arts. III (the NT obligation) and 
XI (general elimination of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT such as LCR’s 
or trade balancing obligations.65 The effect of Art. 10(11) is to ‘translate the 
obligations created by these [GATT] provisions into obligations owed to, and 
enforceable by, Investors under the ECT’ while the WTO Agreements can not 
be enforced by private persons.66
Prohibitions on TRIM’s, or performance requirements as they are sometimes 
referred to, are absent in most BIT’s.67 According to some, these requirements 
are considered to be undesirable as they entail government interference with 
markets, which deters FDI, reduces economic efficiency, and distorts the market 
more generally.68 However, according to others, such requirements are desirable 
as they ensure that the local economy benefits from foreign investment, which 
fosters the economic development of the host State.69
Regardless of the economic rationale of TRIM’s, the major trade and investment 
agreements of the early 1990’s such as, the ECT, the NAFTA, and the WTO 
Agreements all contain provisions that explicitly prohibit them.70
This section will briefly analyze TRIM’s in IIA’s and elaborate how TRIM’s may be 
considered to be obstacles to trade and investment in RES and how they can 
be challenged through the ECT by investors. Since, to the best of the authors 
knowledge, there is currently no ECT case law which addresses Art. 10(11) ECT, 
this section is omitted.
65. Articles III & XI, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30/10/1947, entered into 
force 01/01/1948).
66. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 132.
67. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
331.
68. Ibid. P. 330. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press 2012). P. 90.
69. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
329.
70. See for example: Article 1106, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-
Canada-Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994). Article 2, 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (adopted 15/04/1994, entered into 
force 01/01/1995).
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6.3.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Since Art. 5 ECT explicitly refers to the GATT, the WTO Agreements are an 
important point of reference for a discussion of TRIM’s under the ECT.
On the basis of Art. 2(1) of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (WTO TRIMS), no WTO Member may apply a TRIM that is inconsistent 
with the GATT 1994, including measures that are inconsistent with the NT 
principle of GATT Art. III. An illustrative list of TRIM’s is annexed to the WTO 
TRIMS agreement and identifies various TRIM’s, such as LCR’s and trade 
balancing requirements as being inconsistent with Arts. III and XI GATT 1994. 
In that regard, the WTO TRIMS agreement does not create obligations beyond 
the GATT itself, but rather clarifies the compatibility of certain measures with the 
GATT.71 The fact that the WTO TRIMS Agreement only clarifies the consistency of 
TRIM’s in relation to the GATT means that its scope is limited on trade in goods 
and does not concern services.
The prohibition under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is wider in scope in that regard, 
since it explicitly includes performance requirements that concern services:
“Article 1106: Performance Requirements
1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, 
or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or 
operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party 
in its territory:
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
71. Report of the GATT Panel, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review 
ACT, (L/5504 - 30S/140), 7 February 1984. Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Arwel Davies, 
World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart Publishing 2012). P. 671. William 
A. Fennell & Joseph W. Tyler, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History – Trade-
Related Investment Measures (Kluwer 1993). Pp. 73, 129-130. Michael Hahn, ‘WTO Rules 
and Obligations Related to Investment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 657.
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(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or 
services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services 
from persons in its territory;
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume 
or value of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows 
associated with such investment;
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such 
investment produces or provides by relating such sales in any way to 
the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings;
(f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary 
knowledge to a person in its territory, except when the requirement is 
imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, 
administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged 
violation of competition laws or to act in a manner not inconsistent 
with other provisions of this Agreement; or
(g) to act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or 
services it provides to a specific region or world market.”
Also, it addresses the mandatory transfer of technology. Therefore, it clearly 
extends beyond measures that merely affect trade in goods. In addition, Art. 1107 
NAFTA addresses national requirements concerning the senior management 
and board of directors of investments.
Under the ECT, Art. 5 prohibits TRIM’s that are inconsistent with Arts. III and IX 
of the GATT. This means that it cannot extend to TRIM’s related to services. This 
would be in line with the general trade provisions of the ECT, which merely deals 
with trade in goods. Interestingly, an early draft of the ECT did make reference 
to services in the context of TRIMs.72
Also, Art. 10(11) ECT makes clear that only TRIM’s that are applied to an 
investment of an investor ‘existing at the time of such application’ shall be 
72. Article 13(11), CONF 50, Draft Energy Charter Treaty (Basic Agreement) – Compromise 
text, 15 March 1993. <http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/ECT_
Drafts/15_-_ECT_1__15.03.93__.pdf> accessed on 23/12/2016.
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considered as a breach of the ECT.73 Therefore, investors cannot enforce 
the TRIM’s prohibition with regards to TRIM’s that were enacted prior to the 
establishment of the investor in the host State.74 During the ECT negotiations, the 
US tried to extend the scope of the TRIM’s provision to the pre-establishment 
phase, including the possibility for investors to challenge these pre-establishment 
measures through ISDS.75 The Australian delegation had a completely different 
view, arguing that TRIM’s were a trade issue and not an investment issue.76 
Therefore, they opposed the possibility for investors to challenge TRIM’s through 
ISDS and stated that these measures should be handled in the WTO context.77
The illustrative list of the WTO TRIMS Agreement which prescribes measures 
that are inconsistent with the GATT is reproduced in Art. 5(2) ECT.78 Therefore, 
there is a very close link between the ECT and the GATT with regard to TRIM’s.
It has to be noted that the GATT, the NAFTA, and the ECT all have exceptions 
with regard to TRIM’s. For example, Art. 5(3) states that ‘[n]othing in paragraph 
(1) shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from applying the trade-
related investment measures described in subparagraphs (2)(a) and (c) as a 
condition of eligibility for export promotion, foreign aid, government procurement 
or preferential tariff or quota programs.’79
6.3.2. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors80
Performance requirements or TRIM’s are quite common in the RES sector, 
especially in the form of LCR’s. Quite a few States have incorporated LCR’s in 
73. Article 10(11), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
74. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 133-134.
75. Letter of the United States Department of State of 4 April 1994, Article 10, Binder 4/4, Doc. 
607194 6/4/1994. Pp. 1-2.
76. Letter of the Australian Mission to the European Union of 2/9/1994, Article 10, Binder 4/4, 
Doc 12-9-1994/3514 and 12-9-1994/3508.
77. Id.
78. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 133-134.
79. See: Art. 1108 NAFTA, Arts. III(8)(a) & XI(2) GATT 1947.
80. This section draws from the following publications: Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content 
Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government Procurement or a Violation 
of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy Law Review 185. Cees 
Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable Energy 
Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of Foreign 
Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1.
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their renewable energy policies, especially as an eligibility criterion for a FIT.81 
On the basis of these LCR’s, (the level of) government support is dependent 
upon the (level of) domestic content used in a project.82 According to the OECD, 
the application of LCR’s in the RES sector has increased since 2009 and they 
currently represent one of the most significant policy barriers to international trade 
and investment in the RES sector.83 In fact, it has been said that LCR’s ‘have had 
a detrimental effect on global investment flows in solar and wind energy’ since 
they disrupt the value chain of RES generation equipment that is increasingly 
globally organized.84
From an economic perspective, such LCR’s can yield contradictory results and 
the exact method of application will determine the success of such requirements. 
On the one hand, States may argue that LCR’s are rational: FIT’s require ‘the 
expenditure of a significant amount of public resources and a LCR’ may lead to 
the creation of a local RES industry by virtue of which the local economy reaps 
the benefits of the policy.85 Also, States may rely on the infant industry argument, 
81. Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Local Content Requirements and the 
Renewable Energy Industry: A Good Match?’ (ICTSD, 2013). Pp. 21-34 <http://unctad.
org/meetings/en/Contribution/DITC_TED_13062013_Study_ICTSD.pdf> accessed on 
04/07/2016. This study identified LCR’s attached to FIT’s in, amongst others: China, 
Canada, the United States, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, India and several EU Member 
States. OECD, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green 
Finance and investment (OECD Publishing 2015). Pp. 52-54. This study identified LCR’s 
in the RES sector in, additionally to those named in the previous study: Argentina, Brazil, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Uruguay.
82. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 185.
83. OECD, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance 
and investment (OECD Publishing 2015). P. 50. OECD, OECD Business and Finance 
Outlook (OECD Publishing 2016). Pp. 158-159.
84. OECD, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance 
and investment (OECD Publishing 2015). Pp. 59-60. OECD, OECD Business and Finance 
Outlook (OECD Publishing 2016). P. 159.
85. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – 
Government Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) 
International Energy Law Review 185. P. 185. Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, 
‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Content Requirements Consistent with WTO Law?’ 
in Freya Baetens et al (eds.), Frontiers of International Economic Law – Legal Tools to 
Confront Interdisciplinary Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2014). P. 152. Hartmut Kahl, ‘Trade Law 
Constraints to Regional Renewable Energy Support Schemes’ in Marjan Peeters et al 
(eds.), Renewable Energy Law in the EU – Legal Perspectives on Bottom-Up Approaches 
(Edward Elgar 2014). P. 45.
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on the basis of which a LCR may lead to a more competitive renewable energy 
industry in the long term.86
On the other hand, LCR’s, especially when poorly designed, may reduce the 
economic efficiency of a RES project since the investor would be compelled by 
the LCR to make use of inferior local content in its project.87 As a consequence, 
less renewable energy will be produced at a price that is too high.88 Also, LCR’s 
may impose unnecessary transaction costs when foreign investors are forced to 
cooperate with unknown parties.89 In addition, in particular when a country does 
not have a mature RES market, LCR’s may lead to increased risks because of 
a lack of experienced players in the market with a solid track record which may 
increase the cost of capital.90 Also, LCR’s may expose investors to additional 
regulatory risks.91 This is especially the case when the level of required local 
content may be changed unilaterally by the authorities which could change the 
status of existing facilities.92
Over the last view years LCR’s in renewable energy policies have given rise to 
a significant number of international trade and, to a lesser extent, investment 
86. Id.
87. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 186. Vladimir Tomsik & Jan Kubicek, ‘Can Local Content Requirements 
in International Investment Agreements be Justified?’ (NCCR Trade Regulation, 2006). 
P.15. <http://www.phase1.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP11/wti%20wp%20
2006-20.pdf> accessed on 04/07/2016. An indication that a LCR is poorly designed is, 
for example, when the LCR is set too high, making it (nearly) impossible to meet. This has 
been named as a reason of why Russia’s first round of auction for wind energy projects 
turned out to be a disappointment: Jürgen Heup, ‘Russisch Roulette’ [2014] 1 Neue 
Energie 78. P. 78-81.
88. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 186. OECD, OECD Business and Finance Outlook (OECD Publishing 
2016). P. 159.
89. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 31.
90. Id.
91. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 186.
92. Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015). P. 527. 
Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 186.
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disputes.93 In the context of the WTO, various disputes involved LCR’s in the RES 
sector.94 This has so far resulted in several Reports of the WTO Appellate Body.95 
For example, the Canada – Renewable Energy Cases were initiated by Japan 
and the EU. The Ontario FIT program required ‘wind and solar projects to source 
50 and 60 percent of their project components locally in order to be eligible for a 
FIT’ Contract.96 The SOE in charge of implementation of the FIT program, which 
fell under the ‘legislative responsibility of the Ministry of Energy’, had to enter 
into FIT Contracts with eligible investors.97 Investors that failed to meet the LCR’s 
would default on their obligations under the FIT Contract.98
The WTO Panel had little difficulty with establishing that the LCR’s violated Art. 
III(4) GATT and Art. 2(1) WTO TRIMS since the LCR’s involved ‘the ‘purchase 
or use of’ products from a domestic source,’ and compliance with the LCR was 
also instrumental in order to obtain an advantage.99 In the appeals procedure, the 
contested issue was not so much related to the question of whether or not the LCR 
was a violation of Art. III(4) GATT and Art. 2(1) WTO TRIMS, but rather whether 
Canada could successfully invoke the government procurement derogation of 
Art. III(8)(a) GATT, on the basis of which the NT obligation does not apply to 
laws and regulations governing government procurement.100 The Appellate Body 
93. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185.
94. Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Concerning Wind Power 
Equipment, WT/DS419/1, 2011. Request for Consultations by China, European Union and 
Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector, WT/DS452/1, 2012.
95. Reports of the Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 
WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R, 6 May 2013. Report of the Appellate Body, India – 
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R, 2016.
96. Ontario Power Authority, ‘Feed-in Tariff Program, FIT Rules Version 2.1’ (December 2012) 
Para. 8.4(a). Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes 
with Local Content Requirements Consistent with WTO Law?’ in Freya Baetens et al 
(eds.), Frontiers of International Economic Law – Legal Tools to Confront Interdisciplinary 
Challenges (Brill Nijhoff 2014). P. 154.
97. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 24 March 2016. Para. 355.
98. Ontario Power Authority, ‘Feed-in Tariff Program, FIT Rules Version 2.1’ (December 2012) 
Para. 8.4(b).
99. Reports of the Panel, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/
DS412/R and WT/DS426/R, 19 December 2012. Paras. 7.166 & 7.167.
100. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
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would reject this argument, however, on the basis that there was no competitive 
relationship – an essential requirement to successfully invoke the derogation of 
Art. III(8)(a) GATT – between the product that is being procured on the basis 
of the FIT Program and the product that is being discriminated.101 Whereas the 
former relates to electricity, the latter concerns generation equipment of RES.102 
This conclusion has also been shared in academic literature.103
Hence, the LCR as an eligibility criterion of the Ontario FIT Program amounted 
to a violation of the WTO Agreements.
The facts in the WTO India – Solar Module case were comparable to the 
Canadian case. To receive a FIT, investors were obliged to manufacture and 
assemble PV cells and modules locally. Also, there was a requirement to source 
30 percent of solar thermal projects locally.104 In its Report, the WTO Panel 
established that the LCR’s violated the NT obligation.105 With regards to the 
government procurement derogation, the Panel simply followed the reasoning of 
the Appellate Body as set out in the Canada – Renewable Energy Cases.106 On 
appeal, the Appellate Body confirmed that the Panel was properly guided by the 
Appellate Body Reports of the Canada – Renewable Energy Cases.107 Therefore, 
like the Canadian measures, the LCR in the Indian RES scheme violated the NT 
obligation of Art. III GATT.
Law Review 185. Pp. 188-189.
101. Reports of the Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 
WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R, 6 May 2013. Para. 5.74.
102. Ibid. Paras. 5.76-5.79.
103. Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Content 
Requirements Consistent with WTO Law?’ in Freya Baetens et al (eds.), Frontiers of 
International Economic Law – Legal Tools to Confront Interdisciplinary Challenges (Brill 
Nijhoff 2014). P. 158. Kati Kulovesi, ‘International Trade Disputes on Renewable Energy: 
Testing Ground for the Mutual Supportiveness of WTO Law and Climate Change Law’ 
[2014] 23 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 342. P. 345. 
Marco Citelli, Marco Barassi & Ksenia Belykh, ‘Renewable Energy in the International 
Arena: Legal Aspects and Cooperation’ [2014] 2 Groningen Journal of International Law 1. 
P. 21.
104. Jan-Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, ‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Content 
Requirements Consistent with WTO Law?’ in Freya Baetens et al (eds.), Frontiers of 
International Economic Law – Legal Tools to Confront Interdisciplinary Challenges (Brill 
Nijhoff 2014). P. 153.
105. Report of the Panel, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
WT/DS456/R, 2016. Paras. 7.95-7.99.
106. Ibid. Paras. 7.112-7.115, 7.120 & 7.126-7.135.
107. Report of the Appellate Body, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, WT/DS456/AB/R, 2016. Paras. 5.40-5.41.
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In the NAFTA investment case Mesa v. Canada, the investor also complained 
about the LCR of the FIT Program of Ontario, this time on the basis of Art. 1106 
NAFTA.108 Contrary to the the WTO case, however, Canada would prevail in the 
LCR claim under Chapter 11 NAFTA. Despite the fact that the investor lost, the 
award is still of interest to RES investors both with regard to jurisdiction and the 
merits of the case.
Concerning jurisdiction, the Mesa tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction 
over the LCR claim.109 The tribunal was of the view that the LCR was enacted 
prior to Mesa’s establishment in Canada as an investor and the tribunal only has 
jurisdiction with regard ‘to measures that occurred after the Claimant became an 
“investor” holding an “investment.”’110 Since Mesa incorporated project vehicles in 
Canada after the LCR was already adopted, there was no ‘investment’ by Mesa 
at the time of adoption.111
Despite the fact that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the LCR claim, it 
explicitly stated that the claim would have failed on the merits anyway because 
the FIT Program is to be considered as ‘government procurement’ under Art. 
1108 NAFTA, which excludes a claim under Art. 1106(1)(b) NAFTA.112 This is 
noteworthy since the Appellate Body held that Canada could not invoke the 
government procurement derogation of Art. III(8)(a) GATT, which is formulated 
differently than the exception of Art. 1108 NAFTA.113
108. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Para. 208.
109. Ibid. Para. 335.
110. Ibid. Para. 327.
111. Ibid. Para. 326. Award, Vito G. Gallo v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 55798, 2011. Paras. 325-326. Award, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 2009. Para. 68. Award, Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, 2015. Para. 182.
112. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Para. 335.
113. Article III(8)(a) GATT reads: “The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, 
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of 
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale 
or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.”
The relevant provisions of Article 1108 NAFTA state:
7. Articles 1102, 1103 and 1107 do not apply to:
(a) procurement by a Party or a state enterprise; or
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a state enterprise, including government 
supported loans, guarantees and insurance.
8. The provisions of: […]
(b) Article 1106(1)(b), (c), (f) and (g), and (3)(a) and (b) do not apply to procurement by a 
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According to the tribunal, the government procurement exception of NAFTA 
allows contracting parties to ‘exercise nationality-based preferences in cases 
of procurement’ in a way that allows a State ‘to procure goods or services 
in a manner that yields maximum benefits for the local economy.’114 Like the 
Appellate Body, the tribunal considered the FIT Program to be the procurement 
of electricity.115 The tribunal did not, however, consider the importance of the 
differentiation between the product that is being discriminated (generation 
equipment) and the good that is being procured (electricity) to be relevant.116 
The tribunal held that Art. 1108 NAFTA is broader than Art. III(8)(a) GATT and 
that ‘[o]nce it is established that there has been “procurement” by a Party or 
state enterprise, Article 1108(7)(a) excludes all claims of NT, MFN and domestic 
content in connection with such procurement.’117 As a consequence of this finding, 
it seems that under NAFTA the possibilities for investors to challenge LCR’s 
attached to FIT’s are limited due to the fact that a FIT Program is considered to 
be procurement of electricity which excludes a claim under Art. 1106 NAFTA.
It remains to be seen how a similar claim under the ECT would be resolved. 
Regarding jurisdiction an ECT tribunal might well follow the reasoning of the 
Mesa tribunal since there is nothing in the ECT which suggests that it would 
apply retroactively. Especially when one considers that the investment protection 
standards of the ECT merely apply post-establishment. In addition to this, Art. 
10(11) ECT explicitly states that only TRIM’s applied to an investment ‘existing 
at the time of such application [of the TRIM]’ shall be considered as a breach of 
an obligation under Part III of the ECT. This means that even if a tribunal would 
accept jurisdiction, the claim might still fail on the merits if the LCR was enacted 
prior to establishment because there was no investment of an investor at the time 
of application of the LCR.118
Regarding the government procurement exception of Art. 5 ECT, one could 
argue that the ECT exception should be interpreted in the light of Art. III(8)(a) 
GATT since Art. 5(1) ECT explicitly prohibits TRIM’s that are inconsistent with the 
Party or a state enterprise;
114. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Paras. 419-420.
115. Ibid. Paras. 443-458.
116. Ibid. Para. 459.
117. Id.
118. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). Pp. 133-134.
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GATT. The Mesa Tribunal refused to interpret Art. 1108 NAFTA in the light of the 
GATT exception since both provisions were phrased differently and the tribunal 
considered that if the NAFTA parties had wished to import the GATT exception 
they would have literally done so.119 In an ECT case, the claimant can argue that 
the derogation of Art. III(8)(a) GATT is included by reference as well.
Despite the fact that investment treaties, such as the ECT and the NAFTA, 
may provide investors with the possibility to challenge LCR’s attached to 
FIT Programs, the Mesa case highlights potential difficulties that need to be 
overcome, most importantly perhaps the one related to jurisdiction. It has been 
said that investments in the RES sector are primarily regulatory driven, which 
means that a State will primarily attract foreign RES investors after enacting a 
favorable renewable energy policy.120 However, if this policy already contains 
LCR’s, it will be very difficult for investors to challenge these measures because 
there might not be jurisdiction for a tribunal.121 Also, Art. 10(11) ECT lays down 
that only TRIM’s that are applied to existing investments can be considered as 
a breach of Part III of the ECT.122 While a TRIM may nevertheless be in violation 
of Art. 5 ECT, this article is located in Part II of the ECT and ECT tribunals only 
have jurisdiction over alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT on the basis of Art. 
26 ECT. One can consider this to be a significant shortcoming in the current 
legal framework that the ECT provides for.
Eventhough RES investors can challenge LCR’s through the ECT, this should not 
diminish the role that WTO members play in contesting these measures through 
WTO dispute settlement.123 Primarily because of the remedies that are available 
under WTO law. Under the WTO Agreements, the main sanction for violating the 
WTO Agreements is that the Respondent is obliged to bring its measures in line 
with the WTO Agreements, i.e. it should revoke the LCR.124 This would, in theory, 
benefit all foreign RES investors.125 In investment arbitration, the main remedy is 
119. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Para. 433.
120. Petri Mäntysaari, EU Electricity Trade Law – The Legal Tools of Electricity Producers in the 
Internal Electricity Market (Springer 2015). P. 139.
121. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 192.
122. Ibid. P. 196.
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compensation although specific performance is not excluded under the ECT.126 
However, if a claimant would prevail in an ECT procedure and the tribunal awards 
monetary compensation this would only accrue benefits for that specific claimant 
without reducing barriers to investment for other foreign RES investors.127
6.4. KEY PERSONNEL
On the basis of Art. 11(1) ECT a contracting party has to ‘examine in good faith 
requests’ by investors or key personnel employed by investors or investments 
of such investors, ‘to enter and remain temporarily’ within its jurisdiction, subject 
to its domestic law. Furthermore, Art. 11(2) ECT touches upon the investors 
rights to employ key personnel regardless of nationality and citizenship. These 
provisions address an important issue for both investors and host State’s. From 
the investors perspective, it may be desirable that its key personnel can enter the 
country where it invested in order to make the investment a success.128 Likewise, 
hiring qualified personnel is also a main concern to the investor. From the State’s 
perspective, it may be desirable to regulate the entry of aliens into the country in 
the pursuit of national security, immigration, and labor policies.129 Nevertheless, 
one of the perceived benefits of FDI for a host State is the acquisition of foreign 
technology, skills, and know how, which requires foreign personnel and experts 
to enter the country.130
6.4.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
According to Salacuse, most IIA’s ‘do not contain provisions dealing with the 
entry and sojourn of foreign nationals associated with an investment.’131 In the 
absence of a treaty provision dealing with key personnel, the domestic law of 
the host State will exclusively regulate this issue.132
126. Article 26(8) ECT. See also: Berk Demirkol, ‘Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
[2015] 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 403.
127. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – Government 
Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ [2017] 35(5) International Energy 
Law Review 185. P. 197.





132. Ibid. P. 334.
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Even when an IIA contains a key personnel provision, it is often drafted in non-
normative language.133 As becomes clear from Art. 11(1) ECT for example, 
there is merely an obligation ‘to examine in good faith’ requests of investors 
regarding the entrance of personnel. On the basis of Art. 11(2), investors are 
permitted to employ personnel regardless of nationality ‘provided that such key 
person has been permitted to enter, stay, and work’ in the host State. Salacuse 
interprets this provision as overriding ‘local legislation’ which limits ‘the ability of 
foreign nationals to work in certain jobs or that gives nationals of the host country 
employment priority.’134 Personally, I would interpret this provision differently, with 
only extending rights to the investor once the host State has allowed foreigners 
to enter the country. In the absence of this approval, Art. 11(2) ECT is of little 
benefit for the investor.
Non-normative language can also be found in other IIA’s. The German Model 
BIT for example, only requires States to ‘give sympathetic considerations to 
applications for the entry and sojourn of persons of either Contracting State who 
wish to enter the territory’ of the other contracting party.135 These sympathetic 
considerations shall be given ‘within the framework’ of the national legislation of 
that same State.136
The NAFTA’s provision regarding personnel is limited to senior management and 
the board of directors.137 In relation to the former, NAFTA contracting parties may 
not impose nationality requirements, while in relation to the latter this is allowed 
‘provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor 
to exercise control over its investment.’138 Similar provisions can be found in the 
Model BIT’s of the US and Canada as well as the CPTPP.139 The CETA deviates 
slightly by prohibiting nationality requirements in relation to the appointment of 
both senior management and the board of directors.140
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Article 3(6), Germany Model BIT, 2008.
136. Id.
137. Article 1107, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) 
(adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994).
138. Id.
139. Article 9, US Model BIT, 2012. Article 6, Canada Model BIT, 2004. Article 9.11, 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 
08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018).
140. Article 8.8, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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6.4.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Key personnel provisions are not often invoked in ISDS cases and, to the best of 
the present author knowledge, it has only been relied upon in one ECT dispute.141
In the Anatolie Stati v. Kazakhstan case, the investors relied on the provision. The 
dispute concerned attempts by the Kazakh authorities to force the investors to 
hand over substantial investments in oil and gas fields to a SOE just when the 
project, in which the claimants allegedly invested more than USD 1 bln, began to 
generate returns.142 In order to apply pressure to the investors, Kazakh authorities 
started ‘a targeted campaign of intimidation and harassment’ which included 
the imprisonment of an employee on ‘bogus criminal charges’ and threats to 
other employees that they would be accorded the same treatment.143 When the 
investors refused to comply with the demands of the authorities, ‘the government 
simply seized the investments.’144 The claimants argued that the imprisonment 
of personnel on false charges and the threats to other employees, which forced 
these people to flee Kazakhstan, were in violation of Art. 11 ECT.145
The tribunal would not rule on this argument, however, since it had already 
established that the actions of the respondent amounted to a breach of the 
ECT’s FET standard, which precluded the need to examine any other grounds 
put forward by the claimants if these could not lead to further damages.146 The 
only example where a claimant put forward a claim on the basis of Art. 11 ECT 
is thus one involving rather extreme circumstances.
6.4.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Despite the fact that there is little arbitral practice under the ECT and other 
IIA’s regarding key personnel provisions, this does not mean that it may not be 
a relevant provision for RES investors. The provision might, however, be more 
concerned with the promotion of investment rather than the protection thereof.
141. For a domestic court case relating to a key personnel provision found in a US-Japan 
treaty, see: Judgment, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, US Supreme Court, 457 
U.S. 176 (1982). Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University 
Press 2010). P. 335.
142. Award, Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. 
Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. V (116/2010), 2013. Para. 2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Ibid. Para. 1317.
146. Ibid. Para. 1324.
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Although the RES industry is moving from an early stage of development into 
maturity, the level of knowledge and expertise regarding RES can vary greatly 
from country to country.147 The States that were amongst the early adopters 
of RES, primarily developed countries, have an established RES industry and 
skilled workforce in this regard. However, those countries that do not have a 
developed RES industry and workforce can run into practical problems when 
trying to stimulate the generation of RES, especially when a country suddenly 
experiences a rapid increase in RES investments.148 A lack of a skilled and 
qualified workforce can lead to a situation where the full potential of RES is not 
realized in a country because of a lack of capacity of the industry or because 
inferior planning, construction, and maintenance of RES facilities undermines 
the efficiency of such installations. According to the International Labour 
Organization and the EU, this does not only hold true with regard to the technical 
aspect of RES projects, but also in relation to non-technical professions, such as 
‘sales specialists, inspectors, auditors, lawyers, and those working in investment 
finance.’149
When foreign RES investors are allowed to make use of their own personnel in 
all stages of the development of a RES project, this problem can (partially) be 
overcome by filling a gap in the host State with employees from abroad.150 For 
the host State, allowing foreign engineers to engage in RES projects provides 
opportunities for technology transfer.151 However, under the current legal 
framework that the ECT provides for, the host State has a wide discretion when 
deciding whether or not to allow such foreign personnel to enter the country.
It has been said that RES ‘production is as much based upon services as 
upon hardware.’152 This especially holds true for those services that can take 
place in Mode 4 (movement of natural persons), such as scoping, engineering, 
147. Research Brief, ‘Investment in Renewable Energy Generates jobs - Supply of Skilled 
Workforce Needs to Catch Up’ (International Labour Organization & European Union, 
2011). <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---ifp_skills/documents/
publication/wcms_168354.pdf> accessed on 18/01/2017. P. 6-7.
148. Id.
149. Ibid. P. 7.
150. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 36.
151. Ibid. Pp. 36-37.
152. Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or Enhanced 
Disciplines?’ [2014] 5 Renewable Energy Law & Policy 40. P. 45.
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construction, and maintenance.153 A properly drafted provision on the entrance 
of key personnel can function as a bridge between obligations regarding the 
international trade in services, that are not enforceable by private investors, 
and obligations under IIA’s, that are enforceable by private investors through 
ISDS. Therefore, while there is very little arbitral practice regarding Art. 11 ECT, 
a properly drafted clause about key personnel may nonetheless significantly 
reduce barriers to RES investments.
In this regard, inspiration can perhaps be drawn from the articles on ‘key 
personnel’ and ‘contractual service suppliers and independent professionals’ 
of CETA Chapter 10.154 These provisions contain much more normative language 
thereby containing commitments well beyond best endeavours obligations. 
However, these provisions can be found in the chapter on ‘temporary entry and 
stay of natural persons for business purposes’ and not in the investment chapter. 
Therefore, they were most likely negotiated in the context of trade in services 
under Mode 4, which emphasises the interrelatedness of investment and trade 
in services.
6.5. Conclusion
After this review of the provisions of the ECT’s investment chapter that concern 
investment promotion, the fourth sub-question can now (partially) be answered. 
This question reads in full:
‘What does the current legal framework of the ECT concerning 
investment promotion and protection provide for?’
Since this chapter merely dealth with the ECT’s legal framework concerning 
investment promotion, I will only answer the sub-question with regards to 
investment promotion.
In the previous chapter it was argued that the ECT provides for a high level of 
investment protection but that these investment protection standards are not 
necessarily of significant influence on increased flows of FDI between contracting 
parties in the absence of investment promotion commitments. However, after 
having analyzed the investment promotion provisions, it becomes clear that 
153. Id.
154. Article 10.7 & 10.8, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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the ECT’s emphasis is on post-establishment investment protection rather than 
investment promotion and liberalization. Some of the commitments undertaken 
by ECT contracting parties are rather hortatory in nature – i.e. being of best 
endeavours as is the case of investment liberalization – or they may completely 
subject a topic to national law, as is the case for the ability of key personnel 
to move cross-border. Even if the treaty may contain a potentially important 
provision, such as the one related to TRIMs, it may in practice be of little use to 
investors due to the way in which it is drafted. All in all, this means that foreign 
investors may be confronted with all sorts of pre-establishment investment 
barriers, such as domestic equity participation requirements or LCR’s. This may 
undermine the ability of foreign investors to enter new markets without having to 
overcome significant barriers. In turn, this means that the ECT may currently not 
be very well equipped to effectively facilitate RES investments.
 6
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7. CARVE-OUT AND EXCEPTIONS
The previous chapters discussed the substantive provisions of Part III of the 
treaty. In this chapter, several exceptions will be discussed. Although these are 
not located in Part III of the ECT, they can potentially affect the application of 
norms laid down in Part III.
Carve outs and exceptions are often included in IIA’s in order to balance the 
investors’ rights, as created through the investment protection standards, with 
the States’ right to regulate its domestic affairs.1 Exceptions may be used to 
justify measures that would otherwise be wrongful because they would, in the 
absence of the exception, violate the IIA while a carve out places a particular 
issue outside a tribunals’ jurisdiction.2 As such, they can have a significant impact 
on the application of the treaty.
In this chapter the taxation exception of Art. 21 will be discussed followed by an 
examination of the general exceptions of Art. 24 ECT.
7.1. TAXATION
Due to the existence of Art. 21 ECT, taxation measures are ‘largely outside 
the scope of the protections accorded’ for by the ECT.3 Given the fact that 
taxation measures, especially when applied disproportionately, can have a very 
significant impact on the economic viability of an investment, the carve out can 
have significant effects for investors that seek protection under the ECT.
1. Gloria Alvarez, ‘Article 21 – Taxation’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 290. Arno Gildemeister, ‘Investment Law 
and Taxation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International Investment Law – A Handbook 
(C.H. Beck 2015). P. 1678. Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Americas’ in Marc Bungenberg et 
al (eds.), International Investment Law – A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 214-215. 
Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) 
Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2018. Para. 191.
2. Constantino Grasso, ‘Article 24 – Exceptions’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary 
on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 322. Gloria Alvarez, ‘Article 24 – 
Exceptions’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward 
Elgar 2018). Pp. 327-329.
3. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 186.
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It has been said that Art. 21 ECT is ‘a provision of Byzantine complexity.’4 
Nevertheless, it will be discussed here since it can have a direct influence in 
ECT cases – as is evidenced by numerous awards in RES disputes. In fact, it 
has been said that the ECT’s taxation carve out is the reason that in some RES-
cases, claimants did not even invoke the ECT but relied on another applicable 
IIA instead.5
7.1.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Before comparing the Art. 21 ECT to other tax carve outs in IIA’s, the provision 
itself will be briefly explained.
The first paragraph of Art. 21 ECT provides that:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in this 
Treaty shall create rights or impose obligations with respect to 
Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties. In the event of any 
inconsistency between this Article and any other provision of the 
Treaty, this Article shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.”
On the basis of this provision, taxation measures are exclusively governed by 
Art. 21 and, unless Art. 21 specifies to the contrary, provisions of Part III of the 
ECT regarding investment protection do not apply.6
A definition ‘taxation measures’ can be found in Art. 21(7)(a), which reads the 
following:
“(i) any provision relating to taxes of the domestic law of the 
Contracting Party or of a political subdivision thereof or a local 
authority therein; and
(ii) any provision relating to taxes of any convention for the avoidance 
or double taxation or of any other international agreement or 
arrangement by which the Contracting Party is bound.”
4. Id. See also: Gloria Alvarez, ‘Article 21 – Taxation’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary 
on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). Pp. 297-298.
5. Joe Tirado, ‘Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ 
[2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 21.
6. Thomas Roe & Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011). P. 187.
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According to Roe and Happold, the fact that Art. 21(7)(a) ECT refers to national 
law is unfortunate since it potentially provides ECT contracting parties with a 
loophole in the ECT which might be ‘open to abuse.’7
Despite the fact that taxation measures are exclusively governed by Art. 21, the 
provision touches upon three investment protection standards found in Part III 
of the ECT.
On the basis of Art. 21(3) ECT, the NT and MFN obligations of Arts. 10(2) and (7) 
ECT do apply to taxation measures, with the exception of taxation measures on 
income and capital. It has been said that the exclusion of these specific taxation 
measures can be explained ‘by the fact that double taxation agreements usually 
cover taxes on income and capital, so the intention was to avoid conflict between 
the provisions of such agreements and Articles 10(2) and (7) of the ECT.’8
Other limitations of the applicability of the NT and MFN obligations in relation to 
taxation measures can be found in Arts. 21(3)(a) and (b), which provide for the 
following:
“(a) impose most favoured nation obligations with respect to 
advantages accorded by a Contracting Party pursuant to the tax 
provisions of any convention, agreement or arrangement described 
in subparagraph (7)(a)(ii) or resulting from membership of any 
Regional Economic Integration Organization; or
(b) any Taxation Measure aimed at ensuring the effective collection 
of taxes, except where the measure arbitrarily discriminates against 
an Investor of another Contracting Party or arbitrarily restricts 
benefits accorded under the Investment provisions of this Treaty.”
Expropriation is also addressed in Art. 21 ECT. This one is quite important 
since Art. 21(5)(a) essentially contains a ‘claw back’ provision in relation to 
expropriation by stating that ‘Article 13 shall apply to taxes.’9 However, Art. 
21(5)(b) lays down a procedure that has to be followed in expropriation cases 
7. Id.
8. Ibid. P. 189.
9. Arno Gildemeister, ‘Investment Law and Taxation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 1685.
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involving taxation measures. According to Roe and Happold, ‘what paragraph 
5(a) gives substantively, paragraph 5(b) takes away procedurally.’10 In essence, 
expropriation claims will have to be referred to a ‘competent tax authority’ that 
will have to review ‘whether the tax is an expropriation or whether the tax is 
discriminatory.’11 In the case that neither the investor nor the respondent State 
makes such a referral, ‘bodies called upon to settle dispute pursuant to’ Art. 
26 or 27 ECT will have make such a referral.12 According to Art. 21(7)(c) ECT 
a competent tax authority’ is defined as ‘the competent authority pursuant 
to a double taxation agreement in force between the Contracting Parties or, 
when no such agreement is in force, the minister or ministry responsible for 
taxes or their authorized representatives.’ Hence, when an investor argues that 
taxation measures expropriated its investment, the national tax authority may 
become involved in the dispute. However, the tribunal ‘may take into account 
any conclusions arrived at by the Competent Tax Authority regarding whether 
the tax is an expropriation.’13 These conclusions are therefore not binding upon 
the tribunal. Kolo has described the ECT’s compromise between expropriation 
and taxation as protecting ‘bona fide host state taxing power while also safe 
guarding bona fide claims by foreign investors.’14
The third provision of Part III of the ECT that is addressed in Art. 21 relates to Art. 
14 about the transfer of funds. As clarified by Art. 21(6) ECT, ‘[f]or the avoidance 
of doubt, Article 14 shall not limit the right of a Contracting Party to impose or 
collect a tax by withholding or other means.’ According to Wälde and Kolo, ‘the 
phrase ‘or by other means’ leaves the door wide open for a host state to decide 
on the type of taxes to impose on capital transfers.’15
The ECT is most definitely not the only IIA with a taxation carve out, although 
the exact content of such carve outs can differ considerably.16 A study by Davie 
10. Ibid. P. 191.
11. Article 21(5)(b)(i), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
12. Id.
13. Ibid. Article 21(5)(b)(ii).
14. Abba Kolo, ‘Tax “Veto” as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue In Investor-State 
Arbitration: Need for Reassessment?’ [2009] 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 475. P. 
492.
15. Thomas W. Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Coverage of Taxation under Modern Investment Treaties’ 
in Peter Muchlinski et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press 2008). P. 334.
16. Matthew Davie, ‘Taxation-Based Investment Treaty Claims’ [2015] 6 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 202. P. 210.
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shows that most taxation carve outs in IIA’s exclude the MFN obligation with 
regards to double taxation treaties.17 According to the UNCTAD, these MFN 
exceptions for double taxation treaties allow States to give tax benefits to investors 
from one country without the obligation to extend such preferential treatment, 
which is often the result of a bilateral negotiation process where concessions 
might have been obtained in return, to investors of third States.18
The differences of the scope of tax carve outs in IIA’s are quite significant. 
They range from a complete exclusion of taxation measures from the scope of 
the treaty on the one hand.19 To IIA’s where taxation measures can infringe all 
investment protection standards, perhaps with the sole exception of the MFN 
obligation to double taxation treaties, on the other hand.20 Davie has said about 
IIA’s based on the Netherlands Model BIT, for instance, that ‘they are probably 
the IIA’s which are most conducive to taxation based investment claims.’21 
Treaties like the ECT and NAFTA are somewhere in between these approaches: 
there are exceptions with regards to NT and MFN, FET is completely excluded 
in relation to taxation, but taxation measures that amount to expropriation may 
still violate the IIA subject to certain conditions.22
17. Ibid. P. 216-217. Arno Gildemeister, ‘Investment Law and Taxation’ in Marc Bungenberg et 
al (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 1682.
18. UNCTAD, Taxation (United Nations 2000). Pp. 33-36. Thomas W. Wälde & Abba Kolo, 
‘Coverage of Taxation under Modern Investment Treaties’ in Peter Muchlinski et al (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 
325-326.
19. Matthew Davie, ‘Taxation-Based Investment Treaty Claims’ [2015] 6 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 202. P. 217. Article 11(3), Agreement Between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the Russian Federation 
Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Denmark-Russia) 
(adopted 04/11/1993, entered into force 26/08/1996). Article 2(4), Colombia Model BIT, 
2008.
20. Matthew Davie, ‘Taxation-Based Investment Treaty Claims’ [2015] 6 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 202. P. 217.
21. Id. See for example: Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits, Conocophillips Petrozuata 
B.V., Conocophillips Hamaca B.V. and Conocophillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, 2013. Paras. 313-315.
22. Id. Article 2103, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-
Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994). Abba Kolo, ‘Tax “Veto” 
as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue In Investor-State Arbitration: Need 
for Reassessment?’ [2009] 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 475. P. 478. Arno 
Gildemeister, ‘Investment Law and Taxation’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law – A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 1683.
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7.1.2. ECT Arbitral Practice
Various ECT tribunals have touched upon Art. 21 ECT, including many tribunals 
in RES disputes. Some of these tribunals primarily repeated the words and scope 
of Art. 21.23
Perhaps the most remarkable interpretation of Art. 21 ECT was provided by the 
Yukos tribunal, which somewhat deviated from the text of the provision. In these 
cases, the Russian authorities had imposed massive tax bills upon the investors 
and the question that the tribunal had to answer was whether the investment 
protection standards still applied given the tax exclusion of Art. 21. The tribunal 
would eventually conclude that it had jurisdiction over expropriation claims, as 
well as over claims under Art. 10 ECT since the taxation measures at hand were 
not bona fide taxation measures.24 The tribunal put forward two arguments in 
favor of this. Firstly, it held that despite the taxation carve out of Art. 21(1) ECT, 
it still had jurisdiction over expropriation claims due to the ‘claw back’ provision 
of Art. 21(5) ECT.25 Secondly, the tribunal also came to the conclusion that the 
entire carve out of Art. 21 ECT did not apply in the case since it only applies to 
cases where a host State was exercising its bona fide tax powers.26 In the Yukos 
cases, the conduct of the Russian authorities was not an exercise of bona fide 
tax powers, but rather an exercise intended ‘to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate 
its valuable assets.’27
Most ECT tribunals in Spanish RES cases also addressed Art. 21 ECT because 
investors complained, amongst others, about a 7 percent taxation measure 
imposed on generators of electrical energy.28 Tribunals have, however, held 
consistently that they lack jurisdiction over this measure due to Art. 21 ECT.29 In 
23. Award, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
2008. Para. 266.
24. Final Award, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 2014. Paras. 1405-1407. Final Award, Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/
AA227, 2014. Paras. 1405-1407. Final Award, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The 
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 2014. Paras. 1405-1407.
25. Ibid. Paras. 1409-1429.
26. Ibid. Paras. 1430-1446.
27. Ibid. Para. 756.
28. Article 8, Law 15/2012, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 312, 2012. P. 88081. Joe Tirado, 
‘Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ [2015] 12 
Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 7.
29. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum, Cube Infrastructure 
Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 2019. Paras. 
221-233. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. 
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Eiser v. Spain, the tribunal refused to explicitly endorse the position of the Yukos 
tribunal that Art. 21 only applies in cases of bona fide taxation measures – it 
simply held that it did not need to rule on this aspect since the tribunal held 
that the ‘power to tax is a core sovereign power that should not be questioned 
lightly.’30 The analysis of the Eiser tribunal was received with approval in the 
Masdar v. Spain and 9REN Holding v. Spain cases.31 The Antin v. Spain tribunal 
contrasted the facts in the case at hand with the extreme circumstances of the 
Yukos case.32 In Isolux v. Spain and Cube Infrastructure v. Spain, the tribunals 
shared the view of the Yukos tribunal concerning the bona fide requirement, 
although they still declined jurisdiction because the 7 percent tax was viewed 
as a taxation measure that was adopted in good faith.33
In some Italian RES cases, investors also complain about taxation measures.34 
In 2008, a so-called ‘Robin Hood tax’ was adopted, that was supposed to 
address windfall profits made by energy companies.35 When the revenues of 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 272. Award, Masdar Solar & 
Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, 2018. Para. 295. 
Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. 
v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 323. Final Award, Foresight 
Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R.L., Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 S.Á.R.L., Greentech Energy 
System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I S.P.A and GWM Renewable Energy II S.P.A v. 
Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150), 2018. Para. 247. Decision on Responsibility 
and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-
European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 
2018. Paras. 185-191. Award, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/15, 2019. Para. 207. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Quantum Principles, 
NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11, 2019. Paras. 372-373.
30. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 270.
31. Award, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/1, 2018. Para. 294. Award, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/15/15, 2019. Para. 207.
32. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. 
v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 322.
33. Final Award, Isolux Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case V2013/153, 2016. 
Paras. 733-741. Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum, Cube 
Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20, 
2019. Para. 225.
34. Saverio Massari, ‘The Italian Photovoltaics Sector in Two Practical Cases: How to Create 
an Unfavorable Investment Climate in Renewables’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute 
Management 1. P. 9.
35. Final Award, Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment 
(SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. V 
2015/095, 2018. Paras. 162-166.
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the investor exceeded a certain threshold the tax measure was applied. Although 
RES investors, including PV, biomass and wind energy, were initially excluded 
from the scope of the measure, this changed in 2011.36 In Greentech v. Italy, the 
tribunal nevertheless refused to accept jurisdiction over such a measure as did 
the tribunal in CEF Energia v. Italy.37
Likewise, investors in the Czech PV sector were also confronted with several 
taxation measures, including a so-called ‘Solar Levy’.38 This levy applied in 
relation to both FIT’s (26 percent) and green bonuses (28 percent). The tax 
‘was withheld by the grid operator who paid the FIT’ or green bonuses to the 
RES generators that produced electricity.39 The Solar Levy was extended two 
years after its introduction, although the tax rate was reduced and in effect, this 
measure reduced revenues for RES investors.40 In the Czech Republic a tax 
exemption for RES producers under the Income Tax Act was also withdrawn, 
although only with prospective effects.41 In the Antaris v. Czech Republic case, 
the tribunal held that the application of Art. 21 depended on a two-step analysis: 
‘a characterization under domestic law followed by an application of Article 21’s 
inherent limits.’42 What makes the Czech taxation measures more complicated 
is that different views exist with regards to the qualification of the Solar Levy as 
a taxation measure under Czech law.43 In line with the highest domestic courts, 
the Antaris tribunal held that the ‘Solar Levy’, although labelled a levy, was not 
a taxation measure since, in substance, it reduced the FIT for a very specific 
group of investors rather than raising revenues for the State by being imposed 
36. Id.
37. Ibid. Para. 175. Award, CEF Energia B.V. v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, 
2019. Paras. 204-205.
38. Anna de Luca, ‘Renewable Energy in the EU, the Energy Charter Treaty, and Italy’s 
Withdrawal Therefrom’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. Pp. 3-4. Joe 
Tirado, ‘Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ [2015] 
12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 8. Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael 
Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, 2018. Paras. 96-100.
39. Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-01, 2018. Paras. 96-100.
40. Ibid. Para. 102. See also: Final Award, Jürgen Wirtgen, Stefan Wirtgen, Gisela Wirtgen and 
JSW Solar (zwei) GmbH & Co. KG v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-03, 2017. Paras. 
48-52.
41. Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-01, 2018. Para. 100.
42. Ibid. Para. 224.
43. Ibid. Paras. 225-243.
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across the board.44 Hence, the tribunal concluded that the Solar Levy did not 
fall within the scope of Art. 21.45
The same test was applied by the arbitral tribunal in the PV Investors v. 
Czech Republic cases in relation to the same Solar Levy.46 The tribunal first 
ascertained the domestic law nature of the alleged taxation measure followed 
by an examination of whether the measures fell within the ‘inherent limits’ of Art. 
21 ECT.47 Importantly, the tribunal held that Art. 21 ‘was not intended to exclude 
from the ECT’s scope measures the main objective of which was other than that 
of the raising of general revenue for the State,and which were formulated and 
structured as taxation measures for a particular ulterior reason (such as, here, 
reducing the risk of legal challenges).’48 Since the tribunal found that the Solar 
Levy was not a taxation measure under Czech law and was adopted – not with 
the primary purpose of raising revenue for the State – but rather to reduce the 
FIT for specific investors, the tribunal found that the Solar Levy did not fall under 
the scope of Art. 21 ECT.
7.1.3. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
As already becomes clear from the discussion of ECT case law, RES investors in 
various countries have been confronted with a wide variety of taxation measures 
which makes Art. 21 ECT highly relevant for RES investors.49 In fact, the presence 
44. Ibid. Paras. 243 & 252.
45. Ibid. Para. 252.
46. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-21, 2019. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 
2019. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-19, 2019.
47. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Paras. 296-311. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Paras. 237-252. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech 
Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Paras. 248-263. Award, WA Investments-Europa 
Nova Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Paras. 315-330.
48. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 313. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 254. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 265. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 332. Footnote omitted.
49. Anna de Luca, ‘Renewable Energy in the EU, the Energy Charter Treaty, and Italy’s 
Withdrawal Therefrom’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. Pp. 3-4. Joe 
Tirado, ‘Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ [2015] 
12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 21. Saverio Massari, ‘The Italian Photovoltaics 
Sector in Two Practical Cases: How to Create an Unfavorable Investment Climate in 
Renewables’ [2015] 12 Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 9.
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of Art. 21 ECT has been named as a reason that in the JSW Solar v. Czech 
Republic case, the German investors merely invoked the Germany-Czech 
Republic BIT because it does not contain a provision comparable to Art. 21 
ECT.50
From the cases above, several things can be concluded. Firstly, it is important 
– though not dispositive – that the taxation measure qualified as such under the 
domestic law of the respondent. Secondly, if the measure qualifies as a taxation 
measure and it is applied bona fide, the investor faces an uphill battle to establish 
that Art. 21 does not apply. Thirdly, and particularly the Yukos, Antaris, and the 
PV Investors v. Czech Republic cases pay testimony to this, measures adopted 
under the header ‘taxation’, but which aim to achieve a very different goal than 
raising general revenue for the State may not qualify for exemption under the 
Art. 21 carve out.
As held by the Yukos tribunals:
“Article 21 of the ECT can apply only to bona fide taxation actions, 
i.e., actions that are motivated for the purpose of raising general 
revenue for the State. By contrast, actions that are taken only 
“under the guise” of taxation, but in reality aim to achieve an entirely 
unrelated purpose (such as the destruction of a company or the 
elimination of a political opponent) […] cannot qualify for exemption 
from the protection standards of the ECT under the taxation carve-
out in Article 21(1).”51
More specifically in the context of reducing FIT’s, the Antaris tribuneld held:
“[…] the Tribunal concludes that the Solar Levy does not fall within 
the scope of Article 21 of the ECT. In this regard are of particular 
importance statements made in connection with the enactment of 
50. Final Award, Jürgen Wirtgen, Stefan Wirtgen, Gisela Wirtgen and JSW Solar (zwei) 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-03, 2017. Para. 68. Joe Tirado, 
‘Renewable Energy Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview’ [2015] 12 
Transnational Dispute Management 1. P. 20.
51. Final Award, Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, 2014. Paras. Para. 1431. Final Award, Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-04/
AA227, 2014. Para. 1431. Final Award, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian 
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228, 2014. Para. 1431.
 7
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   327 04/12/2019   11:36:28
328
Chapter 7
the Solar Levy […] These statements clearly show that the Solar 
Levy’s principal objective was a reduction in the level of the FiTs 
payable to certain solar investors, and not the raising of revenue; 
they also show that the Solar Levy was structured, in many respects, 
as a tax in order to reduce the risk of claims against the Czech 
Republic under international law.”52
When comparing the taxation measures in the Czech cases vis-à-vis those in 
Italy and Spain, of particular relevance is whether the measure are imposed to 
a specific group of investors alone, such as PV investors in the Czech Republic, 
or whether the measures are applied across the board in the electricity sector, 
as was the case in Spain, or even to a broader category, namely the entire 
energy sector as was the case in Italy. This means that if a measure targets 
exclusively RES investors with the purpose of reducing financial support, ECT 
arbitral practice demonstrates that Art. 21 ECT does not necessarily apply.53
7.2. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
The final provision of the ECT that will be examined in this chapter is Art. 24, 
which contains the general exceptions of the ECT. Like Art. 21, it is not a provision 
that investors can invoke, but rather one on which States can rely to argue that 
certain investment provisions do not apply to a particular case.
Contrary to Art 21 ECT, which contains a specific tax carve out, the exceptions 
of Art. 24 are of a more general nature and are more comparable with the 
exceptions of the WTO Agreements, as laid down in Arts. XX and XXI GATT 
and Arts. XIV and XIV bis of the GATS.
Despite the fact that Art. 24 ECT has never been invoked in practice, which also 
explains why the section on ECT arbitral practice is omitted, and several leading 
textbooks do not even touch upon this issue, the provision may have an impact 
in practice. Hence, it will be briefly discussed.
52. Award, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-01, 2018. Para. 252.
53. Award, I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-22, 
2019. Para. 321. Award, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech Republic, PCA 
Case No. 2014-21, 2019. Para. 262. Award, Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, 2019. Para. 273. Award, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
The Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, 2019. Para. 340.
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7.2.1. Legal Comparison of IIA’s
Essentially, the exceptions of Art. 24 can be divided into three categories: the 
general exceptions, the essential security exception, and the exception to extend 
MFN treatment as a result of membership to a free trade area or customs union. 
These will be addressed in turn. As a preliminary remark, it is important to note 
that Art. 24(1) makes clear that the exceptions of Art. 24 do not apply to Arts. 12 
and 13 of the ECT, thereby excluding the applicability of the exceptions to the 
compensation for losses and expropriation provisions.
The general exceptions clause of the ECT can be found in Art. 24(2). Essentially, 
this provision allows contracting parties to adopt measures (1) necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health, (2) in emergency energy shortage 
situations, and (3) to benefit indigenous, economically or socially disadvantaged 
investors. With regards to the third category, Art. 24(2)(iii)(b) makes clear that ‘[s]
uch measures shall be duly motivated and shall not nullify or impair any benefit 
one or more other Contracting Parties may reasonably expect under this Treaty 
to an extent greater than strictly necessary to the stated end.’ Noteworthy is, 
however, that the exception related to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
does not apply – in a rather complicated manner – to Part III of the treaty as a 
whole.54 This means that measures adopted in the pursuit of said objectives have 
to comply with all the investment protection standards of the ECT. This clearly 
illustrates that envinromental considerations, although taken into account during 
the ECT negotiations, are clearly second to economic considerations related to 
investment.55
The essential security exception is contained in Art. 24(3) ECT and states that 
nothing in the ECT shall be ‘construed to prevent any Contracting Party from 
taking any measure which it considers necessary’ to protect its essential security 
interests or for the maintenance of public order.56 Although this exception can 
54. Cees Verburg, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty’ in Martha Roggenkamp et al (eds.), Energy Law 
and the Environment (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2020). P. 7.
55. See: Clare Shine, ‘Environmental Protection under the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas 
Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty – An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade 
(Kluwer Law International 1996). Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, 
Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’ [2001] 51 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 811. Antonia Layard, ‘The European Energy Charter 
Treaty: Tipping the Balance between Energy and the Environment’ [1995] 4 European 
Energy and Environmental Law Review 150.
56. Article 24(3) ECT reads as follows:
The provisions of this Treaty other than those referred to in paragraph (1) shall not be 
construed to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any measure which it considers 
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be found in IIA’s more often, the phrasing of such provisions differs from treaty 
to treaty.57
An important issue in relation to these exceptions is the question of whether or not 
the provision is self-judging in nature.58 The ECT, for example, clearly states that 
contracting parties may adopt measures ‘which it considers necessary’ to protect 
the security interests and the public order within its jurisdiction. In that regard, 
the ECT adopts the same approach as Art. XXI GATT.59 According to Salacuse, 
this ‘gives rise to the inference that the exception clause is self-judging.’60 In 
other IIA’s, such as the Argentina-US BIT, the exception does not include the 
phrase ‘which it considers necessary’, which would imply that the clause is not 
self-judging.61 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ touched upon this difference when 
comparing the security clause of GATT to the one found in the applicable treaty, 
the 1956 US-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation which 
does not contain the ‘which it considers necessary’ qualification:
“[…] the text of Article XXI of the [US-Nicaragua] Treaty does not 
employ the wording which was already to be found in Article XXI 
necessary:
(a) for the protection of its essential security interests including those
(i) relating to the supply of Energy Materials and Products to a military establishment; or
(ii) taken in time of war, armed conflict or other emergency in international relations;
(b) relating to the implementation of national policies respecting the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or needed to fulfil its obligations 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Guidelines, and other international nuclear non-proliferation obligations or understandings; 
or
(c) for the maintenance of public order.
 Such measure shall not constitute a disguised restriction on Transit
57. UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking 
(United Nations 2007). Pp. 83-87.
58. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). 
Pp. 344-345. Céline Lévesque & Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Evolution of IIA Practice in 
Canada and the United States’ in Armand de Mestral et al (eds.), Improving International 
Investment Agreements (Routledge 2013). P. 37. Gloria Alvarez, ‘Article 24 – Exceptions’ in 
Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 
328.
59. For legal practice under Art. XXI GATT, see: Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The 
Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press 2013). Pp. 
594-600.
60. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). Pp. 
344-345.
61. Article XI, Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (United States-
Argentina) (adopted 14/11/1991, entered into force 20/10/1994).
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of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This provision of 
GATT, contemplating exceptions to the normal implementation of 
the General Agreement, stipulates that the Agreement is not to be 
construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it “considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests”, in such fields as nuclear fission, arms, etc. 
The 1956 Treaty, on the contrary, speaks simply of “necessary” 
measures, not of those considered by a party to be such.”62
In Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, a WTO Panel held that 
the clause of Art. XXI GATT was not ‘totally self-judging’ but should rather be 
interpreted and applied in good faith.63 The good faith standard of review finds 
further support in arbitral practice and literature.64
Another important aspect relates to the question of whether the essential security 
and public order exceptions merely apply to cases of war and civil unrest, or 
also severe economic crises.65 In the LG&E v. Argentina case, for example, the 
tribunal held:
“The Tribunal rejects the notion that Article XI [Note: the essential 
security and public order exception of the US-Argentina BIT] is 
only applicable in circumstances amounting to military action and 
war. Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called 
for immediate, decisive action to restore civil order and stop the 
economic decline. To conclude that such a severe economic crisis 
could not constitute an essential security interest is to diminish 
the havoc that the economy can wreak on the lives of an entire 
population and the ability of the Government to lead. When a State’s 
62. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. Para. 222. See also: Article XXI(1)
(d), Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Nicaragua-United States) (adopted 
21/01/1956, entered into force 24/05/1958).
63. Report of the Panel, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, 2019. 
Paras. 7.102 & 7.132.
64. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006. Para. 214. Andrew Newcombe & 
Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 
Law International 2009). P. 494.
65. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010). P. 
345.
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economic foundation is under siege, the severity of the problem can 
equal that of any military invasion.”66
This is an important finding considering that investment disputes involving 
particular countries have primarily arisen after a severe economic crisis, a prime 
example of this would be Argentina.67 A notable difference between the essential 
security exceptions of the ECT and the US-Argentina BIT is that the former 
contains the limitative ‘objective circumstances’ under which it may be invoked 
while the latter does not.68
The final exception contained in Art. 24 ECT can be found in the fourth 
paragraph.69 On the basis of this provision, there is no obligation to extend MFN 
treatment to investors of any other contracting party as a result of membership of 
a free trade area or customs union. Similar provisions can be found in the Model 
BIT’s of various States, such as Austria, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, 
the UK, and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union.70 The reason behind this 
exclusion is comparable to the reason that the MFN treatment obligation usually 
does not apply in relation to taxation measures: the membership of free trade 
areas or customs unions is usually obtained after a carefull negotiation exercise 
where concessions were given and obtained in return and an unfettered MFN 
obligation would simply extend these advantages to third State nationals, which 
66. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006. Para. 238.
67. Note: arbitral practice in Argentina cases with regards to the state of necessity has, 
however, not been consistent. See: Michael Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID 
Arbitration: CMS and LG&E ’ [2007] 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 637. P. 643. 
Stephan W. Schill, ‘International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle 
Economic Crises - Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v Argentina’ [2007] 24 
Journal of International Arbitration 265. P. 278.
68. Report of the Panel, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, 2019. 
Para. 7.101.
69. Article 24(4) ECT reads as follows:
The provisions of this Treaty which accord most favoured nation treatment shall not 
oblige any Contracting Party to extend to the Investors of any other Contracting Party any 
preferential treatment:
(a) resulting from its membership of a free-trade area or customs union; or
(b) which is accorded by a bilateral or multilateral agreement concerning economic co-
operation between states that were constituent parts of the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics pending the establishment of their mutual economic relations on a definitive 
basis.
70. Article 3(4)(b), Austria Model BIT, 2008. Article 3(2), Sweden Model BIT, 2002. Article 
III(3), Italy Model BIT, 2003. Article 3(3), Netherlands Model BIT, 2004. Article 3(3), 
Germany Model BIT, 2008. Article 7(1)(a), UK Model BIT, 2008. Article 4(3), Belgo-
Luxembourg Model BIT, 2002.
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might be undesirable. For instance, in the absence of this exception, EU member 
States would have to give the advantages resulting from EU membership to the 
investors from non-EU ECT contracting parties without obtaining anything in 
return.
7.2.2. Relevance for Renewable Energy Investors
Despite the fact that Art. 24 ECT has never been invoked in practice, this does 
not exclude its relevance for RES investors since the most standards of treatment 
are not applicable in cases where a host State successfully invokes Art. 24.71
This will be illustrated by examples of cases where States might invoke both 
one of the general exceptions as well as the essential security and public order 
exception.
The general exceptions clause, which cannot be relied upon by States when 
implementing environmental measures, may be relevant for RES investors 
– although most likely not for purposes of the ECT. In the NAFTA RES case 
Windstream Energy v. Canada, the authorities in Ontario had imposed a 
moratorium on offshore wind projects. This decision was partially ‘based on the 
information available at the time and applying the precautionary principle, that 
Ontario lacked the science necessary to inform the regulatory changes required 
to allow large-scale offshore wind development to proceed while ensuring 
protection of human health and the environment.’72 In particular, there were 
concerns about ‘noise emissions, disturbance of benthic life forms, navigation, 
potential structure failure or safety hazards and decommissioning.’73 In the eyes 
of the Canadian Minister the most pressing concern, however, was related to 
the effect that the construction of 100 turbines would have on Ontario’s drinking 
water and how long these effects might last.74 In addition, the drinking water 
concerns had ‘cross-jurisdictional implications’ and involved concerns regarding 
Canada’s international obligations vis-à-vis the US on the basis of various treaties 
concerning the Great Lakes.75
71. Gloria Alvarez, ‘Article 24 – Exceptions’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). Pp. 328-329.
72. Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA 
Case No. 2013-22, 2015. Para. 252.
73. Ibid. Para. 255.
74. Id.
75. Ibid. Para. 256.
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This case demonstrates that environmental concerns and legislation may affect 
the development of RES projects, even though States cannot use it to avoid 
international liability in ECT cases where it amounts to a violation of the treaty.76
In relation to the essential security and public order exceptions, Art. 24 might 
affect RES investors when an ECT tribunal accepts a line of reasoning similar 
to the LG&E v. Argentina tribunal on the basis of which severe economic crises 
might be included under this exception.77
In Spain, for example, many of the regulatory measures that affected RES 
investors and gave rise to so many ECT disputes, were adopted partially as a 
response to the economic crisis that hit the country after 2008.78 The preamble of 
one of the measures that adversely affected PV investors in Spain, for example, 
explicitly stated that ‘in the current context of crisis and tariff deficiency, it remains 
justified that the generators contribute to the costs attributable to the investments 
[…]’.79 Although the economic crisis of Spain in the wake of 2008 was perhaps 
not as severe as the Argentine crisis of the turn of this century, the fact that Art. 
24(3) ECT is self-judging – contrary to similar provisions in some Argentine BIT’s 
– may have significant implications for investors as breaches of the FET standard 
may be justified on the basis of Art. 24(3) ECT. Much would depend of course on 
the interpretation and application given to this provision by ECT tribunals, which 
until this day lies dormant.80
76. In the Windstream Energy v. Canada case, the tribunal held that ‘[t]he Tribunal is unable 
to find that the Government of Ontario’s decision to impose a moratorium on offshore 
wind development, or the process that led to it, were in themselves wrongful.’ Although 
the tribunal also noted that ‘the evidence before the Tribunal suggests that the decision 
to impose the moratorium was not only driven by the lack of science.’ See: Award, 
Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, 2016. Paras. 
376 & 377.
77. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc 
.v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 2006. Para. 238.
78. Iñigo del Guayo Castiella, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources by Regions: The 
Case of the Spanish Autonomous Communities’ in Marjan Peeters et al (eds.), Renewable 
Energy Law in the EU – Legal Perspectives on Bottom-Up Approaches (Edward Elgar 
2014). P. 67. Iñigo del Guayo, ‘Energy Law in Spain’ in Martha M. Roggenkamp et al (eds.), 
Energy Law in Europe – National, EU and International Regulation (Oxford University Press 
2016). P. 1033.
79. The preamble of Royal Decree Law 14/2010 was quoted in the ECT Charanne v. 
Spain case. See: Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction 
Investments v. Spain, SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 167.
80. See for example: Final Award, Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/063, 2018. Para. 
352.




This chapter addressed certain exceptions contained in the ECT that may affect 
the application of the investment chapter. In practice, Art. 21 ECT contains the 
most relevant exception for RES investors, as was demonstrated by reference 
to RES investment disputes arising in Spain, the Czech Republic, and Italy. 
Since RES investors in all these three countries were confronted with taxation 
measures that de facto reduced financial support, Art. 21 ECT potentially 
contains a loophole. However, arbitral practice seems to mitigate these concers. 
In particular the Yukos and Antaris cases demonstrate that taxation measures 
which aim to achieve a very different goal than raising general revenue for the 
State may not qualify for exemption under Art. 21 ECT.
Contrary to Art. 21, the general exceptions clause of Art. 24 ECT has not yet 
played a role in practice. Nevertheless, in particular Art. 24(3) could be invoked 
by countries that adopted measures in times of economic distress, as happened 
in the Spanish RES cases. By reference to the public order exception of Art. 
24(3)(c) ECT – and the fact that the chapeau of Art. 24(3) is ‘self-judging’ – a 
respondent could try to justify measures that would otherwise violate Art. 10 ECT.
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8.1. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THE ECT
In the previous chapters, the existing legal framework was extensively analyzed. 
After this analysis, and in light of the considerations addressed in chapters 2 and 
3, the following shortcomings can be identified:
· As a general remark, the ECT’s current legal framework does 
provide for investment protection but provisions regarding investment 
promotion are largely lacking. In that regard, the ECT currently only 
provides for investment promotion through protection. However, for a 
legal framework to facilitate RES investments, more comprehensive 
commitments would be desirable since empirical research shows 
that IIA’s that merely provide for investment protection merely have a 
marginal effect on flows of FDI.1
· Regarding Art. 10(1) ECT, the provision that contains the most 
important standards of treatment. The current provision already 
provides investors with quite extensive rights that they can invoke 
vis-à-vis the host State. For example, in ECT arbitral practice it 
is firmly established that the FET standard protects legitimate 
expectations of investors. Also, the non-impairment standard 
prohibits unreasonable measures that impair an investment. Finally, 
by virtue of the umbrella clause, contractual commitments are 
protected under the treaty. In that sense, a higher level of investment 
protection is not necessary, especially given the fact that the 
ECT already provides for a high level of investment protection in 
comparison to other IIA’s and especially in comparison to recent 
IIA’s. Rather, the standards laid down in Art. 10(1) can be improved 
by providing more clarity, which would enhance legal certainty of the 
ECT. For example, both the FET standard and the non-impairment 
standard contain vague and ambiguous language which might 
make it difficult to predict the outcome of a claim based on these 
provisions. Taking into account that these standards are important 
1. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence (Winnipeg, mb: iisd, 2017). Pp. 3-4. <https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/
publications/assessing-impacts-investment-treaties.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018> 
accessed on 09/06/2019.
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for investors, especially in those cases where governmental 
interference does not come close to expropriation, more clarity and 
predictability should be welcomed.
· With regards to Arts. 10(2) and (3) ECT, the lack of pre-
establishment rights is a shortcoming in the ECT. Currently, ECT 
contracting parties are under no obligation what so ever to admit 
foreign energy investors. This means that the treaty does little to 
reduce barriers to investment. The inclusion of pre-establishment 
rights on the basis of NT and MFN and/or the inclusion of market 
access rules would contribute to the ECT as a facilitator of RES 
investments.
· In relation to Art. 10(11) ECT, the fact that RES investors can only 
challenge TRIM’s if they are imposed upon them when they are 
already established in a jurisdiction is a shortcoming. In a sector 
where FDI is to a significant extent regulatory driven, this means that 
RES investors are currently unable to contest LCR’s in RES policy 
schemes if these rules are adopted prior to when the investment was 
made. This means that investors can do little to reduce barriers to 
investment, even if these are discriminatory in nature.
· Pertaining to Art. 11 ECT, the lack of international commitments 
under the current ECT framework with regards to the entrance of 
key personnel is a shortcoming. In the RES sector expertise, both 
technical and non-technical, is of profound importance to ensure 
the success of an investment. Currently, however, the ECT does not 
impose any legally binding commitments upon contracting parties 
to allow foreign investors the entrance of their personnel on their 
territory. The same holds true with regards to persons that seek to 
render services to investments.
· Touching upon Art. 13 ECT, the main shortcoming is the fact 
that the ECT does not contain any textual guidance on where to 
draw the line between indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
government regulation. This does not mean, however, that Art. 13 
ECT suffers from the same level of unpredictability as Art. 10(1) ECT. 
Quite the contrary, it seems that the provision has been interpreted 
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and applied in a rather consistent manner. Nevertheless, it is not 
unlikely that, if the provision would be negotiated today, it would be 
accompanied with an interpretive annex that can nowadays be found 
in many new IIA’s.
· FInally, the tax carve-out of Art. 21 ECT may prove to be a 
loophole in the ECT that may be open to abuse by host States. 
The main exception to this rule is that taxation measures that are 
expropriatory may still violate the ECT. However, the threshold of 
liability under Art. 13 ECT is very high and will in cases of bona fide 
taxation measures most likely not be reached. This means that under 
the current ECT framework, States may for instance not be allowed 
to reduce FIT’s if this is in violation of any legitimate expectations 
that are protected under the treaty, yet they may impose taxes on 
investors that may yield the same result.
This chapter will analyze what improvements could be implemented in the ECT 
with the aim of facilitating RES investments, all of this again in light of the topics 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3. In line with the separation made throughout this 
dissertation, investment protection and promotion will be addressed in turn.
8.2. INVESTMENT PROTECTION
As became clear from the previous chapters, Part III of the ECT provides for a 
relatively high level of investment protection, in particular in comparison to more 
recent IIA’s. Also, due to the vague nature of certain provisions, the treaty has 
not been applied consistently which undermines legal certainty under the treaty.
As stated in chapter 1, the contracting parties to the ECT are currently in the 
process of modernizing the ECT. Since the Energy Charter Conference indicated 
that current main ‘international trends’ will be taken as ‘primary reference’ for 
the modernization process, the practice in certain new IIA’s is a good indication 
for the direction that the modernization process will take regarding investment 
protection.2 In fact, the EU, which will be represented in the modernization 
2. Energy Charter Secretariat, Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> As Accessed 
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process by the European Commission and also negotiate on behalf of the 
Member States, has already indicated it believes that its approach, as evidenced 
in treaties with Canada, Vietnam, Singapore, and Mexico, should also be adopted 
in the context of the ECT.3
In practice, this will most likely mean that the contracting parties will attempt to 
achieve an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, effective standards 
of investment protection while, on the other hand, ensuring that the host States’ 
right to regulate is respected.4 Given the fact that the approach adopted in recent 
IIA’s concluded by the EU provides for more clarity on standards of investment 
protection that have given rise to inconsistent decisions in ECT arbitration, it 
will address one of the major identified shortcomings in the ECT current legal 
framework.
Nevertheless, adopting such an approach could have significant consequences 
for RES investors. Recent IIA’s often contain less investment protection standards, 
in particular the non-impairment obligation, umbrella clause, and effective means 
clause are seemingly out of fashion. Furthermore, standards that are retained, 
such as FET, MCPS, indirect expropriation, NT, and MFN are often more clearly 
defined which does not only enhance legal certainty but it often also leads to a 
lower level of investment protection.
As was seen in chapter 5.2, the FET standard is in practice the most important 
investment protection standard for RES investors and more specifically the 
protection of legitimate expectations. However, when looking at the approaches 
adopted in more recent IIA’s, regardless of whether one takes the EU’s approach 
of explicitly spelling out the content of the FET standard or, alternatively, ties 
the FET standard to the international minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law, these do not necessarily protect the investors’ 
legitimate expectations.5 In addition to that, the CPTPP, EU IIA’s and also the 2019 
on 17/12/2018.
3. Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating Directives for the Modernisation of the Energy 
Charter Treaty’ (2019, 9305/19). P. 3. European Commission, ‘Recommendation for a 
Council Decision Authorising the Entering Into Negotiations on the Modernization of the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ (COM(2019) 231 final, 14/05/2019). P. 2.
4. Indeed, the list of approved topics for modernization does not only include the standards 
of investment protection, but it also makes reference to the right to regulate, sustainable 
development, and corporate social responsibility.
5. See section 5.2.1. of this dissertation.
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Netherlands Model BIT specify that decisions not to issue, renew or maintain 
subsidies do not necessarily amount to a violation of the treaty.6
Since a modernized ECT will not only apply to RES investments, but also to 
energy investments whose activities might have to be phased out in light of 
climate change mitigation efforts and the energy transition, striking an appropriate 
balance is of profound importance.
Hence, instead of maintaining a FET standard that provides for a high level of 
investment protection for energy investments across the board, the contracting 
parties could consider including investment protection standards specifically 
targeting RES investments. Since ECT practice demonstrates that most RES 
investment disputes concern the reduction of financial support, which can 
significantly affect the economic viability of a RES project, these provisions 
would – ideally – protect the fundamental characteristics of support schemes. 
As identified by several ECT tribunals, these include financial support and priority 
dispatch.7 These aspects will be addressed in turn.
8.2.1. Financial Support
Concerning financial support, inspiration could be drawn from ECT jurisprudence. 
In Blusun v. Italy, the tribunal proposed the following standard of review:
‘In the absence of a specific commitment, the state has no obligation 
to grant subsidies such as feed-in tariffs, or to maintain them 
unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, and if 
it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a 
manner which is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative 
amendment, and should have due regard to the reasonable 
reliance interests of recipients who may have committed substantial 
resources on the basis of the earlier regime.’8
6. Article 2(4), Netherlands Model BIT, 2019. Article 9.6(5), Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 08/03/2018, entered into force 
30/12/2018). Article 8.9(3) & (4), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(European Union-Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
7. See section 8.1.2. below.
8. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 319(5).
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This standard of review in principle protects subsidies granted to RES investors 
although this protection is not absolute and leaves room for States’ to revise 
their support schemes if circumstances require. In such circumstances, a 
proportionality test should be used to ensure that a fair balance is reached 
between the public and private interests involved.
Since the EU is a frontrunner in the energy transition, inspiration could also be 
drawn from recent developments in EU energy law. The 2018 EU RES Directive 
for example contains a provision that is aimed at protecting the interests of RES 
investors with regard to the stability of financial support:
‘[…] Member States shall ensure that the level of, and the conditions 
attached to, the support granted to renewable energy projects are 
not revised in a way that negatively affects the rights conferred 
thereunder and undermines the economic viability of projects that 
already benefit from support.’9
This is an innovation in comparison to the earlier 2009 RES Directive, which 
did not contain a comparable provision. Hence, the very significant regulatory 
changes to support schemes, as seen in Spain for instance, were not contrary 
to EU energy law.
Furthermore, the article also makes clear that Member States may only adjust 
the level of support if this is done in accordance with objective criteria that are 
established in the original support scheme. This can prevent situations as were 
seen in the Spanish RES sector where a support scheme was replaced with a 
fundamentally different support scheme.
8.2.2. Priority Dispatch
Although a vast majority of the investment disputes involving RES investors 
concerned regulatory changes to financial support, the importance of priority 
dispatch cannot be overstated.10 For example, in the Charanne v. Spain case, the 
tribunal identified that the support scheme had two fundamental characteristics: 
9. Article 6(1), Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) 
[2018] OJ L328/82.
10. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 91-92.
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the presence of FITs ‘as well as the possibility to sell their electricity production to 
the system in priority.’11 In a similar vein, the Eiser v. Spain tribunal also identified 
priority dispatch as a feature of RD 661/2007 that allowed the investors to obtain 
a significant amount of non-recourse financing.12 Therefore, the importance of 
priority dispatch should not be overlooked.
In the recent reforms of the electricity markets in the EU, priority dispatch for 
RES producers was a contested issue.13 The European Commission proposed 
to remove priority dispatch for most new installations but refrain from applying 
the new standard to investments in existence at the time of entrance into force 
of the new regime, thereby respecting the rights of established investors even 
though not all stakeholders supported this view.14 In the end, the proposal of the 
Commission was largely maintained and one could say that this is the proper 
way to reform RES law: it would affect the situation of future RES investors 
without adversely affecting those RES investors that invested on the basis of the 
privileges existing at the time that such investments were made.15
For those RES regimes where support is not only granted through subsidies, 
but also through support in the form of priority dispatch ensuring that this is 
not withdrawn in relation to existing investments is thus also of importance. 
Supplementing the provisions which ensures financial stability with a provision 
11. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Para. 533.
12. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 412. See also: Award, Antin Infrastructure 
Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 560.
13. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 91-92.
14. Ibid. P. 91. Articles 11(2) & (4), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Internal Market for Electricity (recast), COM(2016) 861 final/2. ACER, 
‘Renewables in the Wholesale Market ’ (European Energy Regulators’ White Paper No 1, 
2017). <http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Position_Papers/Position%20
papers/WP%20ACER%2001%2017.pdf> accessed 13/06/2019. The European Federation 
of Energy Traders also proposed stricter changes to the rules than the Commission, see: 
European Federation of Energy Traders, ‘RES Integration and Market Based Dispatch’ 
(2017). Pp. 3-4 <https://efet.org/Files/Documents/Electricity/EFET_CEP%20amendments_
RES%20%20Redispatch_June%202017.pdf> accessed on 13/06/2019.
15. Nikos Lavranos & Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent 
Developments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al (eds.), European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2018). Pp. 91-92. 
Article 12, Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
June 2019 on the Internal Market for Electricity (Recast) OJ L 158/54.
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that ensures that priority dispatch will not be withdrawn for investments that were 
operational before a new regime enters into force may thereby safeguard the 
interests of RES investors.
8.3. INVESTMENT PROMOTION IN THE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SECTOR
A review of the ECT’s legal framework revealed that it primarily provides for 
investment promotion through protection.16 According to a recent meta-research, 
however, IIA’s that merely provide for investment protection ‘probably do have 
some impact on FDI flows from developed to developing countries, although 
these effects are not so large that they can be identified consistently across a 
range of studies that apply differently specified econometric models to different 
data sets.’17 Therefore, in order to effectively facilitate RES investments, more is 
required than merely post-establishment investment protection. This is all the 
more pertinent since economic research indicates that the effects of IIA’s to 
attract FDI are primarily visible in the extractive industries sectors rather than in 
high-tech sectors.18
In chapters 3.3 and 3.4 it was argued that trade and investment in the RES sector 
are closely related and that, therefore, an international legal framework governing 
trade and investment should reflect this. Although this chapter will be limited to 
investment promotion and liberalization, it will make linkages to provisions that 
may promote investment while also affecting trade in goods or services. This 
chapter will, firstly, explore various ways in which the ECT could liberalize flows 
of FDI in the RES sector by providing for market access for foreign investors. 
Secondly, it will consider investment promotion provisions that are common in 
IIA’s. Finally, several investment promotion provisions that are currently already 
in the ECT – but outside of Part III – will be considered.
8.3.1. Investment Liberalization: Market Access
Market access, which is the ability of investors to enter a given market, is of 
profound importance for investors: if they are not allowed to make an investment, 
they cannot and will not make an investment regardless of the RES potential of 
16. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements (United 
Nations 2008). P. xi.
17. Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence’ (IISD 2017). P. 4.
18. Id.
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the State concerned. This does not only hold true with regards to market access 
to the electricity market, but also with regards to all other relevant economic 
activities that are indispensable for the RES sector, such as construction, 
engineering, and transport. At present, the ECT does not liberalize flows of 
FDI between its contracting parties: investors do not obtain market access to 
markets and there is no obligation under the ECT to grant foreign investors 
market access on a non-discriminatory basis. Thus, not only companies that 
would like to develop RES projects may lawfully be confronted with all sorts of 
discriminatory barriers, such as restrictions on landownership by foreign entities. 
Services providers may be confronted with discriminatory barriers to FDI, such 
as economic needs tests, and equity participation requirements. While individual 
investors may be able to negotiate market access through bilateral negotiations 
with the host State, this will raise transaction costs.19
To address this shortcoming, Art. 10(2) should provide for binding pre-
establishment rights on the basis of NT and MFN, whichever is more favorable, 
to ensure that the ECT entitles an investor to treatment on a basis of the most 
favorable treatment accorded to any other investor. Also, Art. 26 ECT should be 
amended. Currently, Art. 26 only provides investors that have already made an 
investment in the area of a contracting party with a tool to obtain redress. Ideally, 
the jurisdiction of ECT tribunals should be extended to also include investors that 
are seeking to make an investment. The definition of investor under NAFTA can 
be used as an example, where an investor means ‘a Party or state enterprise 
thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making 
or has made an investment.’20 This explicitly includes investors that are seeking 
to make an investment. In addition, Art. 26 ECT should also provide jurisdiction 
with regards to the ‘making of investments’ as defined in Art. 1(8) ECT.
Even though these amendments would not go as far as requiring a host State 
to completely open up its doors to foreign investors, it would ensure that foreign 
investors are not accorded treatment less favorable than that accorded to any 
other investor.
19. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 25.
20. Article 1139, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) 
(adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994). In a similar vein, see the definition 
of investor under the CETA: Article 8.1, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(European Union-Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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The liberalization of FDI by providing for market access to investors may also 
benefit services providers that would like to render RES services through the 
presence of a commercial presence.21 There are, however various ways in which 
the contracting parties can liberalize FDI. The following sections will explain 
the various options that are available to treaty negotiators. As will be seen, the 
drafting methodology chosen can significantly affect the level of liberalization 
and transparency.
8.3.1.1. Scheduling Commitments: Negative or Positive Lists
Where it concerns the appropriate drafting methods for the liberalization of FDI, 
inspiration can be drawn from the techniques used in trade and investment 
agreements concerning trade in services.
In relation to trade in services under GATS, one has to make a distinction between 
general obligations, i.e. those obligations which apply to any measure affecting 
trade in services, and specific commitments which only apply when WTO 
members have explicitly accepted them.22 General obligations can be found in 
Part II of the GATS and concern amongst others, MFN treatment, transparency, 
and domestic regulation. These commitments are not, however, commitments 
that go to the core of liberalizing FDI and services under Mode 3: these are found 
in commitments regarding market access and NT.23
On the basis of Art. XVI GATS on market access, members shall not maintain or 
adopt measures which impose:
· limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form 
of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the 
requirements of an economic needs test;
21. Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘The Evolution of the EU External Trade Policy in Services – CETA, 
TTIP, and TiSA after Brexit’ [2017] 20 Journal of International Economic Law 583. P. 595.
22. Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge University Press 2013). P. 403. Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas 
Schoenbaum, Petros Mavroidis & Michael Hahn, The World Trade Organization – Law, 
Practice, and Policy (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 567.
23. See for example: Articles 8.4-8.6, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(European Union-Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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· limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets 
in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic 
needs test;
· limitations on the total number of service operations or on the 
total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated 
numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an 
economic needs test;
· limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be 
employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier 
may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the 
supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the 
requirement of an economic needs test;
· measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entities 
or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a 
service; and
· limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of 
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value 
of individual or aggregate foreign investment.
Services suppliers in the RES sector that would like to supply services through 
a commercial presence often encounter barriers to investment that could be 
addressed on the basis of the list above. The OECD identified the following 
common barriers: economic needs tests, foreign equity limits, and restrictions 
on land ownership or real estate.24 The market access obligation of Art. 8.4 
CETA is comparable to the list above although phrased slightly different; which 
reflects that the provision applies to both investors and services suppliers as it 
is contained in the investment chapter of CETA.
On the basis of the NT obligation of the GATS, as laid down in Art. XVII, ‘each 
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, 
in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.’
24. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). Pp. 10-11.
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Under the GATS, obligations concerning market access and NT only apply 
when WTO Member States specified so in their schedule of commitments.25 
Under GATS schedules are based on the ‘services sectoral classification list’ 
(W/120). Thus, in the services schedule WTO members indicate whether or not 
NT and market access obligations apply in relation to specific services sectors. 
In the case of GATS, a so-called positive list approach is adopted: ‘Services 
only benefit from market access […] and national treatment […], if the pertinent 
service sector is included in the schedule of specific commitments.’26 In practice, 
WTO members often impose conditions, qualifications, and limitations on NT 
commitments.27 For that reason, it has been said that ‘the GATS has not been a 
showcase for market access in trade in services.’28 For example, NT in relation 
to a specific services sector may be granted only to certain modes of supply.29
The NAFTA was the first agreement to adopt a so-called ‘negative list approach.’30 
On the basis of this approach, liberalization commitments apply across the board 
unless an explicit exception is contained in the ‘negative list’ of non-conforming 
measures.31 More recently, the CETA has adopted this approach.32
Of course, combinations of both approaches are also possible. The Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA) initiative, a plurilateral trade in services agreements 
25. Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge University Press 2013). Pp. 403 & 517. Mitsuo Matsushita, 
Thomas Schoenbaum, Petros Mavroidis & Michael Hahn, The World Trade Organization 
– Law, Practice, and Policy (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 585. Marie-France Houde, 
Akshay Kolse-Patil & Sébastien Miroudot, ‘The Interaction Between Investment and 
Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements’ (OECD Trade Policy Working 
Paper No. 55, 2007). P. 7.
26. Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum, Petros Mavroidis & Michael Hahn, The World 
Trade Organization – Law, Practice, and Policy (Oxford University Press 2015). P. 585. 
Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, ‘How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top 
Down or Bottom-Up?’ [2014] 48 Journal of World Trade 191. P. 191-192.
27. Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge University Press 2013). P. 404.
28. Juan Marchetti & Martin Roy, ‘Services Liberalization in the WTO and in PTAs’ in Juan 
Marchetti et al (eds.), Opening Markets for Trade in Services – Countries and Sectors in 
Bilateral and WTO Negotiations (Cambridge University Press 2008). P. 62.
29. Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge University Press 2013). P. 404.
30. Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, ‘How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top 
Down or Bottom-Up?’ [2014] 48 Journal of World Trade 191. P. 191-192.
31. Id.
32. Articles 8.4, 8.5 & 8.15, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European 
Union-Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
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that is/was being negotiated by a group of WTO members outside the WTO, 
uses a positive list for market access and negative list for NT.33
This negative list approach is often considered to lead to a deeper level of 
liberalization amongst the contracting parties.34 The following arguments 
are often used to support this statement. Firstly, the negative list approach 
fosters transparency as it is easy to identify which measures are excluded 
from coverage.35 Secondly, the negative approach might encourage a ‘pro-
liberalization dynamic’ during the negotiations as governments might want to 
avoid long lists of exceptions.36 Thirdly, the negative list approach would, in the 
absence of an exception to the contrary, liberalize any future services sector 
which is yet unknown due to the fact that it is covered by the agreement.37 
According to Low and Mattoo, however, this final point is also a reason why 
States might be hesitant to make use of the negative list approach.38
8.3.1.2. Additional Obligations: Standstill and Ratchet Clauses
Besides assuming specific commitments in relation to market access and NT, 
negotiating parties can also agree on more far reaching commitments that are 
aimed yielding irreversible results. On the basis of so-called standstill clauses, 
33. European Commission, ‘Services and investment in EU trade deals Using ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ lists’ (European Commission, 2016). P. 6. <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2016/april/tradoc_154427.pdf> accessed on 14/3/2018. Juan Marchetti & Martin 
Roy, ‘The TISA Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues’ [2014] 48 Journal of World 
Trade 683. P. 684. See Articles I-3 & I-4 of the leaked versions of the TiSA core text, 
available at: <https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text/> accessed 
on 14/3/2018.
34. Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘The Evolution of the EU External Trade Policy in Services – CETA, 
TTIP, and TiSA after Brexit’ [2017] 20 Journal of International Economic Law 583. P. 596. 
Pierre Latrille & Juneyoung Lee, ‘Services Rules in Regional Trade Agreements – How 
Diverse and how Creative as Compared to the GATS Multilateral Rules? (WTO, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2012-19, 31 October 2012). Pp. 7-8.
35. Patrick Low & Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to 
Liberalization Under
the GATS’ (Worldbank 1999) P. 22. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
e8c8/68af3e3dc8d0427c9cfabc47478b674014b4.pdf> accessed on 10/07/2019. Marie-
France Houde, Akshay Kolse-Patil & Sébastien Miroudot, ‘The Interaction Between 
Investment and Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements’ (OECD Trade 
Policy Working Paper No. 55, 2007). P. 33.
36. Patrick Low & Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to 
Liberalization Under
the GATS’ (Worldbank 1999) P. 22. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
e8c8/68af3e3dc8d0427c9cfabc47478b674014b4.pdf> accessed on 10/07/2019.
37. Id.
38. Id.
Cees_Binnenwerk.indd   350 04/12/2019   11:36:30
351
Facilitating Renewable Energy Investments: The Lege Ferenda
a State can assume an obligation that is ‘intended to lock-in the applied regime 
at the time an agreement enters into force.’39 Under GATS, such commitments 
were sometimes included in schedules of commitments.40 A standstill clause is 
also proposed in the core text of TiSA:
“The conditions and qualifications on national treatment […] shall 
be limited to measures that a Party maintains on the date this 
Agreement takes effect, or the continuation or prompt renewal of any 
such measures.”41
Thus, on the basis of this provision any condition and qualification concerning 
NT may not go beyond the exceptions made in the schedule of commitments. 
At present, the ECT contains a voluntary stand still clause in Art. 10(6)(a), by 
allowing contracting parties to make declarations that they intent not to introduce 
new exceptions to NT or MFN treatment concerning the making of investments.
Ratchet clauses go even further than that, as they automatically lock in unilateral 
liberalization efforts.42 A clear example of a ratchet clause in relation to NT can 
be found in Art. II-2(3) TiSA:
“If a Party amends a measure referred to in paragraph 2 in a way 
that reduces or eliminates the inconsistency of that measure with the 
treatment provided for in Article I-4 (National Treatment), as it existed 
immediately before the amendment, a Party may not subsequently 
amend that measure in a way that increases the inconsistency with 
the treatment provided for in Article I-4 (National Treatment).”
39. Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, ‘How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top 
Down or Bottom-Up?’ [2014] 48 Journal of World Trade 191. P. 200.
40. Id. See for example the schedule of Korea: WTO document GATS/SC/48/Suppl.3 of 26 
February 1998.
41. Article II-2(2) of the leaked versions of the TiSA core text, available at: <https://wikileaks.
org/tisa/document/20160621_TiSA_Core-Text/> accessed on 14/3/2018. See also Article 
8.15(1)(c), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
42. Pierre Latrille & Juneyoung Lee, ‘Services Rules in Regional Trade Agreements – How 
Diverse and how Creative as Compared to the GATS Multilateral Rules? (WTO, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2012-19, 31 October 2012). P. 22. Juan Marchetti & Martin Roy, ‘The 
TISA Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues’ [2014] 48 Journal of World Trade 
683. P. 684.
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Thus, on the basis of this provision, any measure that would bring discriminatory 
national legislation, that is exempted from the scope of the FTA, in line with the 
non-discrimination regime of that FTA the State may not subsequently amend 
the measure in a way that would again increase the inconsistency with the FTA, 
not even to the level that was previously applied and excluded from the scope 
of the FTA.
Especially the cumulative effect of these clauses is notable: when a negative list 
approach is used and a stand still clause applies, in principle all future barriers 
to investment and trade that are not in line with NT or market access concerning 
services under mode 3 are prohibited, even in relation to economic activities that 
are currently non-existent.43
8.3.2. Investment Promotion Provisions in IIA’s
The investment promotion provisions as contained in existing IIA’s often address 
a wide variety of topics.44 A common denominator of these provisions is that they 
are often primarily hortatory in nature and the contracting parties often have a 
significant level of discretion in their application.45 Below, various examples of 
investment promotion provisions that may be found in IIA’s and that are relevant 
for RES investors will be provided for.
8.3.2.1. Investment Promotion Agencies
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPA) can play an important role in the facilitation 
of FDI. For foreign energy investors they may, for example, serve as a ‘single 
window’ where foreign investors can obtain all relevant information concerning 
the establishment of FDI and the appropriate steps to be taken in the regulatory 
process, including information on required permits, opportunities for investment 
incentives etcetera.46 This could ease some of the informal barriers to investment, 
including a lack of transparency.47 Furthermore, IPA’s can play a role in exploring 
43. Marie-France Houde, Akshay Kolse-Patil & Sébastien Miroudot, ‘The Interaction Between 
Investment and Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements’ (OECD Trade 
Policy Working Paper No. 55, 2007). Pp. 4, 36, 39.
44. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
(Geneva, 2008). P. 5.
45. Ibid. P. 6.
46. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The Energy Charter Investment Facilitation Toolbox’ (Brussels, 
2017). P. 7. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment 
Agreements (Geneva, 2008). P. 45. Articles 15 & 16, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources (recast) [2018] OJ L328/82.
47. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
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market opportunities for investors and link potential business partners from 
various contracting parties.48 These programs could aim at addressing specific 
needs in the RES sector in the various countries involved and contribute to 
reduced transactions costs.
8.3.2.2. Investment Incentives
Investment incentives are often a policy tool available to increase the inflow 
of FDI.49 This particularly holds true for investments in the RES sector where 
investments are largely regulatory driven. Although the importance of financial 
support for RES investments is slowly decreasing due to the increased 
competitiveness of RES, it will remain a highly relevant policy instruments for 
years to come. Notwithstanding that it is probably impossible, and perhaps even 
undesirable, to make international arrangements concerning the design of a 
support scheme for RES, States could lay down certain principles. These could 
include that investors are treated in a non-discriminatory manner when applying 
for support, even if they are not yet established in a given jurisdiction, and that 
information concerning the support scheme can be obtained in the language 
of business (such as English) at the IPA. In the EU, the 2018 RES Directive lays 
down that support is to be granted in a market-based manner, which underlines 
that RES technology is increasingly mature and should, therefore, be exposed 
to market signals.50 However, conditions in the relevant electricity market may 
be determinative for the exact design of a support scheme.
8.3.3. Existing Provisions in the ECT
At present various ECT provisions, located outside Part III, may already be 
relevant for purposes of investment promotion. This does not mean, however, 
that there is no room for improvement.
(Geneva, 2008). P. 38. See for example: Article 26, Free Trade Agreement between the 
EFTA States and the Republic of Lebanon (EFTA-Lebanon) (adopted 24/06/2004, entered 
into force 01/01/2007).
48. Articles 24-26, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (adopted 26/02/2009, 
entered into force 24/02/2012). Article 18.6 and Annex 18A, Free Trade Agreement 
between the Republic of Korea and Singapore (Korea-Singapore) (adopted 04/08/2005, 
entered into force 02/03/2006).
49. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
(Geneva, 2008). P. 33.
50. Article 4, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) 
[2018] OJ L328/82.
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Transparency can encourage FDI by providing foreign investors with the 
knowledge and information relevant for investment decisions. A lack of 
transparency will raise transaction costs for investors and reduce efficiency.51 In 
addition, transparency is often considered to be part of good governance best 
practices.52 Therefore, it is unsurprising that IIA’s sometimes contain provisions 
concerning transparency.53 The Economic Partnership Agreement between 
Japan and Thailand for example requires the contracting parties to publish or 
otherwise make available ‘its laws, regulations, administrative procedures, and 
administrative rulings of general application’.54
An interesting example is Art. 4 concerning transparency from the 2019 
Netherlands Model BIT:
“Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions, procedures and administrative rulings of general 
application with respect to any matter covered by this Agreement are 
promptly published or made available in such a manner as to enable 
interested persons and the other Contracting Party to become 
acquainted with them. Whenever possible, such instruments will be 
made available through the internet in English.”55
At present, Art. 20 ECT is comparable with the provision above although it does 
not contain a reference to providing documents through the internet. Also, Art. 
20(3) states that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall designate one or more enquiry 
points to which requests for information about the above-mentioned laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings may be addressed and 
shall communicate promptly such designation to the Secretariat which shall make 
it available on request.’
51. Mehmet Ögütçü, ‘Good Governance and Best Practices for Investment Policy and 
Promotion (OECD, 2002). P. 5.
52. Id. See also: Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The Energy Charter Investment Facilitation 
Toolbox’ (Brussels, 2017). P. 4.
53. See for example: Article 101, Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Thailand 
for an Economic Partnership (Japan-Thailand) (adopted 03/04/2007, entered into 
force 01/11/2007). Article 58, Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the 
European Communities and the Russian Federation (European Union-Russian Federation) 
(adopted 24/06/1994, entered into force 01/12/1997).
54. Article 101(1), Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Thailand for an Economic 
Partnership (Japan-Thailand) (adopted 03/04/2007, entered into force 01/11/2007).
55. Article 4, Netherlands Model BIT, 2019.
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8.3.3.2. Trade Related Investment Measures
The ECT’s provision on TRIM’s was extensively discussed in section 6.3. For 
RES investors, this provision is highly relevant as LCR’s have been referred 
to as the main policy impediment to investments in the value chain of RES 
technology.56 As elaborated in sections 3.4.2.1 and 6.3, LCR’s can have very 
significant consequences for RES investors. The main shortcoming of the current 
legal framework of the ECT in relation to TRIM’s is that merely TRIM’s that are 
applied to existing investment at the time of such application are actionable 
under the ECT for private investors. This means that only companies that are 
already established in a given jurisdiction can benefit from the provision, and only 
if the LCR’s are applied to its existing investments while excluding prospective 
projects. In a sector where investments are still regulatory driven, meaning that 
investments are most likely to occur after regulatory frameworks have been 
enacted, this means that important barriers to investment cannot be addressed 
if this regulatory framework incorporates LCR’s.57 In addition, Art. 5 ECT only 
addresses TRIM’s in relation to trade in goods while LCR’s can also affect trade 
in services. As was identified in section 3.3, services are just as important for 
the successful realization of an RES project as goods and expressed in terms 
of value, the value of RES services exceeds the value of RES goods in many 
projects. Therefore, an improved provision concerning LCR’s should address 
services, goods, and investment/investors more generally. In that regard, the 
ECT could draw inspiration from Chapter 7 ‘Non-tariff Barriers to Trade and 
Investment in Renewable Energy Generation’ of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement (EUVFTA). Article 7.4 of this chapter states:
“(1) A Party shall:
(a) refrain from adopting measures providing for local content 
requirements or any other offset affecting the other Party’s products, 
service suppliers, investors or investments;
56. OECD, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance 
and Investment (2015). P. 57. Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable 
Energy Schemes - Government Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’ 
[2017] 35(5) International Energy Law Review 185. P. 186.
57. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. Pp. 28-34.
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(b) refrain from adopting measures requiring to form partnerships 
with local companies, unless such partnerships are deemed 
necessary for technical reasons and the Party can demonstrate 
these upon request by the other Party;
(c) ensure that any measures concerning the authorisation, 
certification and licensing procedures that are applied, in particular, 
to equipment, plants and associated transmission network 
infrastructures, are objective, transparent, non-arbitrary and do not 
discriminate between applicants from the Parties;
[…]
(e) ensure that the terms, conditions and procedures for the 
connection and access to electricity transmission grids are 
transparent and do not discriminate against suppliers of the other 
Party.”58
The scope of Chapter 7 EUVFTA extends ‘to measures which affect trade 
and investment between the Parties related to the generation of energy from 
renewable and sustainable sources.’59 This means that the provision quoted 
above addresses LCR’s in goods, services, investments, and investors. Also, 
local equity participation requirements are expressly prohibited. As identified in 
section 3.4.3.1 concerning services supplied through ‘Mode 3’, such local equity 
participation requirements constitute a common barrier to FDI in the RES sector.
Another aspect that deserves attention is the application of this provision. As 
demonstrated by the Mesa v. Canada NAFTA case, even a treaty that provides 
for national treatment in the pre-establishment phase of an investment does 
not apply retroactively.60 This means that an investor has to be able to establish 
that an arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction over a LCR claim even if the 
investor has not yet made an investment, otherwise the tribunal lacks temporal 
jurisdiction.
58. Article 7.4, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 
30/06/2019, entrance into force still pending).
59. Ibid. Article 7.3(1).
60. Award, Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-17, 2016. Paras. 324-338.
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Finally, remedies in relation to violations of LCR’s is also a relevant issue. Can 
a tribunal order a State to withdraw an LCR? Usually, investment tribunals 
are very reluctant in ordering specific conduct as the State’s right to regulate 
is respected.61 Also, one can wonder whether monetary remedies are an 
appropriate remedy. After all, what is the damage?
8.3.3.3. Transfer of Technology
Flows of FDI may also have an impact on technology transfer. In fact, the WTO 
has held that ‘[i]ssues related to transfer of technology on the one hand and, 
international trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, on the other, are 
closely interlinked.’62 More particularly, ‘FDI is generally acknowledged as one of 
the most important mechanisms for technology transfer’ as it may lead to positive 
knowledge spillovers.63
In the context of RES and climate change mitigation efforts, transfer of technology 
is of particular relevance.64 It is, for instance, desirable that developing countries, 
many of which lack a developed RES industry, also adopt RES and avoid 
traditional unsustainable energy sources.65 The diffusion of RES technology is 
thus of great importance for an energy transition. Therefore, the United Nations 
Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) addresses technology 
transfer:
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties 
included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, 
61. See for example: Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg 
S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 425.
62. WTO, ‘Detail Presentation of Trade and Technology Transfer’ (WTO E-learning). P. 2. 
<https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Course_385/Module_1605/ModuleDocuments/
TD_Ttt-L2-R1-E.pdf> accessed on 07/05/2018.
63. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions and Nations – 
Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). Pp. 46 & 54.
64. Frauke Urben, ‘China’s rise: Challenging the North-South Technology Transfer Paradigm 
for Climate Change Mitigation and Low Carbon Energy’ [2018] 113 Energy Policy 320. 
Julian Kirchherr & Frauke Urban, ‘Technology Transfer and Cooperation for Low Carbon 
Energy Technology: Analysing 30 Years of Scholarship and Proposing a Research 
Agenda’ [2018] 119 Energy Policy 600.
65. Charikleia Karakosta, Haris Doukas & John Psarras, ‘Technology Transfer within the 
New Climate Regime’ in Braden Everett et al (eds.), Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Issues (Nova Science Publishers 2010). P. 2.
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particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed 
country Parties shall support the development and enhancement 
of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country 
Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a position to do so may 
also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.”66
Also, in order to develop RES projects in an economically successful manner, 
projects will have to be constructed and operated properly, which requires the 
proper skills and technologies. In that regard, the lack of reliable and capable 
domestic contractors may make foreign investors skeptical to invest in RES 
projects, especially when a protectionist trade and investment policy make it 
cumbersome to overcome domestic shortages by importing goods and services 
from abroad. As identified in chapter 3.3, goods and services in the RES sector 
are often sold in tandem because the purchaser of a wind turbine is often not 
only interested in the hardware, but also in the knowledge to engineer, construct, 
operate, and maintain a wind turbine.
Various IIA’s also contain provisions on transfer of technology. However, they 
often do so in a relatively hortatory manner by adopting language that avoids 
real substantive commitments.67 At present, Art. 8 ECT concerns transfer of 
technology:
“(1) The Contracting Parties agree to promote access to and transfer 
of energy technology on a commercial and non-discriminatory 
basis to assist effective trade in Energy Materials and Products and 
Investment and to implement the objectives of the Charter subject 
to their laws and regulations, and to the protection of Intellectual 
Property rights.
(2) Accordingly, to the extent necessary to give effect to paragraph 
(1) the Contracting Parties shall eliminate existing and create no 
new obstacles to the transfer of technology in the field of Energy 
66. Article 4(5), United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (adopted 
04/06/1992, entered into force 21/03/1994).
67. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
(Geneva, 2008). P. 29.
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Materials and Products and related equipment and services, subject 
to non-proliferation and other international obligations.”
The emphasis of technology transfer on a non-discriminatory and commercial 
basis reflects that the ECT is founded on market-based principles. At first sight, 
this might be a barrier to economic development in developing countries, which 
for that reason sometimes pursue protectionist policies and prescribe forced 
technology transfer. The US, for example, often complains that China adopts such 
policies.68 Allegedly, China enforces foreign ownerships restrictions, ‘such as joint 
venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative 
review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from’ 
US companies.69 Such requirements are clearly discriminatory and relate directly 
to FDI. This example also exposes the main danger for companies. While they 
may have committed significant resources to R&D, (forced) technology transfer 
main result in ‘technology theft or unwanted spillovers to competitors.’70 This, 
in turn, may dissuade companies to commit resources to R&D. Hence, there 
are also IIA’s that explicitly limited the ability of contracting parties to impose 
technology transfer requirements.71
It is therefore of profound importance that a careful balance is struck: on the one 
hand technology transfer is essential for a successful energy transition while, on 
the other hand, forced technology transfer may result in less resources spent on 
R&D which may undermine innovation even though innovation is equally essential 
for a successful energy transition.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of technology transfer and the resulting political 
implications, the business practice of the RES sector provides ample of 
opportunity for technology transfer in line with Art. 8 ECT, that is on a commercial 
and non-discriminatory basis. This even holds true for countries that are only 
marginally integrated in the value chain of RES generation equipment.




70. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions and Nations – 
Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). P. 55.
71. Article 15(8)(f), United States – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (United States-
Singapore) (adopted 06/05/2003, entered into force 01/01/2004).
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As said, OEM’s often sell RES hardware in tandem with related services. In 
practice, the establishment of a local presence by foreign services providers 
is by far the most important method to supply services.72 In order to supply 
services through a local subsidiary, an investment is necessary: a foreign RES 
company cannot establish a local presence in another country without investing. 
However, it has been said that there are several reasons why foreign services 
suppliers cannot compete on a level playing field in various countries, ‘many of 
which involve restrictions on foreign investment.’73
From a development perspective, the establishment of local subsidiaries by 
foreign RES companies offers interesting opportunities as research shows that 
these companies often rely on local personnel.74 This also means that there 
are many opportunities for local job creation, transfer of skills and knowledge, 
and local partnerships.75 Common mechanisms to transfer knowledge include 
the training of local personnel by the foreign parent company, intra-corporate 
transferees, providing information on relevant technologies and equipment and 
the dissemination of knowhow.76
Besides establishing a local presence, the presence of foreign natural persons 
is also a common mode of services supply in the RES sector.77 According to 
the OECD, ‘the temporary presence of highly skilled foreign personnel and the 
establishment of a foreign commercial presence may provide opportunities 
for person-to-person communication and learning by doing.’78 Given the 
controversial nature of this mode of services supply, as it relates directly to 
72. United States International Trade Commission, Renewable Energy and Related Services: 
Recent Developments (Investigation No. 332-534, August 2013). P. 2-19. Jehan Sauvage 
& Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ (OECD, 2017). P. 
10. Camilla Prawitz & Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – Environmental 
Goods and Indispensable Services’ (The National Board of Trade 2014). P. 17.
73. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 10.
74. Ibid. P. 11. Tilak Doshi, ‘Sector Study on Environmental Services: Renewable Energy’ 
(APEC Policy Support Unit 2017). P. 29.
75. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 27.
76. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions and Nations – 
Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). P. 56.
77. Tilak Doshi, ‘Sector Study on Environmental Services: Renewable Energy’ (APEC Policy 
Support Unit 2017). P. 6.
78. OECD, ‘Managing Request-offer Negotiations under the GATS: the case of energy 
services’ (TD/TC/WP(2003)24/FINAL). P. 15.
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labor and immigration policies, barriers to trade in services under this mode are 
manifold.79
8.3.3.4. Access to Capital Markets and the Transfer of Funds
Access to capital markets, and access to finance more broadly, is also of great 
importance for flows of FDI as reduced access to finance will result in a lower 
capacity to invest.80 In addition, the cost of capital may be lower in open capital 
markets, which can contribute significantly to a competitive LCOE.81 Currently, 
Art. 9 ECT addresses access to capital markets: ‘Each Contracting Party shall 
accordingly endeavour to promote conditions for access to its capital market 
by companies and nationals of other Contracting Parties, for the purpose 
of financing trade in Energy Materials and Products and for the purpose of 
Investment in Economic Activity in the Energy Sector in the Areas of those other 
Contracting Parties’ on a NT or MFN basis, whichever is more favorable. The 
article does not preclude measures for prudential reasons, including measures 
designed to safeguard the stability of financial systems.
In addition to the provision of access to capital markets, the transfer of funds 
provision of the ECT can also contribute to facilitating flows of capital into and 
out of contracting parties. Nevertheless, the provisions concerning access to 
capital markets and the transfer of funds should reflect that they may relate 
more closely to Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) than FDI, although FDI of 
course also requires capital. The more liquid nature of FPI can lead to financial 
problems, in particular in developing countries. This is evidenced by recent 
events in Argentina.82
8.3.3.5. Key Personnel
On the basis of Art. 11 ECT, host States shall examine, ‘in good faith’, requests 
by investors concerning the temporary entrance and stay of key personnel 
79. Jehan Sauvage & Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’ 
(OECD, 2017). P. 11. Camilla Prawitz & Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – 
Environmental Goods and Indispensable Services’ (The National Board of Trade 2014). P. 
17.
80. Boris Ricken & George Malcotsis, The Competitive Advantage of Regions and Nations – 
Technology Transfer through Foreign Direct Investment (Gower 2011). P. 47.
81. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
(Geneva, 2008). P. 41.
82. See for example: Marcos Brindicci, ‘The IMF could push Argentina from a currency 
crisis into a debt crisis’ (Business Insider, 2018). <http://www.businessinsider.
com/the-imf-could-push-argentina-from-a-currency-crisis-into-a-debt-crisis-2018-
5?international=true&r=US&IR=T> accessed on 23/05/2018.
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into the territory of the host State. Most often, this provision is considered in 
relation to senior management of a company.83 However, in the RES sector it 
may concern a specific group of employees that are of critical importance for 
the proper construction and operation of a RES project: engineers. Establishing 
a local presence or relying on foreign personnel ‘are the predominant modes 
of [services] supply as the assembly and installation work often requires a 
physical presence at the customers site.’84 Thus, a proper provision concerning 
‘key personnel’ can contribute to rendering RES services in an economically 
efficient manner.
At present, Art. 11 ECT already covers key personnel employed by an investor 
engaged in activities related to ‘key technical services.’85 Major shortcoming of 
this provision is, however, that it subjects the entrance of services to national 
law. As said, key personnel provisions and trade in services in Mode 4 is highly 
controversial as it may relate to immigration and labor policy.
Nevertheless, a positive list approach could be adopted, which allows States 
to list commitments in a clear manner. Also, commitments could be made 
conditional (such as the establishment of a commercial presence and extending 
benefits to intra-corporate transferees).
8.4. Conclusion
At present it seems that the modernization process of the ECT will primarily 
consist of redefining the standards of investment protection in light of current 
trends. Given the significant amount of inconsistent ECT awards, this is in itself 
a welcome development. More recent IIA’s often contain more textual guidance 
in comparison to comparable standards which in the past remained largely 
undefined. Nevertheless, in practice this also often leads to a lower level of 
investment protection. Controversial topics, such as the protection of legitimate 
expectation, are sometimes abandoned while in the RES sector the protection 
83. Marie-France Houde, Akshay Kolse-Patil & Sébastien Miroudot, ‘The Interaction Between 
Investment and Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements’ (OECD Trade 
Policy Working Paper No. 55, 2007). P. 16.
84. Tilak Doshi, Sector Study on Environmental Services: Renewable Energy (APEC Policy 
Support Unit, 2017). P. 6.
85. See also: Article 6(3), Canada Model BIT, 2004:
“Subject to its laws, regulations and policies relating to the entry of aliens, each Party shall 
grant temporary entry to nationals of the other Party, employed by an investor of the other 
Party, who seeks to render services to an investment of that investor in the territory of the 
Party, in a capacity that is managerial or executive or requires specialized knowledge.”
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of legitimate expectations plays a crucial role in providing effective protection 
to investors. Therefore, the ECT contracting parties could consider including 
specific investment protection standards that only apply with regards to RES 
investors and are aimed at addressing specific concerns of RES investors, such 
as the stability of regulatory and financial support. This way, RES investments can 
receive effective investment protection while a high level of investment protection 
does not have to be extended to non-RES energy investors whose economic 
activities might have to be phased out.
Devoting more attention to the investment promotion provisions of Part III of the 
ECT may unlock a significant potential to more actively facilitate RES investments. 
Contrary to the passive investment protection standards, active investment 
promotion commitments may have a more significant effect on FDI.86 Likewise 
since most IIA’s do not contain investment promotion provisions, States that do 
include such provisions in their IIA’s may obtain a comparative advantage.87 It 
has been said that ‘the granting of investment protection increasingly becomes 
a common place’ which means that ‘countries could distinguish themselves 
through additional active investment promotion measures.’88 In addition, 
investment promotion and facilitation can be an effective and relatively simple 
tool to stimulate flows of FDI.89
86. UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements 
(Geneva, 2008). P. 62.
87. Ibid. P. 63.
88. Id.
89. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The Energy Charter Investment Facilitation Toolbox’ (Brussels, 
2017). P. 2.
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9. LEGAL TOOLS AVAILABLE TO MODERNIZE THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY
In the preceding chapters it was argued that the ECT should be changed in 
order to more effectively facilitate RES investments.1 These changes concern 
both investment promotion and protection. Concerning investment promotion, 
the main complaint is that the ECT currently does not contain any binding 
commitments. Since these will have to be introduced, formal steps have to be 
taken by changing or supplementing the existing treaty norms. However, with 
regards to investment protection the contracting parties can take less far reaching 
steps that may yield the desired result. Therefore, this chapter is divided into 
two parts that both contain different legal tools that the ECT contracting parties 
may resort to. Chapter 9.1 will discuss the amendment procedure of the ECT as 
well as the Energy Charter Protocol option. These tools may be used to amend 
(amendment procedure only), or complement, supplement, extend, or amplify 
(amendment and Energy Charter Protocol) the legal regime of the ECT. Chapter 
9.2 will subsequently discuss less far reaching tools that could be used to clarify 
the content of existing rules without changing them. As will be discussed, these 
tools may be suitable to address some of the concerns, in particular with regards 
to the lack of consistency in the interpretation and application of the relevant 
norms concerning investment protection, but they obviously have their limits as 
they cannot change the rules.
9.1. CHANGING OR SUPPLEMENTING THE SUBSTANTIVE 
RULES
This section will explore the legal tools that are available to ECT contracting 
parties to alter the rules of the ECT legal framework.
9.1.1. Amending the ECT
The obvious manner in which to change the ECT would be by amending relevant 
provisions. Particularly for the long-term, this could be a manner to modernize 
the treaty and to bring it in line with contemporary investment policy tendencies, 
especially where it concerns the investment protection provisions, while at the 
same time enhancing the investment promotion and liberalization commitments.
1. This chapter is based on a part of the following article: Cees Verburg, ‘Modernizing the 
Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment & Trade 425.
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For the short term, however, it might not necessarily yield the desired results 
since amending the treaty might be relatively difficult. As becomes clear from Art. 
36(1)(a) ECT, amending the treaty requires unanimity of the contracting parties 
that are present and voting at the Energy Charter Conference.2 Furthermore, 
once adopted, amendments will only affect the relations between the contracting 
parties that subsequently ratify the amendments.3 In the past, the ECT has been 
successfully amended once. In 1998 the Trade Amendment was concluded 
although it only entered into force in 2010. This demonstrates the slow pace of 
the procedure. In particular since the Trade Amendment was relatively modest 
in ambition since its main purpose was to update the ECT’s trade regime with 
the rules and practices of the WTO.4
9.1.2. Energy Charter Protocol
The second available tool would be to conclude an Energy Charter Protocol, 
which is defined in Art. 1(13)(a) ECT as:
“a treaty, the negotiation of which is authorized and the text of which 
is adopted by the Charter Conference, which is entered into by two 
or more Contracting Parties in order to complement, supplement, 
extend or amplify the provisions of this Treaty with respect to any 
specific sector or category of activity within the scope of this Treaty, 
or to areas of co-operation pursuant to Title III of the Charter.”
This option could thus be utilized to ‘complement, supplement, extend or amplify’ 
the provisions of the ECT. In that regard, it might be particularly suitable where it 
concerns commitments regarding investment promotion since they are currently 
largely absent from the treaty.
However, where it concerns investment protection, this option might be more 
complicated. In particular when any new rules would affect the level of investment 
protection, for example by lowering it, or affect the available ISDS mechanism. 
This is due to the presence of Art. 16 ECT, which allows investors to rely on those 
provisions most favorable to them in cases where ECT contracting parties have 
2. Catalin Gabriel Stanescu, ‘Article 36 – Voting’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on 
the Energy Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). Pp. 439-440.
3. Article 42, the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 16/04/1998).
4. Cees Verburg, ‘Modernizing the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal 
Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 425. P. 445.
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adopted a prior or subsequent international agreement dealing with investment 
protection or dispute settlement. Currently, Art. 16 explicitly disables any lex priori 
or lex posterior rule in such a case, which means that investors may still resort 
to the existing rules of the ECT and thereby circumvent the rules agreed upon in 
the Protocol. It goes without saying that the ECT contracting parties can remove 
Art. 16 ECT from the treaty through an amendment, although that option comes 
with the difficulties laid down above.
A second issue that arises when concluding a Protocol relates to the consent-
based nature of the Protocol, meaning that only those ECT parties that agree to 
its terms will be affected by it and those parties that do not submit to it will not be 
affected.5 Although the same situation occurs when the amendment procedure 
is utilized, in particular when the amendment is subsequently not ratified by all 
ECT contracting parties, this may be undesirable as a situation may arise in which 
diverging sets of rights and obligations exist amongst the ECT constituency. 
This might be undesirable given the fact that the ECT was concluded as a 
comprehensive package deal that did not allow for reservations.6
9.1.3. Inter se Modification of the ECT
In light of the difficulties associated with amending the ECT or concluding a 
Protocol, particularly in light of Art. 16 ECT, an alternative manner in which the 
ECT can be brought in line with contemporary policy tendencies between like-
minded States would be by inter se modification on the basis of Art. 41 VCLT.7 
This tool has been described as an ‘essential technique, and necessary safety 
valve, for the adjustment of treaties to the dynamic needs of international society.’8 
5. Article 33(5), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
6. Ibid. Article 46. Decision of the Energy Charter Conference, Modernisation of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (CCDEC 2017
23 STR, 28 November 2017). P. 1.
7. Article 41, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23/05/1969, entered into 
force 27/01/1980). On the basis of VCLT, art 41 ‘[t]wo or more of the parties to a multilateral 
treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves’ if there 
is no prohibition in the treaty, the modification does not affect the rights and obligations 
of other parties to the treaty and it ‘does not relate to a provision, derogation of which 
is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole.’ These conditions are cumulative, see Anne Rigaux & Denys Simon, ‘Article 41 
Agreements to Modify Multilateral Treaties between Certain of the Parties Only’ in Olivier 
Corten et al (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2011). P. 1002.
8. Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris, ‘Re-Shaping Treaties While Balancing Interests 
of Stability and Change: Critical Issues in the Amendment/Modification/Revision of 
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In light of the contemporary controversies surrounding the content of investment 
treaties, in particular where it concerns investment protection, the modification 
procedure can be used as a ‘safety valve.’9 In this regard, one can think of 
providing the provisions regarding investment protection with more clarity, even if 
it would lower the level of investment protection or narrow the scope by modifying 
the definitions contained in Art. 1.
Since the ECT does not contain a prohibition on the modification of its content 
and one could argue that the obligations arising under Part III of the treaty are 
reciprocal rather than absolute, certain ECT contracting parties could modify ECT 
obligations between themselves without affecting those rights of ECT contracting 
parties that are not involved in the process.10
Admittedly, this approach would not be ideal since a situation would emerge 
where different sets of rights and obligations amongst the ECT constituency 
would exist. Nevertheless, it would allow like-minded States to modify the ECT in 
accordance with their needs while at the same time pushing for a critical mass 
within the Energy Charter Conference that could lead to more structural reforms 
in the long-term.
9.2. CLARIFYING THE CONTENT OF EXISTING RULES
Through the tools that have been discussed thus far, the ECT contracting parties 
can change the rules that apply in the international legal framework that is created 
by the ECT. The parties could, however, also resort to instruments of soft law that 
may provide more clarity on the content of existing norms without changing their 
content. This could influence decisions rendered by tribunals operating under 
the current rules of the ECT, although there are certainly limitations. After all, the 
duty of any ECT tribunal is to ‘apply the law as it finds it, not to make it.’11 Mayor 
Treaties’ [2018] 20(1) Austrian Review of International and European Law 41. P. 44.
9. Ibid. Pp. 44-45.
10. Anne Rigaux & Denys Simon, ‘Article 41 Agreements to Modify Multilateral Treaties 
between Certain of the Parties Only’ in Olivier Corten et al (eds.), The Vienna Conventions 
on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011). Pp. 1003-1005.
11. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, 
Judgment of 18 July 1966, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. Para. 89. See also: Award, Saudi 
Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 23 August 1958, I.L.R. 27, 1963, p. 
117. P. 148. Decision of 21 October 1994, Boundary Dispute Between Argentina and Chile 
Concerning the Frontier Line Between Boundary Post 62 and Mount Fitzroy (Laguna Del 
Desierto case), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XXII, p. 3. Para. 75. Malcolm 
N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008). P. 934.
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benefits of these tools are that they may be less time consuming and politically 
less difficult, because ratifications are not required.
9.2.1. Energy Charter Declaration
The adoption of an Energy Charter Declaration would be the first example. This is 
defined in Art. 1(13)(b) ECT as a ‘non-binding instrument, the negotiation of which 
is authorized and the text of which is approved by the Charter Conference, which 
is entered into by two or more Contracting Parties complement or supplement 
the provisions of this Treaty.’ For purposes of treaty interpretation, such a 
declaration may constitute an authoritative subsequent agreement regarding 
the interpretation of ECT provisions in the sense of Art. 31(3)(a) VCLT or it may 
be considered as ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty’ under 
Art. 31(3)(b) VCLT. Subsequently, through the rules of treaty interpretation it may 
influence in the interpretation of ECT norms in dispute settlement procedures. 
Thus, even though – contrary to other IIA’s – the ECT does not contain a 
mechanism that allows for interpretations by the contracting parties that are 
binding upon tribunals, ECT contracting parties may resort to this soft law 
instrument that can yield comparable results.12 Nevertheless, to increase the 
chances that such declarations will have the desired effect, two issues need to 
be kept in mind.
Firstly, in order to enhance the authority of the declaration it should be adopted 
by unanimity, since all parties have than explicitly agreed to the declaration while, 
if it would be adopted by consensus, the agreement would merely be implicit.13
Secondly, the declaration should genuinely clarify the content of the existing rules 
of the treaty and not be a disguised amendment since this would undermine the 
authority of such declarations.14 This point will be illustrated by reference to two 
potential examples:
12. See for example: Article 1131(2), North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-
Canada-Mexico) (adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994).
13. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 63rd Session’ (26 
April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1. P. 559.
14. A similar point was made by the WTO Appellate Body in relation to the authority of WTO 
members to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreements under Article IX:2 of the WTO 
Agreement: Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 DSU by Ecuador, 
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, 2008. Para. 383 and Report of the Appellate Body, European 
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 2008. Para. 
383. Isabelle van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body’ [2010] 21 
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Firstly, the ECT contracting parties may attempt to tie the FET standard of the 
ECT to the international minimum standard of customary international law, 
as happened under NAFTA, although this should be seen as a disguised 
amendment. This can most clearly be illustrated by reference to the ruling in the 
Liman Caspian Oil v. Kazakhstan case, where the tribunal held:
‘[…] the Tribunal considers that the purpose of ECT Article 10(1), 
second sentence, is to provide a protection which goes beyond the 
minimum standard of treatment under international law. The ECT 
was intended to go further than simply reiterating the protection 
offered by the latter. In this respect, ECT Article 10(1), second 
sentence, differs from NAFTA Article 1105 (in its interpretation 
given by the Free Trade Commission on 31 July 2001) which 
contains an express reference to international law. Therefore, when 
assessing Respondent’s actions, a specific standard of fairness and 
equitableness above the minimum standard must be identified and 
applied for the application of the ECT.’15
In light of this statement, the gist of which was recently repeated in the Antin 
v. Spain and RREEF v. Spain cases, a claim that the FET standard of the ECT 
is supposed to provide for no more than the international minimum standard 
is unpersuasive and might be perceived as a disguised amendment.16 As 
experience under NAFTA shows, this may undermine the impact of such a 
declaration, in particular in relation to ongoing cases.17 Since States play a double 
role in this regard, as they are both masters of the treaty as well as (potential or 
actual) respondent in investment arbitration, tribunals may view interpretations by 
contracting parties that are perceived as disguised amendment with skepticism 
‘because of concerns about ensuring the equality of arms’ between investors 
and States.18
European Journal International Law 605. P. 612.
15. Excerpts of the Award, Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14, 2010. Para. 263.
16. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar 
B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 530. Decision on 
Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and 
RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/30, 2018. Paras. 258 & 263.
17. Award in Respect of Damages, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, 2002. Para. 47.
18. Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role 
of States’ [2010] 104 American Journal of International Law 179. Pp. 179-180 & 212-214. 
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A potentially more successful example would be a declaration that mirrors the 
content of interpretive annexes that are nowadays often attached to IIA’s which 
contain more guidance on the concept of indirect expropriation.19 In the Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay case, based on the Uruguay-Switzerland BIT which contains 
an expropriation provision comparable to Art. 13 ECT, the tribunal explicitly 
referred to such interpretive annexes despite the fact that the applicable treaty 
Margie-Lys Jaime, ‘Relying upon Parties’ Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements’ [2014] 46 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 261. P. 292. Christoph Schreuer, ‘Diversity and 
Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
et al (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – 
30 Years on (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010). Pp. 147-148. August Reinisch, ‘The 
Interpretation of International Investment Agreements’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), 
International Investment Law – A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). Pp. 405-407. Michael 
Waibel, ‘International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation – Problems, Particularities 
and Possible Trends’ in Rainer Hofmann et al (eds.), International Investment Law and 
General International Law – From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? (Nomos 2011). 
Pp. 47-48.
19. Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). Pp. 166-167. Annex 8-A, 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) (adopted 
30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Annex 4 Expropriation, EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 30/06/2019, 
entrance into force still pending). Annex B.13(1), Canada Model BIT 2004 and Annex 
B, US Model BIT 2012 contain similar clauses and have made it into the following BIT’s: 
Annex I, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Hong Kong) (adopted 10/02/2016, entered into 
force 06/09/2016). Annex B, Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Republic of Latvia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Canada-Latvia) (adopted 05/05/2009, entered into force 24/11/2011). Annex B.10, 
Agreement Between Canada and Mali for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Canada-Mali) (adopted 28/11/2014, entered into force 28/11/2014). Annex B.13(1), 
Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (Canada-Peru) (adopted 14/11/2006, entered into force 20/06/2007). Annex 
B.10, Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (Canada-Senegal) (adopted 27/11/2014, entered into force 
05/08/2016). Annex B.10, Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Serbia) (adopted 01/09/2014, entered 
into force 27/04/2015). Annex A, Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canada-Slovakia) (adopted 20/07/2010, 
entered into force 14/03/2012). Annex B, Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (United States-Uruguay) (adopted 04/11/2005, entered into force 
01/11/2006). Annex B, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (United States-Rwanda) (adopted 19/02/2008, 
entered into force 01/01/2012).
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did not contain such an annex.20 Although neither Switzerland nor Uruguay was 
involved in the treaties that the tribunal referred to, this was immaterial as the 
tribunal was of the opinion that the annexes reflected the position under general 
international law.21 This demonstrates that an Energy Charter Declaration which 
reflects the content of such interpretive annexes is more likely to be accepted by 
tribunals as an elucidation of the concept of indirect expropriation, rather than 
an apparent amendment.
Therefore, Energy Charter Declarations that contain more guidance on the 
content of existing ECT provisions can be utilized to provide more clarity of 
existing norms and thereby influence ECT dispute settlement, provided that they 
are adopted by unanimity and do not attempt to amend the treaty.
9.2.2. Non-Disputing Parties as Amicus Curiae
Another way in which ECT contracting parties can attempt to provide clarity 
on the content of existing treaty norms is by strengthening the participation of 
contracting parties in ongoing disputes where the ECT is being interpreted and 
applied.
Contrary to ECT practice, parties to NAFTA have for example often participated 
in ongoing disputes, even if they were not involved in the case as respondent. 
Non-disputing NAFTA parties have done so on the basis of Art. 1128 NAFTA, 
which allows a NAFTA party to ‘make submissions to a tribunal on a question 
of interpretation of this agreement.’22 This provision ‘provides an official channel 
through which the parties can agree upon such interpretation, without taking 
position on the facts related to the dispute before the tribunal.’23 For the purposes 
of treaty interpretation, such submissions may constitute either a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ under Art. 31(3)(a) VCLT or ‘subsequent practice’ under Art. 31(3)
(b) VCLT, which shall be taken into account by a tribunal when interpreting the 
20. Award, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, 2016. Para. 300. See also Article 
5(1), Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (Switzerland-Uruguay) 
(adopted 07/10/1988, entered into force 22/04/1991).
21. Award, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, 2016. Para. 301.
22. Article 1128, North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) 
(adopted 17/12/1992, entered into force 01/01/1994).
23. Tarcisio Gazzini, Interpretation of International Investment Treaties (Hart 2016). P. 193.
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treaty.24 A review of NAFTA practice shows that non-disputing States tend to 
submit restrictive interpretations, which – if endorsed by all treaty parties – 
are often taken into account by tribunals although this acceptance is not as 
unequivocal as when binding interpretations, for example under Art. 1131 NAFTA, 
are issued.25
It has been said that the involvement of third parties can have a material impact 
on the outcome of legal proceedings and it constitutes accepted practice under 
the procedural rules of various international courts.26 More specifically in the 
context of investment arbitration, the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 
allow for submissions by non-disputing parties to the treaty.27 Besides the 
NAFTA provision, referred to above, non-disputing parties have a right to make 
submissions on the interpretation of the treaty under the CPTPP, Dominican 
Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement, and the 
Canadian and US Model BIT’s.28 Comparable provisions have also been 
24. Id. Meg Kinnear, Andrea Bjorklund & John Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA: 
An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11 (Kluwer Law International, 2006-2009) 1128-4c. 
Award on Jurisdiction, The Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, 2008. Paras. 186-189.
25. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: 
Resurgence of Diplomatic Protection?’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al (eds.), 
Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement (Brill 2012). P. 314. Wolfgang 
Alschner, ‘The Return of the Home State and the Rise of “Embedded” Investor-State 
Arbitration’ in Shaheeza Lalani et al (eds.), The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration 
(Brill 2015). P. 311. Andrea Menaker, ‘Treatment of Non-Disputing State Party Views in 
Investor-State Arbitrations’ in Arthur Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International 
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2008 (Brill 2009). Pp. 68-73.
26. See Articles 10 & 17, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization) (adopted 15/04/1994, entered into force 01/01/1995). Article 23, Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union [2012] OJ C83/210. Article 96, Consolidated 
Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 [2012] OJ 
L265. See also Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, ‘Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO 
Dispute Settlement’ [2006] 58(3) World Politics 446. P. 447. Clifford Carrubba, Matthew 
Gabel & Charles Hankla, ‘Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from 
the European Court of Justice’ [2008] 102 American Political Science Review 435. Pp. 
449-450. Eugenia Levine, ‘Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The 
Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation [2011] 29 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 200. P. 217. Katia Fach Gómez, ‘Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in 
International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest’ 
[2012] 35 Fordham International Law Journal 510. P. 545.
27. Article 5, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, 2014. Claudia Reith, ‘The New UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency 2014: Significant Breakthrough or a Regime Full of Empty Formula?’ in 
Marianne Roth et al (eds.), Yearbook on International Arbitration, vol 4 (Intersentia 2015). 
Pp. 136-137.
28. Article 28, US Model BIT, 2012. Article 35, Canada Model BIT, 2004, Article 9.23, 
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accepted by the EU in its IIA’s with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam.29 Although 
textual differences exist amongst these provisions, they all have in common that 
the right of non-disputing parties to make submissions is restricted to issues 
regarding the interpretation of the agreement only.
9.2.2.1. Applicable Arbitration Rules
Although the ECT currently does not provide contracting parties with an explicit 
right to make submissions regarding the interpretation of the treaty, the applicable 
arbitration rules in investor-State disputes may fill this gap.
At present, there are examples from ECT practice where non-disputing parties 
have made submissions to tribunals although these tribunals currently possess 
discretion whether or not to admit such submissions and, in doing so, conditions 
may be imposed on their scope and costs may even be levied on the non-
disputing parties.
For instance, in Electrabel v. Hungary and AES v. Hungary, the European 
Commission participated in the proceedings as amicus curiae.30 Both 
tribunals operated under the ICSID arbitration rules and they allowed the 
Commissions intervention on the basis of Rule 37(2) of the ICSID arbitration 
rules.31 The Electrabel tribunal laid down certain parameters for the scope of 
the Commissions submission which went beyond mere issues regarding the 
interpretation of the ECT.32 In the RREEF v. Spain and Eiser v. Spain cases, ICSID 
tribunals acted differently. In RREEF the tribunal twice rejected the attempts from 
the Commission to intervene while in the Eiser case the submission was made 
contingent on the Commissions willingness to pay ‘the additional costs of legal 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 
08/03/2018, entered into force 30/12/2018). Article 10.20, Dominican Republic – Central 
America – United States Free Trade Agreement (adopted 05/08/2004, entered into force 
01/01/2009).
29. Article 8.38, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) 
(adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending). Article 3.17, EU-Singapore 
Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 19/10/2018, entrance into force still pending). 
Article 3.51(2), EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (adopted 30/06/2019, 
entrance into force still pending).
30. Procedural Order No. 4, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2009. Award, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The 
Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 2010. Paras 3.18-3.22.
31. Christoph Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch & Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2009). P. 704.
32. Procedural Order No. 4, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, 2009. Paras. 24-26.
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presentation reasonably incurred by the parties in responding to’ its submission.33 
ECT practice under the ICSID arbitration rules is thus not consistent.
In the Charanne v. Spain case, where the tribunal operated on basis of the 2010 
arbitration rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the Commission 
was allowed to make amicus curiae submissions although it was not given access 
to the case files nor was it allowed to attend the hearings.34 The SCC has since 
updated its arbitration rules and the 2017 version of it contain a right, subject 
to certain conditions, for non-disputing treaty parties to make submissions 
‘on issues of treaty interpretation’ in a separate appendix for investment treaty 
disputes.35 This innovative provision has not yet been relied upon in practice.
The 2013 UNCITRAL arbitration rules incorporate the UNCITRAL Transparency 
Rules by reference and thus provide for a right for non-disputing parties to make 
submissions ‘on issues of treaty interpretation’ by reference.36 In case older 
versions of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules apply, the general procedural power 
of UNCITRAL tribunals will have to be exerted.37 Practice of the IUSCT, which 
operates under the 1976 UNCITRAL arbitration rules, demonstrates that third-
party submissions is accepted under these rules.38
Nevertheless, an explicit endorsement by the Energy Charter Conference of this 
right would be desirable. Under the NAFTA for example, the contracting parties 
– acting through the NAFTA Free Trade Commission – explicitly acknowledged 
through a statement that non-disputing parties, including parties other than non-
33. Decision on Jurisdiction, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European 
Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, 2016. 
Paras. 16-32. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à 
r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 65.
34. Unofficial Translation of the Final Award, Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, 
SCC Case No. 062/2012, 2016. Paras. 16, 49-60.
35. Article 4, Appendix III, SCC Arbitration Rules, 2017.
36. Article 1(4), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2013. Article 5, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, 
2014.
37. Article 15(1), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976. Article 17(1), UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, 2010. See also: David Caron & Lee Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2013). Pp. 30-31, 39-41. Clyde Croft, Christopher 
Kee & Jeff Waincymer, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Cambridge University 
Press 2013). Pp. 176, 192-193.
38. United States v. Iran, No. A17, Decision No. Dec. 37-A17-FT, 1985, 8 Iran United States 
Claims Tribunal Reports 1987. P. 191. David Caron & Lee Caplan, The UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2013). P. 40.
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disputing NAFTA parties, may act as amicus curiae.39 This statement sets certain 
criteria that have to be met by amicus curiae submissions. From subsequent 
NAFTA cases, where tribunals had to decide on the participation of amicus 
curiae, the importance of such a statement becomes apparent.40
Therefore, third party participation is possible in ECT disputes, a possibility 
that is explicitly acknowledged in the 2017 SCC arbitration rules and the 2013 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. The ICSID arbitration rules also allow for this 
possibility, although the tribunal has the discretion to decide on this issue. 
Under the 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration rules the general procedural 
powers of the tribunal will have to be exercised. Therefore, a declaration of the 
Energy Charter Conference that reflects the content Appendix III of the 2017 SCC 
arbitration rules would strengthen the position of non-disputing ECT parties. In 
a similar vein, developments outside of the ECT context could also strengthen 
the position of non-disputing ECT parties. For instance, if more ECT contracting 
parties sign and ratify the 2014 Mauritius Convention on Transparency, the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules could be made applicable in ECT disputes.
9.2.2.2. Transparency in Dispute Settlement Procedures
A strengthened position of non-disputing ECT parties would be futile, however, 
in the absence of enhanced transparency amongst ECT contracting parties 
where it concerns pending ECT disputes. The existence has to be known 
amongst contacting parties before one can participate and, relatedly, relevant 
documents concerning pending procedures, such as parties’ submissions and 
decisions rendered by tribunals should become available. After all, how can 
a State participate in ongoing ECT disputes if it is not aware of such disputes, 
let alone make meaningful submissions if the contested issues are unknown.41 
In that regard, the Energy Charter Secretariat could oversee the distribution of 
documents and other relevant information in a comparable manner to the WTO 
39. Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation <www.sice.
oas.org/TPD/NAFTA/Commission/Nondispute_e.pdf> accessed 06/03/2017.
40. Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, Glamis Gold, Ltd v. 
United States of America, UNCITRAL, 2005. Paras. 9-13. Procedural Order No. 2 on the 
Participation of a Non-Disputing Party, Apotex Inc v. the Government of the United States 
of America, UNCITRAL, 2011. Paras. 15-35. Procedural Order No. 4, Eli Lilly and Company 
v. the Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 2016. Paras. A-B.
41. In Glamis Gold, the non-disputing parties stated ‘that it would be difficult to submit 
meaningful submissions without first examining the Parties’ memorial and counter-
memorial.’ See Procedural Order No. 6, Glamis Gold Ltd v. the United States of America, 
UNCITRAL, 2005. Para. 11.
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Secretariat. In the alternative, if more ECT contracting parties ratify the Mauritius 
Convention, the Secretary General of the United Nations or an institution named 
by UNCITRAL will act as repository.42 Either way, it is encouraging to see that 
transparency is on the approved list of topics for the ECT’s modernization 
process.43
9.3. Conclusion
There are various legal avenues available that can be used by ECT contracting 
parties to address the shortcomings in the current legal framework. The 
appropriate tool to be used depends on the nature of the proposed change. 
For example, where it concerns investment promotion new rules will have to be 
established that deviate from the existing rules. Therefore, amending the current 
ECT or supplementing it with a binding treaty in the form of an Energy Charter 
Protocol will be necessary. The same holds true where it concerns some of the 
issues relating to investment protection; if the contracting parties want to – for 
example – lower the level of investment protection offered by the FET standard 
or they want to narrow the scope of the investment provisions by changing the 
definitions of ‘investor’ and/or ‘investment’, formal steps will have to be taken. 
These latter changes could also be implemented by a group of like-minded 
States through the modification procedure contained in Art. 41 VCLT, although 
the formalities of the said provision have to be complied with.
If the ECT contracting parties want to clarify the existing rules of the ECT without 
changing them, other tools may be available. In that regard, one could think of the 
unanimous adoption of an Energy Charter Declaration or even the participation 
by non-disputing parties in ongoing dispute settlement cases.
42. Article 8, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, 2014.
43. Energy Charter Secretariat, Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
17/12/2018.
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
When the ECT was negotiated and concluded, it was primarily expected to 
protect investments from Western companies in unstable economies in the East. 
At the time, most had probably envisioned that it would concern investments 
in conventional energy sources, such as oil and gas. Nevertheless, the ECT is 
currently primarily invoked in relations between Member States of the EU and 
not predominantly in the conventional energy sector but rather primarily in the 
RES sector.
This means that the ECT currently caters for a need, even though this was not 
the main goal at the time of conclusion: applying an existing legal framework to 
an unanticipated factual context may be easier and save a significant amount of 
time in comparison to where a legal framework has to be established. However, 
the mere fact that the ECT currently does apply to RES investments does not 
necessarily mean that it does so effectively.
At present, RES ECT disputes arise primarily in the relations between EU Member 
States and barely involve non-EU countries and/or their investors. This may be 
because of the liberal economic regime applying within the EU that facilitates 
cross-border economic activities by guaranteeing free movement of capital, 
goods, persons, and the freedom of establishment. Investment promotion is 
then provided for by EU law while the ECT primarily remains an appealing legal 
instrument for purposes of investment protection.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ECT currently applies to RES, there is 
nevertheless ample room for improvement. This chapter will answer the main 
research question, which is repeated in full:
“What changes to the legal framework of the ECT, regarding 
investment promotion and protection, have to be made to facilitate 
investments in renewable energy sources?”
This question will be answered in light of the economic theories discussed 
in chapter 2 and the practical considerations regarding the RES sector as 
discussed in chapter 3. This means that:
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· On the basis of liberal economic theory, trade and investment 
distorting measures may undermine economic efficiency by favoring 
domestic goods and services suppliers over foreign competitors. 
Economics of scale may subsequently not be fully exploited which 
results in higher prices than otherwise necessary.
· From a micro economic perspective, investors may have 
various motives to invest abroad, related to potential higher rates of 
return, risk diversification, avoiding trade barriers, meet increased 
demand on foreign markets, and/or internalize activities in their own 
supply chain. However, risks associated with investing in foreign 
jurisdictions are also an important issue that is taken into account 
by potential investors. A major component of this is the political and 
regulatory risk. Recent experience in the RES sector demonstrates 
that the lack of a stable regulatory framework governing RES can 
undermine the economic viability of RES investments.
· This latter point may directly affect the cost of capital, which 
plays a major role in the LCOE of a RES project. Therefore, reducing 
perceived risks – whether they are of a political, regulatory, technical, 
or any other nature – can contribute to the competitiveness of RES.
· Excessive transaction costs can prevent desirable economic 
exchanges from taking place. Therefore, measures that may reduce 
transaction costs should be favored and measures that cause them 
should be avoided.
· A diverse pool of investors is currently active in the RES sector. 
Nevertheless, the sector is very much internationally oriented, in 
particular when one takes into account not only the stage of project 
development, but also the value chain of RES generation equipment. 
This means that even a project that is completely domestically 
financed is likely to benefit from investment and trade liberalization.
· Investment and trade in the RES are closely related. As said, 
generation equipment is produced through GVC’s, services and 
goods are often sold in tandem, international OEM’s often render 
relevant services through the establishment of a commercial 
 10
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presence in the host State while OEM’s also regularly participate in 
large projects as equity partner.
With these general observations in mind, I will now turn to recommendations that 
could be implemented with the purpose to facilitate RES investments. In line with 
the previous chapters, I will discuss investment protection and promotion in turn.
10.1. INVESTMENT PROTECTION
The ECT’s investment chapter currently primarily provides for post-establishment 
investment protection. It has been said that the ECT is aimed at strengthening 
the rule of law in global energy matters.1 In comparison to more recent IIA’s, the 
ECT prescribes a relatively high level of investment protection: the ECT contains 
a relatively high number of investment protection standards several of which 
are currently not necessarily included in new IIA’s, such as the non-impairment 
obligation, the umbrella clause, and the effective means clause. In addition, even 
if certain provisions are retained in more recent IIA’s, such as the FET standard, 
they are by no means identical to the ECT’s FET standard. In comparison to 
the ECT, newer treaties often describe and clarify the content of standards of 
investment protection more clearly, which de facto, may lead to a lower level of 
investment protection. This often holds true, for example, with regard to the FET 
standard, NT and MFN obligations, MCPS, and (indirect) expropriation.
Also, more recent IIA’s in general contain many more clarifications, exceptions, 
and derogations than older IIA’s. All of this is done in order to safeguard the 
host States’ right to regulate its domestic affairs. As currently evidenced by the 
list of topics approved for modernization by the Energy Charter Conference, 
many investment protection standards will be modernized.2 These include: FET, 
MFN, MCPS, the definition of indirect expropriation, and the umbrella clause. 
Furthermore, certain topics currently not explicitly addressed in the text of the 
ECT are also on the agenda, including the right to regulate and sustainable 
1. Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘Introduction’ in Rafael Leal-Arcas (ed.), Commentary on the Energy 
Charter Treaty (Edward Elgar 2018). P. 1.
2. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
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development and social corporate responsibility. In light of this and more recent 
IIA’s, it seems that the modernization process will largely evolve around redefining 
standards of investment protection in a manner that considers the States’ right 
to regulate.
Providing more clarity to the existing investment protection standards is, however, 
a most welcome development. As shown throughout this dissertation, many ECT 
provisions have given rise to seemingly inconsistent decisions, even in factually 
comparable cases. A lack of legal certainty under the ECT adversely affects all 
parties involved: investors might be unsure what is protected under the treaty 
while States may become hesitant in regulating their domestic affairs fearing that 
investors may invoke the ECT. If the ECT is really supposed to strengthen the rule 
of law in energy affairs, then the rule of law itself is probably one of the strongest 
arguments in favor of more legal certainty.3 Since the ECT contracting parties are 
the masters of the treaty, it is advisable that they take the lead in more clearly 
defining the standards of investment protection. It is in fact a strategy that various 
States, including ECT contracting parties, have already adopted in practice by 
publishing new Model BIT’s and negotiating and concluding IIA’s that contain 
more clearly defined standards of investment protection. This new practice, as 
evidenced by new Model BIT’s and IIA’s, may be an appropriate starting point 
for a modernized ECT. After all, while recent IIA’s may adopt approaches along 
comparable lines they are far from uniform.
10.1.1. Protecting RES Investments
In chapter 2, I established that the costs of capital are determined largely by 
reference to the risks associated with an investment. As shown by ECT RES 
investment disputes: the risk that financial support to RES projects is withdrawn 
or reduced is not just hypothetical. In most, if not all, ECT disputes concerning 
RES the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations is at the heart of 
the dispute. However, when looking at more recent IIA’s, the frustration of the 
investors’ legitimate expectations does not necessarily lead to a violation of the 
treaty. In that regard, it might sound counterintuitive to argue in favor of redefining 
investment protection standards if that would entail a lower level of investment 
protection as this may increase the cost of capital.
3. Cees Verburg, ‘Modernizing the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal 
Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement [2019] 20(2-3) Journal of World Investment 
& Trade 425. P. 454.
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However, in light of the inconsistent arbitral jurisprudence regarding the 
protection of legitmate expectations – including in ECT RES disputes – it may 
be comprehensable that some States might want to avoid explicit reference to 
it. In particular since a modernized ECT will not only apply to RES investors, but 
also to other investors in the energy sector whose economic activities will have 
to be scaled back if we want to meet the climate goals of the Paris Agreement. 
Therefore, it might be advisable that States consider the possibility of drafting 
standards of investment protection specifically targeted at RES investments. For 
example, the 2018 EU RES Directive devotes a specific provision to the financial 
stability of support schemes for RES from which inspiration can be drawn.4 This 
can prevent situations as were seen in the Spanish RES sector where a support 
scheme was replaced with a fundamentally different support scheme.
An alternative approach would be to seek for guidance in ECT jurisprudence. In 
Blusun v. Italy, the tribunal proposed the following standard of review:
‘In the absence of a specific commitment, the state has no obligation 
to grant subsidies such as feed-in tariffs, or to maintain them 
unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, and if 
it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a 
manner which is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative 
amendment, and should have due regard to the reasonable 
reliance interests of recipients who may have committed substantial 
resources on the basis of the earlier regime.’5
As stated by the tribunal itself, a proportionality test ‘carries in-built limitations’ 
and is ‘determinate’ while it is also a ‘criterion which administrative law courts, 
and human rights courts, have become accustomed to apply to governmental 
action.’6
Besides providing for a provision on financial stability it may also be advisable 
to include a provision that foresees in stability with regard to priority dispatch 
as this will protect the fundamental characteristics of a RES support scheme as 
4. Article 6(1), Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) 
[2018] OJ L328/82.
5. Final Award, Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, 2016. Para. 319(5).
6. Ibid. Para. 318.
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identified by ECT tribunals. The combination of financial support and priority 
dispatch ensures that investors have a high level of certainty regarding the price 
of the product that they produce as well as the demand for it. Since it is this 
combination of features that enabled many RES investors to obtain financing for 
their investments, these are also the main elements that should be protected.7
Drafting provisions that exclusively apply to RES investments and reduce risks 
that may be specific for RES investments would be a way to, on the one hand, 
provide for an appropriate level of investment protection for RES investors while, 
on the other hand, avoiding that such provisions can be relied upon by non-RES 
investors in the energy sector.
10.2. INVESTMENT PROMOTION
At present, the ECT – like most other IIA’s – primarily provides for post-
establishment protection while the commitments under the treaty with regards 
to investment promotion are limited. It has nevertheless been questioned whether 
such treaties effectively contribute to increased flows of FDI.8 However, this 
should not be surprising since, in theory, ECT contracting parties are under no 
obligation to admit foreign investors. Therefore, a State may sign and ratify the 
ECT and decide to admit virtually no foreign investors. After all, it is only once the 
host State has unilaterally decided to admit foreign investors that the obligations 
of the ECT become relevant. In such a situation, it can hardly be surprising that 
the effect of the IIA on flows of FDI is limited.
Therefore, in order for the ECT to effectively facilitate investments in RES, the 
contracting parties should work towards removing barriers to FDI that are at 
present lawful under the treaty. In addition to the general liberalization of FDI in 
the RES sector, there are also specific provisions currently in the ECT that could 
contribute to removing barriers to investment and trade in the RES sector that 
remain underdeveloped. This section will address them in turn.
7. Final Award, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. v. Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, 2017. Para. 412. Award, Antin Infrastructure Services 
Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/31, 2018. Para. 560.
8. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the 
Evidence (IISD 2017). <https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/assessing-
impacts-investment-treaties.pdf> accessed on 24/01/2019. Pp. 3-4.
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As was discussed in chapter 6.1, the liberalization of FDI by including so-
called ‘pre-establishment rights’ was a heavily contested issue during the 
ECT negotiations. In the end, the parties settled on a compromise: no pre-
establishment rights would be included in the ECT but the parties committed 
themselves to concluding a supplementary treaty.9 This latter treaty would never 
be concluded.
Various approaches exist with regards to the making of investments. The most 
transparent approach is by extending the NT and MFN obligations to the pre-
establishment phase of an investment. This means that, in principle, foreign 
investors should receive ‘a right of entry on an equal footing with national 
investors.’10 Subsequently, the negotiating parties can agree on exceptions to 
this general rule, for example by allowing for non-conforming measures. These 
non-conforming measures are to be incorporated into a schedule.11 Thereby, 
the contracting parties can agree to the continued application of discriminatory 
legislation. This way, the exact extent to which foreign investors obtain market 
access simply becomes a matter of negotiations. In the end, the parties are 
then expected to reach an equilibrium that is satisfactory to all parties involved.
The pro-liberalization spirit of the agreement could subsequently be further 
entrenched by including a standstill clause, much akin to current Art. 10(6)
(a) ECT albeit for the voluntary nature of that provision, which would preclude 
contracting parties from introducing new laws and regulations that violate the 
NT and MFN obligation. A benefit of this approach would be that it is quite 
transparent, which could reduce transaction costs: discriminatory legislation is 
in principle not allowed unless it is included in the schedule of non-conforming 
measures.
Currently, ‘pre-investment’ is on the list of approved topics for modernization.12 
Although it is not clear what is meant by ‘pre-investment’, it may relate to the 
9. Article 10(4), the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17/12/1994, entered into force 
16/04/1998).
10. August Reinisch, ‘National Treatment’ in Marc Bungenberg et al (eds.), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (C.H. Beck 2015). P. 851.
11. Articles 8.15(1) & (2), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-
Canada) (adopted 30/10/2016, entrance into force still pending).
12. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
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liberalization of investments in a way that was previously attempted by the ECT 
contracting parties. Unfortunately however, the European Commission, which 
as representative of the EU in combination with its Member States, makes up 
a significant proportion of ECT contracting parties, has already indicated that 
it does not consider ‘pre-investment’ a priority in the modernization process.13
10.2.2. Trade Related Investment Measures
Another significant contribution that a modernized ECT could make to facilitate 
RES investments is by abolishing LCR’s, which have been quite common in the 
RES sector. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, these LCR’s can significantly 
affect the LCOE of RES since they can undermine economic efficiency, increase 
transaction costs, and impose additional risks to proposed projects which can 
result in higher cost of capital. At present, Art. 10(11) ECT merely prohibits the 
application of LCR’s to investments ‘existing at the time of such application.’ 
However, since investments in RES are currently still largely regulatory driven, 
this provision is of little use if the RES support scheme contains the LCR: after all, 
the LCR was adopted before the investment even existed, which means that it is 
highly unlikely that it will be applied to an already existing investment. Therefore, 
the application of LCR’s in the pre-establishment phase of an investment should 
also be prohibited. In addition, the scope of the TRIM’s provision could be 
extended to include not only goods but also services, investors, and investments 
as the EUVFTA does.14
The current list of approved topics for modernization does not mention Art. 5 
ECT and TRIM’s. Therefore, it seems that this topic will not be discussed by the 
contracting parties.
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
13. Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating Directives for the Modernisation of the Energy 
Charter Treaty’ (2019, 9305/19). P. 6. European Commission, ‘Recommendation for a 
Council Decision Authorising the Entering Into Negotiations on the Modernization of the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ (COM(2019) 231 final, 14/05/2019). P. 2. About ‘pre-investment’ the 
Recommendation states as follows: ‘The EU recorded its reservation to avoid making pre-
investment subject to dispute settlement. In general, the EU views that the reasons and 
circumstances that did not allow for a successful conclusion of a “Supplementary Treaty” 
in the past, remain. Against this backdrop, pre-investment is not a priority of the EU in this 
modernisation round which should focus on investment protection provisions.’
14. Article 7.4, EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adopted 
30/06/2019, entrance into force still pending).
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The provision regarding key personnel is, like the TRIM’s provision of Art. 5 ECT, 
another clear example of an investment provision that relates to trade as well, in 
this case in particular to the supply of services through the presence of natural 
persons. In the RES sector, this is an important mode of services supply. At 
present, Art. 11(1) speaks of ‘key technical services’ that may be supplied by 
key personnel.
Currently, any decision concerning the admission of foreign key personnel is 
completely subjected to domestic law and there is merely a commitment to 
examine requests by foreign investors to admit such personnel in ‘good faith’. 
Instead of subjecting any decision regarding the matter to domestic law, the 
ECT contracting parties could agree on binding commitments regarding this 
topic during the modernization process. This could reduce transaction costs and 
particularly contribute to the supply of technical services. In addition, it could 
constitute a means through which technology and skills could be transferred 
to host State nationals and thereby contribute to the building of capacity in the 
host State.15
10.2.4. Transparency
Enhanced transparency in the context of the RES sector can be a relatively easy 
manner to facilitate RES investments. IPA’s could take the lead in disseminating 
information regarding investment opportunities in the RES sector, ideally in an 
international business language. Also, IPA’s could serve as contact point for 
foreign investors. Enhanced transparency can thereby facilitate investments and 
reduce transaction costs.
10.2.5. Transfer of Technology
For a successful energy transition, the dissemination of RES technology is of 
great importance, in particular in countries that currently lack RES technology 
and the required skills to employ such technology. Therefore, transfer of 
technology is an important topic. Since FDI is often considered as a main driver 
of transfer of technology, a modernized ECT could play an important role in this 
regard. As Art. 8 ECT currently tries to achieve, transfer of technology always 
requires a balancing exercise between private interests on the one hand, and 
15. Cees Verburg & Jaap Waverijn, ‘Liberalizing the Global Supply Chain of Renewable 
Energy Technology – The Role of International Investment Law in Facilitating Flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Trade’ [2019] 2 Brill Open Law 1. P. 37.
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public interests on the other hand. From an investors’ perspective, a commercial 
basis for the transfer of knowledge and technology is preferred over forced 
transfer. In that regard, the business practice of the RES sector provides plenty of 
opportunities. For example, many of the services necessary for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of RES projects are currently being rendered through 
the establishment of a commercial presence, whereby foreign investors most 
often draw from the local labor market, and the presence of natural persons, 
which allows for learning by doing.
At present, transfer of technology is not part of the modernization process.16
10.3. COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON RES INVESTMENT 
AND TRADE
Investment and trade in the RES sector are closely interrelated: both practically 
as well as legally. From the issues addressed above, investment protection is 
clearly something that falls within the ambit of IIA’s, with regards to investment 
promotion, the linkages to trade are more evident. This also means that one has 
to transcend the traditional silos of international law regarding investment and 
trade if the purpose is to establish a legal framework that can effectively facilitate 
RES investments. Simply because trade related considerations have such an 
important effect on investment and vice versa. Therefore, such a comprehensive 
agreement should take into account not only investment protection and 
promotion, but also trade in RES goods and services.
If a future agreement fails to regulate trade and investment in the RES sector in a 
comprehensive manner, it will most likely affect its ability to effectively contribute 
to the dissemination and deployment of RES technology. Also, for a meaningful 
comprehensive agreement on RES investment and trade, it would be essential 
that important countries in the RES sector participate, such as China, and the US. 
In that regard, one should not expect miracles from the modernization process 
of the ECT. Quite to the contrary, not only are important countries in the RES 
sector currently no contracting party to the ECT but also since the list of topics 
16. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of 
the Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.
org/media/news/article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-
energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_
pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a78fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed on 
06/06/2019.
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approved for modernization evidences that the main focus will be on investment 
protection. This does not mean, however, that the required level of liberalization 
cannot be achieved in the context of FTA’s outside the context of the ECT.
10.4. EPILOGUE
According to the IEA, ensuring that low carbon energy supply meets the worlds’ 
energy demand in 2050 requires annual energy investments in the amount of 
USD 3.5 tln.17 Since 2015, however, annual energy investments amounted to 
around USD 1.8 tln, well below what is required to meet the climate targets set 
by the Paris Agreement and meet the worlds’ energy demand at the same time.
In addition to this, international economic relations have in recent years come 
under pressure from increased protectionism. Recent figures from UNCTAD 
demonstrate that global FDI, across all economic sectors, was down for the third 
consecutive year (-13 percent) in 2018, while in 2017 it was already down by 23 
percent in comparison to 2016.18 In 2017 investments in GVC’s were also down, 
which may be indicative for future trade patterns.19 Furthermore, the UNCTAD 
also noted ‘a remarkable increase in investment restrictions or regulations.’20 
Since FDI can play an instrumental role in financing RES, in particular for 
countries that lack domestic financial resources to finance their energy transition, 
these numbers should be disconcerting.
To further complicate matters, the RES sector was already a sector where 
protectionist measures played an important role. Since the economic interests 
in the sector increase as the sector itself grows, regulating it in accordance 
with liberal economic rules might become increasingly complex. Even if a 
comprehensive agreement on RES trade and investment could be reached in 
the modernization process, the benefits of this agreement have to be accorded 
to all members of the WTO due to the MFN clause which might be a costly affair 
17. International Energy Agency, Perspectives for the Energy Transition – Investment Needs for 
a Low Carbon Energy System (IEA/IRENA 2017). P. 8.
18. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2018 (United Nations 2018). Pp. XI–XII & 2. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, World Investment Report 2019 (United Nations 2019). Pp. X & 2.
19. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2018 
(United Nations 2018). P. XII.
20. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Investment Policy Monitor’ (Issue 
19, March 2018). P. 1.
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if major countries in RES goods and services are absent from the agreement.21 
This is in itself probably a major incentive not to reach an ambitious agreement 
within the ECT context.
All of this is unfortunate in light of the fact that liberalizing investment and trade in 
the RES sector might well enhance the competitiveness of RES – as expressed 
in a lower LCOE. This might accelerate the pace at which RES reach the tipping 
point of grid parity after which the energy transition might not only be regulatory 
driven anymore, but also market driven. If the economic laws of demand and 
supply indeed exist, the market is expected to favor RES over conventional ones 
from that moment onwards and we would be one step closer to a successful 
implementation of the energy transition.
21. Article XXIV, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30/10/1947, entered 
into force 01/01/1948). Article V, General Agreement on Trade in Services (adopted 
15/04/1994, entered into force 01/01/1995). Report of the Panel, Turkey – Restrictions on 
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 1999. Paras. 9.87-9.192. Report 
of the Appellate Body, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 
WT/DS34/AB/R, 1999. Paras. 42-63. William J. Davey, ‘A Model Article XIV: Are There 
Realistic Possibilities to Improve it?’ in Kyle W. Bagwell et al (eds.), Preferential Trade 
Agreements – A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2011). James 
H. Mathis, ‘The “Legalization” of GATT Article XIV – Can Foes Become Friends?’ in Kyle 
W. Bagwell et al (eds.), Preferential Trade Agreements – A Law and Economics Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press 2011). Md. Rizwanul Islam & Shawkat Alam, ‘Preferential 
Trade Agreements and the Scope of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V and the Enabling 
Clause: An Appraisal of GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ [2009] 56(1) Netherlands International 
Law Review 1. Yong Shik Lee, ‘Regional Trade Agreements in the WTO System: Potential 
Issues and Solutions’ [2015] 8(2) Journal of East Asia and International Law 353.
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
Het Moderniseren van het Energiehandvestverdrag – Het Faciliteren 
van Buitenlandse Investeringen in de Hernieuwbare Energiesector
Het multilaterale Energiehandvestverdrag (ECT) werd begin jaren ’90 gesloten 
ten einde handel en investeringen in de energiesector te stimuleren in de relaties 
tussen West-Europese landen en de landen van het voormalige Oostblok. Om dit 
doel te bereiken werden regels afgesproken omtrent handel, investeringen en de 
doorvoer van energie. Dit proefschrift gaat in op de rol die het verdrag kan spelen 
in de huidige energietransitie, door te analyseren hoe het bij zou kunnen dragen 
aan het faciliteren van hernieuwbare energie investeringen. Het zwaartepunt ligt 
aldus op het investeringshoofdstuk van het verdrag, waar hernieuwbare energie 
investeerders in de praktijk met de nodige regelmaat gebruik van maken. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk worden de onderzoeksvragen en de onderzoek-
smethodologie geïntroduceerd. De hoofdvraag luidt: ‘Welke wijzigingen moeten 
worden doorgevoerd in het juridische kader van het ECT, meer specifiek het 
hoofdstuk over investeringsbevordering en -bescherming, ten einde investeringen 
in hernieuwbare energiebronnen te faciliteren?’ Het doel van dit proefschrift is 
om met aanbevelingen te komen die bijdragen aan een verandering van het 
geldende recht. Aldus is het doel van dit proefschrift niet om te analyseren waar 
het thans geldende recht in voorziet, het doel is om te analyseren waar het recht in 
zou moeten voorzien. Deze doelstelling sluit goed aan bij het recentelijk door de 
verdragsluitende partijen geïnitieerde moderniseringsproces van het ECT. Om tot 
een antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag te komen zal gebruik worden gemaakt van 
economische theorieën die ten grondslag liggen aan internationaal economisch 
recht. Om te analyseren waar het juridische kader van het ECT momenteel in 
voorziet wordt gebruik gemaakt van de regels omtrent verdragsinterpretatie 
zoals opgenomen in het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het Verdragenrecht. Deze 
regels worden in de praktijk veelvuldig toegepast in ECT-zaken. Daarnaast wordt 
tijdens de analyse van het juridisch kader van het ECT veelvuldig verwezen 
naar vergelijkbare bepalingen uit andere handels- en investeringsverdragen. 
De reden om een vergelijkend perspectief aan te nemen is gelegen in het 
feit dat de ECT verdragsluitende partijen hebben aangegeven dat ze in het 
moderniseringsproces willen aansluiten bij hedendaagse beleidstendensen. 
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Het tweede hoofdstuk bevat verschillende macro- en micro-economische 
theorieën die als achtergrond gebruikt zullen worden. Tevens worden de 
begrippen transactie- en kapitaalkosten geïntroduceerd. Uit deze theorieën 
blijkt dat handels- en investeringsliberalisering kan leiden tot meer efficiëntie 
waardoor de kosten van goederen en diensten die nodig zijn voor het opwekken 
van hernieuwbare energie gereduceerd kunnen worden. Tevens kan adequate 
investeringsbescherming de risico’s omtrent investeringen mitigeren, waardoor 
de kapitaalkosten omlaag kunnen gaan. 
In het derde hoofdstuk worden de elektriciteits- en hernieuwbare energiesector 
geïntroduceerd. De elektriciteitssector is tegenwoordig nog grotendeels op een 
traditionele manier georganiseerd, waarbij productie plaatsvindt aan de top en 
elektriciteit via transmissie- en distributiesystemen getransporteerd wordt naar 
de eindgebruiker. Dit model komt echter steeds meer onder druk te staan in de 
energietransitie, aangezien hernieuwbare elektriciteit steeds vaker decentraal 
wordt opgewekt. Bedrijven die actief zijn in de hernieuwbare energiesector zijn 
vaak internationaal georganiseerd, zo zijn er veel buitenlandse investeerders 
actief in de sector en zijn de aanvoerlijnen en waardeketens van toeleveranciers 
van de benodigde goederen en diensten vaak internationaal opgezet. 
De hoofdstukken vier tot en met zeven beschrijven met name het huidige 
juridische kader van het ECT. Tevens wordt uitgelegd hoe dit kader relevant is 
voor hernieuwbare energie investeerders. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat de normen 
van het ECT vaak breed en dubbelzinnig zijn. Het verdrag is dan ook veelvuldig 
op een inconsistente manier geïnterpreteerd en toegepast. In vergelijking met 
hedendaagse investeringsverdragen valt verder op dat het ECT voorziet in een 
relatief hoog niveau van investeringsbescherming waardoor de drempel voor 
aansprakelijkheid van verdragsluitende partijen relatief laag ligt. Tot slot blijkt 
dat het huidige ECT vooral voorziet in investeringsbescherming en betrekkelijk 
weinig regelt omtrent investeringsbevordering. 
Aan de hand van de in hoofdstuk twee geïntroduceerde economische 
achtergronden en de analyse van het ECT uit de hoofdstukken vier tot en 
met zeven worden in hoofdstuk acht de tekortkomingen van het huidige 
juridische kader opgesomd. In dit hoofdstuk wordt onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen maatregelen omtrent investeringsbevordering en -bescherming. In 
het kader van investeringsbevordering is er de nodige ruimte voor meer 
investeringsliberalisering en maatregelen die anderszins investeringen kunnen 
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bevorderen. Door middel van investeringsliberalisering, dat wil zeggen het 
scheppen van een gelijk speelveld tussen binnenlandse en buitenlandse 
investeerders, kan het ECT economische efficiëntie in de sector bevorderen 
waardoor de kosten van hernieuwbare elektriciteit kunnen dalen. Tevens hebben 
investeringsbevorderende maatregelen de potentie om transactiekosten te 
verlagen. Met betrekking tot investeringsbescherming is meer rechtszekerheid 
wenselijk: door de onvoorspelbaarheid in het huidige regime is het voor zowel 
Staten als investeerders soms lastig in te schatten of bepaalde maatregelen in 
overeenstemming zijn met het ECT of niet. 
Hoofdstuk negen gaat in de op de verschillende manieren waarop de 
voorgestelde wijzigingen juridisch geïmplementeerd kunnen worden. Alsof 
het hervormen van een multilateraal verdrag in normale omstandigheden 
nog niet moeilijk genoeg is, stelt de huidige verdragstekst van het ECT de 
verdragsluitende partijen voor een grote uitdaging waardoor vergaande – en 
tijdrovende – hervormingsmaatregelen hoogstwaarschijnlijk noodzakelijk zijn. In 
dit hoofdstuk wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen maatregelen die formele 
stappen vereisen, zoals amendementen en/of additionele protocollen, aan 
de ene kant en minder vergaande maatregelen, die door middel van soft law 
maatregelen reeds effect kunnen sorteren, aan de andere kant. Het voordeel 
van deze laatstgenoemde categorie maatregelen is dat ze op een kortere termijn 
het gewenste effect kunnen hebben.
Het laatste hoofdstuk bevat de conclusie en aanbevelingen. Deze volgen 
logischerwijs op hetgeen in voorgaande hoofstukken is besproken. Het 
proefschrift eindigt op een kritische en sombere toon: de meest recente cijfers 
omtrent investeringen in de (hernieuwbare) energiesector wijzen uit dat er 
wereldwijd bij lange na niet genoeg geïnvesteerd wordt in de energiesector 
om in 2050 aan zowel de klimaatdoelstelling van het Parijs-akkoord te voldoen 
als ervoor te zorgen dat de wereldbevolking beschikt over een betrouwbare 
energievoorziening. Tevens lijkt economisch protectionisme de laatste jaren 
wereldwijd de kop op te steken waardoor het draagvlak voor maatregelen die 
moeten voorzien in de liberalisering van handel en investeringen afneemt. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY
The multilateral Energy Charter Treaty was concluded in the early 1990’s with 
the purpose of stimulating trade and investment in the energy sector between 
Western European countries and the countries of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. To that end, rules were established regarding trade, investment, 
and the transit of energy. This dissertation examines the role that the treaty can 
play in the current energy transition, by analyzing how it can contribute to the 
facilitation of investments in the renewable energy sector. The main emphasis 
in this dissertation is on the investment chapter, which is in practice frequently 
invoked by renewable energy investors.
By reference to economic theories and the business practice in the renewable 
energy sector, this dissertation comes up with various recommendations that 
could be considered in the recently initiated modernization process of the 
treaty. Since the investment chapter is analyzed against the wider background 
of international economic law, the recommendations conform to contemporary 
policy tendencies, as preferred by the Energy Charter Conference during the 
modernization process.
Amongst the recommendations is that rules regarding investment protection 
are of great importance in the renewable energy sector, as practice already 
demonstrates, but that these should be accompanied by rules concerning 
investment promotion. Ideally, these rules would be concluded in the context of 
a broader agreement that also regulates trade, in both goods and services, since 
investment and trade in the renewable energy sector are closely interrelated. 
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